The Management of Venkateswara Wires Porur, Chennai v. S. Vijayaraj & Another
2010-02-23
K.CHANDRU
body2010
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment :- The petitioner is a management. They have come forward to challenge a common order passed by the 2nd respondent, Labour Court, Chennai made vide Order dated 18.12.2008 in C.P.Nos.767 to 774 of 2002 filed by the contesting 1st respondents. 2. The contesting 1st respondent moved the Labour Court under section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act for computing the difference in payment of wages for the periods from 14.4.2000 to 31.10.2001 and from 1.12.2001 to 31.3.2002. According to the 1st respondent, the petitioner, who is manufacturing Copper and Aluminium wires and supplying products to various Electricity Boards set up by the State Governments is covered by the Scheduled employment notified by the Government of Tamil Nadu in G.O.Ms.No.2242, Labour and Employment Department dated 13.9.1981 under the caption "Employment in General Engineering and Fabriction Industries". 3. The State Government had fixed the minimum rates of wages in respect of the said employment by G.O.(D) No.1050, Labour and Employment Department dated 3.8.1995. Under the said Notification, appropriate minimum wages have been fixed for various employments in the General Engineering and Fabrication Industry. The Notification not only fixed basic minimum wage but also a variable Dearness Allowance linked to cost of living index by having the base year 1960 with 100 points. The workmen claimed difference in wages of varying amounts. There is no dispute regarding the quantum of the amounts claimed. 4. While resisting the claims made by the contesting respondents, the petitioner filed a counter statement dated 15.3.2004. The stand taken by them was that they were neither manufacturing any Engineering product nor an industry involved in fabrication. Therefore, the minimum wages notification will not apply to them. In that view of the matter, they contended that the workmen are not entitled for variable Dearness Allowance, which is claimed in the Claim Petition filed under section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. 5. Before the Labour Court on behalf of the workmen, one D.Damodaran was examined as W.W.1. On the side of the petitioner management, no witnesses were examined. On the side of the workmen, 6 documents were filed and they were marked as Ex.W.1 to W.6. No documents were also filed by the petitioner.
5. Before the Labour Court on behalf of the workmen, one D.Damodaran was examined as W.W.1. On the side of the petitioner management, no witnesses were examined. On the side of the workmen, 6 documents were filed and they were marked as Ex.W.1 to W.6. No documents were also filed by the petitioner. Before the Labour Court in addition to the non-coverage of their unit under the scheduled employment, they also took the plea that the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 is a complete code by itself and therefore the workers cannot come before the Labour Court with a petition under section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. If at all they should avail the remedy under Section 20 of the Minimum Wages Act. They also stated that since the Minimum Wages Act prescribes limitation, the workmen cannot file applications belatedly that too after a period of four years claiming the differential wages. 6. The Labour Court on an overall consideration of the materials placed before it came to the conclusion that in the absence of management leading any evidence in the issue of coverage under the scheduled employment and not filing any document, merely raising a plea in their written statement cannot be accepted. The Labour Court also held that since they are producing Copper and Aluminum products and distributing it to various Electricity Boards, it will come under the head "General Engineering or Fabrication Industry". The Labour Court also found fault with the petitioner management in not leading evidence on the issue, though such an issue was raised by them. In that view of the matter, the Labour Court computed the difference in wages by its common order dated 8.12.2008. 7. The petitioner has come forward to challenge the same after a period of one year. There is no explanation for not challenging it at an earlier point of time. In fact, a Copy Application was made during May 2009 and the certified copy was made ready and delivered to them during July 2009 itself. 8. In any event, the learned counsel for the petitioner raised once again the same contentions. It must be stated that the term General Engineering or Fabrication Industry" included as an Scheduled employment under the Act will wider the range of activities.
8. In any event, the learned counsel for the petitioner raised once again the same contentions. It must be stated that the term General Engineering or Fabrication Industry" included as an Scheduled employment under the Act will wider the range of activities. The petitioners own admission was that they are manufacturing Copper and Aluminum Wires, which itself is a fabrication process. The term "fabrication" is defined as construction: manufacture: that which is fabricated or invented. See: Chambers 20th Century Dictionary, 1991 Allied publishers. Even otherwise, it is an Engineering Industry. The definition is so wide and the Court cannot whittle down the coverage notified by the State Government. 9. The second contention that proceedings under section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act is not available and therefore the workers ought not have gone before the Labour Court. But, instead they should have filed applications under section 20 of the Minimum Wages Act. The question raised is no longer res integra. 10. The Supreme Court vide its judgment in Athani Municipalitys case reported in AIR 1969 SC 1335 though left the question open, subsequently, the question was answered by various High Courts including this Court. It was held that the remedy by way of Section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act is not barred by the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act. 11. The following judgments are pointer to that effect: i) Municipal Council, Akola vs. Labour Court Reported in 1976 (1) LLJ 334 ii) R.L.Kalatha and Co., Bhavnagar vs. State of Gujarat and others reported in 1991 (2) LLJ 377 iii) Municipal Corporation, Bombay vs. D.B.Pradhan and others reported in 59 FJR 172 iv) Kilaru Gopala Rao vs. Labour Court, Hyderabad and another reported in 1977 LIC 410 v) Somiben Mathurbai Vasava vs. Lalji Hakku Parmer Leather Works Co. reported in 1984 (2) LLJ 381 12. Therefore, the question of bar of limitation will arise only if the workmen move the minimum wages authorities. Even that authority has power to condone the delay. In any event, since the workmen have gone to a right forum and established their legal right, the question of interfering with the impugned order does not arise. 13.
Therefore, the question of bar of limitation will arise only if the workmen move the minimum wages authorities. Even that authority has power to condone the delay. In any event, since the workmen have gone to a right forum and established their legal right, the question of interfering with the impugned order does not arise. 13. Though the learned counsel for the petitioner strenuously contended that the order of the Labour Court suffers from legal infirmity and was willing to deposit the amount as a pre-condition for the admission of the Writ Petition, this Court is not inclined to accept the said submission. It is needless to state that the Supreme Court in Chandra Bhavan Boarding and Lodging vs. State of Mysore reported in AIR 1970 SC 2042 has held that if an industry does not pay the minimum wages, it has no right to exist. Subsequently, the Supreme Court in Peoples Union for Civil liabilities vs. Union of India reported in AIR 1982 SC 1473 and Sanjit Roy vs. State of Rajasthan reported in AIR 1983 SC 328 has held that non-payment of minimum wages would amount to forced labour prohibited under Article 23 of the Constitution. 14. Under these circumstances, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the impugned order, as no prima facie case was made out to entertain the Writ Petitions. Hence, all the Writ Petitions will stand dismissed. No costs. The connected Miscellaneous Petitions stand closed.