JUDGMENT Alok Aradhe, J. 1. This appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been preferred by Defendants who have suffered decree of eviction under Section 12(1)(b) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act (in short 'the Act') from both the Court below. 2. Facts leading to the filing of the instant appeal, briefly stated, are that Respondent/Plaintiff filed a suit for eviction inter alia, on the allegation that suit shop situated at T.T. Nagar, Bhopal was let out on a monthly rent of Rs. 150/- on 1-8-1970 to Defendant No. 1. Later on contract of tenancy was reduced into writing on 4-8-1970. Defendant No. 1 sold the goods of the shop in question to Defendant No. 1 for a consideration of Rs. 20,000/- vide Exh. P-13 and parted with the possession of the premises. Defendant No. 2 is carrying on the business in the name and style of 'Kashmir Fancy Store' in the suit premises. On 25-7-1977 a notice was served on Defendant No. 1. Defendants had damaged the pillars of the shop and thereby caused damage to the tune of Rs. 300/- which adversely and substantially affected the interest of the landlord in the suit accommodation. It was also pleaded that Defendant was in arrears of rent for a period from August, 1978 to November, 1978. Accordingly, a decree of eviction under Sections 12(1)(a), (b) and (k) of the Act was sought. 3. Defendants filed the written statement inter alia, alleging that Defendant No. 2 is neither carrying on business in the name and style of 'Kashmir Fancy Store' nor is a sub-tenant. Defendant No. 2 is nephew of Defendant No. 1 who is working as manager of Defendant No. 1. Defendant No. 1 was carrying on business in the suit shop along with her father-in-law, Dariyanomal. Daryanomal had also a shop of general goods which he had purchased from one Dodumal. Daryanomal had a shop in New Market, T.T. Nagar, Bhopal and was in form of 'gumti'. Since, Daryanomal suffered from attack of paralysis therefore, the goods of his shop were sold which was purchased by Defendant No. 2, Kailash Kumar. It was further alleged that Kailash Kumar used to carry on the business of dealing in general goods in the name and style of 'Kashmir Fancy Store'. Since, Daryanomal suffered from attack of paralysis therefore, the goods of his shop were sold which was purchased by Defendant No. 2, Kailash Kumar. It was further alleged that Kailash Kumar used to carry on the business of dealing in general goods in the name and style of 'Kashmir Fancy Store'. After death Daryanomal, Defendant No. 1 employed Defendant No. 2 as part time manager and continued with her business. Defendant No. 2 in the same name carries on the business in another shop namely, Shop No. 28/30 which he obtained on monthly rent of Rs. 150/- from one P.N. Rai. It was denied that Defendants had in any way caused damage to the suit property or, are in arrears of rent. 4. Trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 31-3-1995 decreed the suit for eviction under Section 12(1)(b) of the Act. However, it was found out that grounds under Section 12(1)(a) and (m) of the Act were not made out. Trial Court on the basis of Exh. P-13 held that stock of Kashmir General Store was sold out to Defendant No. 2 for a consideration of Rs. 20,000/-. Trial Court on the basis of statement made by Kishanchand (D.W. 2) and the documents (Exhs. D-17 to 20 and Exhs. D-22 to D-25) as well as Exh. D-6 certificate issued under the provisions of M.P. Shops and Establishment Act, 1958 and Exh. P-8 recorded a finding that Defendant No. 1's shop is registered as Kashmir General Store. Trial Court further found that Defendant No. 2 has not produced the rent receipts of Shop No. 28/30 to show that aforesaid shop has been taken on rent by him though it was admitted by him in Paragraph 8 of his cross-examination that he used to take rent receipts. Trial Court held that Defendant No. 2 has not been able to disclose the details of neighbouring shops. Placing reliance on Exh. D-65, i.e., inspection note Trial Court came to conclusion that Defendant No. 2 is in possession of the suit shop. By taking into account the document Exh. P-7, i.e., order passed under Section 13(1) of M.P. Shops and Establishment Act, 1958 and Exh. P-14, an application submitted by Defendant No. 2 before Income Tax Officer describing himself to be proprietor of Kashmir Fancy Store and demand notices (Exhs. By taking into account the document Exh. P-7, i.e., order passed under Section 13(1) of M.P. Shops and Establishment Act, 1958 and Exh. P-14, an application submitted by Defendant No. 2 before Income Tax Officer describing himself to be proprietor of Kashmir Fancy Store and demand