JUDGMENT H. Baruah, J. 1. The unsuccessful writ Petitioners in W.P.(C) No. 2519 of 2004 are before us by way of appeal whereby and whereunder they have challenged the legality and correctness of the judgment and order dated 13.04.2007 passed by the Hon'ble Single Judge of this Court in the writ petition as indicated above. 2. The Appellants as writ Petitioners in W.P.(C) No. 2519 of 2004 on facts prayed for two reliefs; primarily, restoration of possession of land measuring 1 bigha 4 kathas 16 lechas following adoption of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 by the State of Assam and interference with the allotment of 4 kathas of land out of the area indicated above to the Respondent No. 6, the Guwahati Metropolitan Development Authority (for short GMDA) by order dated 27.11.2003. 3. The learned Single Judge having gone into the facts and the materials before him refused to provide relief(s) as indicated above and dismissed the writ petition by the judgment and order dated 13.4.2007 impugned in this appeal. 4. The Parliament with an object to provide for the imposition of a ceiling on vacant land in urban agglomerations, for the acquisition of such land in excess of the ceiling limit, to regulate the construction of the buildings on such land and for the matters connected therewith, with a view to preventing the concentration of urban land in the hands of a few persons and speculation and profiteering therein and with a view to bringing about an equitable distribution of the land in urban agglomerations to sub-serve the common good, in exercise of power under Clause (1) of Article252 of the Constitution of India enacted the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, hereinafter called as the Act, 1976. The State of Assam with the intended object also adopted the Act, 1976 under Clause 2 of Article 252 of the Constitution in the year 1976 by a resolution in the Assam Legislative Assembly On adoption of the Act, 1976, the Government of Assam started acquisition of the vacant land in excess of ceiling limit from the owners, the predecessor-in-interest of the Appellants was one of them. The facts set out in the writ petition necessary for the purpose of disposal of this appeal may be provided as under: The Appellants are the legal heirs of Late Bhabadeb Sarma, who died on 3.10.1997. The facts set out in the writ petition necessary for the purpose of disposal of this appeal may be provided as under: The Appellants are the legal heirs of Late Bhabadeb Sarma, who died on 3.10.1997. Appellants' father Late Bhabadeb Sarma was the owner of a plot of land measuring 73.26 Are (5Bs 2Ks 7Ls) covered by K.P. Patta No. 493 (old)/594 (new) in Dag No. 1008 (old) of Sahar Ulubari, 2nd part under Mouza Ulubari, Guwahati. During his life time Late Bhabadeb Sarma sold most of the land retaining ownership and possession of 1 bigha 4 katha 16 lechas. On adoption of the Act, 1976 by the State of Assam, Late Bhabadeb Sarma submitted return under the provisions of Section 7 of the Act, 1976. A draft statement under Section 8(3) of the Act, 1976 was prepared and served on Late Bhabadeb Sarma on 18.05.1982. On due consideration of the objections filed against the said draft statement by Late Bhabadeb Sarma on 3.9.82, the competent authority, under the Act, 1976, prepared and published the final statement under Section 9 of the Act. In the draft as well as final statement prepared under the provision of the Act as indicated above, a total area of 7981.48 Sq. mtrs. of land was identified as vacant land required to be surrendered/delivered possession by the owner. On 16.05.1984 a notification was published in the Official Gazette under Section 10(1) of the Act, 1976 indicating particulars of the vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit and calling persons interested to file their claims in the said vacant land. In the schedule of the notification dated 16.5.1984, the total area of the land has been shown as 7981.18 Sq. mtrs. Subsequently a notification dated 1.1.1987 was published in the Official Gazette under Section 10(3) of the Act. Appellants further contended that Late Bhabadeb Sarma, the predecessor-in-interest continued to pay the land revenue in respect of the aforesaid land up to the year 1991 whereafter such land revenue was refused to be accepted by the concerned authority. The name of Late Bhabadeb Sarma was deleted as recorded pattader in respect of Patta No. 594 and such deletion was made on the basis of the order passed in the land ceiling proceeding in respect of the land owned by Late Bhabadeb Sarma. 5. The name of Late Bhabadeb Sarma was deleted as recorded pattader in respect of Patta No. 594 and such deletion was made on the basis of the order passed in the land ceiling proceeding in respect of the land owned by Late Bhabadeb Sarma. 5. At this stage, it would be pertinent to refer to Section 4 of the Act, 1976 whereunder ceiling limit is provided. In Clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d) specific ceiling limit in respect of urban agglomeration has been indicated against each category in Schedule-I. According to the Appellants, Guwahati falls within the category of 'D' of the Schedule-I where ceiling limit is provided as 2000 Sq. mtrs. That means an owner of land in an urban agglomeration falling within category-D specified in Schedule-I can only retain 2000 Sq. mtrs. of vacant land, the excess thereto are liable to be acquired under the provisions of the Act, 1976. Even after publication of the notification in the Official Gazette under Section 10(3) of the Act, Late Bhabadeb Sarma continued to remain m possession of the land declared as ceiling surplus until his death on 03.09.1997 and after him the Appellants herein. It is also the pleaded case of the Appellants that after the death of their father they being in the continued possession of the land inducted one Sanatan Baishya as caretaker. The Appellants being in possession of the land (ceiling surplus) obtained electricity connection in respect of the premises standing thereon and also installed a public call office after obtaining permission from the postal department. They also obtained permission from Gauhati Municipal Corporation Authorities for running a restaurant/tea stall in said premises by Sanatan Baishya. The electricity connection to the premises on the land, the installation of P.C.O. and permission to run a restaurant in the premises by Sanatan Baishya, according to the Appellants give indication of their possession in the land even after finalization of the ceiling proceeding. The Act, 1976 was repealed by the Parliament by the Repealing Act of 1999 with effect from 22.03.1999. The Repealing Act was adopted by the State of Assam on 06.08.2003 by a resolution under Clause-2 of Article 252 of the Constitution in the Assam Legislative Assembly and the Gazette notification in this regard was published on 5.12.2003. The Act, 1976 was repealed by the Parliament by the Repealing Act of 1999 with effect from 22.03.1999. The Repealing Act was adopted by the State of Assam on 06.08.2003 by a resolution under Clause-2 of Article 252 of the Constitution in the Assam Legislative Assembly and the Gazette notification in this regard was published on 5.12.2003. It is the case of the Appellant that the Repealing Act, 1999 did not affect the vesting of any vacant land under Section 10(3) of the Principal Act if the possession of such land had been taken over by the State or any other person duly authorized by the State Government. Under Section 3(2) of the Repealing Act, 1999 though any land may have vested in the State Government under Section 10(3) of the Act, if the possession of such land had not been taken over by the State or any persons duly authorized by the State Government such land is to be restored to the owner subject to return of compensation that may have been received by such owner. Appellants contended in categorical terms that possession of 1B 4Ks 16Ls of land out of the total land covered by the land ceiling proceeding continued to remain with their predecessor-in-interest and after his death, with the Petitioners notwithstanding the finalization of the ceiling proceeding. Appellants also contended that under Section 10(5) of the Act, 1976 a person in possession of the ceiling surplus land is entitled to receive a notice to deliver or surrender possession to the State and in the event of such possession not delivered, recourse is available under Section 10(6) of the Act and with the aid of the provision possession can be taken over. At no point of time neither the predecessor-in-interest Late Bhabadeb Sarma nor the Appellants after his death nor the caretaker of the land (1B 4Ks 16Ls) did receive any notice under Section 10(5) of the Act directing to handover rather deliver or surrender the vacant possession of the land in question. This being the position, it is contended by the Appellants that they continued in possession and remained there at till the date of their eviction on 25.12.2003 taking recourse to Rule 18(2) of the Rules under Assam Land and Revenue Regulation and by virtue of the Repealing Act 1999 they are entitled to get back the ownership of the land in question. Further the Appellants also contended that no compensation for the land under the provisions of the Act had been paid by the State either to their predecessor Late Bhabadeb Sarma or to them. 6. Allotment of 4 kathas of land out of land measuring 1B 4Ks 10Ls under their alleged possession was allotted in favour of the Respondent No. 6 by order dated 27.11.2003. Such allotment, in absence of notice under Section 10(5) of the Act, is also challenged together with the eviction proceeding initiated by eviction notice issued under Rule 18(2) of the settlement Rules. 