JUDGMENT Hon’ble Krishna Murari, J.—This civil revision is directed against the orders dated 4.2.2010 and 5.2.2010 passed Execution Case No. 1 of 2009. Vide order dated 4.2.2010, the application for adjournment filed by the applicant-judgment debtor was rejected and Parvana for possession was issued. Vide order dated 5.2.2010, the application under Section 151, C.P.C. filed by the applicant with the prayer that order dated 4.2.2010 should be kept in abeyance and the objections being filed under Section 47, C.P.C. be decided, was rejected. 2. I have heard Shri K.N. Tripathi and Shri Shashi Nandan, learned Senior Advocates assisted by Shri Shishir Prakash and Smt. Tulika Prakash for the applicant and Shri Rakesh Dwivedi, Shri K.R. Sirohi, Shri W.H. Khan, learned Senior Advocates assisted by Shri Vijay Shankar Mishra and Shri Sharad Malviya for the opposite party. 3. Pleadings have been exchanged between the parties and the revision is being finally disposed of with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties. 4. Shorn of unnecessary details, facts giving rise to the dispute are as under. 5. The applicant is a company incorporated under the provisions of Companies Act, 1956 and is engaged in the production of various television programs including news program, documentary films etc. The opposite party is also a company incorporated under the provisions of Indian Companies Act, 1956. On 11.3.2004, a lease agreement was executed between the parties under which the opposite party agreed to give its property bearing plot Nos. 17-B and 17-C situate in Film City, Sector 16-A, Noida to the applicant on lease for the purpose of broadcasting the News Channel, for uplinking to the satellite, for studio operations and also for dissemination of various news related services. The lease was for a initial term of 5 years with a lock-in period for initial 2 years during which the agreement was not terminable by either party, however, after the expiry of 2 years, the Lease agreement could be terminated by either party with six months’ notice in writing. 6. The lease was for a initial term of 5 years with a lock-in period for initial 2 years during which the agreement was not terminable by either party, however, after the expiry of 2 years, the Lease agreement could be terminated by either party with six months’ notice in writing. 6. Clause 19 of the agreement provided that the lessee shall hand over peaceful possession of the premises upon expiry of the present Lease or such extended period by efflux of time or upon termination of the same at the end of the lease period in the same conditions as received, except normal wear and tear, damage of fire, acts of God and such other causes not within the control of lessee. On the same date, i.e., on 11.03.2004, two hire agreements were also entered into between the parties with regard to the studio and other equipments. The first hire agreement in respect of Studio ‘A’ situate in the premises with PCR, Make-up rooms, toilets etc. and equipments installed in the said studio and the air conditioning and split air conditioner and 24 hours fully back-up electricity from UPS and Generator was for a period of two years. Whereas the second hire purchase agreement in respect of equipments installed in Studio ‘B’, ‘C’ and ‘D’ and air conditioning, electricity back-up etc. was for a period of 5 years w.e.f. 1st April, 2004. Both the hire agreements were renewable with joint consent of both the parties in writing. 7. Some dispute arose between the parties which resulted into multiple legal proceedings, one of which was Original Suit No. 874 of 2007 filed by the applicant in the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division, Gautam Budh Nagar seeking a permanent injunction to restrain the opposite party not to dispossess except in accordance with law. 8. However, the dispute was amicably settled and a Memorandum of Understanding dated 14th January, 2008 was drawn between the parties. The terms and conditions of Memorandum of Understanding provided as under. “(1) With a view to settle the issues in an amicable manner, it is agreed between parties that INS shall pay an amount (net of TDS) of Rs. 3,19,45,749.00/- (Rupees Three crores nineteen lacs forty five thousand seven hundred and forty nine only) towards full and final settlement of the amount due to CCL till 31.12.2007 vide Cheque No. 983984 dt. 3,19,45,749.00/- (Rupees Three crores nineteen lacs forty five thousand seven hundred and forty nine only) towards full and final settlement of the amount due to CCL till 31.12.2007 vide Cheque No. 983984 dt. 14.01.2008 at the time of execution of this MOU. (2) INS shall continue to pay the rent, hire charges and other payments promptly when they become due and payable under the aforementioned agreements. (3) INS unconditionally undertakes to vacate the premises in question and peacefully handover the premises and all equipments (as per list attached) made available to it by CCL on 30.09.2009 without any let or hindrance and without demur or litigation. (4) INS has withheld a sum of Rs. 75 lacs (Rupees Seventy five lacs only) pending upgradation of equipments by CCL which would be released to Century Communication Ltd. after the upgradation is done. (5) CCL will make all four studios fully functional and provide electricity through transformer and back up through Generators. This process will start immediately and will be completed within 30 days of the payments under clause (1) is made. As far as Studio A is concerned the CCL would be entitled to remove equipments (as per list attached) after 30 days of the MOU, and thereafter INS would be entitled to place its own equipments in Studio A which placement would be a license ending on 30.9.2009 whereafter INS would be entitled and obliged to remove on the said date. This