JUDGMENT A.C. Upadhyay, J. 1. Heard Mr. A.K. Bhowmik, learned senior Counsel assisted by Mr. S. Ghosh, learned Counsel, Mr. N. Adhikari, learned Advocate General, Tripura, Mr. S. Talapatra, learned senior Counsel assisted by Mr. S. Chakraborty, learned Addl. Government Advocate and Mr. P.K. Biswas, learned Counsel on behalf of the respective parties. 2. These criminal revision petitions, arising out of the same set of facts, which raise similar questions of law and facts, have been taken up together for disposal by this common judgment and order. 3. In Criminal Revision Petition No. 04 of 2010, the accused/Petitioner, Sri Subal Kr. Dey, prays for his acquittal from the charges under Section 500/501 IPC, by quashing the order dated 18.01.2010 passed by learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Court No. 2, West Tripura, in complaint case C.R. No. 03 of 2005, titled, 'Public Prosecutor v. Ratan Lai Nath and Subal Kumar Dey' (accused). In Criminal Revision Petition No. 05 of 2010, the accused/Petitioners Smti. Paramita Livingstone and Sri Pradip Datta Bhowmik, seek quashing ofthe order dated 18.01.2010 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 2, Agartala, West Tripura, in complamt case C.R. No. 01 of 2005, titled. 'Public Prosecutor v. Ratan Lai Nath, Smt. Paramita Livingstone and Pradip Datta Bhowmik (accused), and pray for acquittal of the accused Petitioners from the offence under Section 500/500 IPC. Further, in Criminal Revision Petition No. 19 of 2010, the complainant/Petitioner i.e. the Public Prosecutor, Tripura, seeks quashing of the impugned order dated 02.01.2010, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, were by proceeding against accused Sri Ratan Lai Nath has been dropped. 4. Facts, leading to the filing of these criminal revision petitions, may be stated briefly, as follows: The Public Prosecutor, West Tripura, Agartala filed two complaint cases as aforenoted i.e. C.R. 01 of 2005 and C.R. 03 of 2005, on the basis of two separate sanction orders accorded by the Governor of Tripura, under the provision of Clause (a) of Sub-section (4) of Section 199 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, alleging commission of offence under Section 500/501of the Indian Penal Code against the accused above named for making false imputation and for printing and publishing the defamatory news item in the local news papers against the Minister in-charge of Finance Department, Government of Tripura, Sri Badal Choudhury. 5. 5. After examination of the witnesses of the complainant, the learned trial Court cognizance of the offence and, accordingly, issued process against the Respondents for their appearance. On appearance of the Respondents in the Court, the evidence of the witnesses before charge was recorded by the learned trial Court. On the basis of the materials available on record, finding sufficient grounds to proceed ahead with the trial against the accused, the learned trial Court framed formal charge against all the accused under the aforesaid Sections of law in both the complaint cases separately. 6. When the criminal trial was at the stage of recording prosecution witnesses, after framing of the charge, an application was filed by Sri Ratan Lai Nath, accused in CR No. 03 of 2005, before learned trial Court, praying for dropping the complaint proceeding against him on the plea that a charge has already been framed against him for alleged commission of offence of making defamatory statement against Sri Badal Choudhury, Finance Minister of Tripura, in complaint Case CR No. 01 of 2005, on the ground that it offends Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India. 7. The learned Court on the prayer so made by the accused passed the following orders: Since the case C.R. 01/05 is pending in this Court, the case has been called on the same sitting and on careful perusal of the charge brought against the accused Ratan Lai Nath is found to be similar to that of the charge framed in C.R. 03/05. Since the fundamental rule of law is being pleaded by the defence for the accused Ratan Lai Nath, this Court is also of the same view that a person is not to be tried twice for the same allegation. Accordingly, the case against Shri Ratan Lai Nath in C.R. 03 of 2005 is liable to be dropped, as prayed for under the above petition. Accordingly, it is ordered that the case against the said accused Ratan Lai Nath in C.R. No. 03 of 2005 stands dropped. 8. Accordingly, the case against Shri Ratan Lai Nath in C.R. 03 of 2005 is liable to be dropped, as prayed for under the above petition. Accordingly, it is ordered that the case against the said accused Ratan Lai Nath in C.R. No. 03 of 2005 stands dropped. 8. The revision petition (Criminal Revision Petition No. 19 of 2010) has been filed by the State contending therein that the learned Court below committed serious illegality and material irregularity in dropping the charge in respect of accused, Sri Ratan Lai Nath, inasmuch as the Court has got no legal authority to drop the charge against an accused during the continuance of the trial. Mr. Talapatra, learned senior Counsel for the Petitioner contended that since the learned trial Court had no jurisdiction to drop the charge at trial stage, at the most the Court ought to have asked for joint trial of both the complaints and, if necessary, by reframing the charge against the accused. