JUDGMENT Deepak Gupta, J. This appeal by the State is directed against the judgment dated 17th May, 1996 delivered by the learned Sessions Judge, Solan in Session Trial No. 10-NL/7 of 1995, whereby the accused has been acquitted of having committed an offence of attempting to rape the prosecutrix punishable under Section 376 read with Section 511 of the Indian Penal Code. 2. It is not disputed that the prosecutrix is only about eight years old. On 13th January, 1995 at 12.30 p.m Smt. Rattani Devi (PW-4), mother of the prosecutrix lodged a complaint with Police Station, Nalagarh to the effect that at about 11.30 a.m., she and her daughter (prosecutrix) after taking their meals were sitting on the roof of the house enjoying the sunshine. After some time, the prosecutrix went down to the ground floor. Their neighbour Hem Raj accused, called the prosecutrix and told her that he would give her some money to celebrate “Lohri”. Then the prosecutrix went to the room of Hem Raj. The mother of the prosecutrix came down and saw that the prosecutrix had been made to stand next to the wall of the kitchen of Hem Raj accused and her ‘Pajami’ had been pulled down. Accused Hem Raj had also taken off his Pajama and underwear and he had raised the frock of the prosecutrix and had placed his male organ next to the private part of the prosecutrix. The complainant immediately raised an alarm and called the owner of the house Mr.Yash Pal Joshi, who was standing below the house. He came, and was informed about the entire incident and thereafter the matter was reported to the Police. 3. The prosecutrix, who is only eight years old, was examined in Court. She is a child witness. The Court came to the conclusion that this child did not understand the sanctity of oath. Therefore her statement was recorded without administering oath to her. Her entire statement reads as follows: “Stated that it was winter about one year back on the day of ‘Lohri’. I was at my house. My mother was on the roof of the house. I know accused Hem Raj. He is our neighbourer. The accused called me near him by promising to give me five rupee on account of ‘Lohri’. I went near the accused. The accused pulled out my underwear. He lifted my frock. I was at my house. My mother was on the roof of the house. I know accused Hem Raj. He is our neighbourer. The accused called me near him by promising to give me five rupee on account of ‘Lohri’. I went near the accused. The accused pulled out my underwear. He lifted my frock. He kissed my private parts. Thereafter he took out his underwear and wanted to touch his penis to my stomach.called my mother. My mother came there. When my mother came there the accused did not run. He stayed there. My mother thereafter came to Police Station, Nalagarh. One Joshi uncle resides in our village. My mother called Joshi uncle there. Xxxx By Sh.A.S.Ranu, Advocate I had come from the roof to the door of the house to put a lock thereon.” 4. It is pertinent to note that this witness has not been cross-examined at all except that she had came down from the roof of the house to lock the door. No suggestion has been put to this witness that her statement that the accused lured her by offering her Rs.5/-; pulled off her underwear; lifted her frock and kissed her private part is false. The prosecutrix has not been subjected to any cross-examination in this regard. . This child has clearly stated that the accused had placed his penis on her stomach. There is no cross-examination to this part of this statement. Once a child witness is examined in the Court, the other side has a right to cross-examine the child witness. No doubt, it is the duty of the court to ensure that complicated questions are not put to the child in cross-examination so that the witness does not get confused but the accused has a right to cross-examine the witness and if he chooses not to exercise his right, he does so at his own peril. 5. The law with regard to appreciation of the evidence of a child witness is well settled. The statement of the child witness is required to be scrutinized with great care and caution because there is always the possibility of a child being tutored by his/her parents or guardians to make a statement in a particular manner. In this case there is not even a suggestion put to the child that she had been tutored. The statement of the child witness is required to be scrutinized with great care and caution because there is always the possibility of a child being tutored by his/her parents or guardians to make a statement in a particular manner. In this case there is not even a suggestion put to the child that she had been tutored. We cannot also loose the sight of the fact that the F.I.R. was lodged within one hour of the incident and on all material particulars, the statement of the prosecutrix tallies with what has been recorded in the F.I.R. 6. Coming to the statement of Smt. Rattani Devi, mother of the prosecutrix, in substance her statement remained the same. However, the main difference between her statement and what was stated in the complaint is that whereas in the complaint it was stated that the prosecutrix went down on her own accord, in the statement made on oath it is stated that the prosecutrix was sent down to lock the door of the room. The other contradiction pointed out by Sh. Ramakant Sharma is that the prosecutrix had called the mother down whereas this fact was not stated in the F.I.R. An F.I.R. is not supposed to be a complete encyclopedia of what has happened. It is only a First Information Report which is given to the police. At that time, a person like PW-4, the mother of a young girl who has been sexually abused would herself be in a state of shock and there shall always be some minor discrepancies in such a case. The mother also stated that when she went down, the accused took off his pant and underwear. The underwear of the prosecutrix was also not on her legs. The prosecutrix also informed her mother about the entire incident. 7. PW-6 Sh. Yash Pal Joshi, owner of the house has given a different version. According to him, it was the prosecutrix who called him from a shop when he was going out of his house to do the work. When he went inside the house of the accused, he saw the mother of the prosecutrix giving beatings to the accused with a ‘Danda’ and the accused was sitting with his trouser open. According to this witness, the accused admitted that he had committed a mistake. When he went inside the house of the accused, he saw the mother of the prosecutrix giving beatings to the accused with a ‘Danda’ and the accused was sitting with his trouser open. According to this witness, the accused admitted that he had committed a mistake. He also stated that the mother of the prosecutrix told him that the accused was trying to have sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix. 8. The learned trial Court has basically acquitted the accused mainly on the ground that in view of the contradictory statement of PW-6, it is not possible to rely upon the statement of the prosecutrix. The statements of the prosecutrix and the mother have been discarded mainly on the ground that the only independent witness PW-6 Sh.Yash Pal Joshi has not supported the prosecution version in material particulars. According to the learned trial Court the accused may have been extending some affectionate gestures to the prosecutrix which appear to have been mistaken by her mother. In view of the contradictions in the statements of the witnesses, the learned trial Court held that no attempt to have sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix was proved and hence acquitted the accused. 9. With due respect to the learned trial Court, we are of the considered view that the trial court has totally mis-appreciated the evidence in this regard. The statement of the prosecutrix herself has been reproduced completely in the earlier part of the judgment. The prosecutrix clearly stated that the accused pulled off her underwear, lifted her frock and kissed her private part. In her statement, she has not stated that any attempt was made by the accused to commit the offence of rape since in her statement in Court she had not stated that the accused tried to insert his male organ into her private part. However, she stated that he had placed his penis on her stomach. Even if an attempt to commit rape is not made out, it is clearly a case of outraging the modesty of a woman that too a very young girl. 10. At the outset , we may note the principles relating to the powers of the Appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against acquittal which have been enumerated by the Apex Court in Chandrappa and Others Vs State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415. The Apex Court held as follows:- ’15. 10. At the outset , we may note the principles relating to the powers of the Appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against acquittal which have been enumerated by the Apex Court in Chandrappa and Others Vs State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415. The Apex Court held as follows:- ’15. Bare reading of Section 378 of the present Code (Appeal in case of acquittal) quoted above, makes it clear that no restrictions have been imposed by the Legislature on the powers of the appellate Court in dealing with appeals against acquittal. When such an appeal is filed, the High Court has full power to reappreciate, review and reconsider the evidence at large, the material on which the order of acquittal is founded and to reach its own conclusions on such evidence. Both questions of fact and of law are open to determination by the High Court in an appeal against an order of acquittal. 16. It cannot, however, be forgotten that in case of acquittal, there is a double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person should be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved to be guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured an acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is certainly not weakened but reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.” 