7. The case of the Appellants has been denied and disputed by the Respondents herein by filing their affidavits. All the Respondents appear to have taken almost similar objections in their counter affidavit. The Respondents have denied and disputed that the possession of the surplus land determined by the ceiling-proceeding against Late Bhabadeb Sarma was not acquired by the State. In this connection the Respondents have contended that the possession of the land was unilaterally taken over by the revenue authority on 7.12.1991 since the land owner, the predecessor-in-interest of the Appellants failed to deliver or surrender possession of the land under the Act. According to the Respondents, after the notification dated 16.5.1984 issued under Section 10(1) of the Act was published in the Official Gazette, the predecessor-in-interest of the Appellants Late Bhabadeb Sarma had sold some parts of the land on 12.11.1984. After publication of the notification under Section 10(3) of the Act, the possession of the land was taken over in the manner indicated above and allotment of the part of the land was made in favour of certain persons but when the allottees had gone to take possession of their respective land so allotted, the persons who had purchased the land from Late Bhabadeb Sarma raised a dispute which entailed a writ proceeding registered and numbered as Civil Rule No. 2568 of 1992, wherein Late Bhabadeb Sarma, the predecessor-in-interest of the Appellants was arrayed as proforma Respondent. The aforesaid Civil Rule was disposed by this Court on 21.5.2002 holding that the transfers made by Late Bhabadeb Sarma after publication of notification dated 16.05.1984 under Section 10(1) of the Act are void and contrary of the provisions of the Act. The aforesaid Civil Rule was disposed by this Court on 21.5.2002 holding that the transfers made by Late Bhabadeb Sarma after publication of notification dated 16.05.1984 under Section 10(1) of the Act are void and contrary of the provisions of the Act. This Court further held that as the land had already vested in the State upon publication of the notification dated 1.1.1987 under Section 10(3) of the Act, the purchases cannot be held to have acquired any right whatsoever in the lands. This Court thus holding the allotments made to the allottees from the ceiling surplus land in question dismissed the Civil Rule. The Respondents also by their counter brought on record an order dated 8.8.2003 of the Apex Court dismissing the Special Leave Petition against the order dated 21.05.2002 affirmed by a division bench of this Court in Writ Appeal No. 419 of 2002 by order dated 20.12.2002. It was also contended in the counters by the Respondents that at no point of time in course of the proceeding in Civil Rule No. 2568 of 1992, the question of possession was raised by the predecessor-in-interest of the Appellants. In absence of such plea/contention, this Court by order dated 21.5.2002 arrived at a categorical finding that after publication of the notification under Section 10(1) of the Act, the predecessor-in-interest of the Appellants had not filed any claim in the land in question. The Respondents, therefore, claimed that the issues now sought to be raised has been settled by this Court vide judgment and order dated 21.05.2002. The land measuring 1Bs 4Ks 16Ls being a part of the ceiling surplus land, when the judgment and order dated 21.5.2002 goes in favour of the allottees, such allied possession of the Appellants cannot subsist in law. In this circumstances the Respondents contended that the allotment of the land measuring 4 kathas to Respondent No. 6 for building its office complex though made belatedly will not affect the validity of the same. It is also claimed by the Respondents that claimed possession of their lands through their caretaker, Sanatan Baishya being absolutely unauthorized, the Appellants cannot reap any fruit from such possession. 8. It is also claimed by the Respondents that claimed possession of their lands through their caretaker, Sanatan Baishya being absolutely unauthorized, the Appellants cannot reap any fruit from such possession. 8. The averments of the Respondents made in their respective counter affidavit have been confronted by the Appellants by filing reply wherein it is contended that the issues involved in the Civil Rule No. 2568 of 1992 are quite distinct and different from the issues involved in this writ petition and the writ appeal as well. Civil Rule No. 2568 of 1992 was filed by the purchasers of the land, purchased from Late Bhabadeb Sarma, the predecessor-in-interest of the Appellants challenging the allotment made to the Respondents therein and therefore, the decision of the Civil Rule would not however affect or prejudice the issues involved in the writ petitions as well as appeal. It is contended in the reply affidavit that even after publication of notification under Section 10(3) of the Act Late Bhabadeb Sarma, the father of the Appellants and after his death the Appellants themselves continued to remain in possession at least in the land measuring 1Bs 4Ks 16Ls, a parcel of the ceiling excess acquired vide notification under Section 10(1) of the Act. Unless the possession of the land (ceiling surplus) is taken over under the provisions of Sections 10(5) of the Act by issuing a notice directing the owner to surrender or deliver the possession of the land, the possession of the land can never be with the Government. If after issue of notice under Section 10(5) of the Act, the owner refuses to surrender or deliver possession of the land in question, the provisions of Section 10(6) of the Act would come into play and the Government can act accordingly else not. When no notice under Section 10(5) of the Act was issued either to Late Bhabadeb Sarma and on his death to the Appellants directing him or them to surrender or deliver possession, the possession of the land remained with the owner and for that by operation of the provisions of Section 3(2) despite vesting of the land in the State Government under Sub-Section 3 of Section 10 of the Principal Act, the land requires restoration to the person concerned after refund of the amount if paid by the State Government in the meantime. It is further contended, the land deemed to have been vested in the State Government under Sub-Section 3 of Section 10 of the Principal Act would not operate as an estoppel in the restoration of the land to the person concerned if possession of the land has not been taken over by the State Government under Section 10(5) of the Act. Appellants contended in their reply affidavit that the alleged unilateral taking over possession would be invalid for non-compliance of the provisions of Section 10(5) of the Act. They have also contended that such unilateral possession was also not taken over by any person duly authorized by the State Government. When any vacant land is vested in the Government under Section 10(3) of the Act, the competent authority is required to issue a notice in writing to the person concerned to surrender or deliver possession of the vacant land to the State Government or to any person authorized by the State Government within 30 days of the service of notice, in other words, the owner of the vacant land vested in the State Government is required to deliver or surrender possession of the land within 30 days of the service of notice. This provision being not resorted to by the State Government or its competent authority, the owner of the vacant land would be entitled to restoration of possession of the land subject to refund of the amount if already paid. 9. If the owner even after a receipt of the notice failed to comply with an order made under Sub-Section 5 of Section 10 of the Act, the authority may take possession of the vacant land by use of force as may be necessary. This provision is provided under Sub-Section 6 of Section 10 of the Act. The Appellants therefore, for non-compliance of this mandatory provision of Section 10(5) of the Act, contended that unilateral possession of the Respondents in respect of the vacant land would be illegal and inoperative in law. Subsequent eviction of the Appellants from the land in question by resorting to eviction proceeding as provided under Rule 18(2) of the Rules under Assam Land and Revenue Regulation would not come in aid rather rescue of the Respondents. In the facts situation under the Repealing Act, the Appellants are entitled to restoration of the possession of the vacant land measuring 1Bs 4Ks 16Ls. 10. In the facts situation under the Repealing Act, the Appellants are entitled to restoration of the possession of the vacant land measuring 1Bs 4Ks 16Ls. 10. The Respondents before the learned Single Judge raised an issue of maintainability of the writ petition in view of the decision in Civil Rule No. 2568 of 1992 which attained finality after the passing of the order dated 8.8.2003 by the Apex Court in SLP (civil) No. 5059 of 2003. It was contended before the learned Single Judge that after publication of the notification in the Official Gazette under Section 10(1) of the Act on 16.5.1984 in respect of the ceiling surplus land owned by Late Bhabadeb Sarma, he in the year 1984 executed sale deeds transferring different areas of the ceiling surplus land to six different persons and after publication of notice under Section 10(3) of the Act, the State Government after taking unilateral possession of the land on 7.12.1991 allotted some parcels of land to different allottees namely Respondent No. 4 to 9 and on account of such allotment the purchasers being aggrieved brought this Civil Rule No. 2568 of 1992 which attained finality after the order passed by the Apex Court on 8.8.2003. It was contended that by virtue of notification under Section 10(1) of the Act the State Government acquired land measuring 7981.48 Sq. mtrs. being the ceiling surplus land which subsequently vested in the State Government absolutely by dint of notification under Section 10(3) of the Act. It was also contended that the sale deeds executed by Late Bhabadeb Sarma in favour of six persons in the year 1984 were after acquisition of the land by the State Government and therefore, such sale is void and inoperative. When by notification under Section 10(1) of the Act, the vacant land (ceiling surplus) had been acquired and vested per notification under Section 10(3) of the Act in the State Government absolutely, possession in respect of a part thereof by Late Bhabadeb Sarma and after his death by the Appellants cannot sustain in view of judgment of tills Court in Civil Rule 2568 of 1992 and affirmed by division bench of this Court and ultimately by the Apex Court. Therefore, allotment of the land to the allottees by the Government was proper and legal. Therefore, allotment of the land to the allottees by the Government was proper and legal. It was also contended that vesting of the ceiling surplus land under the provision of Section 10(3) of the Act was in respect of the entire ceiling surplus land owned by