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner submitted that there is no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure to drop a charge in the trial Court after it has been formally framed and the trial on the charge so framed has commenced. 9. At this stage it would be more pertinent to examine the procedure of trial of complaint case filed a Public Prosecutor in terms of Sub-section (2) of Section 199 Code of Criminal Procedure. As per provision of Section 237 Code of Criminal Procedure, a (Court of Sessions taking cognizance of an offence of defamation under Sub-section (2) of Section 199 Code of Criminal Procedure, shall try the case in accordance with the procedure, for the trial of warrant cases instituted otherwise than on a police report before a Court of Magistrate. In terms of provision of Section 244 Code of Criminal Procedure in Chapter-XIX part-B (cases instituted otherwise than on a police report), when the accused appears or is brought before the Court, the trial Court shall proceed to hear the prosecution and take all such evidence in support of the prosecution and as per provision of Section245 of Code of Criminal Procedure, if, upon taking all the evidence referred to in Section 244, the trial Court considers for reasons to be recorded that no case is made out against the accused, he shall discharge him. Sub-section 2 of Section 245 of Code of Criminal Procedure further provides that the trial Court is not prevented from discharging the accused at any previous stage of the case if, for the reasons to be recorded, he considers to be the charge is groundless. Section 246 of Code of Criminal Procedure refers to a procedure when the accused is not discharged. As per the provision of Section 246 of Code of Criminal Procedure the Court is of the opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence triable under this chapter, he shall frame the charge in writing against the accused and the same shall be read over and explained to the accused and he shall be asked whether he pleads guilty or has any defence to make. In the event of the accused pleads guilty, the trial Court shall record the plea and may in his discretion convict him hereon. If, however, the accused refused to plead his guilt or claims to be tried or if the accused is not convicted in terms of the aforesaid provision, the Court shall give an opportunity to the accused to cross-examine the witnesses examined before framing of the charge. The accused may decide, as to who among the witnesses, he would like to cross-examine. In terms of the indication so made by the accused, the witnesses would be summoned by the Court for cross-examination and re-examination, if any, and thereafter, the evidence of the remaining witnesses of the prosecution shall be taken and opportunity of cross-examine or re-examination, if any, would also be afforded. In terms of Section 247 of Code of Criminal Procedure, the accused shall thereupon be called to enter upon his defence and produce his evidence and as per provision of Section 248 of Code of Criminal Procedure, on conclusion of the trial, the Court may either convict or acquit the accused. Section 249 of Code of Criminal Procedure provides a procedure of dealing with the case when the complainant of the case is absent and Section 250 of Code of Criminal Procedure refers to compensation for accusation without reasonable cause. 10. Section 249 of Code of Criminal Procedure provides a procedure of dealing with the case when the complainant of the case is absent and Section 250 of Code of Criminal Procedure refers to compensation for accusation without reasonable cause. 10. Therefore, on careful perusal of the provisions referred to above, which the Sessions Court is required to follow while dealing with the complaint cases filed by the Public Prosecutor, as per provision of sub section (2) of Section 199 of Code of Criminal Procedure, and on due consideration of the submissions advanced by there learned Counsel for the respective parties, we find no indication of any provision, for dropping the case against one of the accused after the charge has been framed by the Court on due consideration of the materials on record and the trial of the case has commenced. 11. In reply to the above contention, Mr. P.K. Biswas, learned Counsel for the Respondent No. 1 submitted that since the Respondent No. 1 has been dropped from the case, he is neither discharged nor acquitted from the proceeding. When a Court finds that it has no jurisdiction to proceed with the trial it can adopt a procedure by dropping the proceeding for want of jurisdiction. In support of his contention, Mr. Biswas relied on the following decisions - (i) Ratilal Bhanji Mithan v. State of Maharashtra (1979) 2 SCC 179 , (ii) K.V. Subbaish v. State of Mysore and Anr. 1969 Cri. LJ. 754, (iii) Hemant P. Vissanji and Ors. v. Mulshankar Shivram Rawal and Anr. 1991 Cri. LJ. 3144, (iv) Vishwa Nath Jiloka and Ors. v. 1st Munsiff Lower Criminal Court, Bahraich and Anr. 1989 Cri. LJ. 2082, (v) Damodar S. Prabhu v. Sayed Babalal H AIR 2010 SC 1907 and (vi) Shyam Sunder Bhartia and Anr. v. NCT of Delhi and Anr. 2007 Cri. LJ. 820. 