JUDGMENT : C.R. Dash, J. - Learned Trial Court found the appellant guilty of offence u/s 302, I.P.C. and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment for life and pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default to suffer further R.I. for six months. The aforesaid judgment and order of sentence passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Jeypore in Sessions Case No. 16 of 1999, is impugned in this appeal. 2. The occurrence happened at 6.00 a.m. on 25.5.1998 in front of the house of deceased Padma Dora at village Teteliguda under Kotpad Police Station. At that time, deceased Padma Dora was cleaning her front courtyard. The appellant came there and assaulted her by means of an Axe causing bleeding injuries on her neck, head and shoulder. It is alleged that the assault by the appellant on the deceased was the effect of the appellant's belief that she (deceased) was a witch. Immediately after the assault, the; deceased was shifted inside her hut where she declared before the post-occurrence witnesses P.Ws. 3, 4 and 5 that she was assaulted by the appellant. Then she was shifted to Kotpad Community Health Centre where her dying declaration was recorded by the treating doctor. She succumbed to the injuries while undergoing treatment in Community Health Centre, Kotpad. On registration of the case, P.W. 11 took up investigation and submitted charge-sheet against the appellant u/s 302, I.P.C. on completion of the investigation. The defence plea is one of complete denial. 3. The prosecution has examined eleven witnesses to prove the charge. P.Ws. 1 and 2 are the eye witnesses to the occurrence. Out of them, P.W.1 is the son of the deceased and P.W.2 a child witness is the grand-daughter of the deceased. P.Ws. 3,4 and 5 are the post-occurrence witnesses before whom the deceased is asserted to have made oral dying declaration and out of them P.W.3 is the husband of the deceased. P.W.6 is a witness to some relevant seizures. P.W. 7 is a witness regarding incriminatory conduct of the appellant and the fact that he saw the appellant holding a bloodstained Tangia and further fact that the appellant confessed before him that he had just killed a person. P.W.6 is a witness to some relevant seizures. P.W. 7 is a witness regarding incriminatory conduct of the appellant and the fact that he saw the appellant holding a bloodstained Tangia and further fact that the appellant confessed before him that he had just killed a person. Rest of the witnesses are official witnesses, out of whom P.W. 8 is the Medical Officer, who recorded dying declaration of the deceased, examined the deceased while she was undergoing treatment and conducted post-mortem examination on her dead body after her death and P.W. 11 is the Investigating Officer. Defence on the other hand, has examined none. 4. Learned Trial Court on consideration of the evidence on record held that death of the deceased was a homicidal death and the appellant has caused such homicidal death of the deceased. 5. So far as the finding of the learned Trial Court on the point of homicidal death of the deceased is concerned, learned counsel for the appellant does not dispute such findings. It is strenuously submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that in view of discrepancies in the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 so far as their eye witness account of the occurrence is concerned and in view of suspicion regarding the recording of dying declaration by the Medical Officer (P.W. 8) vide Ext. 1, learned Trial Court has erred in arriving at the finding of guilt against the appellant and consequent order of sentence is bad in law. Learned Additional Government Advocate on the other hand, supported the impugned judgment. 6. Evidence of P.W.I shows that at the time of occurrence he was brushing his teeth out side his house on the eastern side of the main road which is at a distance of about 25 feet from the spot of occurrence. There is a mud boundary wall in front of the spot house as testified by P.W 1. P.W 1 has further testified that at the time of the assault he alone was present near the spot. P.W. 2, who is a child witness on the other hand has testified that hearing her cries, P.W. 1 came to the spot and asked her as to who had assaulted the deceased. Such evidence of both P.Ws. P.W 1 has further testified that at the time of the assault he alone was present near the spot. P.W. 2, who is a child witness on the other hand has testified that hearing her cries, P.W. 1 came to the spot and asked her as to who had assaulted the deceased. Such evidence of both P.Ws. 1 and 2, who have been examined as eye witnesses rules out presence of each other at the spot at the time of the occurrence. Learned Trial Court on thorough scrutiny of the evidence on record accepted and believed P.W.2 as the eye witness as she was a child and there was nothing on record to show that she was tutored and held P.W.1 to be the immediate post-occurrence witness. Learned Trial Court further held that P.W.I being the immediate post-occurrence witness saw the deceased running away. Such a finding by the learned Trial Court is, however, erroneous inasmuch as if P.W. 1, would have seen the appellant, who is none other than his paternal uncle running away from the spot, he would not have asked P.W.2, as to who had assaulted the deceased. In view of the contradictory evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 and the discussion on the probative effect of their evidence by the learned Trial Court, we are of the view that P.W.2 has been rightly believed as the eye witness, as there was nothing on record to show her to have been tutored and P.W.1 is the immediate post-occurrence witness, who did not see the appellant running away from the spot but lends corroboration to what P.W.2 has testified and such corroboration is relevant and admissible u/s 11 of the Evidence Act. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant has raised questions doubting the veracity of evidence regarding oral dying declaration made by the deceased before P.Ws. 3, 4 and 5 and the recorded dying declarations. According to P.Ws. 3, 4 and 5, the deceased made oral dying declaration on the verandah of her hut where she had been shifted from the initial spot of occurrence situated in the front of courtyard. According to P.Ws. 4 and 5 by the time they reached in the house of the deceased, she was kept there in the verandah and she was in a semi conscious state. According to P.Ws. 4 and 5 by the time they reached in the house of the deceased, she was kept there in the verandah and she was in a semi conscious state. According to P.W. 3, however, by the time the deceased was shifted to the verandah she lost her sense. P.W. 3, who is the husband of the deceased is specific in his examination-in-chief to the effect that Raghunath Dora (not examined) Nanda Dora (not examined), Biswanath Dora (P.W. A) and others came to the verandah and his wife declared at that time that appellant Maheswar Dora had assaulted her. P.Ws. 4 and 5 have also testified that deceased made the declaration while she was kept on the verandah of her house. Such evidence of P.Ws. 3,4 and 5 is belied in view of evidence of P.W. 3 in his cross-examination to the effect "by the time we shifted her to our verandah she had lost her sense. My wife was then shifted to the hospital in that condition". P.W.2, who appears to be a truthful witness and who is the person who rushed to inform P.W.3, husband of the deceased about the occurrence has also testified that after the assault the deceased bleeded professedly and lost her senses. She has further testified that the deceased was shifted to the hospital and till then she had not regained her senses. 8. P.W.1, who is held to be the immediate post-occurrence witness in paragraph 4 of his cross-examination has stated thus:- After the assault there was profuse bleeding from the injuries sustained by my mother. She fell there loosing consciousness. We shifted my mother to our verandah and made her sit there.... In paragraph 5 of his cross-examination, P.W.1 has stated thus :- ...It is not a fact that I have stated in the F.I.R. as well as before the I.O. that my mother declared before me and other villagers that the accused Maheswara had assaulted her.... Such answer as aforesaid by P.W.I to the question by the defence amounts to contradiction u/s 145 of the Evidence Act so far as his (P.W. 1's) assertion in his examination-in-chief regarding oral dying declaration of the deceased before him and P.Ws. 3, 4 and 5 are concerned. In view of such fact and the facts discussed supra the oral dying declaration of the deceased as asserted to have been made before P.Ws. 3, 4 and 5 are concerned. In view of such fact and the facts discussed supra the oral dying declaration of the deceased as asserted to have been made before P.Ws. 1, 3, 4 and 5 cannot be believed. But evidence of P.W.3, who is also immediate post-occurrence witness lends corroboration to the evidence of P.W.2, who after the occurrence rushed to P.W.3 to call him and inform him that the appellant had assaulted the deceased by means of an axe. Similarly, the evidence of P.Ws. 4 and 5 lends corroboration to P.W.2 so far as the injuries sustained by the deceased are concerned. 9. The second dying declaration is the statement made by the deceased (Ext. 14) recorded by the Investigating Officer (P.W. 11) u/s 161, Cr.P.C. P.W. 11, in his evidence is testified to have recorded the statement of the deceased at about 9.30 a.m. while she was being taken to Kotpad Hospital for treatment. He (P.W.11) has further testified that at the time of her examination the deceased was able to speak coherently. In view of our discussion supra and the specific evidence of P.Ws. 2 and 3 to the effect that in her state of unconsciousness the deceased was shifted to the hospital and evidence of P.Ws. 4 and 5 to the effect that after the dying declaration made by the deceased before them on the verandah of her house she lost consciousness, evidence of the Investigating Officer (P. W. 11) cannot be believed and the statement of the deceased recorded u/s 161, Cr.P.C. which assumed relevance u/s 32 of the Evidence Act later on, on the death of the deceased cannot be accepted. 10. Ext. 1 is the dying declaration recorded by the Medical Officer (P.W. 8) the caption of. Ext. 1 is as follows :- Sub-recording of dying declaration of the injured Padma Dora. Recorded in full consciousness and clear mental condition of the patient." In the aforesaid caption the words "recorded in full consciousness and clear mental condition of the patient" seems to have been inserted subsequently in different ink and hand writing. Such a feature in Ext. 1 when taken into consideration in conjunction with the evidence of P.W. 8, a doubt is created in our mind about the veracity of the dying declaration so recorded and we have no hesitation to hold that the dying declaration vide Ext. Such a feature in Ext. 1 when taken into consideration in conjunction with the evidence of P.W. 8, a doubt is created in our mind about the veracity of the dying declaration so recorded and we have no hesitation to hold that the dying declaration vide Ext. 1 also suffers from infirmities. 11. In view of our discussion supra the dying declaration asserted to have been made by the deceased on three occasions, i.e., before P.Ws. 3, 4 and 5, before the Investigating Officer (P.W.11) during examination u/s 161, Cr. P.C. and before the Medical Officer (P.W 8) cannot be accepted. But in view of our discussion in the preceding paragraphs regarding probative effect of the evidence of P.W.2, who is held to be reliable and whose evidence is acceptable and corroborated by P.Ws. 1,3,4 and 5 and the Medical Evidence of P.W 8 so far as the injuries are concerned and further the evidence of P.W 5, who has stated about the conduct of the appellant immediately after the occurrence and who is testified to have seen the appellant being armed with bloodstained Tangia and stating before him that he (appellant) had just killed a person, we are of the view that the prosecution has been able to drive home the guilt to the appellant. Even though the dying declarations pressed by the prosecution is deficient, evidence of P.W.2 alone as corroborated by other evidence, is sufficient to sustain the conviction recorded by the learned Trial Court. 12. We, therefore, find no merit in the appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed