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2010 DIGILAW 749 (CAL)

Kamal Kumar Bohra v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL

2010-07-06

AMIT TALUKDAR, M.K.CHAUDHURI

body2010
JUDGMENT 1. LIKE Article 21 of the Constitution of India, perhaps the last word in the conspectus of the Law governing the field in relation to sub-section (2) of Section 439 CrPC is yet to be said. Perhaps, never to be said. It is ever widening. 2. IN the glasshouse of such situation, we will be required to assess the impeachability of the order dated 26.2.2009 in CGR Case No.4173 of 2008 and its connected Applications passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Alipore, which has been both, found fault with, by the State of West Bengal on one hand in C.R.M. No.7677 of 2009, C.R.M. No.7679 of 2009, C.R.M. No.7680 of 2009, C.R.M. No.7681 of 2009, C.R.M. No. 7682 of 2009, C.R.M. No.7684 of 2009 and C.R.M. No.7685 of 2009 whilst on the other hand by the de facto Complainant in C.R.M. No. 13602 of 2009, C.R.M. No. 13603 of 2009, C.R.M. No. 13606 of 2009, C.R.M. No. 13608 of 2009, C.R.M. No. 13623 of 2009, C.R.M. No. 13629 of 2009 and C.R.M. No. 13685 of 2009. Stemming from the common cause of action, these Applications have bubbled up with the similar grievance felt by two different segments in the original proceeding. They would be required to be dealt with, in this Application as a common factor and the fate of each of them would be guided by the disposal of this order. 3. BACKGROUND facts necessary for the purpose of proper disposal of this Application should be set out in a brief fashion. The de facto complainants were in search of a plot of land for construction of a warehouse. In course of the same, they had come across amongst others, these two opposite parties, who were part of the design, in which the complainants were duped into the purchase of a land which was already acquired by the Government. 4. A petition under sub-section (3) of Section 156 was filed before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Alipore on 19.11.2008 and in terms of the directions passed by the said Court, Section V-1' Police Station took up the investigation of the same and subsequently, registered Section 'V1'/DD/Spl Cell (GS) Case No. 296/2008 dated 24.11.2008 under Sections 120B/420/406/465/468, 471 of the Indian Penal Code against the present respondents and others. Both the said respondents submitted themselves before the Court of the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Alipore on 31.1.2009. 5. UPON their surrender, the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Alipore enlarged them on interim bail till 11.2.2009 after taking into account the gamut of the allegations against them. 6. PRAYER for cancellation of the Order of bail filed by the State was refused by the learned Court below. Subsequently, on 26.2.2009, the said order was confirmed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate on the basis of consideration of the materials in the Case Diary and upon hearing the parties. 7. INITIALLY, these Applications were filed on 15.9.2009 by the de facto complainant before a learned Single Judge of this Court, who issued Notice. Subsequently, it was felt that since Section 467 was also included in the FIR the same being punishable above seven years, it was released from the list. 8. CONSEQUENT, thereof, the then Principal Senior Criminal Division Bench on 02.2.2010 clubbed all these batch of Applications filed on one hand by the de facto complainant and on the other hand by the State of West Bengal and fixed the same for hearing. Later, the said Division Bench on 22.2.2010 directed exchange of affidavits. 9. THE same having matured for hearing, it was listed in our roaster and upon conclusion of the same, we reserved our order on 23.8.2010. 10. WE will now proceed to dispose of the same on the basis of our experience gathered from the submissions made at the Bar in the light of the materials and the decisions cited at the Bar. Shri Amit Bhattacharya with Shri Sandip Kumar Bhattacharya and Shri Ayan Bhattacharya in support of the Application has assailed the order on the ground that the same was passed without consulting the case diary at the initial stage and the learned Magistrate simply acted on the basis of a one sided picture without considering the entire set of allegations levelled against the accused persons. 11. SHRI Battacharya further submitted that the learned Magistrate did not consider the prayer made by the State for cancellation of the interim bail in an appropriate manner, instead confirmed it without any basis. 12. SHRI Bhattacharya further stated that absolutely, irrelevant consideration were taken into account by the learned Magistrate, which resulted in an erroneous order that is required to be set aside in this application. 