notices (Exhs. P-15 to P-17) issued by Income Tax Officer under Section 156 of the Income Tax Act to Defendant No. 2 as proprietor of Kashmir Fancy Store and Exh. P-18 by which Defendant No. 2 paid the tax treating himself to be proprietor of Kashmir Fancy Store, Trial Court came to the conclusion that Defendant No. 2 is the proprietor of Kashmir Fancy Store. Thus, on meticulous appreciation of oral and documentary evidence on record, Trial Court recorded the finding that Defendant No. 1 has sublet the suit-shop to Defendant No. 2 without obtaining written consent of Plaintiff and Defendant No. 2 is carrying on business in the suit shop. Accordingly, the claim for eviction under Section 12(1)(b) of the Act was decreed. 5. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and decree, Defendants preferred an appeal. Lower Appellate Court vide judgment and decree under challenge in the instant appeal has affirmed the findings recorded by Trial Court. Lower Appellate Court took into account the statement of neighbouring shop keepers who have been examined as Ramchandra (P.W. 2) and Shankarlal (P. W. 4) while arriving at the conclusion that Defendant No. 2 is carrying on the business in the suit shop. Lower Appellate Court also took note of the statement of Mohan Kumar (P.W. 3), a photographer who proved the photograph taken on 7-9-1976 (Exh. P-11) of the suit premises in which Takechand, the father of Appellant No. 2 has been shown sitting in the suit shop. Aforesaid fact was admitted by Kailash Kumar (D.W. 4) in Paragraph 13 of his cross-examination. Lower Appellate Court also took into account the statement of Defendant No. 1 that from last 17 to 18 years business is being carried on in the suit shop in the name and style of 'Kashmir Fancy Store'. Lower Appellate Court also considered the statement of Defendant No. 2, Kailash Kumar who stated that he does not know adjoining shop keepers of the shop No. 28/30 where he is carrying on business. Defendant No. 2 is related to Defendant No. 1 as sister's son. Lower Appellate Court also considered the statement of Defendant No. 2, Kailash Kumar who stated that he does not know adjoining shop keepers of the shop No. 28/30 where he is carrying on business. Defendant No. 2 is related to Defendant No. 1 as sister's son. However, Defendant No. 1 who has been examined as D.W. 1, in Paragraph 31 of her cross-examination stated that she is not aware whether Defendant No. 2 is having other shop in New Market, Bhopal and does not know its location. Lower Appellate Court also held that Defendants have failed to produce documentary evidence such as books of account to establish the payment of remuneration to D.W. 2 who was said to be working as Manager. Accordingly, Lower Appellate Court upheld the judgment and decree passed by Trial Court. 6. This Court on 11-3-1996 while admitting the appeal framed following substantial questions of law: (1) Whether the Court below came to wrong conclusion that the suit shop was sub-let by the Appellant No. 1 in favour of Appellant No. 2 by ignoring the material piece of evidence on record ? (2) Whether the document (Exh. P-13) related to the suit shop under the facts and circumstances of the case ? 7. During pendency of the appeal an application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure was filed by Appellants by which photocopy of certain documents, namely, licence issued by Municipal Corporation, Bhopal in favour of Appellant No. 1 for a period from 2006-2007 to 2009-2010, copy of certificate of registration of establishment of the shop dated 29-4-1971 issued under the provisions of the M.P. Shops and Establishment Act, 1958 and income tax return filed by Defendant No. 1 in respect of business run by her in the name and style of "Kashmir Fancy Store" are sought to be brought on record. 8. Shri Ashok Lalwani, learned Counsel appearing for Appellants submitted that the finding recorded by Courts below that ground for eviction under Section 12(1)(b) of the Act has been proved is perverse. Lower Appellate Court has misread the contents of the documents (Exh. P-13 and Exh. D-6). Learned Counsel further submitted that from perusal of Exh. D-66 and D-67 no inference can be drawn that Defendant No. 1 has parted with the possession of the suit shop. Lower Appellate Court has misread the contents of the documents (Exh. P-13 and Exh. D-6). Learned Counsel further submitted that from perusal of Exh. D-66 and D-67 no inference can be drawn that Defendant No. 1 has parted with the possession of the suit shop. While referring to the documents annexed with the application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, learned Counsel for Appellants contended that documents annexed with the aforesaid application unequivocally show that Appellant No. 1 is still carrying on business in the name and style of 'Kashmir Fancy Store'. Learned Counsel further contended that so long legal possession remains with the tenant, a decree under Section 12(1)(b) of the Act cannot be granted. In support of this proposition, learned Counsel placed reliance on decision of the Supreme Court in Mahendra Saree Emporium (II) v. G.V. Srinivasa Murthy (2005) 1 SCC 481 . 