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2010 DIGILAW 774 (KAR)

Javaraiah v. Umesha

2010-07-02

A.N.VENUGOPALA GOWDA

body2010
JUDGMENT :- A.N. Venugopala Gowda, J: The appellants, who are the legal representatives of the 1st defendant, call in question legality of the judgment rendered by the Civil Judge (Sr.Dn.), Bhadravathi allowing the appeal filed by the 1st respondent-plaintiff and remanding the suit to the Trial Court for disposal. 2. Background facts in nutshell are as follows: The appellant-Javaraiah, preferred an application under Section 22 of Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 (‘Act’ for short) against the 1st respondent- B. Umesh, claiming compensation for the employment injuries sustained by him while working at the sugarcane crusher unit run by the 1st respondent. The Commissioner for Workmen Compensation (‘Commissioner’ for short) passed an award entitling Javaraiah to receive compensation amount of Rs.92,085/- with interest at 6% p.a and also Rs.1,500/-as penalty. The 1st respondent- B. Umesh was ordered to pay the amount within 30 days of the award dated 27.07.1996. The 1st respondent filed a Misc. petition before the Commissioner to set-aside the said award. The said petition was dismissed. The 1st respondent filed W.P.1876/1998 questioning the award/order. The writ petition was dismissed on 12.03.1998 inter-alia holding that, the remedy lies in filing an appeal under Section 30 of the Act. Liberty was reserved to file an appeal. The writ appeal filed thereafter, failed. 3. 1st respondent instituted a suit in the Trial Court by stating that neither the Commissioner nor this Court noticed the important ingredients as to whether the defendant is a workman or not and whether the country sugarcane crusher comes under Section 2(1)(n) of Act and that, the Commissioner has acted against the principles of natural justice. It was further stated that, Court has jurisdiction to try the suit as the status of a person can be declared under Section 34 of Specific Relief Act. The relief prayed was, to declare that the plaintiff is not the employer, the defendant is not a workman, working in the crusher and the award is nullity and not binding on the plaintiff. A further prayer to grant permanent injunction from executing the said award was also sought. Tahsildar-Shimoga, the executing authority was subsequently impleaded as the 2 defendant. The 1st defendant filed written statement, wherein reference was made to the proceedings that had taken place before the Commissioner and in the writ petition / writ appeal. A further prayer to grant permanent injunction from executing the said award was also sought. Tahsildar-Shimoga, the executing authority was subsequently impleaded as the 2 defendant. The 1st defendant filed written statement, wherein reference was made to the proceedings that had taken place before the Commissioner and in the writ petition / writ appeal. It was contended that, Civil Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit in view of the bar under Section 19(2) of the Act; that the suit is hit by principles of resjudicata; that the suit has no cause of action and is also not maintainable. 4. The Trial Court framed the following issues: i) Whether the plaintiff proves that the defendant is not a workman of the plaintiff and consequently, the plaintiff is not the employer of the defendant? ii) Whether the plaintiff proves that the judgment and decree passed by Labour Officer and Workman’s Compensation Commissioner under KAPK: KC.38/1995 dated 27.07.1996 is nullity and not binding on the plaintiff? iii) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the reliefs sought for? iv) Whether the defendant proves that this Court has no jurisdiction to try and entertain the matter as contended in para 11 of the written statement? v) Whether the Court fee paid is insufficient? vi) What order or decree? Issue-IV was treated as a preliminary issue. Considering the case of the parties and the written arguments filed, the Trial Court held that, the suit is not maintainable and it has no jurisdiction to try the suit. The suit was dismissed accordingly. 5. An appeal was preferred by the plaintiff in the Court below. The following points were raised for determination: i) Whether appellant/plaintiff establishes that the Trial Court has erred in holding that it has no jurisdiction to try and entertain the suit by dismissing his suit? ii) Whether judgment and decree of the Trial Court calls for interference by this Court? iii) What order? 6. The Court below has held that, the sugarcane crushing unit will not fall within Entry 29 of Second Schedule to the Act and hence there is a doubt whether the Commissioner has got jurisdiction to award compensation by holding the defendant to be a workman and the parties should adduce their evidence on the question of jurisdiction. The suit was held to be maintainable and that, the Trial Court has got jurisdiction to try the case. The suit was held to be maintainable and that, the Trial Court has got jurisdiction to try the case. As a result, the decree passed by the Trial Court was setaside. The appeal was allowed and the suit was remanded to the Trial Court for disposal. 