12. In Ratilal Bhanji's Case (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court examined the scheme of the relevant provisions of the Code dealing with warrant cases. It pointed out that in a warrant case instituted otherwise than on a police report, an order of discharge can be made only after the process has been served and before the charge is framed. It further pointed out that if after recording evidence, the learned Trial Court is of the opinion that the allegation is baseless, he may discharge the accused. It further pointed out that if after recording evidence, the learned Trial Court is of the opinion that the allegation is baseless, he may discharge the accused. If, however, the evidence discloses a prim facie case, it is incumbent on the Trial Court to proceed to frame a charge against the accused. Once a charge is framed, the Trial Court has no power to cancel the charge and reverse the proceedings to the stage prior to framing charge and discharge the accused. He could not have dropped the charge and therefore, the impugned order could never be said to be an order of discharge. After the framing of charge if the accused enters a plea of not guilty, the learned Trial Court must proceed with the trial in the manner provided. Once a charge is framed, the Trial Court has no power to discharge the accused because after he has reached the post-charge stage, he can either acquit or convict the accused unless he decides to proceed under Section 325 or 360 of the Code. It is presumably for this reason that the learned Trial Court thought that since the post-charge stage was reached. 13. Ordinarily, in a case where the proceedings are dropped, for want of jurisdiction or maintainability without a decision on merits one way or the other, the order cannot be treated as an order of acquittal. This is so because the learned Trial Court does not come to any conclusion of guilt or otherwise on the merits of the matter. He merely directs the proceedings to be dropped because he thinks that the sine qua non for the institution of the complaint is not satisfied and, therefore, the complaint is not maintainable meaning thereby that he has no jurisdiction to either convict or acquit the accused. The Supreme Court had an occasion to consider more or less a similar situation in Nagraj v. State of Mysore : 1964 Cri. LJ. 161. That was a case in which the learned Magistrate committed the accused to the Sessions Court for trial for offences under Sections 307 and 326 of the Indian Penal Code. The Supreme Court had an occasion to consider more or less a similar situation in Nagraj v. State of Mysore : 1964 Cri. LJ. 161. That was a case in which the learned Magistrate committed the accused to the Sessions Court for trial for offences under Sections 307 and 326 of the Indian Penal Code. The learned Sessions Judge made a reference to the High Court on the ground that the learned Magistrate could, not have taken cognizance of the offences without the sanction of the State Government in view of the provisions of Sections 132 and 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Several questions were raised in that case but the one with which we are concerned, is dealt within paragraph 18 by the Supreme Court in the following words: The last question to consider is that if the Court comes at any stage to the conclusion that the prosecution could not have been instituted without the sanction of the Government, what should be the procedure to be followed by it, i.e., whether the Court should discharge the accused or acquit him of the charge if framed against him or just drop the proceedings and pass no formal order of discharge or acquittal as contemplated in the case of a prosecution under the Code. The High Court has said that when the Sessions Judge be satisfied that the facts proved bring the case within the mischief of Section 132 of the Code then he is at liberty to reject the complaint holding that it is barred by that section. We consider this to be the right order to be passed in those circumstances. It is not essential that the Court must pass a formal order discharging or acquitting the accused. In fact no such order can be passed. If Section 132 applies, the complaint could not have been instituted without the sanction of the Government and the proceedings on a complaint so instituted would be void, the Court having no jurisdiction to take those proceedings. When the proceedings be void, the Court is not competent to pass any order except an order that the proceedings be dropped and the complaint is rejected. 14. When the proceedings be void, the Court is not competent to pass any order except an order that the proceedings be dropped and the complaint is rejected. 14. In Ratilal Bhanji's case (supra) also after observing that once a charge is framed the learned Trial Court must either acquit or convict the accused, their Lordships hastened to point out an exception in the following words: Excepting where the prosecution must fail for want of a fundamental defect, such as want of sanction, an order of acquittal must be passed upon a 'finding of not guilty' turning on the merits of the case and the appreciation of evidence at the conclusion of the trial. 