Judgment The petitioner, who was hitherto the Vice-Chancellor of Sri Krishna Devaraya University, Anantapur, (henceforth referred to as `University') has been removed from the said office by the Chancellor through orders dated 1.8.2010. Consequent thereto the State Government has made incharge arrangement through their orders contained in G.O.Rt. No. 546, Higher Education (UE.I) Department, dated 1.8.2010, validity of both these orders is challenged in this writ petition. The writ petitioner submitted that she was appointed as the Vice- Chancellor of the University and assumed charge of the said office on 23.8.2008 and that she was discharging her duties with utmost devotion and that she was carrying on the functions in accordance with the spirit of the Universities Act and rules and regulations framed by the University and that she has been functioning quite transparently and openly. The Executive Council Meeting of the University was held on 17.12.2008 and at that meeting it was unanimously resolved to regularize the services of eight Assistant Professors who have been appointed earlier under X Plan Scheme and that though she wanted to record her dissent, she could not do so inasmuch as the Principal Secretary to the Government in the Higher Education Department and the Secretary to the Government in the Finance Department, both are ex-officio members of the said Executive Council and present at the meeting have approved of the proposed action of regularization of those teachers. It is further pointed out that the attempts made by the University to make recruitment to 14 posts of Assistant Professors in Group I and 15 posts of Assistant Professors in Group II had fallen through due to the intervention of this court, thus requiring re- notification of those very vacancies through separate notifications published on 4.2.2009 and 5.2.2009 respectively. It is further submitted that entertaining an allegation that the writ petitioner has committed certain irregularities, the State Government appointed a Two Men Committee under the Chairmanship of Professor K.C.Reddy to inquire into the allegations. It is submitted that Professor K.C.Reddy Committee has been apprised of all the facts and made available the necessary records and files for its perusal and it submitted its report holding that several of the allegations leveled against the writ petitioner are baseless. But, however, Prof. It is submitted that Professor K.C.Reddy Committee has been apprised of all the facts and made available the necessary records and files for its perusal and it submitted its report holding that several of the allegations leveled against the writ petitioner are baseless. But, however, Prof. K.C.Reddy Committee has recommended to appraise this court of its findings relating to the fixation of roaster points for recruitment of Assistant Professors, since WP No. 18681 of 2009 which was filed challenging the validity of the aforementioned two notifications, was pending. It is further pointed out that the said writ petition has been dismissed by this court on 22.1.2010, even before the University could take any action to bring to it's notice the findings of Professor K.D.Reddy Committee. It is further stated that the State Government through their letter dated 10.12.2009 directed the University to place the report of Prof. K.C.Reddy Committee before the Executive Council. Accordingly, steps are taken to place the report of Prof. K.C.Reddy Committee before the Executive Council Meeting scheduled for 16.12.2009. However, due to the concerted action of the members of the Executive Council, the meeting could not be held for want of quorum and consequently Prof.K.C.Reddy's Committee Report could not be placed at the said meeting. It is further asserted that several attempts were subsequently made for convening and holding the Executive Council Meeting, but, with little success. At this stage, the Chancellor of the University has appointed Justice A.Hanumanthu, a retired Judge of this Court as Enquiry Authority for conducting an enquiry against the writ petitioner for willful omission and refusal to carry out the provisions of the Universities Act, through a notification published by the State Government in their G.O. Ms. No. 17, Higher Education (UE-I) Department, dated 3.3.2010. It is further submitted that the Enquiry Authority had finalized and submitted its report on 31.7.2010 and after examining the findings of the report of the Enquiry Authority, the State Government observed that the writ petitioner has committed irregularities in appointments of Assistant Professors notified on 4.2.2009 and 5.2.2009 and issuing orders of appointment by willfully violating Section 19(5)(ii) of the A.P. Universities Act, 1991, and that the writ petitioner has violated the instructions issued by the Government through their letters dated 10.12.2009, 28.1.2010 and 19.2.2010 apart from committing financial and other irregularities. Based on the opinion tendered by the State Government, the Chancellor passed the impugned orders on 1st August 2010 removing the writ petitioner from the Office of the Vice-Chancellor of the University for her willful omission and refusal to carry out the provisions of the Universities Act, 1991. The State Government through their notification got published in G.O. Rt. No. 546, Higher Education (UE.I) Department, dated 1.8.2010, has made in-charge arrangements appointing the Vice-Chancellor of Yogi Vemana