7. With reference to the aforesaid background, Sri R.V. Jayaprakash, learned Advocate appearing for the appellants submits that: (a) The suit was clearly not maintainable and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction. (b) The procedure prescribed in the Act in the matter of determination of the claim was followed by the Commissioner and thereafter the award was passed. (c) The challenge made to the award in the writ petition and writ appeal was negatived. (d) The challenge if any to the award can only be under Section 30 of the Act and since the statute provides for a forum before which the redressal of the grievances, if any, should be put forth for consideration, the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to try and the suit is not maintainable. (e) There is an express bar under Section 19(2) of the Act of the Civil Court to settle, decide or deal with any questions which is by or under the Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Commissioner or to enforce any liability incurred under the provisions of the Act. (f) The question as to whether the appellant is a workman or not and whether the injuries sustained by him was in the course of his employment or not and whether the appellant was entitled to any compensation for the injuries sustained, are all questions which can effectively be adjudicated by the Commissioner and therefore the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred. (g) The Trial Court having considered the matter, rightly dismissed the suit and by reversing the decree passed by the Trial Court, the lower appellate Court has committed material error and illegality. 8. Sri R.Gopal, learned Advocate appearing for the 1st respondent- plaintiff, on the other hand contended that: (a) The Commissioner has not conducted the enquiry in terms of the provisions of the Act and the Rules. There was violation of procedure prescribed under the Act and the Rules and the award being null and void, suit filed for declaratory and consequential reliefs is maintainable. Exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court would be subject to limitations. There was violation of procedure prescribed under the Act and the Rules and the award being null and void, suit filed for declaratory and consequential reliefs is maintainable. Exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court would be subject to limitations. Reliance was placed on the decision In the case of Katikare Chintamani Dora Vs. Guatreddi Annamanaidu, AIR 1974 SC 1069 . (b) Ouster of jurisdiction can be upheld if rights or liabilities in question have been created In the Act in question and remedy provided therein is found to be adequate. Even in such case, the Court is not precluded from examining jurisdictional question despite the bar placed on its power. The Court can also examine whether the provisions of statute are applicable and procedural requirements are complied with. The suit is maintainable since there is a jurisdictional error committed by the Commissioner. Reliance was placed on the decision in the case of Shiv Kumar Chadha Vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, 1996 (6) Kar.L.J.107. (c) Exclusion of jurisdiction of civil Court must not be inferred readily, must be explicitly expressed or clearly implied and even if jurisdiction is so excluded, Civil Courts have jurisdiction to examine the cases where provisions of Act have not been complied with or statutory Tribunal has not acted in conformity with principles of judicial procedure. Reliance was placed on the decision in the case V.M. Govindaswamy (Since Dead) by L.Rs Vs. Shimoga City Municipal Council, Shimoga, 1996(3) Kar.L.J.324. (d) The Civil Court has jurisdiction to try all kinds of suits, except those which are expressly or impliedly barred under Section 19 of the Act and hence the Trial Court was not justified in reaching the conclusion that there is an implied bar for trial of the suit. (e) Even an issue relating to jurisdiction to try the suit is a mixed question of fact and law and since the Trial Court passed the judgment/decree without conducting a trial, there is an illegality and in the circumstances, the appellate Court is justified in reversing the decision of the Trial Court and in remanding the suit for disposal afresh. (f) The appeal remedy under Section 30 of the Act is not an adequate and efficacious remedy, since the appeal thereunder is not maintainable unless the appeal is accompanied by a receipt of deposit of the award amount and the appeal raises a substantial question of law. (f) The appeal remedy under Section 30 of the Act is not an adequate and efficacious remedy, since the appeal thereunder is not maintainable unless the appeal is accompanied by a receipt of deposit of the award amount and the appeal raises a substantial question of law. (g) In the circumstances of the case, the suit filed in the Trial Court has been rightly found to be maintainable by the lower appellate Court and keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, the impugned judgment does not call for interference. 