15. In 1989 Cri. LJ. 2082 : Vishwa Nath Jiloka and Ors. v. 1st Munsiff Lower Criminal Court, Bahraieh and Anr. it was observed that: after appearance before the Magistrate according to law, the accused is entitled to claim discharge inter alia on the ground that the allegations of the, complaint are inherently improbable and false or constitute no offence without recording any additional evidence under Section 244 since the intent behind Section 245(2) is that the complaint should not be allowed to be proceeded with on a charge which is a groundless and in order to prevent undue harassment of the accused persons. It is true that ordinarily the Magistrate should record evidence and proceed under Section 244 Code of Criminal Procedure and thereafter to take further proceedings under Section245(1). But it is equally true that in view of the language employed by Legislature in Section 245(2) there is no bar against Magistrate in discharging the accused even without recording the evidence in an appropriate case. 16. In AIR 2006 SC 915 : Rameshchandra Nandlal Parikh v. State of Gujarat and Anr. it was observed as follows: 13. In the facts of the present case, we are satisfied that the complaints, which were filed in respect of malfeasance and misfeasance within the jurisdiction of the Ahmedabad Police, were not in respect of the same cognizable offence or the same occurrence giving rise to one or more cognizable offences, nor were they alleged to have been committed in the course of the same transaction or the same occurrence as the ones alleged in First C.R. No. 67/2001. 14. 14. There is a further distinction in that while First C.R. No. 67/2001 pertained to cases concerning one Ketan Parikh and entitles associated with him in the crime, subsequent complaints pertained to other parties. Further, the FIR being investigated pertained only to criminal acts relating to the Mandvi Branch (Mumbai), while the subsequent complaints being investigated by the State Police pertained to criminal acts at the Shahibaug (Ahmedabad) Branch of the Bank. In our view, the distinctions drawn by the High Court are fully justified. The High Court was right in observing that the FIRs, which were under challenge before it, were regarding independent and distinct offences. Hence, the FIRs could not be prohibited on the ground that some other FIR had been filed against the Petitioner in respect of other allegations made against the Petitioner. 15. Moreover, the High Court was correctly cognizant of limitations while exercising its powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which should not in any event, be exercised lightly. Reading the impugned judgment of the High Court as a whole, we are satisfied that there is no scope for interference by us. The High Court was justified in declining to exercise its powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and in refusing to interfere with the orders passed by the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. Finally, considering the nature of the allegations involved and the facts and circumstances of the present case, we too are not inclined to exercise our extraordinary powers under Article 136 of the Constitution to interfere. However, I do not find any relevant point of law in issue before this Court in (i) 1991 Cri. LJ. 3144 : Hemant P. Vissanji and Ors. v. Mulshankar Shivram Rawal and Anr.; (2) AIR 2010 SC 1907 : Damodar S. Prabhu v. Sayed Babalal H., (3) 2007 Cr. LJ. 820 (Delhi) : Shyam Sunder Bhartia and Anr. v. NCT of Delhi and Anr., and (4) 1969 Cri. LJ. 754 : K.V. Subbaiah v. State of Mysore and Anr. to quote and/or initiate any discussion. 17. Mr. Biswas, learned Counsel further submitted that there cannot be two trials for commission of one alleged offence by the accused Sri Ratan Lai Nath. v. NCT of Delhi and Anr., and (4) 1969 Cri. LJ. 754 : K.V. Subbaiah v. State of Mysore and Anr. to quote and/or initiate any discussion. 17. Mr. Biswas, learned Counsel further submitted that there cannot be two trials for commission of one alleged offence by the accused Sri Ratan Lai Nath. Learned Counsel further submitted that the defamatory statement allegedly made by the accused, Sri Ratan Lal Nath, was made in one transaction, when the statement was made by him, therefore, multiple cases filed by several complainants or by the same complainant in different proceeding cannot be continued as because it would be hit by Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India. Referring to the provision of Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India, learned Counsel pointed out that no person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once. 18. The constitutional provision under Article 20(2) is not applicable unless the person has been both prosecuted and punished. The constitutional provision, which corresponds to Section 300 of Code of Criminal Procedure is based on the general principle of 'autrefois acquit', which means that a man may not be put twice in jeopardy for the same offence committed by him. The defence of 'autrefois acquit' can be successfully pleaded as a bar to subsequent trial for the same offence or for offence based on same facts, is that the accused had been (a) tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction and acquitted or convicted of an offence alleged to have been committed by him. However, same is not the situation in the present case, therefore, I do not find force in the submission of the learned Counsel for the accused, Sri Ratan Lal Nath on the above issue. 