Late Bhabadeb Sarma. The Respondents on this ground contended before the learned Single Judge that the writ petition is not maintainable. But the learned Single Judge refused to accept their submission on the ground that question of taking over possession in order to determine the rights of the Appellants under the Repealing Act, 1999 in view of the contention raised by the Appellants in particular will be open for consideration of the Court and such question should not be understood as foreclosed by the decision in Civil Rule 2568 of 1992. We, therefore, do not find any ground to re-open the issue of maintainability since the learned Single Judge set the issue in rest. 11. There is no dispute in regard to acquisition of the ceiling surplus land owned by Late Bhabadeb Sarma, the predecessor-in-interest of the Appellants and vesting of the same in the Government by notification under Section 10(3) of the Act. There is also no dispute regarding possession in respect of the land measuring 1B 4Ks 16Ls even after publication of notification under Section 10(3) of the Act. Such possession in respect of the land with the Appellants is not only evident from the eviction proceeding under Rule 18(2) of the Rules under Assam Land and Revenue Regulation but also from the fact of providing, the electricity connection to the premises situated in the land, establishment of a PCO with the approval of the postal department and permission of the Gauhati Municipal Corporation for running a restoration/tea stall thereat. Mr. A.K. Bhattacharjee, learned senior counsel, therefore, contended that possession in respect of land measuring 1B 4Ks 16Ls which is a parcel of the acquired land under the Urban Land Ceiling Case No. 343 of 1976 was with the Appellants till their eviction therefrom on 25.12.2003. Mr. A.K. Bhattacharjee, learned senior counsel, therefore, contended that possession in respect of land measuring 1B 4Ks 16Ls which is a parcel of the acquired land under the Urban Land Ceiling Case No. 343 of 1976 was with the Appellants till their eviction therefrom on 25.12.2003. This piece of submission though not refuted by the counsel of the Respondents, it was vehemently argued that such possession of the Appellants of the land was illegal in view of taking over of the possession of the entire ceiling surplus land unilaterally on 7.12.1991 by one of the officers of the Revenue Department of the State Government confirmed by the Circle Officer vide letter dated 20.4.1992 addressed to Deputy Commissioner (Land Reform Branch). 12. Countering the above submissions by the counsel of the Respondents, Mr. A.K. Bhattacharjee, learned senior counsel for the Appellants submitted before us that such unilateral possession of the land being taken over by an unauthorized person would be invalid in view of non-compliance of the provisions of Section 10(5) of the Act. It was argued by Mr. Bhattacharjee that the unilateral taking over of possession would be possible only when the land owner in spite of issuance of notice under Section 10(5) of the Act failed to surrender or deliver possession of the land to the State Government or to any person duly authorized in this behalf within 30 days of the service of notice. It was also argued that there is no evidence forthcoming that the S.K. whose signature appears in Annexure-IV was a person duly authorized by the State Government to take possession of the land (ceiling surplus). It was also argued by him that evidence is wanting in respect of issue of notice to the land owner under Section 10(5) of the Act. Unless a notice under Section 10(5) of the Act is issued or served upon the owner of the land directing to surrender or deliver possession, despite vesting of the land in the State Government under notification 10(3) of the Act, the possession of the land would remain with the land owner. Section 10(6) would be operative or in other words come in aid when the land owner refuses to deliver or surrender the possession. Section 10(6) would be operative or in other words come in aid when the land owner refuses to deliver or surrender the possession. When there is no evidence forthcoming of such issuance of notice under Section 10(5) of the Act, refusal on the part of the land owner would not come to the forefront therefore, unilateral possession of the land as claimed by the Respondents on 7.12.1991 would be illegal and not sustainable. 13. The moot question that involves in this appeal is whether the words "such land shall be deemed to have vested absolutely in the State Government" occurring in Section 10(3) of the Act, 1976 would signify delivery or surrender of possession of such land to the Government by the authority of the notification, if not, whether for the purpose a notice under Section 10(5) of the Act is mandatorily required to be issued to the owner of the land directing him to surrender or deliver possession. 14. In the Act, 1976, the procedure for acquisition as well as possession has been provided in Sections 6 - 11, both inclusive. Section 6 provide for submission of return in respect of vacant land in excess of ceiling limit Section 7 deals with filling of statement in cases where vacant land held by a person is situated within the jurisdiction of two or more competent authorities, while Section 8provides for preparation of draft statement as regards to vacant land in excess of ceiling limit and also objection to the draft statement by the person concerned. Section 9 deals with preparation of the final statement after disposal of the objections, if any in respect of the ceiling surplus land, while Section 10 provides the provision for acquisition of the vacant land in excess of ceiling limit. Sub-Section 1 of Section 10 speaks of publication of notification for acquisition of the land in excess of ceiling limit in the Official Gazette. While Sub-Section 2 provides for filing of claims of the persons interested in the vacant land. Sub-Section 3 of Section 10 is in regard of publication of a notification in the Official Gazette that the land so acquired (excess of ceiling limit) is deemed to have been vested absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances with effect from the date so specified. Sub-Section 3 of Section 10 is in regard of publication of a notification in the Official Gazette that the land so acquired (excess of ceiling limit) is deemed to have been vested absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances with effect from the date so specified. Sub-Section 4 of Section 10 prohibits transfer of such land by way of sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise specified in the notification and also in regard to alteration of such land. Sub-Section 5 of Section 10 is in regard to surrender or delivery of possession of such land to the State Government or to any person duly authorized by the State Government in this behalf by a notice in writing within thirty days of the service of such notice while Sub-Section 6 relates to taking over possession of the land by use of force, if necessary, when persons raises or falls to comply with the order made under Section 10(5) of the Act. Section 11 provides for payment of amount of (compensation for) the vacant land so acquired by the State Government. Of these provisions indicated above, provisions of Section 10 appear to be very vital and important in respect of acquisition of the land in excess of ceiling limit as provided under Section 4 of the Act. From the bare reading of these provisions it would appear to us that for achieving the goal of acquisition of vacant land in excess of ceiling limit, the procedures provided in Sections 6 - 11 are to be followed one after Anr. without any deviation therefrom. Pick and choose procedure adopted by the competent authority would not stand the test of acquisition of vacant land in excess of ceiling limit. 15. It was contended by Mr. A.K. Bhattacharjee, learned senior counsel for the Appellants that the competent authority failed to adhere to the provisions at least under Section 10(5) of the Act in the context of acquisition of the vacant land in excess of ceiling limit belonging to Late Bhabadeb Sarma, the predecessor-in-interest of the Appellants. It was argued that the competent authority cannot by pass any of the provisions of the Act in respect of acquisition of the vacant land and if done so, the entire procedure for acquisition would be vitiated. It was argued by Mr. It was argued that the competent authority cannot by pass any of the provisions of the Act in respect of acquisition of the vacant land and if done so, the entire procedure for acquisition would be vitiated. It was argued by Mr. Bhattacharjee that the intention of the Parliament was lucid and clear, to incorporate the provisions of Section 10(5) in the Act. Though vacant land in excess of ceiling limit is deemed to have vested absolutely under publication of the notification in the Official Gazette under Section 10(3) of the Act, such deemed vesting would not signify surrender or delivery of possession of the vacant land by the person concerned and to achieve that end competent authority is required to issue notice in writing directing the land owner to deliver or surrender the possession of the vacant land to the State Government or to any person duly authorized by the State Government within 30 days from the date of the received of the notice. If such land owner fails or refuses to surrender or deliver the possession of the vacant land so acquired and vested in the State Government, the competent authority may take possession of the vacant land by use of force as may be necessary for the purpose. 16. The competent authority after publication of the notice under Section 10(3) of the Act never issued any notice in writing either to Late Bhabadeb Sarma or on his death to the Appellants at any point of time directing him or them to surrender or deliver the possession of the vacant land in excess of ceiling limit retained by them. Therefore, the possession of the Appellants in respect of land measuring 1B 4Ks 16Ls though a part of the entire vacant land in excess of ceiling limit was always with them until their dispossession and therefore, on adoption of Repealing Act, 1999 the competent authority is to restore that piece of land that was under the occupation of the Appellants by virtue of the provisions of Section 3(2) of the Repealing Act, 1999. Mr. Bhattacharjee further argued that after acquisition of the land the competent authority did not pay the compensation either to Late Bhabadeb Sarma, the predecessor-in-interest of the Appellants or to the Appellants at any point of time and, therefore, restoration of the parcel of the land would not be subject to refund of the amount. 