9. Keeping in view the rival contentions and the record, the question that arises for consideration is: “Whether the provision under Section 19(2) of the Act bars the jurisdiction of a civil Court to entertain the suit?” 10. The jurisdiction of the Courts to try all suits of civil nature is expansive as is evident from the plain language of Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code (for short ‘Code’). This is because of the principle “where there is a right, there is a remedy”. A litigant, thus having a grievance of civil nature has a right to institute a civil suit in a civil Court, unless it’s cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred by any statute. The general principle is that, a statutory provision excluding the jurisdiction of civil Courts should be construed strictly. 11. In the case of Ram Swarup Vs. Shikar Chand, AIR 1966 SC 893 , Hon’ble Supreme Court has formulated the two tests, which are often considered relevant in dealing with the question about the exclusion of civil Court’s jurisdiction. They are: (a) Whether the special statute which excludes such jurisdiction has used clear and unambiguous words indicating that intention; and (b) Does that statute provide for an adequate and satisfactory alternative remedy to a party that may be aggrieved by the relevant order under its material provisions. 12. In the light of the above, it is necessary to examine the relevant provisions of the Act. Section 19 of the Act reads as follows: “19. 12. In the light of the above, it is necessary to examine the relevant provisions of the Act. Section 19 of the Act reads as follows: “19. Reference to Commissioners.- (1) If any question arises in any proceedings under this Act as to the liability of any person to pay compensation (including any question as to whether a person injured is or is not a workman) or as to the amount of duration of compensation (including any question as to the nature of extent of disablement), the question shall, in default of agreement, be settled by a Commissioner. (2) No Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question which is by or under this Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with by a Commissioner or to enforce any liability incurred under this Act. A perusal of the section, quoted above, would show that the jurisdiction of a civil Court stands ousted to entertain or adjudicate upon any of the following questions; (1) Liability of any person to pay compensation (including any question as to whether the person injured is or is not a workman); (2) As to the amount of duration of compensation (including any question as to the nature of extent of disablement); (3) The agreement relating to aforesaid aspects. (a) In respect of any Act which is required to be settled, decided or dealt with by a Commissioner empowered to do so under the Act, or (b) To enforce any liability incurred under the Act. Clauses (a) & (b), noted above, are relevant for my purpose. In respect of any matter which the Commissioner is empowered by or under the Act to determine the Issue, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in respect of such matter is barred. It is well settled that the averments and relief claimed in the plaint determine the jurisdiction of the Court. The respondent has questioned the legality of the award passed by the Commissioner under the Act as being in violation of principles of the Act and the Rules and also questioning the jural relationship between the parties and the liability to pay the compensation. That takes me to the question whether such question/dispute can be raised in appeal under Section 30 of the Act. It is relevant to take note of Section 30 of the Act, which reads as follows: “30. That takes me to the question whether such question/dispute can be raised in appeal under Section 30 of the Act. It is relevant to take note of Section 30 of the Act, which reads as follows: “30. Appeals.-(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court from the following orders of a Commissioner, namely: (a) an order awarding as compensation a lump sum whether by way of redemption of a half-monthly payment or otherwise or disallowing a claim in full or in part for a lump sum; [(aa) an order awarding interest or penalty under Section 4A;] (b) an order refusing to allow redemption of a half-monthly payment; (c) an order providing for the distribution of compensation among the dependants of a deceased workman, or disallowing any claim of a person alleging himself to be such dependant; (d) an order allowing or disallowing any claim for the amount of an indemnity under the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 12; or (e) an order refusing to register a memorandum of agreement or registering the same or providing for the registration of the same subject to conditions: Provided that no appeal shall lie against any order unless a substantial question of law is involved in the appeal, and in the case of an order other than an order such as is referred to in clause (b), unless the amount in dispute in the appeal is not less than three hundred rupees; Provided further that no appeal shall lie in any case in which the parties have agreed to abide by the decision of the Commissioner, or in which the order of the Commissioner gives effect to an agreement come to by the parties: [Provided further that no appeal by an employer under clause (a) shall lie unless the memorandum of appeal is accompanied by a certificate by the Commissioner to the effect that the appellant has deposited with him the amount payable under the order appealed against.] (2) The period of limitation for an appeal under this section shall be sixty days. (3) The provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), shall be applicable to appeals under this section. 