12. SHRI Bhattacharya further stated that absolutely, irrelevant consideration were taken into account by the learned Magistrate, which resulted in an erroneous order that is required to be set aside in this application. Shri Bhattacharya also submitted that since Section 467 was incorporated in the FIR-the Magistrate did not have the power to consider the question of grant of bail and the order was also bad in law on that score. He placed a compendium of twenty decisions of the Apex Court, our Court, Guwahati, Allahabad and Delhi High Courts. 13. HOWEVER, he has concentrated mainly on the decisions of Nirupama Chaudhury v. Stale of W.B.1; State of W.B. v. Noor Ahmed and Anr.2; Dinesh M.N.(S.P.) v. State of Gujarat3; Lokesh Singh v. State of U.P. and Anr.4 and; Anil Kumar Tulsiyani v. State of U.P.and Anr.5 14. LEARNED public prosecutor with Shri Debabrata Roy, Shri Ranjit Ghosal and Shri Pushpal Satpathi endorsed the view of Shri Bhattacharya and showed from the Order that the allegations against the accused persons were grave in nature. He was also of the opinion that unless these persons are Custodially interrogated-the truth will never come out, where Government plot was illegally sold away by these persons. 15. LEARNED public prosecutor also filed the consolidated facts of the cases and the memo of evidence in this case. 16. HE adopted the submissions of Shri Bhattacharya in C.R.M. 13602 of 2009, CRM. 13603 of 2009, CRM. 13606 of 2009, CRM. 13608 of 2009, CRM. 12623 of 2009, 1. 2007 Vol.(2) CHN (Cal.) 879. 2. 2002(1) CHN (Cal.) 729. 3. (2008)2 SCC (Cri) 508. 4. 2009 (1) Crimes 113 (SO. 5. 2006 (2) SCC (Cri) 565. C.R.M. 13629 of 2009 and C.R.M. 13685 of 2009 on behalf of the State by way of supporting his case. In his capacity as petitioner in CRM 7677 of 2009, C.R.M. 7679 of 2009, C.R.M. 7680 of 2009, C.R.M. 7681 of 2009, C.R.M. 7682 of 2009, C.R.M, 7684 of 2009 and C.R.M. 7685 of 2009, he strongly argued that the discretion exercised by the learned Magistrate in granting bail to the two Opposite Parties was totally wrong. He has submitted the orders are required to be set aside immediately. 17. SHRI Bagchi with Ms. Rupa Bandopadhyay and SHRI Sourav Chatterjee appeared for the respondents in all these applications. 18. He has submitted the orders are required to be set aside immediately. 17. SHRI Bagchi with Ms. Rupa Bandopadhyay and SHRI Sourav Chatterjee appeared for the respondents in all these applications. 18. SHRI Bagchi at the outset submitted that the order dated 31.1.2009 granting interim bail, which was subsequently confirmed on 26.2.2009, can neither be said to be perverse nor without jurisdiction. He submitted that since the learned Magistrate had the necessary jurisdiction, it was his judicial discretion to have passed the said order. 19. HE did not see that any irrelevant consideration had weighed in the mind of the learned Magistrate, while granting bail under challenge. 20. FURTHERMORE, Shri Bagchi submitted that the argument of Shri Bhattacharya that the learned Magistrate, was swayed away by the fact that the respondents were members of the Bar, was not correct. He had simply referred to their professional status and was never guided by the same. He also doubted the correctness of Shri Bhattacharya's contention that in view of Section 467 of the IPC being inserted in the list of allegations as to whether the Magistrate had the power to consider the prayer for bail on the strength of the Single Bench decision of this Court in Sudarsan Bose v. The state of W.B.6 21. LASTLY, he wrapped up his submission by showing from the materials, the order was finally confirmed on 26.2.2009 whereas the State of West Bengal filed a prayer for cancellation on 11.6.2009 i.e. after a lapse of four months and the de facto complainant came to this court on 13.9.2009 i.e. after a lapse of seven months and as already sufficient time is elapsed-it would not be practical to interfere in the absence of any compelling reasons. 22. HE has also relied on a list of decision in support of his case to counter the point taken by Shri Bhattacharya, which are set out hereunder: (1) Savitri Agarwal and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr7; (2) Vimlaben Ajitbhai Patel v. Vatslaben Ashokbhai Patel and Ors.8; (3) Ashok Kumar v. State of U.P. and Anr.9; (4) Dolatram and Ors. v. State of Haryana10; (5) Hazari Lal Das v. State of W.B. and Anr.11; (6) Subhendu Mishra v. Subrat Kumar Mishra and Anr.12; (7) Ramcharan v. State of M.P.13; (8) Raj Kumar Jain and Anr. v. Kundan Jain and Anr.14; 6. 1997 C Cr. LR (Cal.) 346. 7. v. State of Haryana10; (5) Hazari Lal Das v. State of W.B. and Anr.11; (6) Subhendu Mishra v. Subrat Kumar Mishra and Anr.12; (7) Ramcharan v. State of M.P.13; (8) Raj Kumar Jain and Anr. v. Kundan Jain and Anr.14; 6. 1997 C Cr. LR (Cal.) 346. 7. (2009) 2 C Cr LR (SC) 656. 8. (2008) 2 C Cr. LR (SC) 1. 9. (2009) 3 SCC (Cri.) 1393. 10. 1995 SCC (Cri) 237. 11. 2009 (6) Supreme 564 . 12. 2000 SCC (Cri) 1508. 13. 2006 (1) SCC (Cri) 511. 14. 2004 SCC (Cri) 2034. (9) Sukhwant Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab15; (10) Mukesh Kishanpuria v. State of W.B.16 and ; (11) Anuradha Khemka Nee Bansal v. Sudarshan Kumar Khemka and Anr.17 At the outset, after having apprised us about the factual background of the instant case, we would proceed to see as to whether in the present case the interim bail granted by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate on 30.1.2009, which has subsequently been confirmed on 26.2.2009 can be sustained in the eye of the objection raised by Shri Bhattacharya. 