8. Thereafter the Apex Court Culled out the following principles:- “42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge; (1) An appellate Court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded; (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law’ (3) Various expressions, such as, ‘substantial and compelling reasons’, ‘good and sufficient grounds’, ‘very strong circumstances’, ‘distorted conclusion’, ‘glaring mistakes’, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of ‘flourishes of language’ to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 11. Reference may also be made to the judgment of the apex Court in Arulvelu and another Vs. State represented by the Public Prosecutor and another (2009) 10 S.C.C.206, wherein the apex Court held as follows: “36. Careful scrutiny of all these judgments lead to the definite conclusion that the appellate Court should be very slow in setting aside a judgment of acquittal particularly in a case where two views are possible. The trial Court judgment can not be set aside because the appellate Court’s view is more probable. The appellate court would not be justified in setting aside the trial court judgment unless it arrives at a clear finding on marshalling the entire evidence on record that the judgment of the trial court is either perverse or wholly unsustainable in law” 40. Unquestionably, the appellate court has power to review and reappreciate the entire evidence on record. The appellate court would be justified in reversing the judgment of acquittal only if there are substantial and compelling reasons and when the judgment of the trial court is found to be a perverse judgment. Interfering in a routine manner where other view is possible is contrary to the settled legal position crystalised by the aforementioned judgments of this Court. The accused is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty. The accused possessed this presumption when he was before the trial court. Interfering in a routine manner where other view is possible is contrary to the settled legal position crystalised by the aforementioned judgments of this Court. The accused is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty. The accused possessed this presumption when he was before the trial court. The trial court’s acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. This fundamental principle must be kept in view while dealing with the judgments of acquittal passed by the trial court.” 12. The conclusion which we can draw from the aforesaid law laid down by the apex Court is that the appellate Court has full powers to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence. There are no limits to the powers of the appellate Court but if two views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court. However, if the judgment of the trial Court is totally perverse then the appellate Court can definitely interfere in the matter. 13. In the present case, the learned trial Court seems to have swayed only by the fact that no case of attempt of rape was made out. A conjoint reading of the statement of the prosecutrix who has virtually been subjected to no cross examination as well as the statement of the mother (PW-4) and the land-lord (PW-6) leave no manner of doubt that the accused is guilty of outraging the modesty of a young girl child. He may not have raped her or attempted to commit rape on her but his conduct is reprehensible. A thirty three year old man kissing the private part of a eight year old girl is subhuman conduct. Though there may be a minor contradictions in the statements of the witnesses, what emerges from the evidence is that the accused had taken off his pants and underwear and had also taken off the underwear of the minor girl. If this is not an offence amounting to outraging the modesty of a woman, we fail to understand what would constitute such an offence. Any offence which casts a cloud on the character of a female, is an offence amounting to outraging the modesty of woman in terms of Section 354 I.P.C. 14. The main defence of the accused is that he has been falsely implicated. Any offence which casts a cloud on the character of a female, is an offence amounting to outraging the modesty of woman in terms of Section 354 I.P.C. 14. The main defence of the accused is that he has been falsely implicated. According to him, the father of the prosecutrix used to regularly fight with and in a drunken state beat the mother of the prosecutrix. According to him, PW-4, Smt. Rattani Devi wanted to file a case against her husband and had asked the accused to appear as her witness. Since he refused, she had falsely implicated him in this offence. This explanation on the face of it appears to be false. Reference in this behalf may be made to the judgment of the apex court in State of Punjab vs. Gurmit Singh and others, JT 1996(1) SC 298, the Apex Court held as follows:- “The courts must, while evaluating evidence, remain alive to the fact that in a case of rape, no self-respecting woman would come forward in a court just to make a humiliating statement against her honour such as is involved in the commission of rape on her. In cases involving sexual molestation, supposed considerations which have no material effect on the veracity of the prosecution case or even discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix should not, unless the discrepancies are such which are of fatal nature, be allowed to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. The inherent bashfulness of the females and the tendency to conceal outrage of sexual aggression are factors which the courts should not overlook. The testimony of the victim in such cases is vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of her statement, the courts should find no difficult to act on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable. Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. Why should the evidence of a girl or a woman who complains of rape or sexual molestation, be viewed with doubt, disbelief or suspicion? Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. Why should the evidence of a girl or a woman who complains of rape or sexual molestation, be viewed with doubt, disbelief or suspicion? The court while appreciating the evidence of a prosecutrix may look for some assurance of her statement to satisfy its judicial conscience, since she is a witness who is interested in the outcome of the charge leveled by her, but there is no requirement of law to insist upon corroboration of her statement to base conviction of an accused. The evidence of a victim of sexual assault stands almost on a par with the evidence of an injured witness and to an extent is even more reliable. Just as a witness who has sustained some injury in the occurrence, which is not found to be self inflicted, is considered to be a good witness in the sense that he is least likely to shield the real culprit, the evidence of a victim of a sexual offence is entitled to great weight, absence of corroboration notwithstanding. Corroborative evidence is not an imperative component of judicial credence in every case of rape. Corroboration as a condition for judicial reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix is not a requirement of law but a guidance of prudence under given circumstances. It must not be overlooked that a woman or a girl subjected to sexual assault is not an accomplice to the crime but is a victim of another person’s lust and it is improper and undesirable to test her evidence with a certain amount of suspicion, treating her as if she were an accomplice. Inferences have to be drawn from a given set of facts and circumstances with realistic diversity and not dead uniformity lest that type of rigidity in the shape of rule of law is introduced through a new form of testimonial tyranny making justice a casualty. Courts cannot cling to a fossil formula and insist upon corroboration even if, taken as a whole, the case spoken of by the victim of sex crime strikes the judicial mind as probable.” 15. Courts cannot cling to a fossil formula and insist upon corroboration even if, taken as a whole, the case spoken of by the victim of sex crime strikes the judicial mind as probable.” 15. The Apex Court in Rajinder @ Raju vs. State of H.P. JT 2009 (9) SC 9 held as follows:- “In the context of Indian Culture, a woman – victim of sexual aggression – would rather suffer silently than to falsely implicate somebody. Any statement of rape is an extremely humiliating experience for a woman and until she is a victim of sex crime, she would not blame anyone but the real culprit. While appreciating the evidence of the prosecutrix, the Courts must always keep in mind that no self respecting woman would put her honour at stake by falsely alleging commission of rape on her and, therefore, ordinarily a look for corroboration of her testimony is unnecessary and uncalled for. But for high improbability in the prosecution case, the conviction in the case of sex crime may be based on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix. It has been rightly said that corroborative evidence is not an imperative component of judicial credence in every case of rape nor the absence of injuries on the private parts of the victim can be construed as evidence of consent.” 16. In the present case, the prosecutrix is a young girl child of 7-8 years. She probably may not even understand what the accused was trying to do with her. She immediately told to her mother about the incident, who in turn, called PW-6 the land-lord and then they went to the police station. The F.I.R. was lodged within one hour. There is no reason to disbelieve the testimonies of the prosecutrix and her mother. If we apply the principles laid down in the aforesaid cases by the apex Court, it is more than apparent that no mother would involve her minor daughter in a false case of sexual molestation just to settle scores with a person who does not want to appear as a witness, in her favour. 17. In view of the above discussions, we are of the considered opinion that the learned trial Court has totally mis-directed itself in not considering the question as to whether the accused was guilty of an offence lesser than the offence with which he was charged. 17. In view of the above discussions, we are of the considered opinion that the learned trial Court has totally mis-directed itself in not considering the question as to whether the accused was guilty of an offence lesser than the offence with which he was charged. From the evidence on record, we have no doubt in our mind that the accused is guilty of having committed an offence punishable under Section 354 I.P.C. Having convicted the accused, we would like to hear the accused on the question of quantum of sentence. For this purpose, the matter be listed on 27th May, 2010. 18. Mr. Ramakant Sharma, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, states that bailable warrants may be issued to secure the presence of the accused. His request is accepted. The Registry is directed to issue the bailable warrants against the accused in the sum of Rs.10,000/- with one surety of the like amount directing the accused to appear before this Court on 27th May, 2010.