JUDGMENT : ARUN MISHRA, J. 1. In these matters the question involved is the same, hence they are being decided by this common order. In M.Cr.C. No. 3172/2007 and Cr. R. No. 1702/2007, petitioner is Jugal Kishore Bagri and in M.Cr.C. No. 2906/2007 and Cr. R. No. 1778/2007, petitioner is Ganesh Singh. 2. A prosecution has been filed against Jugal Kishore Bagri and Ganesh Singh for commission of offence under section 13(1)(d) read with section 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, under sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 120-B and 511/34 of Indian Penal Code and section 6 of M. P. Lok Seva (Anusuchit Jatiyon, Anusuchit Janjatiyon Aur Anya Pichhade Vargon Ke Liye Aarakshan) Adhiniyam, 1994 (hereinafter referred to as Adhiniyam, 1994). 3. Offence relates back to the period June, 1998 to September, 1998. Shri Jugal Kishore Bagri was a Member of Legislative Assembly for the period 3-1-1995 to 6-1-2000. By virtue of holding said office of Legislative Assembly, he entered in the office of Education Committee of District Panchayat, Satna. He was member of said committee w.e.f. 13-1-1995 till 6-1-2000. He was elected as Member of Legislative Assembly initially w.e.f. 7-12-1993 to 1-12-1998 and thereafter he was re-elected as Member of Legislative Assembly on 1-12-1998 till 5-12-2003 and entered the office of Member of Legislative Assembly again w.e.f. 5-12-2003 till the date of filing of the charge-sheet on 18-1-2007. It is also submitted that he had entered the office of Education Committee w.e.f. 4-4-2000 to 28-2-2005 and thereafter from 25-1-2006 he became Member of Administrative Committee and Works Committee of District Panchayat by virtue of holding the office of Member of Legislative Assembly. On 18-1-2000, an additional charge-sheet was filed against him. Sanction was applied for, which was refused by the Speaker of erstwhile Vidhansabha. 4. Shri Ganesh Singh at the relevant time when offence in question was committed, was elected Member of District Panchayat. By virtue of elected Member of District Panchayat, he was a member of Selection Committee appointed for the purpose of selection of Shiksha Karmis. He was ceased to be the Member of said District Panchayat, thereafter re-elected as Member of Parliament. After the said tenure is over, he has again was re-elected as Member of Parliament. He remained member of District Panchayat till 10-9-2004 and on 13-5-2004 he was elected as Member of Parliament. He was ceased to be the Member of said District Panchayat, thereafter re-elected as Member of Parliament. After the said tenure is over, he has again was re-elected as Member of Parliament. He remained member of District Panchayat till 10-9-2004 and on 13-5-2004 he was elected as Member of Parliament. Then he was co-opted as Member of General Administration Committee of District Panchayat. 5. Petitions under section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code have been filed by the petitioners to quash the charge-sheet and order dated 17-3-2007 passed by Special Judge, Satna in Special Case No. 7/2004. In Criminal Revisions, same set of petitioners have assailed order dated 20-8-2007 whereby charges have been framed by the Special Judge, Satna. 6. Shri S. C. Datt, learned Sr. Counsel along with Shri Anil Khare, Shri G. P. Patel and Shri Pratyush Tripathi for petitioners have submitted that in discharge of the duty as public servant, the act was done, the sanction under section 197 of Criminal Procedure Code was required to be obtained. Apart from that the petitioners continue to hold the office of Member of Committee of District Panchayat by virtue of their election as people's representative. The sanction under section 19 of Prevention of Corruption Act was also necessary to be obtained as well as under section 6 of Adhiniyam, 1994. Thus the charge-sheet could not have been filed without obtaining requisite sanction, neither the petitioners could have been put to trial by framing the charges. 7. Shri Aditya Adhikari, learned counsel appearing for respondents has submitted that under section 19 of Prevention of Corruption Act, it was not necessary to obtain any sanction as the petitioners cease to hold the office of their being members of the Committee. In case they have entered in another office or re-elected to the same office for different tenure, it cannot be said that sanction is necessitated. For commission of offence under sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 120-B and 511 read with section 34 of Indian Penal Code no sanction was necessary to be obtained under section 197 of Criminal Procedure Code. Since they have ceased to hold the office, no sanction was necessitated under section 6 of Adhiniyam, 1994. Counsel has placed reliance on a decision of Apex Court in State of H. P. vs. M. P. Gupta, (2004) 2 SCC 349 . 