23. BEFORE that, we will read the decisions cited at the Bar. 24. AT first, we will deal with the various decisions cited by Shri Bhattacharya. Even though Shri Bhattacharya in his compendium of decisions, has relied upon twenty decisions consisting amongst them of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, our Court, Allahabad High Court, Rangoon High Court, Guwahti High Court and the Delhi High Court-since he has laid particular emphasis on the decision of Lokesh Singh v. State of U.P. and Anr., (supra), Anil Kumar Tulsiyani v. State of U.P. and Anr.(supra); Dinesh M.N. (S.P.) v. State of Gujarat (supra); State of W.B. v. Noor Ahmed and Anr. (supra) and Nirupama Choudhury v. State of W.B. (supra), we will be dealing with them, although in our own way we have made our foray in the rest of others. 25. IN the decision of Lokesh Singh v. State of U.P. and Anr.(supra), which has been relied upon by Shri Bhattacharya, he has stressed that in the absence of proper 15. 2009 (3) SCC (Cri) 487. 16. 2010(2) C Cr LR (SC) 595. 17. 2005 (3) CHN 179 . 25. IN the decision of Lokesh Singh v. State of U.P. and Anr.(supra), which has been relied upon by Shri Bhattacharya, he has stressed that in the absence of proper 15. 2009 (3) SCC (Cri) 487. 16. 2010(2) C Cr LR (SC) 595. 17. 2005 (3) CHN 179 . reasoning given, both at the stage of interim bail as well as at the stage of confirmation of the same by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, the order itself became susceptible. 26. ON the strength of the same, Shri Bhattacharya has sought to cancel the order. We have perused the said decision. We are of the view that the ration of the said decision would be of no avail to Shri Bhattacharya in view of the fact that learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate has given its reasons before arriving at his conclusion, both on 1.1.2.2009 and 26.2.2009. In the said decision of the Supreme Court in Lokesh Singh v. State of U.P. and Anr. (supra), in paragraph 8 of Supreme Court had held: "...reasons for prima facie concluding why bail was granted...." is required to be indicated-in our opinion, cannot have any application since we have found reasons were there, which may not be of axiomatic strength. Reference was made by Shri Bhattacharya to the decision of Supreme Court in Anil Kumar Tulsiyani v. State of U.P. and Anr. (supra) with regard to the question that while granting bail, the learned Magistrate should have taken into account the gravity and nature of the offence. The Supreme Court in the said decision of Anil Tulsiyani v. State of U.P. and anr. (supra), was dealing with a case relating to Section 302 read with Section 201 of the IPC. In the instant case, we find even though the allegations are quite serious in nature, the same being document based and most of them having been seized already - altogether, it cannot be said that the decision arrived at by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate was improper. 27. SHRI Bhattacharya has also relied on the decision of Anil Kumar Tulsiyani v. State of U.P. and Anr. (supra) to show that it was not proper for the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate to have been swayed away by the professional status of the Opposite Parties as an Advocate. 27. SHRI Bhattacharya has also relied on the decision of Anil Kumar Tulsiyani v. State of U.P. and Anr. (supra) to show that it was not proper for the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate to have been swayed away by the professional status of the Opposite Parties as an Advocate. We have also kept the same in mind on the anvil of paragraph 12 of the said decision. As rightly pointed out by SHRI Bagchi that the respondent was a member of the Bar, was not taken note of by way of guiding factor but for locating his occupational status. We do not find from the tenor of the order that the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate ever suffered from the factum of the respondent being a member of the Bar. As such the said decision of Anil Kumar Tulsiyani v. State of U.P. and Anr. (supra), is distinguishable in the fact situation of the instant case. 28. HE has next referred to the decision of Apex Court in Dinesh M.N.