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2010 DIGILAW 761 (GAU)

Naru Debbarma v. State of Tripura

2010-09-27

C.R.SARMA, I.A.ANSARI

body2010
JUDGMENT I.A. Ansari, J. 1. The Appellant herein, namely, Sri Naru Debbarma, was tried, as an accused on charges, under Sections 364/302/201 read with Section 34 of the IPC, in Sessions Case No. 24(WT/K) of 2006, which arose out of PS case No. 25 of 2004 and convicted by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, West Tripura, Khowai, under Section 302 read with 201 of the IPC and sentenced, for his conviction under Section 302, IPC, to suffer imprisonment for life and pay fine of Rs. 5,000 and, in default of payment of fine, suffer rigorous imprisonment for a further period of one month and suffer, for his conviction under Section 201, IPC, rigorous imprisonment for two years and pay fine of Rs. 2,000 and, in default of payment of fine, rigorous imprisonment for a further period of three months with direction that the sentences shall run concurrently. 2. Aggrieved by his conviction and the sentences passed against him, the Appellant has come with this appeal. 3. In the appeal, the Appellant has contended that he was a juvenile at the time of the alleged commission of offences. In order to determine the question as to whether the Appellant was, on the date of the alleged commission of offences, was or was not a juvenile, an enquiry was ordered by this Court, on 9.6.2010, in CM. Application No. 62 of 2010, which was filed, in this appeal, by the Appellant. 4. Pursuant to the above direction, a report has, now, been submitted by the learned trial court. In terms of the enquiry report, the learned trial Judge has determined that the Appellant was, at the time of the alleged commission of offences, i.e., on 16.10.2004, aged 17 years 7 months and 11 days, his date of birth being 5.3.1987 and that he was, thus, a juvenile on the date of the alleged commission of offence. 5. We have heard Mr. H. Debnath, learned Counsel for the Appellant, and Mr. A. Ghosh, learned Addl. Public Prosecutor, for the State. 6. 5. We have heard Mr. H. Debnath, learned Counsel for the Appellant, and Mr. A. Ghosh, learned Addl. Public Prosecutor, for the State. 6. Considering the fact that the Appellant has been found to be a juvenile on the day of the alleged commission of offences, we are of the view that since in terms of Sub-section (2) of Section 6 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, the High Court can exercise the powers of the Juvenile Justice Board constituted under Section 4 of the said Act, this Court, while interfering with the conviction of the accused-Appellant and the sentences passed against him, pass appropriate order(s) as could have been passed by the Board defined in Section 2(c) of the said Act. 7. We may, now, point out that Section 16 of the said Act, inter alia, provides that no juvenile shall be sentenced to death or life imprisonment, or committed to prison in default of payment of fine or in default of furnishing security. A juvenile, under the provisions of the Act, can be referred to the Juvenile Board for such orders to be passed by the Board as it thinks fit in terms of Section 15 of the said Act. (See Upendra Kumar v. State of Bihar in (2005) 3 SCC 592 . 8. When a Board is satisfied, on enquiry, that a juvenile has committed an offence, then, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Board may, if it so thinks fit, order, under Sub-section (1) of Section 15(g), that the juvenile be sent to special home, as defined in Section 2(v) of the said Act, for a period of three years. 9. Coupled with the above, it may be further noted that Section 15 of the said Act provides for various orders, which the Juvenile Justice Board ('the Board') may pass against a juvenile, when it is satisfied that the juvenile has committed an offence, which includes an order directing the juvenile to be sent to a special home for a period of three years. Section 16 of the said Act stipulates that where a juvenile, who has attained the age of sixteen years, has committed an offence and the Board is satisfied that the offence committed is so serious in nature that it would not be in his interest or in the interest of other juvenile, in a special home, to send him to such special home and that none of the other measures, provided under the Act, is suitable or sufficient, the Board may order the juvenile in conflict with law to be kept in such place of safety and in such manner as it thinks fit and shall report the case for the order of the State Government. Proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 16 of the Act of 2000 provides that the period of detention so ordered shall not exceed in any case the maximum period provided under Section 15 of the said Act, i.e., for three years. (See Dharambir v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Anr., AIR 2010 SC 1801 ). 10. A combined reading of Sections 15 and 16 of the said Act clearly shows that even if a juvenile is found to be guilty of an offence, howsoever serious such offence may be, he cannot be kept in confinement longer than a period of three years. In the light of this position of law, when the case of the Appellant is considered, it becomes clear that even if the Appellant had been found guilty of the offences, which he is alleged to have committed, he could not have been kept even at the special home, far less incarcerated, for a period longer than three years. 11. In the case at hand, admittedly, the Appellant has been in custody since 2.3.2007. The Appellant has, thus, spent more than three years in jail. In the circumstances of the present case, we are, in the light of the decisions, in Upendra Kumar v. State of Bihar, (2005) 3 SCC 592 and in Dharambir v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Anr., AIR 2010 SC 1801 , of the view that while the Appellant's conviction cannot be interfered with, for, his conviction is not challenged before us, the sentences, passed against him, need to be set aside and the Appellant needs to be directed to be released forthwith. 12. 12. Because of what have been discussed and pointed out above, this appeal is partly allowed. While the Appellant's conviction is not interfered with, the sentences, passed against him, are hereby set aside. The Appellant is hereby directed to be set at liberty forthwith unless he is required to be detained in connection with any case, wherein he may be involved after he ceased to be a juvenile. 13. With the above observations and directions, the criminal appeal stands allowed. Appeal allowed