JUDGMENT Hon’ble Prakash Krishna, J.—Challenging the order dated 6th of December, 1994 passed by the authority under the Minimum Wages Act and the Labour Commissioner (Central), Kanpur in MWA/128 of 1992 and MWA/37 of 1992, the present writ petition has been filed. The facts of the case lie in a narrow compass. 2. Two proceedings under the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act were initiated by the Assistant Labour Commissioner (C), Kanpur against the petitioners namely Union of India on the ground that the petitioners are not paying the minimum wages to the labourers employed by the respondent No. 3 namely M/s. Janta Labour Cooperative Society Ltd.. After affording opportunities of hearing on various dates, finally on 8th of November, 1994, the impugned award awarding a sum of Rs. 44,927.20 in both the cases was passed with the direction to the petitioners to pay it to the workers within 60 days from the date of issue of the order. 3. Sri B.B. Paul, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, submits that the impugned order is vitiated in as much Kanpur city has been notified as class ‘B’ city for the purposes of Minimum Wages Act. But it has taken note of the notification issued by the Ministry of Finance being notification No. OM 11016/5/82-E-II (B) dated 7th of February, 1983, wherein Kanpur has been declared as ‘A’ class city for the purposes of HRA and CCA w.e.f. 1st of August, 1982. 4. The authority concerned took the view that due to some oversight Kanpur has been mentioned in ‘B’ area in the Notification while copying out old Notification. The second submission is that the Assistant Labour Commissioner (C) Kanpur could not file the aforestated two applications before the authority under the Minimum Wages Act. 5. Elaborating the argument, he submits that the authority concerned was bound to read the Notification as it is and it could not add or subtract anything therein. The second submission is that the Assistant Labour Commissioner (C) Kanpur could not file the aforestated two applications before the authority under the Minimum Wages Act. 5. Elaborating the argument, he submits that the authority concerned was bound to read the Notification as it is and it could not add or subtract anything therein. He referred a book titled as Interpretation of Statutes 4th Edition by Vepa P. Sarathi and has placed reliance on the following sentence from the said book : “Whatever the method of performing these functions in other types of governments may be, in a democracy, there is a legislature which makes laws, an Executive which implements the laws and the Judiciary which interprets and determines the scope of the laws in the event of a dispute about such scope between one citizen and another, or between a citizen and the government.” 6. Considered the aforesaid submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner. So far as the first submission is concerned, I find no force therein. Admittedly, a subsequent notification was issued wherein Kanpur has been mentioned as ‘A’ class city. This notification has come into force on 12th of July, 1994. The authority concerned has rightly held that it is a case of sheer omission. It is not a case of adding or subtracting anything in the notifications. It has taken into consideration the ground realities of life. City ‘Kanpur’ undoubtedly is one of the biggest cities of the State of U.P.. Moreover Kanpur has been declared as ‘A’ class city in the notification issued by the Ministry of Finance dated 7.2.1983 as noticed in the impugned order. So far as the other submission is concerned that it is only Legislature that makes the law, no comment is required from the Court. The said point does not arise from the impugned award. The issue involved herein is with regard to the interpretation of the notification. Taking into consideration the entire facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the considered opinion that the notification has been rightly interpreted. 7. Even otherwise also, I do not find it as a fit case to interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It has been stated by the Apex Court from time to time that the State Governments, Central Government and the instrumentalities of the States should act as a model litigant. 7. Even otherwise also, I do not find it as a fit case to interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It has been stated by the Apex Court from time to time that the State Governments, Central Government and the instrumentalities of the States should act as a model litigant. They should not raise any technical objections. Reference can be made to the case of Dilbagh Rai Jarry v. Union of India, 1973 (3) SCC 554 where the Apex Court has extracted with approval, the following statement (from an earlier decision of the Kerala High Court) : “The State, under our Constitution, undertakes economic activities in a vast and widening public sector and inevitably gets involved in disputes with private individuals. But it must be remembered that the State is no ordinary party trying to win a case against one of its own citizens by hook or by crook; for the State’s interest is to meet honest claims, vindicate a substantial defence and never to score a technical point or overreach a weaker party to avoid a just liability or secure an unfair advantage, simply because legal devices provide such an opportunity. The State is a virtuous litigant and looks with unconcern on immoral forensic successes so that if on the merits the case is weak, government shows a willingness to settle the dispute regardless of prestige and other lesser motivations which move private parties to fight in Court. The lay”out on litigation costs and executive time by the State and its agencies is so staggering these days because of the large amount of litigation in which it is involved that a positive and wholesome policy of cutting back on the volume of law suits by the twin methods of not being tempted into forensic show”downs where a reasonable adjustment is feasible and ever offering to extinguish a pending proceeding on just terms, giving the legal mentors of government some initiative and authority in this behalf. I am not indulging in any judicial homily but only echoing the dynamic national policy on State litigation evolved at a Conference of Law Ministers of India way back in 1957.” 8. In Madras Port Trust v. Hymanshu International by its Proprietor v. Venkatadri (Dead) by L.Rs., (1979) 4 SCC 176 , it has been held : “2... I am not indulging in any judicial homily but only echoing the dynamic national policy on State litigation evolved at a Conference of Law Ministers of India way back in 1957.” 8. In Madras Port Trust v. Hymanshu International by its Proprietor v. Venkatadri (Dead) by L.Rs., (1979) 4 SCC 176 , it has been held : “2... It is high time that governments and public authorities adopt the practice of not relying upon technical pleas for the purpose of defeating legitimate claims of citizens and do what is fair and just to the citizens. Of course, if a government or a public authority takes up a technical plea, the Court has to decide it and if the plea is well founded, it has to be upheld by the Court, but what we feel is that such a plea should not ordinarily be taken up by a government or a public authority, unless of course the claim is not well”founded and by reason of delay in filing it, the evidence for the purpose of resisting such a claim has become unavailable.” 9. In a three Judge Bench judgment of Bhag Singh and others v. Union Territory of Chandigarh through LAC, Chandigarh, (1985) 3 SCC 737 , it has been held : “3... The State Government must do what is fair and just to the citizen and should not, as far as possible, except in cases where tax or revenue is received or recovered without protest or where the State Government would otherwise be irretrievably be prejudiced, take up a technical plea to defeat the legitimate and just claim of the citizen.” 10. The Apex Court in Urban Improvement Trust v. Mohan Lal, (2010) 1 SCC 512 has held as follows : “It is a matter of concern that such frivolous and unjust litigation by governments and statutory authorities are on the increase. Statutory Authorities exist to discharge statutory functions in public interest. They should be responsible litigants. They cannot raise frivolous and unjust objections, nor act in a callous and highhanded manner. They cannot behave like some private litigants with profiteering motives. Nor can they resort to unjust enrichment. They are expected to show remorse or regret when their officers act negligently or in an overbearing manner. They should be responsible litigants. They cannot raise frivolous and unjust objections, nor act in a callous and highhanded manner. They cannot behave like some private litigants with profiteering motives. Nor can they resort to unjust enrichment. They are expected to show remorse or regret when their officers act negligently or in an overbearing manner. When glaring wrong acts by their officers is brought to their notice, for which there is no explanation or excuse, the least that is expected is restitution/restoration to the extent possible with appropriate compensation. Their harsh attitude in regard to genuine grievances of the public and their indulgence in unwarranted litigation requires to be corrected.” 11. There is no merit in the writ petition. The writ petition is dismissed. No order as to costs. ————