12. The Act is a beneficial legislation, as it provides for payment of compensation to the workman employed by the employers. (3) The provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963), shall be applicable to appeals under this section. 12. The Act is a beneficial legislation, as it provides for payment of compensation to the workman employed by the employers. The amount of compensation is to be determined in terms of the provisions and the schedule to the Act. The Commissioner under the Act is a quasi judicial authority and is bound to apply the principles and the factors laid down in the Act for the purpose of determining the compensation. The aim of the Act is to provide for expeditious relief to the victims of accident. The statute deserves liberal consideration. The legislative act contained therein is required to be interpreted with a view to give effect thereof. 13. The scheme of the Act indicates that it has provided for a forum for determination of the claims which includes payment of compensation with regard to liability or otherwise of the employer and the insurer, if any. There is a machinery provided in the Act. Against the Award passed by the Commissioner, there is a forum for appeal and that too, at the highest higherarchyl of judiciary in the State. The adjudicatory system provided in the Act is cheap and rapid. The procedure to be followed by the Commissioner in the matter of determining the claims is simple unlike the pleadings, trial, admissibility of evidence and proof of evidence according to law before a Civil Court. Since the procedure required to be followed by the Commissioner has been laid down in the Act and the Rules, he can discharge the functions with greater expedition and inexpensiveness. The Act is intended to give speedy and inexpensive justice to the workman or the families of deceased workman. In the circumstances, the Court should adopt the purposive approach to reflect the contemporary needs and the legislative declaration of the policy envisaged in the Act. 3 14. In the case of State of Tamil Nadu Vs. Ramalinga Samigal Madam, (1985) 4 SCC 10 , inter alia it has been held as follows: “8. The principles bearing on the question as to when exclusion of the Civil Court’s Jurisdiction can be inferred have been indicated in several Judicial pronouncements but we need refer to only two decisions. In Secretary of State Vs. Ramalinga Samigal Madam, (1985) 4 SCC 10 , inter alia it has been held as follows: “8. The principles bearing on the question as to when exclusion of the Civil Court’s Jurisdiction can be inferred have been indicated in several Judicial pronouncements but we need refer to only two decisions. In Secretary of State Vs. Mask and Company, the Privy Council at page 236 of the Report has observed thus: It is settled law that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is not to be readily inferred, but that such exclusion must either be explicitly expressed or clearly implied. It is also well settled that even if Jurisdiction is so excluded, the Civil Courts have jurisdiction to examine Into cases where the provisions of the Act have not been complied with, or the statutory Tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. In Dhulabhai Vs. State of M.P., Hidayatullah, C.J., speaking for the Court, on an analysis of the various decision cited before the Court expressing diverse views, culled out as many as 7 propositions: out of them the first two which are material for our purposes are these: (1) Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special Tribunal the Civil Court’s jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the Civil Courts would normally do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory Tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. (2) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the Court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the Inquiry may be decisive. Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the Inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the Tribunals so constituted and whether remedies normally associated with actions in Civil Courts are prescribed by the said statute or not. XXXXX 14. Thirdly, having regard to the principle stated by this Court while enunciating the first proposition in Dhulabhai case It is clear that even where the statute has given finality to the orders of the special Tribunal the Civil Court’s jurisdiction can be regarded as having been excluded If there is adequate remedy to do what the Civil Court would normally do in a suit. In other words, even where finality is accorded to the orders passed by the special Tribunal one will have to see whether such special Tribunal has powers to grant reliefs which Civil Court would normally grant in a suit and if the answer is in the negative it would be difficult