(S.P.) v. State of Gujarat, (supra) to show that in the event irrelevant materials have been taken into consideration, the Order resulting therefrom, is liable to be cancelled, in our reading of the entire order passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate while confirming the interim bail and refusing the prayer for cancellation filed by the State of West Bengal, we find that the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate took into account the conspectus of the entire case while recording the order confirming bail on 26.2.2009. It may be that in his understanding the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, after taking note of the fact "....It appears from the record and the CD that the present case appears to be a case of offence like cheating, forgery and Criminal Breach of Trust, allegedly made by all the seven accused persons including the present two in connivance and conspiracy with each other by way of making purported transfer of an immovable property against a huge consideration price by way of suppressing and misleading the D. Complainant in believing that the said immovable property was free from all encumbrances by producing and furnishing several fake and fabricated documents though subsequently it transpired that the said immovable property in question had already been acquired by the Government long ago" still felt that the interim bail granted earlier can be confirmed. It is his judicial discretion. Can it be said that it is a result of non-consideration of material aspects of the Matter? Resultantly giving it a colour of vulnerable a Order? In the light of the finding of the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, we do not feel the decision of Dinesh M.N. (S.P.) v. State of Gujarat (supra) referred to by Shri Bhattacharya would come to his rescue. 29. HE has next referred to the Division Bench decision of our Court in State of W.B. v. Noor Ahmed and Anr., (supra), which was already been taken note of by Shri P.N. Sinha J., delivering the judgment in Nirupama Choudhury v. State of W.B. (supra). 30. SINHA, J., in Nirupama Choudhury v. State of W.B. (supra) was dealing with a matter relating to an offence punishable under Section 406/420 of the IPC where the learned Magistrate on the very first day allowed the prayer for bail. SINHA, J., held there was non-application of judicial mind by the learned Magistrate. The discretionary power was wrongly exercised by the learned Magistrate. As such, the bail was liable to be cancelled. While writing the judgment in Nirupama Choudhury v. State of W.B. (supra) Sinha, J., took note of the decision of Apex Court in Puran v. Rambilas and Anr.18 and of this Court in State of W.B. v. Noor 18. 2001 SCC (Cri.) 1124. Ahmed and Anr. (supra) which, we are not discussing separately and cancelled the bail. Since even in this case on the very first day the learned Magistrate enlarged the respondents on interim bail, which was fructified into a reasoned Order, which saw the confirmation of the earlier order, we feel the decision of Sinha, J., in Nirupama Choudhury v. State of W.B. (supra) cannot be applied with full strength in the fact situation of the present case. 31. THE group of decisions referred to by Shri Bagchi have also been closely perused by us. 32. AFTER we have appraised ourselves with regard to the ratio of the various decisions cited at the Bar, we find that it is quite a trite position that grant of bail, even in a serious case, is one aspect of the matter- cancellation of the same is a diametrically opposite proposition. Unless there are some cogent and overwhelming circumstances, in ordinary situation, the order granting bail should not be lightly interfered with. Unless there are some cogent and overwhelming circumstances, in ordinary situation, the order granting bail should not be lightly interfered with. Now, however, the scope in respect of sub-section (2) of Section 439 CrPC has expanded by virtue of several decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court. 33. GRANT or refusal of bail is purely a matter of discretion of the Court and no rigid guideline can be formulated. What is important is not the order but reasons in support thereof and as to whether the same suffers from the vice of non-consideration of material aspects of the matter thus rendering it to be vulnerable. 34. THE post conduct after the bail has been obtained, is also relevant consideration [See Subodh Kumar Yadav v. State of Bihar19] but in the instant case we find that there is not even the slightest murmur in this respect, on the contrary there are materials 19. (2009) 14 SCC 638 . to show that the respondents have been cooperating with the investigation. The order passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate being well reasoned, even though the conclusions reached therein may in susceptible to another view but neither it can be termed on a result of non-application of mind or passed in oblivion of relevant matters on record. As such, the same not being perverse would not be required to be set aside. [See Narendra Kumar Amin v. State of Gujarat20 as also Manjit Prakash v. Shova Devi21] 35. EVEN though Shri Bhattacharya has deleted from his area of submission, as noted earlier by us, from amongst the residual citations we would be emboldened to cull out from the decision of Apex Court in Brij Nandan Jaiswal v. Munna @ Munna Jaiswal and Anr.22 an aspect of the matter, which is of some importance in the present case. 36. IN this batch of application half of them is filed by the de fecto complainant. IN Brij Nandan Jaiswal v. Munna @ Munna Jaiswal and Anr. (supra) the Supreme Court in paragraph 7 has held: "....it is now a settled law that complainant can always question the order granting bail if the said order is not validly passed. It is not as if once a bail is granted by any court, the only way is to get it cancelled on account of its misuse. The bail order can be tested on merits also. It is not as if once a bail is granted by any court, the only way is to get it cancelled on account of its misuse. The bail order can be tested on merits also. IN our opinion, therefore, the complainant could question the merits of the order granting bail. However, we find from the order that no reasons were given by the learned Judge while granting the bail and it seems to have been granted almost me- 20. (2008) 13 SCC 584 . 