17. Mr. Bhattacharjee further argued that after acquisition of the land the competent authority did not pay the compensation either to Late Bhabadeb Sarma, the predecessor-in-interest of the Appellants or to the Appellants at any point of time and, therefore, restoration of the parcel of the land would not be subject to refund of the amount. 17. Appellants have not disputed the acquiring of ceiling surplus land of the predecessor-in-interest of the Appellants Late Bhabadeb Sarma in the ceiling proceeding. Respondents also appear to have confined to the unilateral possession of the land taken over by the Revenue Authority on 7.12.1991. In support of it Respondents contended that when the land owner failed to hand over the possession of the land, the competent authority had no other option than to take possession of the land unilaterally on 7.12.1991. The Respondents further contended that after publication of the notification under Section 10(3) of the Act possession of the land was taken over unilaterally. Allotment of part of the said land was subsequently made in favour of certain persons which ultimately gave rise to the Civil Rule No. 2568 of 1992. The learned Single Judge- in view of decision in Civil Rule No. 2568 of 1992 which received finality after order dated 8.8.2003 passed by the Apex Court- in Paragraphs-10 and 11 of the impugned judgment held as under: 10. A reading of the provisions contained in Section 10 of the Act makes it clear that in the notification required to be published under Section 10(1) of the Act, after clear identification of the surplus vacant land, which is sought to be acquired, "persons interested" are to be invited to file their claims to the vacant land in question. Thereafter, the claims, as may be filed are required to be settled and notice to hand over possession under Section 10(5) of the Act may be served on the person in possession. This appears to be order or scheme of action under the Act. In the present case, the owner of the land, i.e., predecessor of the Petitioners had already filed his objections under Section 8(3) of the Act in respect of the draft statement issued, whereafter, the final statement under Section 9 was prepared. This appears to be order or scheme of action under the Act. In the present case, the owner of the land, i.e., predecessor of the Petitioners had already filed his objections under Section 8(3) of the Act in respect of the draft statement issued, whereafter, the final statement under Section 9 was prepared. Admittedly, the predecessor of the Petitioners did not file any claim to the land after publication of the notification under Section 10(1) of the Act- a fact, which has been recorded by this Court in its order dated 24.5.2002 passed in CR No. 2568/1992. In such a situation, the Court cannot understand that any prejudice was caused to the owner of the land even if it is to be assumed that no notice under Section 10(5) of the Act was served, a conclusion that the Court feels safe to draw from the use of the word 'May' in Section 10(5) of the Act. In any event, whether such a notice was issued or served on the predecessor of the Petitioners is a seriously disputed question of fact in view of the clear stand taken by the Respondents in the affidavit filed that the predecessor of the Petitioners not having handed over possession of the land, such possession was taken over unilaterally by the State. 11. There are certain other features of the case, which impel the Court to take a negative view with regard to the above contentions advanced by the Petitioners. The fact that allotment of a part of the surplus vacant land covered by the land Ceiling Proceeding in question been found to be valid by this Court in the earlier proceeding is a significant fact that cannot be overlooked. Such allotment from the same surplus land, even if in part, tilts the balance on the question of possession against the Petitioners. The correction of the revenue records, as evident from the extract copy of the revenue records, as evident from the extract copy of the revenue records, as evident from the extract copy of the jamabandi available on record, showing deletion of the name of Late Bhabadeb Sarma as the recorded pattadar of the land in question and the further endorsement showing such land as Government land, must also be construed by the Court to be a relevant fact for deciding the question of possession in favour of the State and against the Petitioners. Viewed from the aforesaid context, the claimed possession of the Petitioners through their caretaker, Sanatan Baishya, will hardly be relevant to judge their entitlements under the Repealing Act of 1999. The said Act, in the considered view of the Court, contemplates a clear abandonment of the rights of the State to take over possession of I the surplus land that had vested in it under Section 10(3) of the Act rather than failure to continuously maintain such possession or combat attempts of re-possession or encroachment by the erstwhile owner or any other person. 18. We are unable to accede to the view of the learned Single Judge magnified in paragraph 10 of the impugned judgment in respect of taking over possession of the vacant land in excess of ceiling limit unilaterally. The learned Single Judge appears to have confined to the findings of this Court arrived at Civil Rule No. 5268 of 1992. Admittedly the vacant land in excess of ceiling limit belonged to Late Bhabadeb Sarma, the father of the Appellants and the same was acquired by the State Government by notification under Section 10(1) of the Act, 1976. After acquisition under Section 10(1) of the Act, the State Government published a notification under Section 10(3) of the Act declaring deemed acquisition of the vacant land and vesting of the same in the State Government. It is on record that Late Bhabadeb Sarma sold some parcels of the vacant land to six different persons by executing sale deeds in the year 1984 after publication of notification under Section 10(1) of the Act for which, perhaps Late Bhabadeb Sarma despite his impleadment as proforma Respondent in Civil Rule No. 2568 of 1992 did not raise any issue and for that notice under Section 10(5) of the Act can be waived, in our considered view, is not an acceptable finding. Late Bhabadeb Sarma, predecessor-in-interest of the Appellants even after vesting of the vacant land in the State Government by notification under Section 10(3) of the Act continued to remain in possession thereof and in that event the competent authority ought to have taken resort to the provisions of Section 10(5) of the Act. Since notice of this nature was never issued and served on the predecessor-in-interest of the Appellants and after his death on the Appellants either, unilateral possession claimed by the Respondents cannot survive. Since notice of this nature was never issued and served on the predecessor-in-interest of the Appellants and after his death on the Appellants either, unilateral possession claimed by the Respondents cannot survive. Since Section 10(5) is mandatory in nature it ought to be followed by the competent authority when any person is found in possession of such land (ceiling surplus). The words "any person" in our present case may be construed as predecessor-in-interest of the Appellants while alive and after his death the Appellants, his legal heirs, who had the possession of the land measuring 1B 4Ks 16Ls, a part of the vacant land that vested in the State Government by virtue of notification 10(3) of the Act. 19. It is true that the allotment of parts of the surplus vacant land covered by land ceiling proceeding in question is found valid by this Court in earlier proceedings by way of Civil Rule No. 2568 of 1992 and Writ Appeal No. 419 of 2002. In paragraph 11 of the impugned judgment, learned Single Judge- in view of the findings of this Court in the earlier proceedings in respect of the surplus vacant land and allotment thereto- has held that such allotment from the said surplus land even if in part goes against the Appellants in respect of possession of the vacant land in excess of ceiling surplus land. Learned Single Judge also held that correction of revenue records as evident from the extract copy of the Jamabandi showing deletion of the name of Late Bhabadeb Sarma as the recorded pattadar of the land in question and further endorsement showing such land as Government land must be construed in favour of the Respondents in respect of possession of the vacant land. The learned Single Judge did not accept the claimed possession of the Appellants through their caretaker Sanatan Baishya rather held that such possession would not entitle the Appellants restoration in view of adoption of the Repealing Act, 1999. It is already indicated that Late Bhabadeb Sarma after notification under Section 10(3) of the Act was in possession of the land. The learned Single Judge did not accept the claimed possession of the Appellants through their caretaker Sanatan Baishya rather held that such possession would not entitle the Appellants restoration in view of adoption of the Repealing Act, 1999. It is already indicated that Late Bhabadeb Sarma after notification under Section 10(3) of the Act was in possession of the land. Respondents claimed that on account of failure on the part of the Late Bhabadeb Sarma to surrender or deliver the possession of the land to the State Government or to any other officer duly authorized in that behalf, the SK one of the Revenue Officers of the Revenue Department took possession of the land on 7.12.1991 unilaterally and thereafter some parcels of the land were allotted to some persons by the State Government. This unilateral action perhaps prompted the Revenue authority to delete the name of Late Bhabadeb Sarma from the Revenue records as recorded pattadar. Deletion of name of recorded pattadar from the Revenue records and endorsing the land in question as Government land do not necessarily mean that recorded pattadar was/is not in the possession of the land in question. Deletion of name of the recorded pattadar may occur on various factors. Facts remain that till the date of dispossession, the Appellants were in possession of the vacant land in excess of ceiling limit measuring 1B 4Ks 16Ls, a part of the surplus vacant land covered by the land ceiling proceeding. In the counter affidavits it is nowhere provided that till 25.12.2003 the Appellants were not in possession except the statement of taking over of the land unilaterally on 7.12.1991. Therefore, we are unable to hold the view of the learned Single Judge that the possession of the ceiling surplus land is with the Respondents. 