University, Kadapa as in-charge Vice-Chancellor of the respondent University with effect from 2.8.2010. Hence, the above writ petition has been instituted questioning the orders passed by the Chancellor in terms of Section 11 (2) of the A.P. Universities Act 1991 and the notification of the government contained in G.O. Rt. No. 546, Higher Education (UE.I) Department, dated 1.8.2010 making in-charge arrangements. I have heard Sri C.V.Mohan Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the learned counsel for the writ petitioner Sri M.Vidya Sagar and Sri A.Sudershan Reddy, learned Addl. Advocate General for the 1st respondent – State and Sri M.Ramalinga Reddy, learned Standing Counsel for the 2nd respondent University. Sri C.V.Mohan Reddy, learned Senior Counsel would contend that the State Legislature has enacted Andhra Pradesh Universities Act, 1991, Act 4 of 1991 (henceforth referred to as 'Universities Act'), with a view to democratize the functioning of the Universities in the State by drawing upon the rich experience of several persons in various fields and that the Universities Act is essentially intended to confer greater autonomy upon the Universities concerned and that Section 8 of the said Act, which empowers the State Government to have the right to cause an inspection of the University, its buildings, laboratories, libraries, museums, workshops and equipments and of any institutions maintained by or affiliated to the University and also cause an enquiry to be made, into the teaching and other work conducted with the University, has to be understood to be narrow in it's scope. Learned Senior Counsel would further submit that government in case seeks to conduct an inspection or enquiry, shall give notice to the University of its intention to cause such an inspection or enquiry and that the University will be entitled to represent thereat and in the instant case, no such procedure has been adopted or followed and that baseless allegations have been made the basis for inquiry contrary to the mandate contained in Section 8 and that as soon as Justice A.Hanumanthu Enquiry Authority submitted its report on 31.7.2010, the Chancellor has exercised the power available to him under sub-section (2) of Section 11 even without affording a fair and reasonable opportunity for the writ petitioner to defend herself against the proposed action. It is also submitted by the learned Senior Counsel that the copy of the report of the Enquiry Authority has not been made available to the writ petitioner to enable her to assess the correctness of the findings of the said authority. Learned Senior Counsel would submit that consistently courts have been reading the applicability of the principles of natural justice even if a statutory provision does not specifically require adherence thereto, provided the action is likely to effect the rights of any other individual and hence the learned Senior Counsel would submit that for sheer violation of principles of natural justice the impugned orders deserve to be set-at-naught. Sri A.Sudershan Reddy, learned Addl. Advocate General who took notice on behalf of the 1st respondent would submit that a fair opportunity has been accorded by the Enquiring Authority duly permitting the petitioner to examine witnesses on her behalf and based upon the findings contained in the report submitted by the Enquiring Authority, the State Government has tendered its opinion for the Chancellor to take appropriate action and accordingly the Chancellor has passed appropriate orders and since the writ petitioner had more than a fair opportunity to defend herself before the Enquiring Authority the contention that the follow up action has been taken in breach of principles of natural justice does not hold water. The learned Addl. The learned Addl. Advocate General would further submit that the differences between the writ petitioner - Vice-Chancellor of the University and the rest of the Executive Committee members are so deep and persisting, consequently the meetings of the Executive Council could not be held for one reason or the other including lack of quorum and that the writ petitioner has been found guilty of violating the provisions contained in sub-section (5) of Section 19 of the Universities Act and hence action taken by the Chancellor is undoubtedly in conformity with the provisions of the Universities Act warranting no interference. It is further submitted by the learned Addl. Advocate General that the atmosphere in the University has been vitiated and has reached such a stage where no teaching work worth the mention, was going on for the past over five months and all sections of the staff, both teaching and non-teaching and the students are adversely effected by the near chaotic conditions prevailing in the University's administration and that the writ petitioner has deliberately avoided making any references to the communications which she has received from the State Government on 10.12.2009, 28.1.2010 and 19.2.2010 and her failure to comply with the directives of the Government. Thus, for having violated the provisions of the Act, the impugned action of the Chancellor is sustainable. Before examining the rival contentions canvassed on either side, I consider it appropriate to peruse some of the important provisions of the Universities Act. Sub-Section (9) of Section 2 of the Universities Act defined the expression `Government' as meaning the State of Andhra Pradesh. Section 