to imply or infer exclusion of Civil Court’s jurisdiction. (emphasis supplied) 15. In the case of Church of North India Vs. Lavajibhai Ratanjibhai, AIR 2005 SC 2544, it has been observed that: “With a view to determine the question as regard exclusion of jurisdiction of civil Court in terms of the provisions of the Act, the Court has to consider what in substance, and not merely in form, is the nature of the claim made in the suit and the underlying object in seeking the real relief therein. If for the purpose of grant of an appeal the Court comes to the conclusion that the question is required to be determined or dealt with by an authority under the Act, the jurisdiction of the civil Court must be held to have been ousted. The questions which are required to be determined are within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the authorities whether simple or complicated”. 16. At this stage, it is necessary to notice the decision relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellant. In N.D.M.C Vs. The questions which are required to be determined are within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the authorities whether simple or complicated”. 16. At this stage, it is necessary to notice the decision relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellant. In N.D.M.C Vs. Satish Chand, AIR 2003 SC 3187 , the question for consideration was regarding maintainability of civil suit to challenge the assessment and levy of property tax on a property owned by the respondent. The demand made by the appellant was questioned by the respondent in a suit for permanent injunction on the ground that the assessment of the property was illegal and without justice. The appellant took objection against the maintainability of the suit based on Sections 84 and 86 of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911. Section 84 provides for appeals against taxation and Section 86 provided that taxation not to be questioned except under the Act. By making a reference to the decision in Dhulabhai’s case AIR 1969 SC 78 , it was held that: “A bar to file a civil suit may be express or implied. An express bar is where a statute itself contains a provision that the jurisdiction of a civil Court is barred. An implied bar may arise when a statute provide a special remedy to an aggrieved party. A bar like the one noticed under Section 86 is held to be an implied bar envisaged in Section 9 CPC against filing of civil suit”. 17. In The Premier Automobiles Ltd. Vs. Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke of Bombay, (1976) 1 SCC 496 , It has been held that: i. If the dispute is not an industrial dispute, nor does it relate to enforcement of any other right under the Act, the remedy lies only in the civil Court. ii. If the dispute arise out of a right or liability under the general or common law and not under the Act, the jurisdiction of the civil Court is alternative, leaving it to the election of the suitor concerned to choose his remedy for the relief which is competent to be granted in a particular remedy. iii. If a dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Act, they the only remedy available to the suitor is to get an adjudication under the Act. (emphasis supplied) 18. iii. If a dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Act, they the only remedy available to the suitor is to get an adjudication under the Act. (emphasis supplied) 18. At this stage it is necessary to notice the decisions relied upon by the learned Counsel for the respondent. In the case of Katikara Chintamani Dora (supra), the Settlement Officer in the enquiry under the Tamil Nadu Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act (26 of 1948) had gone beyond limits of his jurisdiction circumscribed by Section 9(1) of the Abolition Act and determining a question unnecessary and incidental to the main issue. It was held that, such determination can be questioned in civil Court. 19. In the case of Shiv Kumar Chadha (supra), it was held that, where a statutory enactment only create rights or liabilities without providing forums for remedies, any person having a grievance that he has been wronged or his right was being affected, could approach the ordinary civil Court on the principle of law that there is a right, there is a remedy – ubi jus ibi remedium. It was also made clear that, where a particular Act had created a right or liability and had also provided a forum for such right for protection from enforcement of a liability without any authority of law, the ouster of Courts jurisdiction can be upheld on the finding that the rights or liabilities in question have been created by the Act without touching pre-existing common law right and the remedy provided therein is adequate and complete. 20. In the case of V.M. Govindaswamy (supra), the appellant had filed a suit for declaration that the respondent has no right to demand development, betterment or layout charges in respect of suit property and for permanent injunction. The respondent had not followed the statutory provisions and it had not complied with the principles of natural justice. As the procedure had not been followed, it was held that, where notice of demand has been issued without due compliance of the Act and principles of natural justice, civil Court can intervene. It is important to notice that, the availability or otherwise of alternate remedy has not been considered. 