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2010 DIGILAW 759 (JHR)

Madhusudan Mukherjee v. A. G. Office Employees Co-operative House Construction Society Limited, through the Circle Officer, Ranchi

2010-07-27

R.K.MERATHIA

body2010
Order Heard the parties. 2. The only question involved in this writ petition is whether in the facts and circumstances of this case, the Tribunal is right in holding that the petitioner should prefer appeal before the Board of Appeal under clause 7.5 of the Ranchi Planning Standards & Building Bye-Laws, 2002 (Bye-Laws for short). The Tribunal observed that it cannot adjudicate upon the matter relating to withdrawal of sanction order passed under Section 38 of the Jharkhand Regional Development Authority Act, 2001 (The JRDA Act for short). Though the Tribunal has set aside part of the order passed under Section 38 by the Vice Chairman so far as demolition is concerned, on the ground that petitioner was not heard on the question of demolition and order was passed simultaneously for demolition while canceling sanction. On this score, the matter was remitted by the Tribunal to the Vice-Chairman for hearing the petitioner on the point of demolition. 3. In the present case, by order under appeal dated 5.7.2006, the sanction of petitioner was withdrawn/cancelled on the ground that sanction was obtained wrongly and petitioner could not show his right over the land. The Tribunal itself has observed "that the effect of withdrawing sanction order dated 8.2.2005 would be refusal of sanction as contemplated in Section 37 of the JRDA Act, 2001, which deals with sanction or refusal of a building or addition or alteration thereto". 4. In view of the said position, the Tribunal should have held that it had jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the appeal in question, in terms of Section 54 of the JRDA Act. Section 37 inter alia provides for the grounds of sanction or refusal of application for erection of a building etc. Section 38 inter alia provides for cancellation of sanction accorded in consequence of any material misrepresentation or fraudulent statement contained in the notice given or information furnished under Section 37 of the Act. Thus, in the present case, Sections 37 and 38 are to be read together as rightly observed by the Tribunal itself. Sub-section (1) of Section 54 of the Act inter alia provides for passing orders, for the actions which may be taken, on the grounds mentioned therein and subsection (2) provides for appeal to the Tribunal against such orders/actions. Thus, in the present case, Sections 37 and 38 are to be read together as rightly observed by the Tribunal itself. Sub-section (1) of Section 54 of the Act inter alia provides for passing orders, for the actions which may be taken, on the grounds mentioned therein and subsection (2) provides for appeal to the Tribunal against such orders/actions. In my opinion, for adjudication of the disputes involved in this case the proper remedy is appeal before the Tribunal under Section 54(2) and not the appeal under clause 7.5 of the Bye-Laws, before the Board of Appeal. 5. In the facts and the circumstances of the case, the impugned order dated 24.10.2008 is set aside and the matter is remitted back to the Tribunal for hearing the parties and decide the appeal on its own merits, as early as possible, and preferably within two months from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order. Consequently, the Vice-Chairman need not proceed in terms of the impugned order. The parties are directed to appear before the Tribunal at 11 A.M. on 9.8.2010, and cooperate in early disposal of the appeal. With these observations and directions, this writ petition is disposed of.