9. Learned Counsel for Appellants while referring to decision of the Supreme Court in Kunhayammed and Ors. v. State of Kerala and Anr. (2000) 6 SCC 359 , contended that since the judgment and decree passed by Trial Court has been affirmed by Lower Appellate Court, the same has merged in the decision of the Superior Forum and, therefore, findings recorded by Trial Court cannot be read. Learned Counsel has further contended that during pendency of the appeal State Legislature has enacted M.P. Parisar Kiraydari Adhiniyam, 2010, which has been published in the Gazette dated 25th March, 2010 and the provisions of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 have been repealed. 10. On the other | hand, learned Counsel for Respondent/landlord contended that no issue was framed by Trial Court whether the Defendant No. 2 was employed as manager in the suit premises. Trial Court as well as Lower Appellate Court have meticulously discussed the oral and documentary evidence on record and have taken into consideration Exh. P-13 and have recorded a finding that the suit premises were sublet by Defendant No. 1 to Defendant No. 2 without the consent of the Plaintiff and Defendant No. 2 is carrying on the business in the suit shop. Aforesaid finding is a finding of fact. The matter stands concluded against the Appellants by concurrent finding of fact. 11. I have considered the submissions made by learned Counsel for parties and have perused the records. 12. Aforesaid finding is a finding of fact. The matter stands concluded against the Appellants by concurrent finding of fact. 11. I have considered the submissions made by learned Counsel for parties and have perused the records. 12. At this stage it is appropriate to deal with the application filed by Appellants under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Jurisdiction of Appellate Court to allow additional evidence to be produced is circumscribed by following three conditions: (a) the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted, or (aa) the party seeking to produce additional evidence, establishes that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such evidence was not within his knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due diligence, be produced by him at the time when the decree appealed against was passed, or (b) the Appellate Court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause. 13. It is well settled in law that no party should be permitted at the appellate stage to remove lacunae in presenting its case. [See: State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava AIR 1957 SC 912 ]. It is equally well settled that Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure confers discretion on the Appellate Court to receive additional evidence which is judicial one, circumscribed by the limitations specified in Order 41 Rule 27 of Code of Civil Procedure. The true test to be applied in dealing with applications for additional evidence is whether the Appellate Court is able to pronounce judgment on the materials before it, without taking into consideration the additional evidence sought to be adduced. In the absence of any inherent obscurity or difficulty in rendering the judgment without such record, receipt of documents in additional evidence is not permissible. [See : Natha Singh and Ors. v. The Financial Commissioner, Taxation, Punjab and Ors. AIR 1976 SC 1053 ]. 14. In the backdrop of the aforesaid well settled legal position, if the documents produced by Appellants are seen, it is clear that contingency envisaged in clause (a) of Order 41 Rule 27 has no application. [See : Natha Singh and Ors. v. The Financial Commissioner, Taxation, Punjab and Ors. AIR 1976 SC 1053 ]. 