21. (2009) 13 SCC 785 . 22. 2009(1) Crimes 153 (SC). chanically without considering the pros and cons of the matter. While granting bail, particularly in serious cases like murder some reasons justifying the grant are necessary." By the aforesaid reckoning, the de fecto complainant easily has the locus in this application not only filed by them but also in those, which have been preferred by the State. 37. IN the light of the same, we have heard the said applications filed by the de facto complainants in tendem with those of the State of West Bengal. However, not with standing the fact that the de facto complainant assumes a right to question the legality of the order granting bail to the respondents, it has to be established that the same was not a valid order. 38. IN the fact situation of the instant case, as we found in the foregoing paragraphs neither it can be concluded that this order, which has been assailed, is not passed validly nor it can be said that on merit the same requires interference from our discussion, which we have noted earlier. Shri Bagchi has placed before us a catena of decision which impugne on the following proposition: Merely, because the High Court had taken a different view on the subject but it cannot be said that the factors which have been taken into account by the learned Session Judge is irrelevant to the issue involved and was not a valid ground to level the order as perverse [See Savitri Agarwal and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra).] Factors which are relevant for grant and setting aside the bail order are completely different [See Vimlaben Ajitbhai Patel v. Vatslaben Ashokbhai Patel and Ors. (supra) and Dolatram and Ors. v. State of Haryana (supra). v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. (supra).] Factors which are relevant for grant and setting aside the bail order are completely different [See Vimlaben Ajitbhai Patel v. Vatslaben Ashokbhai Patel and Ors. (supra) and Dolatram and Ors. v. State of Haryana (supra). The accused being on bail for a considerable period, even though the said order suffers from same infirmities, cancellation of the same is inappropriate [See Ashok Kumar v. State of U.P. and Anr.(supra)]. The tests to be applied for interfering with an order of bail [See Subhendu Mishra v. Subrat Kumar Mishra and Anr, (supra) as also Ramcharan v. State of M.P. (supra) and Anuradha Khemka Nee Bansal v. Sudarshan Kumar Khemka and Anr. (supra). 39. RECENTLY the Supreme Court in Hazari Lal Das v. State of West Bengal and anr. (supra) after considering Dolatram and Ors. v. State of Haryana's case (supra) has held that unless there is proof of interference or attempt there of with the due course of administration of justice by the accused and that the liberty granted to him is misused in any fashion in the absence of any supervening circumstances cancellation of an Order of bail is not justified. 40. SHRI Bagchi's reference to the decision of Apex Court in Sukhwant Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab (supra) and Mukesh Kishanpuria v. State of W.B. (supra) with regard to the power of the Court to grant interim bail need not be dealt with by us at this stage since we find that the same having been merged with the final Order being assailed in this application and passes the Litmus Test applied by us. Having an overall view of the entire citations relied upon both by Shri Bhattacharya and Shri Bagchi, we are of the view while those relied upon by Shri Bhattarcharya would be difficult to apply in the factual matrix of the present case and the one referred to by Shri Bagchi has much force. 41. FROM a wholesome appreciation of all the materials, which we have seen, in the light of the submissions made at the Bar, we find that the basic structure of the case is; 42. THE de facto complainants had gone in for purchase of a certain plot of land from a person, who claimed to be the owner thereof, although the same was in acquisition by the Government. THE de facto complainants had gone in for purchase of a certain plot of land from a person, who claimed to be the owner thereof, although the same was in acquisition by the Government. These two persons placed the role of inducing the de facto complainant by way of producing forged and fabricated documents and subsequently, had the same registered on the basis of the said documents. 