20. Now, a question arises whether taking over of possession by the Respondents on 7.12.1991 unilaterally would amount to taking over of possession under Section 10(6) of the Act in absence of proof of issuance of notice under Section 10(5) of the Act. From a careful scrutiny of the counter affidavits filed by the Respondents herein we are unable to locate any order or document to show issuance of notice under Section 10(5) of the Act to the Appellants' father Late Bhabadeb Sarma to deliver or surrender of the land so vested in the State Government. From a careful scrutiny of the counter affidavits filed by the Respondents herein we are unable to locate any order or document to show issuance of notice under Section 10(5) of the Act to the Appellants' father Late Bhabadeb Sarma to deliver or surrender of the land so vested in the State Government. Therefore, the claim of the Respondents that the predecessor-in-interest of the Appellants refused to surrender or deliver possession of the land cannot sustain. Mr. A.K. Bhattacharjee, learned senior counsel taking the opportunity of non-existence of any order and notice made or issued under Section 10(5) of the Act very strenuously argued that the possession of the land being with the Appellants, the legal heirs of Late Bhabadeb Sarma on the adoption of the Repealing Act, 1999 such land is to be restored to the owner by virtue of Section 3(2) of the Repealing Act, 1999. The claim of taking of unilateral possession by one of the Revenue Officers of the Respondents would not subsist unless after issuance of the notice the owner or any person in possession refuses to deliver or surrender the possession of the land in question. In the counter affidavits the Respondents also failed to make an averment that on refusal to surrender or handover possession of the land in question, possession of the land had been taken unilaterally by use of force except the statement made in paras 7(c) and 25 "the recorded pattadar did not come forward to deliver possession of the land". The averments made in the counter affidavit in respect of taking over of the land in question unilaterally appear to be plain and simple. Such statement is not supported by any document whatsoever. 21. It was submitted by Mr. A.K. Bhattacharjee, learned senior counsel that the word "restoration" contemplated under Section 3(2) of the Repeal Act is of the ownership rights which are deemed to have been vested in the State under the Principal Act. It is open to the State to make compensation under Section 11 of the Act once the land is deemed to have vested under Section 10(3) even when the possession has not been surrendered or delivered or taken over under Section 10(5) or 10(6) of the Principal Act. It is open to the State to make compensation under Section 11 of the Act once the land is deemed to have vested under Section 10(3) even when the possession has not been surrendered or delivered or taken over under Section 10(5) or 10(6) of the Principal Act. Provisions of Section 3(2) of the Repealing Act, 1999 makes it manifestly clear to restore ownership of the surplus land deemed to have been vested in the State to the land holders/owners on refund of the amount paid by the Government when possession has not been taken over under Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act. Mr. Bhattacharjee also further argued that the "savings" provision in the Repeal Act, 1999 expressly are made applicable only to that land which satisfies under Section 10(3) and the possession of which has been taken over under Section 10(5) or 10(6) of the Principal Act. Indicating provisions of Clause (a) of Sub-Section 2 of Section 3 of the Repeal Act, 1999, Mr. Bhattacharjee laid stress that the repeal of the Principal Act shall not effect vesting of any vacant land under Sub-Section 3 of Section 10 possession of which has been taken over by the State Government or person duly authorized by the State Government in this behalf or by the competent authority, but when any land deemed to have been vested in the State Government under Section 10(3) of the Principal Act, but possession has not been taken over by the Government or any person duly authorized by the State Government in this behalf or by the competent authority such land should be restored subject to refund of the compensation if paid by the Government. According to Mr. Bhattacharjee, the learned senior counsel the competent authority or any person at no point of time did take over the possession of the land by issuing a notice under Section 10(5) of the Principal Act and in defiance thereto under Section 10(6) of the Act. Therefore, the land though vested in the State Government, the possession being remained with the owner in other words not taken by the State Government or any person duly authorized by the State Government or by the competent authority, such land needs to be restored to the person subject to refund of the amount. Much stress had been laid by Mr. Much stress had been laid by Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned senior counsel in the words "possession of which has not been taken over by the Government or any person duly authorized by the State Government in this behalf or by the competent authority" since according to him the State Government or the competent authority failed to resort to the provision of Section 10(5) of the Principal Act. Mr. Bhattacharjee, therefore, in view of vesting of the land in the State Government by notification under Section 10(3) of the Act, inaction on the part of the State Government or its competent authority to take action per provision of Section 10(5) of the Act and the possession of the land being continued to remain with the Appellants till dispossession, Appellants are entitled to restoration at least the parcel of the land which was under their active possession till 25.12.2003. 22. Further in regard to unilateral taking over of possession on 7.12.1991 as claimed by the Respondents, it was argued by Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned senior counsel that such taking over of possession cannot foreclose the right of the Appellants under Section 3(2)(a) of the Repealing Act since possession was allegedly taken over without following the procedure under Section 10(5) of the Act and more so by an Officer not authorized in that behalf Such unilateral taking of possession according to Mr. Bhattacharjee is illegal and unlawful. No document thus finds place in any of the counter affidavits filed by the Respondents authorizing the S.K. to take over possession on 7.12.1991. Referring to the provisions of Section 10(6) of the Principal Act, Mr. Bhattacharjee submitted that to act under that provision the person must be duly authorized by the State Government for the purpose, who may in taking possession of the vacant land use force if necessary. Therefore, in order to take recourse to this provision there must be a refusal on the part person in possession to surrender or deliver the possession of the land in question. Refusal or failure on the part of the land holder/owner would only come into play when a notice under Sub-Section 5 of Section 10 is issued. According to Mr. Therefore, in order to take recourse to this provision there must be a refusal on the part person in possession to surrender or deliver the possession of the land in question. Refusal or failure on the part of the land holder/owner would only come into play when a notice under Sub-Section 5 of Section 10 is issued. According to Mr. Bhattacharjee when the factum of issuance of notice under Section 10(5) of the Act and refusal thereto has not been proved by the Respondents by placing acceptable proof, unilateral taking over of possession of the land in question by the S.K. under garb of Sub-Section 6 of Section 10 of the Principal Act would be illegal and unlawful and consequently Appellants would be entitled to the benefit of the Repealing Act. In support of his contention Mr. Bhattacharjee placed reliance in the decision in the case between Bharatkumar Lalbhai Vasa v. State of Gujarat; reported in 2006 (TLS) 217024. 23. In the case of M/s. B.T.L. Education Trust, Bangalore v. State of Karnataka and Ors. : AIR 2006 Kant 12, a Division Bench of the Court in the context of application of Section 3 of the Repeal Act, 1999 in Paragraph-12 held as under: 12. If a declarant was in lawful possession of a land at the time when the Repeal Act came into force, the proceedings initiated under the Act against him would abate by virtue of the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Repeal Act. In the instant case, there is abundant relevant materials on record to conclude that when the Repeal Act came into force, the Respondents 4 to 8 where in actual and lawful possession of the subject land. Even according to the second Respondent, though after the Notification under Sub-section (3) of Section 10 of the Act was issued and Late Budda Reddy was directed to deliver possession of the subject land within 30 days from the date of receipt of the notice, the records maintained by the second Respondent competent authority would not show that as a matter of fact, the possession of the subject land was taken over by the competent authority and the same vested in the State Government. In fact, the above finding recorded by the second Respondent in his order dated 28th February, 2002 directly contest the correctness of the statement made by the Special Deputy Commissioner earlier that the possession of the subject land was taken over on 21.10.1988. The Deputy Commissioner in the same order 28th February, 2002 having referred to the report of the Tahsildar, Bangalore South Taluk dated 13.6.2001, has recorded the finding that there is nothing on record to show that the possession of the subject land was handed