14. In the backdrop of the aforesaid well settled legal position, if the documents produced by Appellants are seen, it is clear that contingency envisaged in clause (a) of Order 41 Rule 27 has no application. So far as the document dated 29-4-1971, i.e., certificate with regard to establishment of 'Kashmir Fancy Store' is concerned, Appellants have failed even to aver in the application that notwithstanding with exercise of due diligence they were not able to produce the said document at the time when the decree was passed. Therefore, for this reason document dated 29-4-1971 cannot be taken on record at this stage. The remaining documents, namely, licence issued in favour of Appellant No. 1 and income tax Teturn filed by Appellant No. 1 in respect of business rendered by her in the name and style of 'Kashmir Fancy Shop' for period of 1994-95 till 2007-08 are concerned, this Court is of considered opinion that the Court is in position to pronounce the judgment on the basis of evidence which has already been adduced without production of aforesaid documents. For aforementioned reasons, application under Order 41 Rule 27 is rejected. 15. So far as contention of learned Counsel for Appellants with regard to enactment of the M.P. Parisar Kiraydari Act, 2010 is concerned the same has no impact and effect so far as the proceedings in instant appeal are concerned. The Act, as is perceptible from Sub-section (3) of Section 1, shall come into force from such date which may be notified by the State Government. No notification regarding enforcement of the Act has been produced before this Court to show that the Act has come into force. For yet another reason aforesaid Act has no application on the present proceeding, as under Section 45 (2) of the Act it is provided that the proceedings which are pending under the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 shall continue as if the provisions of the 1961 Act were in force. 16. For yet another reason aforesaid Act has no application on the present proceeding, as under Section 45 (2) of the Act it is provided that the proceedings which are pending under the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 shall continue as if the provisions of the 1961 Act were in force. 16. Another contention of learned Counsel for Appellants that since the decree of the Trial Court has been affirmed by Lower Appellate Court and has merged with the same, and, therefore, the findings recorded by Trial Court cannot be looked into, is concerned, from perusal of the judgment in Kunhayammed (supra), relied on by learned Counsel for Appellants itself it is clear that in Paragraph 44 it has been held that if decree of Trial Court is affirmed by Lower Appellate Court, it is the decree of the Lower Appellate Court which subsist and remains operative and capable of enforcement in the eye of law. Thus, aforesaid observation was made by the Supreme Court in the context of execution of decree and, therefore, contention that findings of Trial Court cannot be looked into, cannot be accepted. 17. When a landlord seeks a decree under Section 12(1)(b) of the Act, initially onus of proving unlawful letting at the first instance lies on the landlord. Sub-tenancy can hardly be proved by direct evidence. All that the Plaintiff is required to do is to place on record certain circumstances from which an inference with regard to sub-letting can be drawn. When such circumstances are proved, prima facie the burden on the Plaintiff is discharged and the onus shifts on the Defendant to prove by positive fact about the non-existence of alleged sub-tenant occupying the premises and that the tenant has not parted with the possession in whole or in part of the accommodation. Therefore, the question whether there is an unlawful sub-letting in most cases is a matter of inference which can be drawn from the facts of each case. In the instant case, Respondent/Plaintiff in order to discharge the initial burden has examined the neighbouring shop keepers who have been examined as Ramchandra (P. W. 2), and Shankarlal (P.W.4) who have stated that Defendant No. 2 is in possession of the suit-shop and is carrying on the business in the suit-shop. Plaintiff has also examined Photographer (P.W. 3), who has proved the photograph (Exh. Plaintiff has also examined Photographer (P.W. 3), who has proved the photograph (Exh. P-11), in which Defendant No. 2's father is shown to be sitting in the suit-shop as has been admitted by Defendant No. 2 in Paragraph 13 of his cross-examination. Apart from this Plaintiff has also produced documents (Exhs. P-15 to P-18) to show that Defendant No. 2 is the proprietor of 'Kashmir Fancy Store'. It has further been admitted by Yashoda Bai, Defendant No. 1 to whom Kailash Kumar, Defendant Nos. 2 is related as sister's son that in the suit shop, for past 15 to 18 years, business is carried on in the name and style of 'Kashmir Fancy Store'. Thus, all the aforesaid facts which have been found by both the Courts below to be proved concurrently, clearly and unequivocally show that Plaintiff has brought on record the circumstances from which an inference can be drawn that suit shop has been sublet illegally by Defendant No. 1 to Defendant No. 2. 