8. Since they have ceased to hold the office, no sanction was necessitated under section 6 of Adhiniyam, 1994. Counsel has placed reliance on a decision of Apex Court in State of H. P. vs. M. P. Gupta, (2004) 2 SCC 349 . 8. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that there is no merit in the submissions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners. In Prakash Singh Badal and others vs. State of Punjab and others, 2007(1) SC 1, similar submissions were raised, the Apex Court has laid down that in such circumstances the sanction is not necessary. It has also been laid down that when the commission of offence is under sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 120-B of Indian Penal Code, no sanction for prosecution is necessary. The Apex Court has considered the question of sanction for prosecution with reference to the similar fact situation where person who had been sought to be prosecuted, had already ceased to hold the office in question, though he may continue to be a public servant in any other capacity at the time of taking cognizance. It is not necessary to obtain sanction, section 19(1) is time and offence related. In our opinion, similar is the situation with respect to section 6 of Adhiniyam, 1994. The Apex Court has laid down in Parkash Singh Badal and another (supra) thus :- 23. The main contention advanced by Shri Venugopal, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant is that a public servant who continues to remain so (on transfer) has got to be protected as long as he continues to hold his office. According to the learned counsel, even if the offending act is committed by a public servant in his former capacity and even if such a public servant has not abused his subsequent office still such a public servant needs protection of section 19(1) of the Act. According to the learned counsel, the judgment of this Court in R. S. Nayak vs. A. R. Antulay, (1984) 2 SCC 183 holding that the subsequent position of the public servant to be unprotected was erroneous. According to the learned counsel, the public servant needs protection all throughout as long as he continues to be in the employment. 24. The plea is clearly untenable as section 19(1) of the Act is time and offence related. 9. According to the learned counsel, the public servant needs protection all throughout as long as he continues to be in the employment. 24. The plea is clearly untenable as section 19(1) of the Act is time and offence related. 9. A Division Bench of this Court in Misc. Criminal Case No. 9247/2007, Mukesh Kacker vs. Special Police Establishment and another has considered the question thus :- 13. In R. S. Nayak vs. A. R. Antuly (supra) Supreme Court held : "the relevant date with reference to which a valid sanction is sine-qua-non for taking cognizance of an offence committed by public servant as required by section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 is the date on which the Court is called upon to take cognizance of the offence of which he is accused. If, therefore, when the offence is alleged to have been committed, the accused was a public servant, but by the time the Court is called upon to take cognizance of the offence committed by him as public servant, he has ceased to be a public servant, no sanction would be necessary for taking cognizance of the offence against him. This approach is in accord with the policy underlying section 6. In that a public servant is not to be exposed to harassment of a frivolous or speculative prosecution. In the above case, on the date on which the cognizance was taken, the accused had ceased to hold the office of Chief Minister and then ceased to be a public servant and, therefore, no sanction under section 6 was found necessary before cognizance of the offence could be taken against him for offences alleged to have been committed in his former capacity as a public servant. In R. S. Nayak's (supra) it was held that the Prevention of Corruption Act was enacted to make more effective provision for the prevention of bribery and corruption. Therefore, the provisions of the Act must receive such construction as would advance the object and purpose underlying the Act and at any rate not defeated. It would be the duty of the Court to adopt that construction, which would advance the object underlying the Act. 14. Therefore, the provisions of the Act must receive such construction as would advance the object and purpose underlying the Act and at any rate not defeated. It would be the duty of the Court to adopt that construction, which would advance the object underlying the Act. 14. In the decision rendered in the case of Prakash Singh Badal (supra) the Supreme Court repelled the contention of the accused that even if the offending act was committed by a public servant in his former capacity and even if such a public servant had not abused his subsequent office, still such a public servant needed protection of section 19(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act throughout, as long as he continues to be in public employment, and that the judgment of Supreme Court in R. S. Nayak case (1984) 2 SCC 182 holding that the subsequent position of the public servant to be unprotected, was erroneous. This contention is clearly untenable as section 19(1) of the Act is time and offence related. Protection of public servant under section 19(1) had been confined to the time related criminal acts performed under the colour or authority of public servant's own pleasure or benefit as categorized in sections 7, 10, 11, 14 and 15. In view of the aforesaid we are of the considered opinion that no sanction was necessary under section 19 of Prevention of Corruption Act and section 6 of Adhiniyam, 1994. 