19. Mr. A. K. Bhowmik, learned senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner in Crl. Rev. R No. 04 of 2010 and Crl. Rev. P. No. 05 of 2010 and the Respondent No. 2 in Crl. Rev. P. No. 19 of 2010 strenuously submitted that dropping of the charge against the accused who made the defamatory statement amounts to acquittal. When the main accused in the trial is exonerated by the Court, the co-accused who carried the alleged defamatory news in the newspaper cannot be prosecuted. Mr. Rev. P. No. 19 of 2010 strenuously submitted that dropping of the charge against the accused who made the defamatory statement amounts to acquittal. When the main accused in the trial is exonerated by the Court, the co-accused who carried the alleged defamatory news in the newspaper cannot be prosecuted. Mr. Bhowmik referring to the provision of Sub-section (2) of Section 199 of Code of Criminal Procedure enlightened the Court by explaining the procedure provided in Sub-section (2) of Section 199, Sections 227, 228, 237, 245 and 258 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Referring to the provision of Section 248 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Mr. Bhowmik has submitted that since the trial Court had dropped the case against the main accused Ratan Lal Nath, it would amount to acquittal from the charge. In support of his contention Mr. Bhowmik, learned senior Counsel has relied on the following decisions: (i) 2006 Cri. LJ. 2568 (para 6), (ii) (2002) 2 SCC 210 (para 17 and 60), (iii) AIR 2006 SC 915 (para 13, 14, 15), (iv) AIR 2000 SC 11 . 20. In 2006 Cri. LJ. 2568 : Sidhardhan v. Prasannan and Ors., it was observed that: 6. Equally untenable is the contention that the provisions contained in Section 220 of the Code are applicable in the case. What is contemplated in the above provision is a joint charge and one trial for more than one offence, if they are committed in one series of acts so connected together as to form the same transaction. It is inconceivable as to how the common accused in two complaints filed by two different complainants albeit alleging commission of the same offence (Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act), under different circumstances, can seek the benefit of Section 219 or 220 of the Code. As rightly noticed by the learned Magistrate, the complainants and their witnesses have to be examined in both the cases. The documents in the two cases have to be marked separately and for all practical purposes the merit of the two cases has to be evaluated separately. It may be true that the offence in the two cases is of the same kind. The common factor is only that the Petitioner is the accused in the two cases. The documents in the two cases have to be marked separately and for all practical purposes the merit of the two cases has to be evaluated separately. It may be true that the offence in the two cases is of the same kind. The common factor is only that the Petitioner is the accused in the two cases. For that reason alone, it cannot be contended that the two complaints filed by two different complainants under the different set of circumstances have to be tried at one trial. The learned Magistrate, in my view, was therefore justified in dismissing the applications. 21. According to Mr. Bhowmik, learned senior Counsel for the accused Paramita Livingstone, Subal Kr. Dey and Pradip Dutta Bhowmik further pointed out that the offence alleged against the accused Ratan Lai Nath being distinct and separate, no joint trial as ordered by the learned Court below can be taken up since criminal procedure code has not laid any exception or bar to try a second charge for any subsequent defamatory statements made by the same person, and therefore, if complaint is properly laid there is no bar in proceeding with both the complaint According to Mr. Bhowmik, at this stage, it would not be proper to scrutinize the evidence on record to analyze the facts and circumstances leading to the occurrence, which might prejudice either of the parties. Basis of filing two complaint cases, namely, C.R. No. 01 of 2005 and C.R. No. 03 of 2005 against the Publisher, Editor etc. of the two news papers is publication of the defamatory news item in both the news papers. In both the aforesaid complaint cases, different news items appeared. Accused Sri Ratan Lal Nath took the stand that he had made one statement in one transaction which was carried by two news papers. Therefore, analyzing such a defence stand at this stage of the proceeding would require analysis and scrutiny of the evidence and material on record, and such analysis of facts would obviously have the potential to prejudice either of the parties. 22. Basis of filing two complaint cases, namely, C.R. No.01 of 2005 and C.R. No. 03 of 2005 against the Publisher, Editor etc. of the two news papers is publication of the defamatory news item in both the news papers. In both the aforesaid complaint cases, different news items appeared. 22. Basis of filing two complaint cases, namely, C.R. No.01 of 2005 and C.R. No. 03 of 2005 against the Publisher, Editor etc. of the two news papers is publication of the defamatory news item in both the news papers. In both the aforesaid complaint cases, different news items appeared. Accused Sri Ratan Lal Nath took the stand that he had made one statement in one transaction which was carried by two news papers. Therefore, analyzing such a defence stand at this stage of the proceeding would require analysis and scrutiny of the evidence and material on record, and such analysis of facts would obviously have the potential to prejudice either of the parties. 23. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Narinderjit Singh Sahni v. Union of India, (2002) 2 SCC 210 , at page 239 held that: as regards the issue of a single offence, we are afraid that the fact situation of the matters under consideration would not permit to lend any credence to such a submission. Each individual deposit agreement shall have to be treated as a separate and individual transaction brought about by the allurement of the financial companies, since the parties are different, the amount of deposit is different as also the period for which the deposit was effected. It has all the characteristics of independent transactions and we do not see any compelling reason to hold it otherwise. The plea as raised also cannot have our concurrence. 24. On 13.01.2010 accused Subal Kr. Dey had filed an application praying for his discharge/acquittal on the ground that the charge against principal accused has been dropped. It is contended that since that the dropping of the case amounts to acquittal and the prosecution consented the dropping of the case against accused Sri Ratan Lal Nath, who was the maker of the defamatory statement, therefore, the co-accused are entitled to be acquitted from the trial. In the course of hearing of the aforesaid petition filed by the Petitioner, an application was filed on behalf of the complainant in C.R. No. 03 of 2005 praying for clubbing together the case Nos. C.R. 01 of 2005 and C.R. 03 of 2005 and for passing an order for trying the two cases together. In the course of hearing of the aforesaid petition filed by the Petitioner, an application was filed on behalf of the complainant in C.R. No. 03 of 2005 praying for clubbing together the case Nos. C.R. 01 of 2005 and C.R. 03 of 2005 and for passing an order for trying the two cases together. It is contended on behalf of the Petitioner that the learned Sessions Judge without giving any opportunity of filing objection to the petition filed on 18.01.2010, passed an order rejecting the petition of the Petitioner and allowing the petition filed by the complainant for joint trial of both the C.R. No. 01 of 2005 and C.R. No. 03 of 2005, without even fixing any date for hearing. 25. It would be appropriate at this stage to reproduce the relevant extract of the order passed by the learned Court below on 18.01.2010, in C.R. No. 03 of 2005, which reads as follows: So far as the joint trial of C.R. 01/05 and CrP. 03/05 is concerned it is contended by the learned Senior Advocate that there is provision for analogous trial of main case, but there is no provision under the Code of Criminal Procedure for joint trial of the cases. The learned Advocate D. Sarkar for the Prosecution however, contended that if the spirit of the provision of Section 223, Code of Criminal Procedure is appreciated there is no bar under the Code of Criminal Procedure for trial of Joint cases for the sake of proper administration of criminal justice and convenience of the parties where the allegation is same and the complaint is also the same. It is needless to say that the complainant is same and the nature of allegation against the accused person are of the same fact. The combined reading of Section 184, 218 and 223, Code of Criminal Procedure shows that a joint trial is not un-warranted under the law provided it does not cause any pre-judice to other side. In a case between Purusatham Das Dalmiya v. West Bengal the Hon'ble Supreme Court decided almost similar matter reported in 1961 SCC 1581wherein it was observed that: The prosecution and the accused are to be un-necessary trouble inasmuch as the prosecution will have to produce the same evidence a 2nd time and the accused will have to test the credibility of that evidence a 2nd time and Anr. Court will be again spent a 2nd time in determining the same incident. If the present two cases are tried separately similar above situation is likely to arise. The term 'joint trial' is not a new one. Persons acted together may be jointly tried under Section 500 and 501 of IPC (PC 19335A) 761, Madan, 1950 ALJ 284 quoted from Sarkar Code of Criminal Procedure 4th Edn. in Section 223, Code of Criminal Procedure just above the last part of page 389. The result is that for the sake of convenience let both the cases bearing No. C.R. 01/05 and C.R. 03/05 be tried jointly in a single trial. Attach this case with Code of Criminal Procedure 01/05. The complainant and the witnesses present today are to remain present on the next date. This is a case pending for disposal since the year 2005 and a criminal Court is yet to Award its verdict. Delay in disposal of the criminal case, where parties are ready, is not warranted under the law. So, the complainant and the witness present to face cross-examination are to remain present on the next date. Hence forth all orders shall be passed in CR 1/05. 26. Though general rule is that there should be separate trial but there are many cases where joinder of charges and joinder of accused for cases become necessary for the ends of justice. The provision for joinder of charges and joinder of accused has been made with the object of avoiding the necessity of the same witnesses being examined and giving same evidence for two or three times in different trials and to join the same trial over which it may overlap. This was also added with a view to avoid multiplicity of trial and prevent wastage of time of the Court as well as harassment to the parties. At the same time there is also a proviso that where a number of persons are charged with separate offence and if such persons do not fall within any of the categories specified in this section, the trial Court may on an application in writing by such person, if it is satisfied that such persons would not be prejudicially affected thereby, and it is expedient so to do, try all such persons together. Therefore, it all depends upon the satisfaction of the trial Court concerned to come to a conclusion about the joinder of charge and the joinder of trial of such persons would not be prejudicially affected. 27. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Balbir v. State of Haryana : (2000) 1 SCC 85, held that for several offences to be part of the same transaction, the test which has to be applied is whether they are so related to one Anr. in point of purpose or of cause and effect, or as principal and subsidiary, so as to result in one continuous action. Thus, where there is a commonality of purpose or design, where there is a continuity of action, then all those persons involved can be accused of the same, or different offences "committed in the course of the same transaction". The relevant extract of the decision reads as follows: As per that provision, all persons falling under any one of the seven categories enumerated therein can be charged enumerated in the section we need not even advert to those the section as they are not relevant in this context. We would, therefore, extract Clauses (a) and (d) in Section223 as under: 223. The following persons may be charged and tried together, namely- persons accused of the same offence committed in the course of the same transaction; (b)-(c)* * * (d) persons accused of different offence committed in the course of the same transaction; In both the aforesaid clauses the primary condition is that persons should have been accused either of the same offence or of different offences "committed in the course of the same transaction". The expression advisedly used is "in the course of the same transaction". That expression is not akin to saying "in respect of the same subject-matter". It is pertinent to point out that the same expression is employed in Section 220(1) of the Code also [corresponding to Section 235(1) of the old Code], The meaning of the expression "in the course of the same transaction" used in Section 223 is not materially different from that expression used in Section 223 [sic 235(1)]. It is so understood by this Court in State of A.P. v. Cheemalapati Ganeswara Rao AIR 1963 SC 1850 : (1964) 3 SCR 297 . It is so understood by this Court in State of A.P. v. Cheemalapati Ganeswara Rao AIR 1963 SC 1850 : (1964) 3 SCR 297 . The following observation in the said judgment is contextually quotable: The series of acts which constitute a transaction must of necessity be connected with one Anr. and if some of them stand out independently, they would not form part of the same transaction but would constitute a different transaction or transactions. Therefore, even if the expression 'same transaction' alone had been used in Section 235(1) it would have meant a transaction consisting either of a single act or of a series of connected acts. The expression 'same transaction' occurring in Clauses (a), (c) and (d) of Section 239 as well as that occurring in Section 235(1) ought to be given the same meaning according to the normal rule of construction of statutes. 12. For several offences to be part of the same transaction, the test which has to be applied is whether they are so related to one Anr. in point of purpose or of cause and effect, or as principal and subsidiary, so as to result in one continuous action. Thus, where there is a commonality of purpose or design, where there is a continuity of action, then all those persons involved can be accused of the same or different offences "committed in the course of the same transaction." 28. In Harjinder Singh v. State of Punjab (1985) 1 SCC 422 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 93, a two-Judges Bench of this Court has held that clubbing and consolidation of two cases, one instituted on a police report and the other instituted on a private complaint (when both were triable by the Sessions Court) is impermissible. It was directed that the two cases in such a situation should be tried by the same Judge but not consolidated. The following direction was given in that case: (SCC p. 426, para 8): The evidence should be recorded separately in both the cases one after the other except to the extent that the witnesses for the prosecution who are common to both the cases be examined in one case and their evidence be read as evidence in the other. The following direction was given in that case: (SCC p. 426, para 8): The evidence should be recorded separately in both the cases one after the other except to the extent that the witnesses for the prosecution who are common to both the cases be examined in one case and their evidence be read as evidence in the other. The learned Additional Sessions Judge should after recording the evidence of the prosecution witnesses in one case, withhold his judgment and then proceed to record the evidence of the prosecution in the other case. Thereafter he shall proceed to simultaneously dispose of the cases by two separate judgments taking care that the judgment in one case is not based on the evidence recorded in the other case. 29. It may be noted here that the provision of joint trial is for facilitating the Court, so that it may charge and try the accused jointly. Therefore, it is not incumbent or obligatory for the Court to try the cases jointly even if the offences committed by one or the other accused persons are part of the same transaction. Thus whether there should be a joint or separate trial depends upon the discretion of the Presiding Officer who is competent enough to be satisfied about the entire circumstances depending upon the legal provisions. More so, Section 223, Clause (d) which provides that even persons accused of different offences committed in the course of the same transaction may be charged and tried together. 