4 of the Universities Act ordained that on and from the date of commencement of the said Act (i) The Andhra University established under the Andhra University Act, 1925 (Act II of 1926). (ii) The Kakatiya University established under the Kakatiya University Act, 1976 (Act 44 of 1976). (iii) Sri Krishna Devaraya University established under the Sri Krishna Devaraya University Act, 1981 (Act 36 of 1981). (iv) The Nagarjuna University established under the Nagarjuna University Act, 1976 (Act 43 of 1976). (ii) The Kakatiya University established under the Kakatiya University Act, 1976 (Act 44 of 1976). (iii) Sri Krishna Devaraya University established under the Sri Krishna Devaraya University Act, 1981 (Act 36 of 1981). (iv) The Nagarjuna University established under the Nagarjuna University Act, 1976 (Act 43 of 1976). (v) The Osmania University established under the Osmania University Act, 1959, (Act 9 of 1959) and, (vi) Sri Venkateswara University established under Sri Venkateswara University Act, 1954 (Act XIV of 1954), shall be deemed to have been established and incorporated under this Act and they were declared as such to be Universities by the aforesaid names. Thus, the respondent - University is one such University which is deemed to have been established and incorporated under the Universities Act. Powers, functions and objects of the Universities have been dealt with in great detail in Section 5 of the Universities Act. Section 8 dealt with power of inspection and inquiry by the government and the follow up action to be taken by the University. Section 9 defined who would constitute the officers of the University. The Chancellor, the Vice-Chancellor, the Rector, the Principals/Dean of the University Colleges, the Registrar, The Finance Officer and such other persons as the Statutes may declare to be officers of the University would constitute the officers. Section 10 declares that the Governor of Andhra Pradesh shall be the Chancellor of every University established or deemed to have been established under the Universities Act. Section 11 dealt with the method and manner of appointment and removal of the Vice-Chancellor. Since Sections 10 and 11 will have a bearing upon the controversy at issue, it will be appropriate to notice the said provisions in detail. They read as under: "10 Chancellor :- The Governor of the Andhra Pradesh shall be the Chancellor of every University established or deemed to have been established under this Act. He shall by virtue of his office, be the Head of the University and shall, when present, preside at convocations of the University. He shall exercise such other powers and perform such other duties as may be conferred on or vested in him by or under the provisions of this Act. He shall by virtue of his office, be the Head of the University and shall, when present, preside at convocations of the University. He shall exercise such other powers and perform such other duties as may be conferred on or vested in him by or under the provisions of this Act. The Chancellor may, by order in writing annul any proceeding of the University, which is not in conformity with this Act, the Statutes or the Ordinances: Provided that before making any such order he shall give a notice calling upon the University to show cause why such an order should not be made and if any cause is shown within the time specified therefor in the said notice, shall consider the same. 11 Vice-Chancellor :- (1) The Government shall constitute a Search Committee consisting of: (i) a nominee of the Executive Council; (ii) a nominee of the University Grants Commission; and (iii) a nominee of the State Government. The Search Committee shall submit a panel of three persons to the Government in alphabetical order from among whom the State Government shall recommend one person to the Chancellor for appointment as Vice-Chancellor and the Chancellor shall appoint such person as Vice-Chancellor: Provided that it shall be competent for the Government to call for a fresh panel if they consider necessary and the Search Committee shall submit a fresh panel to the Government. (2) The Vice-Chancellor shall not be removed from his office except by an order of the Chancellor passed on the ground of wilful omission or refusal to carry out the provisions of this Act, or abuse of the powers vested in him and after due enquiry ordered by the Government, by the Lokayukta or by such person who is or has been a Judge of a High Court or the Supreme Court as may be appointed by the Chancellor in which the Vice-Chancellor shall have an opportunity of making his representation against such removal: Provided that where the enquiry is conducted by a person who is or has been a Judge of High Court or the Supreme Court the report of such an enquiry shall be forwarded to the Government and the Chancellor shall act in accordance with the advice tendered by the Government on a consideration of the report while exercising his powers under this sub-section; Provided further that where the Lokayukta enquires into an allegation against the Vice-Chancellor under the Andhra Pradesh Lokayukta and Upa-Lokayukta Act, 1983, then, notwithstanding anything contained in Section 12 of that Act, the Lokayukta shall submit the report to the Government and the Chancellor shall act in accordance with the advice tendered by the Government on a consideration of the report while exercising his powers under this sub-section. (Emphasis is mine) Sub-section (1) of Section 12 which dealt with the term of office of the Vice- Chancellor made it clear that subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 11, the Vice-Chancellor shall hold the office for a term of three years from the date of his appointment. Sub-section (2) thereof made it clear that the Vice Chancellor shall be paid such pay and allowances from time to time and shall also be provided with a furnished accommodation subject to payment of 10% of salary towards rent. Subsection (3) of Section 12 conferred power on the State Government to appoint a person to be In-charge Vice-Chancellor where the Vice-Chancellor is unable to exercise his powers or perform his functions or discharge his duties owing to absence, illness or any other cause. Section 13 specified the powers and functions of the Vice-Chancellor. Section 17 has defined various authorities of the University. The Executive Council is one of the authorities so specified. Section 13 specified the powers and functions of the Vice-Chancellor. Section 17 has defined various authorities of the University. The Executive Council is one of the authorities so specified. Section 18 dealt with the composition of the Executive Council and the manner of its constitution. Sub-section (3) of Section 18 reads as under: "18(3) - The Executive Council shall meet atleast once in three months and may meet often if necessary." Section 19 laid out the powers and duties of the Executive Council. Sub-section (3) and Sub-section (5) thereof, since will have some impact upon the controversy, it would be appropriate to quote them. They read as under: "19(3) to enter into, vary, carry out and cancel contracts on behalf of the University in the exercise of performance of the powers and duties assigned to it by this Act and the Statutes; "19(5) - subject to such Statutes as may be prescribed in this behalf:- (i) to appoint the teachers of the University below the rank of lecturers; (ii) to appoint the teachers of the University and above the rank of lecturers on the recommendations of the Section Committee constituted for the purpose : Provided that the Executive Council may invite any person of high academic distinction and professional attainments to accept post of Professor in the University and appoint him to that post : Provided further that if the Board of Management rejects the selections made by the Selection Committee, the matter shall be referred by the University to the State Government whose decision thereon shall be final : (iii) to fix emoluments of the teachers of the University and define their duties and conditions of service; Thus, the multimember body, called the Executive Council has been conferred the power to enter into any contracts on behalf of the University and it is the Executive Council, which has got the power to appoint various teachers. The Vice Chancellor is one of the members of the Executive Council. He shall act as it's Chairman. But, he was not granted any powers by Section 13, to make any appointments of teachers in the service of the University. On the contrary, Sub-section (3) read with Sub-section (5) of Section 19 conferred such powers only on the Executive Council. The Vice Chancellor is one of the members of the Executive Council. He shall act as it's Chairman. But, he was not granted any powers by Section 13, to make any appointments of teachers in the service of the University. On the contrary, Sub-section (3) read with Sub-section (5) of Section 19 conferred such powers only on the Executive Council. Therefore, there appears to be some justification, as at present advised, in the criticism that the petitioner has violated these mandatory provisions, warranting action to be initiated against her in terms of Section 11 of the Universities Act. The all important question that engages the attention in this regard is whether the Vice Chancellor is entitled to an opportunity of making a representation against removal from office or not ? Sub-section (1) of Section 11 of the Universities Act, rendered it abundantly clear that it is the Chancellor, who has the power to appoint the Vice Chancellor. Consequently, he acquires the power for removing the Vice Chancellor from the said office as well. Further, Section 10 of the Universities Act, conferred power on the Chancellor to annul any proceeding of the University, which is not in conformity with the Provisions of the said Act or the Statutes or Ordinances made thereunder. However, the Proviso to Section 10 of the Universities Act, made it amply clear that before making any such order, the Chancellor was required to give a notice, calling upon the University to show cause why such an order should not be annulled. When we contrast the contents of Section 10 to that of the contents of Sub-section (2) of Section 11, strikingly, a similar provision relating to the pre-decisional hearing, has been omitted by the Statute maker in Sub-section (2) of Section 11. But however, a proper analysis of the contents of Sub-section (2) of Section 11, does not appear to have excluded totally or completely the applicability of the principles of natural justice in the matter of removal of Vice Chancellor from the office. The last limb of Sub-section (2) of Section 11, holds the key to unravel the scheme in this regard. The expression, ".................... The last limb of Sub-section (2) of Section 11, holds the key to unravel the scheme in this regard. The