over by Respondents 4 to 8 to Government pursuant to the proceedings initiated by the competent authority under the Act in terms of Section 10 of the Act nor is there any evidence to show that the Government has taken over possession of the subject land from Respondents 4 to 8. However, we need not rest our opinion only on the above findings recorded by the second Respondent Deputy Commissioner in his order dated 28th February, 2002. There are other independent materials also to reach the same conclusion. Although earlier the special Deputy Commissioner for Urban Land Ceiling had claimed that the possession of the subject land was taken over on 21.10.1988, that claim seems to be highly incredible. We say this, because, Budda Reddy died on 21.8.1988. Therefore, taking over the possession of the subject land from a dead person on 21.10.1988 would not have arisen. It is not the case of the competent authority that before taking over possession of the subject land on 21.10.1988, notices were issued to the Respondents 4 to 8 herein and possession of the subject land was taken over from them. The second circumstances which goes in favour of Respondents 4 to 8 is the entries in the Record of Rights and Phahanis of the subject land. In the RTC extracts produced at page 98 of the material papers, the name of Budda Reddy is shown both in Column No. 9 as well as in Column No. 12 for the revenue years 1997-98 and 1998-99. It is true that well before the above revenue years commenced. In the RTC extracts produced at page 98 of the material papers, the name of Budda Reddy is shown both in Column No. 9 as well as in Column No. 12 for the revenue years 1997-98 and 1998-99. It is true that well before the above revenue years commenced. Budda Reddy had died, but, the fact remains that if the possession of the subject land was taken over on 21.10.1988 itself by the competent authority as claimed, the name of Budda Reddy or his sons would not have appeared in the Record of Rights and Phahanis of the subject land subsequent to the revenue year 1988-89. The third circumstance is the house tax paid receipts produced at pages 114-123 of the material papers. These house tax paid receipts would also go to show that the Respondents 4 to 8 were in possession of the subject land before and after the Repeal Act came into force. Thus, it is quite clear that not only the findings recorded by the second Respondent in his order dated 28th February, 2002, but also the above noted documents would fully support the claim of the Respondents 4 to 8 that they were in lawful possession of the subject land when the Repeal Act came into force. In addition, in pursuance of the order of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 3011 of 1995, the possession of the subject land was restored to the Respondents 4 to 8 on 6.8.1998, that is to say, well before the Repeal Act came into with effect from 8.7.1999. Furthermore, it needs to be noticed that in paragraph-5 of the statement of objections filed on behalf of the Respondents 1 to 3 in W.P. No. 19739 of 2002, it is stated that all the proceedings with regard to handing over of the possession of the subject land to the Appellant Trust was only on paper and no physical possession of the subject land was handed over to the Appellant Trust. The Tahsildar, Bangalore South Taluk who inspected the subject land on 2.6.2001 along with field staff and the surveyor has reported that the land owners, i.e. Respondents 4 to 8 were in physical possession of the subject land. The Tahsildar, Bangalore South Taluk who inspected the subject land on 2.6.2001 along with field staff and the surveyor has reported that the land owners, i.e. Respondents 4 to 8 were in physical possession of the subject land. The piece of evidence noticed fully support the claim of the Respondents 4 to 8 that they were in actual and lawful possession of the subject land when the Repeal Act came into force. If that is so, the proceedings initiated and orders made under the Act abated when the Repeal Act came into force. In our present case the pleaded case of the Appellants is that even after publication of the notification under Sections 10(1) and 10(3) of the Act, 1976, they continued to remain in possession of a parcel of the vacant land so acquired and vested in the State Government at least measuring 1B 4Ks 16Ls. The Appellants while possessing the parcel of the land as indicated above obtained electricity connection to the premises thereon, installed a PCO obtaining permission from the postal department and also obtained permission from GMC to run a restaurant/tea stall in the premises by caretaker Sanatan Baishya. These facts according to Appellants conjointly testify that land measuring 1B 4Ks 16Ls, a parcel of the vacant land is in the possession of the Appellants. Possession of that parcel of the land being not taken over by the State Government or by any person authorized in this behalf or the competent authority under provisions of Section 10(5) of the Act in 'defiance thereto under Section 10(6) of the Act, such possession being remained with the Appellants on the date of adoption of the Repeal Act, 1999 by the State Government, by virtue of Section 3(2)(a) or the Repealing Act, 1999, such land in possession of the Appellants requires restoration to the Appellants subject to refund of the amount if paid. It is not the case of the Respondents that Late Bhabadeb Sarma, the father of the Appellants during his life time did receive the compensation for the acquired land that vested in the State Government and after his death by the Appellants, therefore, refund of compensation on restoration of the land to the Appellants cannot arise. It is not the case of the Respondents that Late Bhabadeb Sarma, the father of the Appellants during his life time did receive the compensation for the acquired land that vested in the State Government and after his death by the Appellants, therefore, refund of compensation on restoration of the land to the Appellants cannot arise. Further the eviction proceeding started against the Appellants under Rule 18(2) of the Rules under Land and Revenue Regulation and their ultimate dispossession therefrom on 25.12.2003 would also testify that the Appellants were in possession of the land (1B 4Ks 16Ls) a part of the vacant land so vested in the State Government on the date of adoption of the Repeal Act, 1999 and thereafter. 24. In the context of failure to adhere to the provisions of Section 10(5) of the Principal Act and its effect thereto, Mr. A.K. Bhattacharjee, relied in the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Writ Petition No. 8356 of 2006 in between Voltas Ltd. and Anr. v. Additional Collector and Competent Authority, Thane Urban Agglomeration and Ors. The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court while rendering the judgment in the case consistently held that failure on the part of the competent authority to take resort to provision of Section 10(5) of the Principal Act would render the Government in which the land vested under Section 10(3) of the Act to act per provision of Section 3(2)(a)(b) of the Repealing Act, 1999. 25. In the case of M/s Raico Pvt. Ltd. v. Competent Authority and Ors. reported in 2003 AIHC 657, a learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court in the context of provisions of Section 10 of the Principal Act, 1976 and Section 3 of the Repealing Act, 1999 in Paragraph 10 held as under: 10. On perusal of Annexure-R1 to CM No. 1024/87, and Annexure-R4 to the counter affidavit being the same document it shows that this site plan duly signed was the sole document relied upon to show that the possession has been taken over on 20.1.1987. The said document is signed by the Junior Engineer and the official of PWD Department in take over possession and by Shri K.L. Chugh of Land and Building Department of having handed over the possession. The said document is signed by the Junior Engineer and the official of PWD Department in take over possession and by Shri K.L. Chugh of Land and Building Department of having handed over the possession. However, the submission in the application that the same was done in the presence of the representatives of the Petitioner, is not borne out from the said document. Interestingly, para 6 of the application, as originally typed out, had an averment that the possession was taken over on 20.1.1987 "from the representative of the Petitioner" but the same was scored out. This aspect shows that no possession was taken over from any representatives of the Petitioner. The handing over and taking over of possession requires one party to hand over possession and the other to take over possession. The Respondent department merely by exchanging documents between themselves cannot hand over and take over possession. 26. The Hon'ble Single Judge of the Gujarat High Court while dealing with the case between Laxmanbhai K. Chokshi v. Competent Authority and Additional Collector (U.L.C); reported in 2007 GLR (3) 2231,2001 (TLS) 218561 in the context of requirement of notice under Section 10(5) of the Principal Act in Paragraph-5 held as follows: 5. ***** In any view of the matter, it is apparent that the State Government has not taken over the possession of the said land in accordance with Section 10(5) of the Act Sub-section (5) of Section 10 of the Act enjoins the competent authority, by notice in writing, to order any person who may be in possession of the vacant land to surrender or deliver possession, thereof to the State Government. Thus, it is person who is in possession of the land is entitled to a notice in writing. In the present case, admittedly the notice, as envisaged by Sub-section (5) of Section 10 of the Act, was given to the holder of the land alone and not to the persons in possession. The action of the State Government in taking over possession of the said excess vacant land unilaterally, contrary to the aforesaid Sub-section (5) of Section 10 of the Act, was illegal. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the State Government cannot be said to have legally taken over possession of the said excess vacant land. The possession of the said excess vacant land thus continued with the Petitioner. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the State Government cannot be said to have legally taken over possession of the said excess vacant land. The possession of the said excess vacant land thus continued with the Petitioner. The Act of 1999 is made effective in the State of Gujarat on 30th March, 1999. In view of Section 4 of the Act of 1999 the proceeding in respect of the said excess vacant land shall stand abated. 27. A similar view was adopted by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court while deciding the case in between Kailash v. State of U.P. reported in 2005 (TLS) 316957. In paragraphs 5 and 6, the Division Bench held as under: 5. *****The Repeal Act shall have no effect on the Principal Act if possession of surplus land was not taken as contemplated in the Principal Act. Repeal Act, clearly talks possession being taken under Section 10(5) or 10(6) of the Act. It is a statutory obligation on the Competent Authority or State to take possession as permitted in law. It is to be appreciated that in case possession is purported to be taken under Section 10(6) of the Act, still Court is required to examine whether 'taking of such possession' is valid or invalidated on any of the considerations in law. If Court finds that one or more grounds exist which show that the process of possession, though claimed under Section 10(5) or 10(6) of the Act is unlawful or vitiated in law, then such possession will have no recognition in law and it will have to be ignored and treated as of no legal consequence. The possession envisaged under Section 3 of the Repeal Act is de facto and not de jure only. 6. Even thereafter we wanted to verify the truth of actual physical possession and appointed a member of the bar as Special Officer to visit the spot and place a report before the Court under sealed cover. Such report categorically speaks that no actual physical possession has been taken by the State. A fake defence has been taken by the State that at the time of inspection no one was present on behalf of the State. Such report categorically speaks that no actual physical possession has been taken by the State. A fake defence has been taken by the State that at the time of inspection no one was present on behalf of the State. But we find from the earlier order of the Court that in presence of all the parties when the order was passed, it was made clear that no further notice will be given but all will be present at the time of making inspection of the spot by the Special Officer. Under the order dated 18th July, 2005, date and time were fixed by this Court. After opening the sealed cover and going through the report we have directed to circulate the report to give further opportunity to the parties to take appropriate step including exception to the report but State has not made any application taking exception to the report. They have relied upon their own record to establish the cause under Section 10(5) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. The law under Section 10(5) of the Act is crystal clear that notice in writing is to be given to surrender or deliver the possession and if any body refuses or fails to comply, the authority may take possession of the vacant land under Section 10(6) of the Act. From the record we find that only a notice under Sub-section (5) was received by one "Bachchan Lal". According to the Petitioners he has no authority to receive the notice. Even if a co-sharer cannot affect the right of the Ors. in receiving such notice. In any event notice under the principal Act upon one "Bachchan Lal" cannot help the cause of the Respondents at present. 28. Mr. A.K. Bhattacharjee, learned senior counsel also placed reliance in the decision in the case between Indrajitsing P. Geel v. Competent Authority and Deputy Collector; reported in 2007 GLR (1) 677, 2006 (TLS) 217018, the learned Single Judge of the Gujarat High Court in respect of necessity of issue of notice under Section 10(5) of the Principal Act, 1976, in Paragraphs 22, 23 and 26 held as under: 22. On a plain reading of the aforesaid provisions, it is apparent that the statute contemplates giving an opportunity to the landholder of any person in possession of excess vacant land to surrender or deliver possess thereof to the State Government and for this purpose provides for giving notice in writing, ordering such person to surrender or deliver possession of such lands. It is only when pursuant to such notice, such person refuses or fails to comply with an order under Sub-section (5) within a period of thirty days of the service of notice, that the competent authority is required to take over possession of the vacant land and for that purpose may use force, if necessary. Therefore, the provisions of Sub-section (6) are to be resorted to only when there is refusal or non-compliance of an order under Sub-section (5) of Section 10 of the Act within the prescribed period. 29. As can be seen from the facts noted above, though it is the case of the Respondents that the Petitioner has been duly served with notice under Section 10(5) of the Act, no supporting document has been produced to show that service of notice has been duly effected. For the purpose of verifying the correctness of the aforesaid averments made by the competent authority, the learned Assistant Government Pleader had been directed to call for the record of the case from the competent authority. Upon perusal of the record, it is apparent that though at every stage of the proceeding notices issued to the Petitioner have been served by Registered Post Acknowledgement Due and the Acknowledgement receipts thereof are also found on record. But, insofar as notice under Section 10(5) of the Act is concerned no such receipt is found on record. Hence, in absence of proof of service of notice, it cannot be said that the requirements of Section 10(5) of the Act have been complied with. 30. Thus, applying the principle of strict construction with the dictum of the aforesaid decision, the authorities are required to act strictly in accordance with the statutory provisions. Thus, when Sub-section (5) of Section 10 mandates giving notice of an order under the said Sub-section to the person in possession, the same is required to be complied with in true letter and spirit. Thus, when Sub-section (5) of Section 10 mandates giving notice of an order under the said Sub-section to the person in possession, the same is required to be complied with in true letter and spirit. Considering the nature of rights involved, mere issuance of notice without service thereof, cannot be said to be due compliance with the provisions of the statute. Besides, the provisions of Sub-section (6) of Section 10 can be resorted to only if the person fails comply with an order under Sub-section (5) thereof, within a period of thirty days of service of notice. Hence, possession cannot be taken over under Section 10(6) of the Act, unless a period thirty days from the date of service of notice has elapsed. In absence of service of notice under Sub-section (5) of Section 10, there will be no starting point for calculating the period of thirty days. In other words time will not start running, hence the question of taking over possession under Sub-section (6) of Section 10 of the Act, will not arise at all. In this view of the matter, it was not open to the Respondent authorities to resort to the provisions of Sub-section (6) of Section 10 of the Act without first complying with the provisions of Sub-section (5) thereof Hence, such action being in contravention of the statutory provisions cannot be sustained and deserves to be struck down. 31. In the cases (supra) it would appear that the provisions of Section 10(5) of the Principal Act, 1976 shall have to be mandatorily followed by the State Government or its competent authority when the vacant land in excess of ceiling surplus vests in the State Government by notification under Section 10(3) of the Act. Provisions of Section 10(6) would come into play only when the person in possession of the ceiling surplus land refuses or fails to deliver or surrender possession of the vacant land to the State Government or to any person duly authorized by the State Government in this behalf. Provisions of Section 10(6) would come into play only when the person in possession of the ceiling surplus land refuses or fails to deliver or surrender possession of the vacant land to the State Government or to any person duly authorized by the State Government in this behalf. After passing of the Repealing Act, 1999 and on and from the date of its adoption by the respective State Government if the vacant land in excess of ceiling limit is acquired and vested by in the respective State Government under Sections 10(1) and 10(3) of the Act, 1976, possession of such land if not taken over by the State Government or by any person duly authorized in consonance with the provisions of Section 10(5) of the Act, provisions of Section 3(2) of the Repealing Act would come into play. In our present case the vacant land in excess of ceiling surplus belonged to Late Bhabadeb Sarma, the predecessor-in-interest of the Appellants and the same having been acquired under Section 10(1) of the Act and vested under Section 10(3) of the Act in the Government, possession of such land being remained with the predecessor-in-interest of the Appellants and after him the Appellants, his legal heirs in respect of a parcel of the said land measuring 1B 4Ks 16Ls at least on account of failure on the part of the Government to resort to provision of Section 10(5) such parcel of land at least is to be restored to the holders of the land. The claim unilateral taking over of possession by one of the Revenue Officers of the State Government would not subsist in absence of any proof whatsoever. The counter affidavits of the Respondents are found totally silent in respect of the authority, who did actually authorize the S.K. to take over the possession unilaterally. Therefore, such unilateral taking over of possession being not supported by any document (proof) it can be branded as paper work only. Such possession in our considered view is illegal and unauthorized. 32. Mr. Therefore, such unilateral taking over of possession being not supported by any document (proof) it can be branded as paper work only. Such possession in our considered view is illegal and unauthorized. 