30. Before proceeding to discuss the issue raised by the learned Counsel for the revision Petitioner, it would be apposite to say herein that any legal relief under the provision of law is not granted in terms of the agreements between the parties, unless it is so provided. A legal decision is bound to be in accordance with law and not in accordance with the agreement of the parties. Therefore, legality of dropping of the charge against an accused, cannot said to be with the consent of the prosecution. Even if it is so, such consent by the prosecution would not prevent legal consequences which may follow. 31. Considering the facts and circumstances discussed above, I am of the considered view that the learned trial Court could not have dropped the case against the accused Sri Ratan Lal Nath abruptly in the midst of trial. Even if it is so, such consent by the prosecution would not prevent legal consequences which may follow. 31. Considering the facts and circumstances discussed above, I am of the considered view that the learned trial Court could not have dropped the case against the accused Sri Ratan Lal Nath abruptly in the midst of trial. On careful consideration of the provision relating to trial of cases under Chapter XIX Part-B, in the absence of any fundamental defect, there is no scope for the Court to drop a proceeding before the conclusion of the trial. Therefore, this Court is of the considered view that the procedural remiss committed by the learned Court below in dropping the proceeding is required to be rectified by interfering with the impugned order. 32. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 02.01.2010 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 2, Agartala, West Tripura in C.R. No. 03 of 2005 dropping the case of the accused Sri Ratan Lal Nath is set aside and quashed. 33. In respect of the prayers on behalf of the accused Sri Subal Kumar Dey, Smti. Paramita Livingstone and Sri Pradip Dutta Bhowmik for acquittal from the charges under Section 500/501IPC in the revision filed by them, on perusal of the complaint and the materials on record, this Court is unable to come to a conclusion that not even a prima facie case is made out against the Petitioners for offence under Sections 500/501 IPC, therefore, the question is really whether at this stage, without the case going to trial, the defence of the Petitioners with reference to the merit of the petition can be adjudicated upon. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 2, Agartala, West Tripura, upon perusal of the evidence before charge of the complainant and the witnesses, has come to the conclusion that a prima facie case has been made out against the accused facing trial in CR No. 01 of 2005 and CR No. 03 of 2005. The materials placed before this Court, do not reflect any perversity in the order, vitiating the conclusion. There is no scope to test the veracity of the statements made by the witnesses at this stage of the proceedings. 34. The materials placed before this Court, do not reflect any perversity in the order, vitiating the conclusion. There is no scope to test the veracity of the statements made by the witnesses at this stage of the proceedings. 34. This Court is of the considered view that all defences that may be available to the Petitioners will have to be gone into at the time of trial of the complaint case and finally each case will be decided on its own merits and demerits. On that yardstick many of the decisions referred to by the learned Counsel for the Petitioners as well as the Respondents can be understood as having been referred on the facts of the particular case before the Court. In the considered view of this Court, no case has been made out by the accused-Petitioners to direct discharge or acquittal of the Petitioners at this stage. 35. Further, as a matter of fact, whether there should be a joint or separate trial depends upon the discretion of the Presiding Officer, who is competent enough to be satisfied about the entire circumstances depending upon the legal provisions. Therefore, I do not propose to disturb the discretion exercised by the learned Trial Court in initiating a joint trial as proposed by him at this stage. 36. Further more, since the dropping of the case against the accused Sri Ratan Lai Nath has been set aside, the plea of the accused/Petitioners, namely, Subal Kumar Dey, Paramita Livingstone and Pradip Dutta Bhowmik in Crl. Rev. P. No. 04 of 2010 and Cri. Rev. P No. 05 of 2010, for acquittal on the ground of dropping of the charge against Sri Ratan Lai Nath has become odious. Accordingly, Cri. Rev. P No. 04 of 2010 and Cri. Rev. R No. 05 of 2010, in the facts and circumstances discussed above, stand dismissed. 37. The learned Court below is directed to proceed with the trial of pending cases, i.e., C.R. No. 01 of 2005 and C.R. No. 03 of 2005 in accordance with law. 38. With the above observations and directions, all the above noted criminal revisions stand disposed of. Criminal Revisions Petitions disposed of.