expression, ".................... the Vice Chancellor shall have an opportunity of making his representation against such removal", to my mind, makes it clear that the applicability of principles of natural justice have not been excluded from the scheme and on the other hand, an opportunity of making a representation against removal is very much contemplated by the Statute. The contention of the learned Additional Advocate General that this part of the Provision contained in Sub-section (2) must be read with the immediately preceding words, namely, ".................. by such a person, who is or has been a Judge of the High Court of the Supreme Court, as the case may be, appointed by the Chancellor, does not merit acceptance. Let us assume that the Chancellor had considered it appropriate to get any allegation made against the Vice Chancellor to be investigated or enquired into by a person, who is or has been a Judge of the High Court or the Supreme Court, at that stage, the question of removal of the Vice Chancellor from the said office is out of his contemplation. The Chancellor would have certain material before him making out only a prima facie case, warranting an enquiry by such a person, who is or has been a Judge of the High Court or the Supreme Court. Such an Enquiring Authority would have a limited brief, namely, to return a finding as to the correctness or otherwise of the allegations thrown against the Vice Chancellor in office. Such a person is not the appointing authority to order for removal of the Vice Chancellor. Therefore, he will not be concerned about the consequences that might flow from his findings. Since, his assignment would be to gather all the relevant facts and material, he would be complying with the principles of natural justice in the process of collection of such material by providing every opportunity, fair and reasonable in content and context, to the person against whom allegations are being investigated. It is the ultimate findings of such an investigation, which form a platform or basis for the follow up action of removal of the Vice Chancellor from office. Till such time, the very notion of removal of the Vice Chancellor is out or reckoning. It is the ultimate findings of such an investigation, which form a platform or basis for the follow up action of removal of the Vice Chancellor from office. Till such time, the very notion of removal of the Vice Chancellor is out or reckoning. Therefore, it should be construed that the Statute has intended to provide for an opportunity to the Vice Chancellor to make a representation against removal from office as and when the same is contemplated. Otherwise, the last portion of Sub-section (2) does not have any meaningful effect. It is well to remember the legal principle that no part of a Statute, Provision or words employed therein, should be construed as redundant or unnecessary. Every part of a Statute, Provision and every word or expression contained therein, must be construed as the end product of a great deliberation before the same has transformed itself into a Statute. They are intended to serve a purpose. Therefore, I concede, in principle, that an opportunity to make a representation against removal, is required to be provided to the Vice Chancellor and hence, I reject the contention of the learned Additional Advocate General in this regard. It can also be looked at from a different perspective. If the Chancellor is required to annul any of the proceedings of the University the proviso to Section 10 makes it obligatory upon him to provide an opportunity to the University. But, when he seeks to take a far drastic action of ordering for the removal of the Vice Chancellor, it would be incomprehensible to visualize of an omission of such an opportunity. Hence, I hold that the Vice Chancellor is entitled to have an opportunity to submit a representation against his / her intended removal. The evolution of the principles of natural justice and their applicability deserves to be traced here. Byles, J., in COOPER v. THE BORAD OF WORKS FOR WANDSWORTH DISTRICT ((1863) 14 CBNS 180), said long go about the primordial character of the opportunity to be heard before punishment: "The laws of God and man both give the party an opportunity to make his defence, if he has any. I remember to have heard it observed by a very learned man, upon such an occasion, that even God himself did not pass sentence upon Adam before he was called upon to make his defence 'Adam' (says God) 'where art thou? I remember to have heard it observed by a very learned man, upon such an occasion, that even God himself did not pass sentence upon Adam before he was called upon to make his defence 'Adam' (says God) 'where art thou? Hast thou not eaten of the three whereof I commanded thee that thou should not eat". One of the illustrious Jurists of this country, Justice Mahomood of Allahabad High Court in QUEEN EMPRESS v. POHPI ((1891) ILR 13 ALL 171), has described the said principle as one of universal jurisprudence. The question whether the adjudicating authority is bound to followthe principles of natural justice, before he concludes the proceedings, has beensettled long years ago by Byles, J., in COOPER's case (cited 1 supra), whereinit is observed as under: " (A) long course of decision, beginning with Dr Bently case and ending with some very recent cases, establish that although there are no positive words in the statute requiring that the party shall be