43. THE profile of the case, as emerges from the memorandum of evidence submitted by the learned public prosecutor, is quite serious. THE allegations levelled against the respondents and others cannot be viewed lightly. Materials collected shows the involvement of the accused persons. 44. BUT simply, the gravity of the offence cannot be sufficient for the purpose of setting aside an Order of bail obtained from an otherwise Court of competent jurisdiction. As rightly pointed out by Shri Bagchi, the interim bail granted on 30.1.2009, has subsequently been confirmed on 26.2.2009. There has been sufficient delay, both by the State of West Bengal as well as by the de facto complainant in preferring application for cancelling the said order. 45. IN our opinion, the cause of action has become quite stale. The respondents had been on bail since 30.1.2009. There is no allegation that they have misused the liberty. 46. POST-bail conduct is very much important factor to be reckoned with for the purpose of cancelling the bail. We have meticulously considered this aspect and do not find that there is even any single allegation that either these respondents had misused the liberty granted by the learned Magistrate or they have in any way tampered with the investigation. [See Nityanand Rai v. State of Bihar23]. That apart, the learned Magistrate, while granting interim bail and subsequently confirming it, in exercise of his judicial discretion, reached his own conclusion. 47. A Court while assessing the impact of an order of bad within the meaning of subsection (2) of Section 439, would normally not question the Order but however, would be free to look into the reasons, which has persuaded the Court while granting bail, which falls but challenge before it. 48. IN such curve, we have weighed the order on the anvil of the various decisions cited at the Bar. 48. IN such curve, we have weighed the order on the anvil of the various decisions cited at the Bar. Reasons that have persuaded the learned Magistrate to arrive at his conclusion, can neither be said to be perverse nor the result of material non-consideration of the relevant fact. As such, the said order, not being vulnerable and after lapse of so many months, we feel it would not be an appropriate exercise on our part to interfere with an otherwise valid Order from a Court of competent jurisdiction. 49. IT would be very much pertient to note that both Shri Bhattacharya and the learned Public Prosecutor has waxed much eloquence with regard to the Custodial interrogation of the respondents. The learned Magistrate has very aptly found, ".. ..There is also nothing in the record to hold that the investigating agency ever made any attempt to have interrogation of any of the said two accused or that the said two accused ever dis- 23. 2005 SCC (Cri.) 1159. regarded the said authority of the investigating agency in ay manner." 50. THERE is a Magisterial finding to the effect that these two respondents have never disregarded any of the directions contained in the Order of the interim bail in any manner. To the subjective satisfaction he concluded "The interim bail granted in favour of the said two accused accordingly stands confirmed..." In view of Sudarsan Bose's case (supra) the objection with regard to the jurisdiction of Ld. ACJM to grant bail also place into insignificance . We feel there is hardly any scope for intervention with the said Order in the absence of any overwhelming or cogent reasoning or that the order has been vulnerable. 51. ACCORDINGLY, we refuse to interfere with the same. But however, we would feel some embargo should be put on the respondents for the purpose of an effective investigation. 52. THE respondents would be required to report to the investigation officer twice a week and that they shall not leave the jurisdiction of their local police station (Maheshtolla) except for the purpose of meeting the Investigating Officer and also attending the Court as well as their profession place of business. 52. THE respondents would be required to report to the investigation officer twice a week and that they shall not leave the jurisdiction of their local police station (Maheshtolla) except for the purpose of meeting the Investigating Officer and also attending the Court as well as their profession place of business. It should be further noted that under no circumstances the respondents would be permitted to enter of the GRO Office (Calcutta) or have any access to the documents related to this case as maintained in the officer of the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Alipore in whatsoever fashion. 53. IN the event it is borne out that either they are seeking to tamper with any document, or making any overt threat or inducement to any person interested or related wit this case or otherwise in any manner misusing the liberty-the bonds furnished by them before the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate on 11.2.2009 in connection with CGR Case No. 4173,4174,4177,4172,4175, 4176,4178 of 2008 shall automatically stands cancelled without any further reference to this Court. With this modification, the applications stand disposed of. Petition dismissed.