32. Mr. A.K. Bhattacharjee, learned senior counsel further submitted that the Government of Assam due to poor performance of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 adopted by a resolution of the legislative assembly under Clause-2 of the Article 252 of the Constitution of India in the year 1976, on passing of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 by the Government of India, the Government of Assam also by a resolution of the Assam Legislative Assembly adopted the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 under Clause-2 of Article 252 of the Constitution on 6th August, 2003. Therefore, by virtue of the Repealing Act, 1999 all proceedings taken under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 shall abate. In the Repealing Act, 1999 the Union Legislature incorporated Section 3 with a view to save accrued and vested right under the Repeal Act which is neither expressly saved or nor expressly or impliedly taken away by the Repealing Act, it was argued by Mr. A.K. Bhattacharjee that such accrued and vested right would continue to be effective and enforceable under the Repeal Act, 1999. In support of his contention Mr. Bhattacharjee placed reliance in the case between Commissioner of Income Tax, U.P. v. M/s. Shah Sadiq and Sons, reported in (1987) 3 SCC 516 . The Apex Court while dealing with the subject of repeal and saving clause under General Clauses Act, 1897 in Paragraphs-14 and 15 of the judgment held as under: 14. Under the Income Tax Act of 1922, the Assessee was entitled to carry forward the losses of the speculation business and set off such losses against profits made from that business in future years. The right of carrying forward and set off accrued to the Assessee under the Act of 1922. A right which has accrued and had become vested continued to be capable of being enforced notwithstanding the repeal of the statute under which that right accrued unless the repealing statute took away such right expressly or by necessary implication. This is the effect of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. 15. A right which has accrued and had become vested continued to be capable of being enforced notwithstanding the repeal of the statute under which that right accrued unless the repealing statute took away such right expressly or by necessary implication. This is the effect of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. 15. In this case the 'savings' provision in the repealing statute in not exhaustive of the rights which are saved or which survive the repeal of the statute under which such rights had accrued. In other words, whatever rights are expressly saved by the 'savings' provision stand saved. But, that does not mean that rights which are not saved by the 'saving' provision are extinguished or stand ipso facto terminated by the mere fact that a new statute repealing the old statute in enacted. Rights which have accrued are saved unless they are taken away expressly. This is the principle behind Section 6(c) of the General Clauses Act, 1897. The right to carry forward losses which had accrued under the repealed Income Tax Act of 1922 is not saved expressly by Section 297 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. But it is not necessary to save a right expressly in order to keep it alive after the repeal of the old Act of 1922. Section 6(c) saves accrued rights unless they are taken away by the repealing statute. We do not find any such taking away of the rights by Section 297 either expressly or by implication. 33. Mr. A.K. Bhattacharjee, the learned senior Counsel with the aid of the decision rendered in the case (supra) by the Apex Court contended that on the date of adoption of the Repeal Act, 1999, the Appellants being in possession of the land measuring 1B 4Ks 16Ls, which is a part of the vacant land so acquired and vested in the State Government and the possession of the same being not taken over under Section 10(5) of the Act, 1976, Appellants acquired right by virtue of their continuous possession in the parcel of the land under the Repealed Act and such accrued and vested right would be saved by Section 3(2)(a) of the Repealing Act, 1999, by operation of Section6 of the General Clauses Act. Mr. Mr. Bhattacharjee, the learned senior counsel, therefore, argued that under saving Clause 3(2)(a) of the Repealing Act, 1999 are Appellants are entitled to restoration in the land so dispossessed on 25.12.2003. 34. In support of the impugned judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge, Mr. B.J. Ghosh, the learned Government Advocate representing the official Respondents submitted that the issue involved in this appeal having been settled in Civil Rule No. 2568 of 1992 which subsequently attained its finality after the judgment of the Apex Court dated 8.8.2003 it cannot be agitated again that the possession of the vacant land acquired under Section 10(1) and vested in the State Government under Section 10(3) of the Act had not been taken over on 7.12.1991. After taking over of possession, the appropriate Government allotted some parcels of the land to the allottees. Such allotments being found valid by this Court while deciding the Civil Rule 2586 of 1992 restoration of possession in respect of the parcel measuring 1B 4Ks 16Ls, a part of the acquired land cannot be claimed under the Repeal Act, 1999. It was also argued that since Late Bhabadeb Sarma being arrayed as proforma Respondent in the civil rule did not raise any claim whatsoever in respect of the land so acquired and vested, possession by implication rests with the Government. However, when the predecessor-in-interest of the Appellants did not come forward to deliver possession, possession of the vacant land in excess of ceiling limit was taken over unilaterally. This piece of argument would not in any manner come in rescue of the Respondents since no proof has been placed to show that provisions of Section 10(5) of the Principal Act had been followed. The Respondents, more particularly Respondent Nos. 1 to 5 tried to bang upon the unilateral taking over possession of the land and also the decision in the Civil Rule. On this issue we have already shown our reluctance to accept this validity of the unilateral taking over of possession. 35. Ms. M. Hazarika, learned standing counsel, Guwahati Metropolitan Development Authority (for short GMD A) also submitted that the possession of the entire vacant land in excess of ceiling surplus including the land over which the Appellants now stake their claim had been taken over unilaterally on 7.12.1991 by S.K. one of the Revenue Officers of the State Government. 35. Ms. M. Hazarika, learned standing counsel, Guwahati Metropolitan Development Authority (for short GMD A) also submitted that the possession of the entire vacant land in excess of ceiling surplus including the land over which the Appellants now stake their claim had been taken over unilaterally on 7.12.1991 by S.K. one of the Revenue Officers of the State Government. By an order dated 8.5.1992 the State Government after retaining 8.03 Areas allotted rest of the land to 8 (eight) different persons. Subsequently, the Government of Assam allotted land measuring 8.03 Areas retained by it out of the ceiling surplus land acquired and vested in the Government and possession taken unilaterally to GMD A for construction of office building (s). In view of the facts and attending circumstances Ms. M. Hazarika argued that the entire vacant land being acquired, vested in the State Government and possession taken over unilaterally on 7.12.1991 restoration of the land measuring 1B 4Ks 16Ls over which the Appellants stake claim cannot be restored by operation of Section 3(2)(a) of the Repealing Act, 1999. 36. In respect of other issues involved in this appeal, Ms. Hazarika also stood in the line of argument advanced by Mr. B.J. Ghosh, learned Government Advocate appearing for the State Respondents. It was further submitted by the learned counsel for the Respondents that the vacant land in excess of ceiling surplus belonging to Late Bhabadeb Sarma being acquired under Section 10(1) and vested under Section 10(3) of the 1976, possession of which had been taken over unilaterally by one of the officers of the State Government, allotment of some parcels of the said land to different allotees, such allotment being found valid by this Court in Civil Rule No. 2568 of 1992, which attained finality, Appellants cannot claim an accused and vested right under the Repealed Act. Possession so retained by the Appellants in the parcel of the land as indicated, possession of which was unilaterally taken over including other lands (ceiling surplus), possession of the Appellants was illegal for which they were evicted under the eviction proceeding on 25.12.2003. Such illegal possession of the Appellants in the land cannot give rise an accrued and vested right. Appellants are therefore not entitled to restoration of the parcel of the land measuring 1B 4Ks and 16Ls including the land allotted to G.M.D.A., they argued. 37. Such illegal possession of the Appellants in the land cannot give rise an accrued and vested right. Appellants are therefore not entitled to restoration of the parcel of the land measuring 1B 4Ks and 16Ls including the land allotted to G.M.D.A., they argued. 37. We have given our anxious consideration to the facts and circumstances of the case together with the materials supplied in support of the contentions. We have also given our thoughtful consideration to the decisions rendered by the Apex Court and the High Courts and the submissions advanced by the counsel of either party as well. From over all considerations, we are of the considered view that the Appellants are entitled to restoration of the land measuring 1B 4Ks 16Ls at least, a parcel of the acquired vacant land in excess of ceiling limit and vested in the State Government under Section 3(2)(a) of the Repealing Act, 1999. Appellants, perhaps, relinquished their claim in the remaining land on account of sale of the same to the unsuccessful purchaser, 6 in number. The impugned judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 13.04.2007 is hereby set aside and quashed. The Respondent authorities, Respondent Nos. 1 to 5 in particular are directed to restore possession of the land measuring 1B 4Ks 16Ls to the Appellants. Such exercise shall be taken by the State Respondent Nos. 1 to 5 within a period of 3 (three) months from the date of receipt of the copy of the judgment and order. 38. Appeal stands allowed. No cost. Appeal allowed.