heard, yet the justice of the common law will supply the omission of the legislature." The above principle is accepted in India and it is now well settled that where exercise of a power results in civil consequences, unless the Statute specifically rules out, the principles of natural justice would necessarily apply. In STATE OF ORISSA v. DR. BINAPANI ( AIR 1967 SC 1269 ), the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the question of applicability of principles of natural justice in the absence of a specific requirement in that respect and held as under: "(12) ................. It is true that the order is administrative in character, but even an administrative order which involves civil consequences, as already stated, must be made consistently with the rules of natural justice after informing the first respondent of the case of the State, the evidence in support thereof and after giving an opportunity to the first respondent of being heard and meeting or explaining the evidence.............." And further, the Supreme Court in A.K.KRAIPAK v. UNION OF INDIA ( AIR 1970 SC 150 ), has said this: "The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words they do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it." At the same time, the applicability of principles of natural justice should not be overstretched beyond the limits of elasticity so as to be counterproductive to the ends of justice. The words of Lord Reid in WISEMAN v. BORNEMAN ((1971) AC 297), offer valuable guidance in this regard and they are to the following effect: " Natural justice should not degenerate into a set of hard and fast rules. There should be a circumstantial flexibility. ........................There must be a balance between the need for expedition and the need to give full opportunity to the defendant to see material against him." In MANEKA GANDHI v. UNION OF INDIA ( (1978) 1 SCC 248 ), the Supreme Court has accepted the doctrine of post-decisional hearing in exceptional cases. It will also be apt at this stage to notice the principles enunciated by Sarkari, J, in SWADESHI COTTON MILLS v. UNION OF INDIA ( AIR 1981 SC 818 ) at page 831, in the following words: "Where the civil consequences of the administrative action are grave and its effect is highly prejudicial to the rights and interests of the person affected and there is nothing in the language and the scheme of the statute which unequivocally excludes a fair pre-decisional hearing and the post-decisional hearing provided therein is not a real remedial hearing equitable to a full right of appeal, the court should be loathe to infer a legislative intent to exclude even a minimal fair hearing at the pre-decisional state merely on the ground of urgency." And thereafter in SHIV SAGAR TIWARI v. UNION OF INDIA ( (1997) 1 SCC 444 ), this is what has been stated by the Supreme Court in paragraphs 48 and 49: "(48) MAY it also be stated that it is well settled that requirements of natural justice can be moulded in such a way as to take care of two basic facets of this principle: (1 to make known the nature of accusation; and (2 to give opportunity to state the case, as accepted by this court in Him Nath Mishra v. Principal, Rajendra Medical College,. In Subhas Chandra case it has been even held that no hearing is required to be given to the candidates before canceling the examination where mass-copying was indulged, if a case for the same was otherwise made out. Present is also a case of large- scale out-of-turn allotments, and so, on principle no hearing at all might have been given. But we did not go to that extent and gave even personal hearing to many among those who chose to appear pursuant to the notice published in the newspaper, which alone was feasible. All the allottees liable to be adversely affected being in Delhi and being well educated, newspaper publication was definitely sufficient to enable them to know what they must have been informed. Indeed, the employees concerned were knowing much aliunde also. (49). Natural justice is after all "no unruly horse, no lurking land mine" as characteristically stated by Krishna Iyer, J. in Chairman, Board of Mining Examination and Chief inspector of Mines v. Ramjee. Its unnatural expansion without reference to these realities can be "exasperating" as observed by the learned Judge. It is also worthwhile to remember, as stated in para 24 of S. L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan,that where on admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion is possible, the court may not compel the observance of natural justice, as it would be futile to do so. The real point for determination for us has been whether the incumbent got the allotment as per his turn or he jumped the queue, on the face of our rejection to depart from the existing policy requiring eviction of those also included in Categories VI and X. This we got examined well and have felt satisfied at the work undertaken by the Committee in this regard." In view of the above well settled principles, hence, a balance has got to be struck between the need for expedition and the need to give a full opportunity to the incumbent to meet the material collected against her. The learned Additional Advocate General has pointed out that the Executive Council meetings of the University could not be held notwithstanding the compulsion enshrined in Sub-section (3) of Section 18 of the Universities Act, requiring such a meeting, at least, once