18. Now, I may advert to the evidence adduced by Defendants in this behalf to see whether Defendants have been able to disprove the inference of subletting. Defendant No. 2 Kailash Kumar who has been examined as D.W. 4 has stated that he is running the business of general goods in the name and style of Kailash Fancy Store' in shop No. 28/30, T.T. Nagar,Bhopal. In Paragraph 28 of his deposition he had further admitted that he used to take rent receipt from landlord of the said shop. However, Defendant No. 2 has not produced any rent receipt in respect of shop No. 28/30. From perusal of his deposition he has not been able to disclose the details of neighbouring shop-keepers. From Exh. D-65, i.e., inspection note, Defendant No. 2 has been found to be in possession of the suit shop. 19. Defendant No. 1 who has been examined as Yashoda Devi (D.W. 1) to whom D.W. 4, namely, Defendant No. 2 related being sister's son in Paragraph 31 of her cross-examination has stated that she is not aware where Defendant No. 2 is having some other shop in New Market, Bhopal and she does not know about its location. 19. Defendant No. 1 who has been examined as Yashoda Devi (D.W. 1) to whom D.W. 4, namely, Defendant No. 2 related being sister's son in Paragraph 31 of her cross-examination has stated that she is not aware where Defendant No. 2 is having some other shop in New Market, Bhopal and she does not know about its location. On the other hand, Yashoda Devi (D.W. 1) has categorically stated that for past 17 to 18 years the business is being carried out in the suit shop in the name and style of 'Kashmir Fancy Store'. Defendants have failed to produce any documentary evidence such as books of accounts to establish payment of remuneration to Defendant No. 2 who was allegedly employed as manager. Thus, it is clear that Defendants have failed to disprove the factum of subletting by positive evidence. 20. Question of subletting is a question of fact. Both the Courts below on meticulous appreciation of oral and documentary evidence on record have recorded a finding that suit shop was sublet by Defendant No. 1 to Defendant No. 2 wherein Defendant No. 2 is carrying on business. True it is, that a finding of fact may give rise to a question of law in case it is based on no evidence or while arriving at the said finding relevant and admissible evidence is not taken into consideration or inadmissible evidence has been taken into account. [See : Narendra Gopal Vidyarthi v. Razat Vidyarthi (2009) 3 SCC 287 ]. 21. From perusal of evidence which is referred to supra it is apparent that by no stretch of imagination, findings recorded by Courts below can be said to be either erroneous or perverse or that while recording the finding the Courts below have discarded any admissible evidence or ignored material evidence or that the findings are based on no evidence. Jurisdiction of this Court to interfere with the findings of fact under Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure is limited to the case where the finding is either perverse or based on no evidence. This Court cannot interfere with the concurrent finding of fact until or unless the same is perverse or contrary to material on record. [See : Sugani (Mst.) v. Rameshwar Das and Anr. This Court cannot interfere with the concurrent finding of fact until or unless the same is perverse or contrary to material on record. [See : Sugani (Mst.) v. Rameshwar Das and Anr. (2006) 11 SCC 587 , Gurdev Kaur v. Kaki (2007) 1 SCC 546 , Prakash Kumar v. State of Gujrat (2004) 5 SCC 140 , Thiagarajan and Ors. v. Sri Venugopalaswamy B. Koil and Ors. (2004) 5 SCC 762 and Narayanan Rajendran and Anr. v. Lekshmy Sarojini and Ors. (2009) 5 SCC 264 ]. It is equally well settled that this Court in exercise of power under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot re-appreciate evidence. [See: Thimmaiah and others v. Ningamma and Anr. (2000) 7 SCC 409 ]. It has further been held by the Supreme Court that interference with a question of fact is not permissible. [See -. Basayya I. Mathad v. Rudrayya S. Mathad and Ors. (2008) 3 SCC 120 ]. In S. Appadurai Nadar and Anr. v. A. Chokalinga Nadar and Anr. (2007) 12 SCC 774 , it has been held by the Supreme Court that in exercise of power under Section 100 the Courts should be slow in reversing the finding of fact. 22. For aforementioned reasons, first and second substantial questions of law deserve to be answered in the negative. Consequently, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.