10. With reference to question of sanction when the person has committed the offence under sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 120-B and 511 read with section 34 of Indian Penal Code, no sanction is required, he was not acting in discharging to the official duty. The Apex Court in Prakash Singh Badal (supra) has considered the question thus :- 50. The offence of cheating under section 420 or for that matter offences relatable to sections 467, 468, 471 and 120-B can by no stretch of imagination by their very nature be regarded as having been committed by any public servant while acting or purporting to act in discharging of official duty. In such cases, official status only provides an opportunity for commission of the offence. In State of H. P. vs. M. P. Gupta (supra), the Apex Court has considered the question thus :- 21. In such cases, official status only provides an opportunity for commission of the offence. In State of H. P. vs. M. P. Gupta (supra), the Apex Court has considered the question thus :- 21. That apart, the contention of the respondent that for offences under sections 406 and 409 read with section 120-B Indian Penal Code sanction under section 197 of the Code is a condition precedent for launching the prosecution is equally fallacious. This Court has stated the legal position in Shreekantian Ramayya Munipalli case AIR 1955 SC 287 and also Amrik Singh case AIR 1955 SC 309 that it is not every offence committed by a public servant which requires sanction for prosecution under section 197 of the Code, nor even every act done by him while he is actually engaged in the performance of his official duties. Following the above legal position it was held in Harihar Prasad vs. State of Bihar, (1972) 3 SCC 89 as follows : "As far as the offence of criminal conspiracy punishable under section 120-B, read with section 409 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned and also section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act are concerned, they cannot be said to be of the nature mentioned in section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. To put it shortly, it is no part of the duty of a public servant, while discharging his official duties, to enter into a criminal conspiracy or to indulge in criminal misconduct. Want of sanction under section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is, therefore, no bar." 22. Above views are reiterated in State of Kerala vs. V. Padmanabhan Nair, (1999) 5 SCC 690 and Shreekantian Ramayya Munipalli case AIR 1955 SC 287 were noted in that case. Sections 467, 468 and 471 Indian Penal Code relate to forgery of valuable security, Will etc; forgery for the purpose of cheating and using as genuine a forged document respectively. It is no part of the duty of a public servant while discharging his official duties to commit forgery of the type covered by the aforesaid offences. Want of sanction under section 197 of the Code, is therefore, no bar. Shri Anil Khare, learned counsel has relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in State of M. P. vs. Sheetla Sahai and others, (2009) 8 SCC 617 . Want of sanction under section 197 of the Code, is therefore, no bar. Shri Anil Khare, learned counsel has relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in State of M. P. vs. Sheetla Sahai and others, (2009) 8 SCC 617 . The facts of aforesaid case are totally different. The accused was not charged under sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 120-B and 511 read with section 34 of Indian Penal Code. The main charge was under section 13(1)(d)(ii)-(iii) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Considering the facts of the said case, it was held that in discharge of official duty, offence under section 120-A of Indian Penal Code was committed. In the instant case the charges levelled are totally different, thus decision is of no assistance to espouse the submission raised by Shri Khare. In view of the aforesaid, we find there is no merit in these petitions, they deserve dismissal. Petitions are hereby dismissed. Special Judge to expedite the trial as for the last three years matters have remained pending before this Court. No costs.