in three months. The learned Additional Advocate General has pointed out that the Executive Council meetings of the University could not be held notwithstanding the compulsion enshrined in Sub-section (3) of Section 18 of the Universities Act, requiring such a meeting, at least, once in three months. The Vice Chancellor of the University has the onerous task of convening and gathering the collective wisdom of the multi-member Executive Council and carry on the functions of the University as per the directions provided by the Executive Council. If the meetings of the Executive Council, which are required to meet at least once in three months could not be held for want of quorum, it only reflects the sorry state of affairs prevailing in the University. Coupled with this, when I reckon the submission of the learned Additional Advocate General that no teaching work worth the mention was undertaken for the past five months in the University and that the entire administration of the University has been run in an atmosphere of apprehensions, the situation, undoubtedly, calls for urgent measures to be put in place, essentially, for restoring the tranquil position conducive of an institution of higher learning. I, therefore, consider this case to be an exceptional case warranting for a departure from the pre-decisional hearing requirement of the principles of natural justice. The decision announced by the Chancellor on 01-08-2010, therefore, must be treated and construed as a provisional conclusion. The writ petitioner shall be provided with an opportunity of making a representation against the proposed action of removal from office. The writ petitioner is entitled to be supplied with a copy of the report dated 31-07-2010, submitted by the Enquiry Authority appointed by the Chancellor. From the date of supply of such a report, the writ petitioner shall be provided thirty days time to make her representation in the matter, which will be taken into account and consideration and an appropriate final decision, in accordance with law, could be taken by the Chancellor, thereafter. I must also necessarily answer as to what would be the status in the interregnum period of the writ petitioner. The office of the Vice Chancellor occupies a very preeminent position amongst the academic circles. It is an office of great distinction, which is conferred upon few individuals noted for their scholarship and hence, it will be indecorous to keep such an individual under suspension. The office of the Vice Chancellor occupies a very preeminent position amongst the academic circles. It is an office of great distinction, which is conferred upon few individuals noted for their scholarship and hence, it will be indecorous to keep such an individual under suspension. Therefore, advisedly, the Statute never contemplated the Vice Chancellor to be kept under suspension. But, depending upon the circumstances, the appointing authority, namely, the Chancellor, can always require the Vice Chancellor to stay away from performing the duties attached to the said office. Such an action would be akin to "putting off a servant from his duties". Wherever there is no provision for placing an officer or an employee under suspension, the very contract of employment implies the prerogative or right of the employer to put him off duty. But, in such circumstances, the officer or the employee would be entitled to all remuneration and other perquisites that go along with the office (see Management, Hotel Imperial, New Delhi- AIR 1959 SC 1342 ). Therefore, the writ petitioner shall be treated to have been put off the duty as Vice Chancellor and all amenities and facilities including remuneration and a furnished accommodation, which are attached to the office of the Vice Chancellor of the respondent University shall be deemed and treated to have been kept intact till such time a final decision in the matter is taken. I may also add that Sub-section (3) of Section 19 of the Universities Act has visualized such a contingent situation and provided for in-charge arrangements to be made, till such time the incumbent Vice Chancellor can resume the functions of the said office. I, therefore, conclude that the impugned order passed by the Chancellor on 01-08-2010, shall be treated as provisional in its scope and content and the writ petitioner shall be afforded a copy of the report dated 31- 07-2010, submitted by the Enquiring Authority, appointed by the Chancellor and thereafter, she shall be provided thirty days time to make her representation against the proposed action of removal from office of the Vice Chancellor and in the interregnum, all benefits and perquisites and facilities attached to the office of the Vice Chancellor shall be restored. But, at the same time, the writ petitioner shall not discharge the functions of the office of the Vice Chancellor, in any manner, as the writ petitioner shall be treated to have been put off such duties. In the view taken by me, the action of the State Government in making in-charge arrangements in exercise of the power available to it under Section 19(3) of the Universities Act, cannot be faulted. The writ petition stands disposed of with the above directions. It is needless to observe that all other contentions canvassed by the writ petitioner, which have not been specifically adverted to and dealt with in this judgment shall be treated as to have been preserved. Respective parties would bear their costs.