21. In the case of R. Ravindra Reddy Vs. As the procedure had not been followed, it was held that, where notice of demand has been issued without due compliance of the Act and principles of natural justice, civil Court can intervene. It is important to notice that, the availability or otherwise of alternate remedy has not been considered. 21. In the case of R. Ravindra Reddy Vs. H. Ramaiah Reddy, (2010) 3 SCC 214 , a suit was filed for a declaration that the order passed by the Land Tribunal granting occupancy rights was illegal and not binding on the plaintiffs and to their inherited rights and title to the schedule properties. The Trial Court held that, the suit was barred by limitation and was also not maintainable in view of bar of Section 132(2) of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 and dismissed the suit. An appeal was preferred in this Court, which was dismissed holding that, the civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit. The findings were questioned in the Apex Court on the ground that, the proceedings initiated before the Tribunal were vitiated by fraud & collusion and the bar under Section 132(2) of the 1961 Act would not apply to the facts of the case and as such, the Trial Court was not justified in holding that the suit was barred under the said provisions. Reliance was placed on the decision in the case of Shiv Kumar Chadha (supra), apart from other judgments and it was also urged that, without taking evidence as to the character of the lands, the issue related to bar of jurisdiction of civil Court could not have been decided. Negativing the contentions, by making reference to the provisions under Section 132 and 133 of the Act, it has been held, that, the jurisdiction of the civil or criminal Court or officer or authority stood ousted in matters where the decision had to be taken as to whether the land in question was agricultural land or not and whether the person claiming to be in possession is or is not a tenant of the land from prior to 01.04.1974. 22. In the case of Gottumukkala Appala Narasimha Raju Vs. 22. In the case of Gottumukkala Appala Narasimha Raju Vs. National Insurance Co Ltd., (2007) 13 SCC 446 , with reference to Section 19 of the Act, it has been held as follows: “Section 19 of the Act specifically provides that any questions with regard to liability of a person who is required to indemnify the employer must be determined in the proceeding under the said Act and not by way of a separate suit”. 23. Section 30 of the Act provides for an appeal against the award passed by the Commissioners Section 19(2) excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Court so far as matters, which are required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Commissioner. This is not a case where the controversy cannot be resolved in appeal preferred under Section 30 of the Act. The grievance of the respondent against the legality of the award passed by the Commissioner, could have been questioned in appeal under Section 30 of the Act. In fact, W.P.No.1876/1998 was dismissed on 12.03.1998 on the ground that the remedy lies in filing the appeal under Section 30 of the Act. In fact, liberty was reserved to the 1st respondent. The further challenge put in writ appeal was unsuccessful. Thus the 1st respondent could have questioned the award passed by the Commissioner only under the Act and not otherwise. That has not been done and on the other hand, the suit was filed, which is not maintainable. The Trial Court has correctly examined the matter and having found that the suit is not maintainable and it has no jurisdiction to try, dismissed the suit. In view of the provisions of Section 19(2) of the Act, referred to above, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain and adjudicate the matter is clearly barred. The award passed by the Commissioner in the facts and circumstances of the case cannot be termed to be a nullity. The scheme of the Act is complete in itself and thereby the jurisdiction of the civil Court would take cognizance of the cases arising under the Act by necessary implication as stood barred. The civil Court thereby is devoid of jurisdiction to give declaration on the invalidity of the award passed under the Act. The only right an aggrieved person has, is to avail the remedy of appeal under Section 30 of the Act. The civil Court thereby is devoid of jurisdiction to give declaration on the invalidity of the award passed under the Act. The only right an aggrieved person has, is to avail the remedy of appeal under Section 30 of the Act. The Court below by holding otherwise has committed illegality, which warrants interference. In the result, I pass the following: ORDER a) The appeal is allowed. b) The order under challenge passed by the appellate Court stands set-aside. As a consequence, the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court stands restored. c) Needless to observe that this judgment does not preclude the respondent/plaintiff from availing the remedy under Section 30 of the Act. d) No Costs.