placement would not create any right in the property in favour of INS. (6) CCL would continue to provide all services and maintenance as per agreements dt. 11.3.2004. (7) The rent would remain the same as agreed in agreement dt. 11.3.2004 as modified by MOU dt. 01.12.2006 except that Rs. 6 lacs (Rupees Six lacs) per month would be reduced from the hire charges in lieu of equipment removed by CCL from Studio A. (8) After the expiry of lease/hire agreements i.e., 31.3.2009, the total rent and hire charges will be increased by Rs. 5 lacs (Rupees Five lacs) per month w.e.f. 1.4.2009 to 30.9.2009. (9) Other terms and conditions of the three agreements dt. 11.3.2004 would remain the same. (10) INS undertakes to withdraw its application filed with NOIDA for cancellation of leases of plot in question and for its allotment to INS. 5 lacs (Rupees Five lacs) per month w.e.f. 1.4.2009 to 30.9.2009. (9) Other terms and conditions of the three agreements dt. 11.3.2004 would remain the same. (10) INS undertakes to withdraw its application filed with NOIDA for cancellation of leases of plot in question and for its allotment to INS. (11) Both parties, i.e., INS and CCL, agree to withdraw and file appropriate proceedings for withdrawing/quashing the FIRs lodged against each other and/or their agents, directors, employees and to assist each other in withdrawal of all cases which may be pending with regard to the disputes which have arisen between the parties with respect to the agreements. These applications would be moved forthwith and in any case within seven days of this MOU. (12) This MOU would be filed by INS or CCL before the Court of Additional District and Sessions Judge, Gautam budh Nagar (FTC No. 2) in OS No. 874 of 2007 INS v. CCL with a request to pass a compromise decree in terms of this MOU. This MOU would also be filed before the Police Authorities and the appropriate Criminal Courts, wherever the proceedings are pending.” 9. In pursuance to clause (12) of the Memorandum of Understanding, an application dated 18.1.2008 was filed in the civil suit pending between the parties with a prayer that the suit may be disposed of in terms of Memorandum of Understanding. Vide order dated 25.1.2008, the suit was decided in terms of Memorandum of Understanding, which was made a part of the decree. In accordance with clause (3) of the Memorandum of Understanding, the applicant was to vacate the premises in question and handover the premises and all equipments on 30.9.2009 without any let or hindrance or without any demur or litigation. The applicant in pursuance to the compromise decree, as stated in paragraph 15 of the affidavit filed in support of the stay application, vacated 39950 sq. ft. out of the total area of 61050 sq. ft. in their occupation, however the rest of the area, according to their own case, has not been vacated up till now. The opposite party initiated execution proceedings and moved an execution application on 25.11.2009, which was registered as Execution Case No. 1 of 2009. The record indicates that there was already a caveat. ft. in their occupation, however the rest of the area, according to their own case, has not been vacated up till now. The opposite party initiated execution proceedings and moved an execution application on 25.11.2009, which was registered as Execution Case No. 1 of 2009. The record indicates that there was already a caveat. A copy of the execution application was served upon the counsel for the applicant in the Court on 1.12.2009 and the matter was adjourned to 8.12.2009. On 8.12.2009, on the basis of statement that there has been some mutual settlement between the parties, the matter was adjourned to 15.1.2010. On the said date, again an adjournment was sought which was allowed and the case was fixed for 29.1.2010. On the said date, the applicant again sought adjournment and as a last opportunity, time was allowed and the case was fixed for 4.2.2010. On this date also, the applicant did not file any objection and again sought adjournment, which was rejected and the order for issuance of writ of possession was passed. On 5.2.2010, the application for recall of the order dated 4.2.2010 along with the objection under Section 47, C.P.C. was filed on behalf of the applicant. 10. The executing Court rejected the application for recall of the order issuing writ of possession on the ground that in spite of number of opportunities, no objection has been filed and only adjournment was being sought and, as such, there was no justification to recall the said order. 11. The first submission made by Shri K.N. Tripathi, learned Senior Advocate is that the decree is inexecutable as compromise did not contain stipulation that the decree holder shall be entitled to enforce the compromise decree in execution proceedings and eject the applicant and in the absence of any such stipulation in the agreement which forms a part of the decree, eviction can only be made through a fresh suit. 12. Reliance in support of the contention has been placed on decision of Orrisa High Court in the case of Khalli Rath v. Eppili Ramchandra, AIR 1953 Ori 74 . 13. In reply, Shri Rakesh Dwivedi, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the opposite party has submitted that there is no such requirement of law that the agreement or a compromise, on the basis of which a decree was passed by a competent Court, should contain a stipulation for execution. 14. 13. In reply, Shri Rakesh Dwivedi, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the opposite party has submitted that there is no such requirement of law that the agreement or a compromise, on the basis of which a decree was passed by a competent Court, should contain a stipulation for execution. 14. In support of the argument reliance has been placed on decision of Kerala High Court in the case of V.N. Sreedharan v. Bhaskaran, AIR 1986 Ker 49 , Pushpa Devi Bhagat v. Rajinder Singh and others, (2006) 5 SCC 566 and Gopal Lal v. Babu Lal and others, AIR 2004 Raj 273 . 15. A decree, as defined under sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is a formal expression of an adjudication that conclusively determines the rights of the parties as respects the matter in controversy. This adjudication of rights may take place after contest and also by consent of the parties, that is, under a compromise. Thus, a compromise decree is as much a decree adjudicating the rights of the parties. Executability is one of the main incidences of decree, whether it is a compromise decree or decree passed after contest. Thus, every decree is executable unless the right to execute is restricted either expressly or by necessary implication either by the terms of decree, or by the provisions of any supervening legislative enactment. 16. In the case of Khalli Rath (supra), a Division Bench of Orrisa High Court has taken a view that in the absence of any stipulation in the compromise, the decree would be inexecutable. In Khalli Rath’s case, the suit was for recovery of possession which was compromised on 21.3.1946, stipulating that at the end of the year, the premises in dispute would be vacated without notice. Interpreting the terms of compromise, it was held as under : “The Courts below have held that the compromise decree is executable as the suit itself was for possession. It appears to us that it would be travelling beyond the words used by the parties in the compromise deed, to import into it anything like a provision directing execution to be taken in the event of the defendant not vacating the house after the expiry of the period of one year. The compromise does not say that the decree-holder shall be entitled to enforce the compromise in execution proceedings and eject the defendant. The compromise does not say that the decree-holder shall be entitled to enforce the compromise in execution proceedings and eject the defendant. Nor does it say that the defendant should deliver back possession at the end of the stipulated period. All that the stipulation amounts to is that the defendant agreed to vacate after a certain date. What would happen in the event of a violation of this provision was not stipulated or agreed to between the parties. In such circumstances, it is difficult to hold that the parties intended that the plaintiff should recover possession by way of execution as the suit itself was one for possession. We are, therefore, unable to accept the view taken by the Courts below that the decree was executable as the suit itself was for possession and would set aside the order under appeal.” 17. No doubt, the view taken by the Division Bench of Orrisa High Court supports the proposition advanced by Shri Tripathi. However, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the Prakash Chand Khurana v. Harnam Singh and others, AIR 1973 SC 2065 while adjudicating upon the precise controversy has held as under. “The next contention of the appellants is that the award is merely declaratory of the rights of the parties and is therefore inexecutable. This contention is based on the wording of Clause 7 of the award which provides that on the happening of certain events the respondents “shall be entitled to take back the possession. We are unable to appreciate how this clause makes award merely declaratory”. .......It is never a pre-condition of the executability of a decree that it must provide expressly that the parties entitled to a relief under it must file an execution application for obtaining that relief.” 18. In view of pronouncement of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Prakash Chand Khurana (supra), the view taken by Orrisa High Court in the Khalli Rath case can be held to be no longer a good law. The same view has been taken by Rajasthan High Court in the case of Gopal Lal (supra). In view of pronouncement of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Prakash Chand Khurana (supra), the view taken by Orrisa High Court in the Khalli Rath case can be held to be no longer a good law. The same view has been taken by Rajasthan High Court in the case of Gopal Lal (supra). Reference at this stage may also be made to the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Devdutta Dheer v. Janki Vallabh, AIR 1986 SC 170, wherein in a suit for eviction, the parties entered into a compromise under which the defendant agreed to vacate the premises by the end of 1970. The question before the Hon’ble Apex Court was as to whether this decree was executable. The contention for the decree being unexecutable was that a fresh contract was entered into between the parties, as an undertaking was given that the suit premises would be vacated by the end of 1970 and, thus, the possession could be obtained only by a fresh suit. 19. Repelling the contention, Hon’ble Apex Court observed in paragraph 15 as under : “.........The defendant agreed to get passed a decree for ejectment against him, and the Court granted him time to vacate the suit premises, till the end of 1970. After this period, the decree holder would certainly be entitled to execute the decree. It is incorrect to say that this decree was a fresh contract or a declaratory decree. No fresh lease was arrived at between the parties. So, the decree was executable.” 20. In the case in hand, the parties entered into a compromise whereunder the applicant undertook to vacate the premises in question and peacefully handover the premises and all equipments made available to it on 30.9.2009 without any let or hindrance and without demur or litigation. The said Memorandum of Understanding is a part of decree. The aforesaid condition is in direct contrast of terms of compromise considered by the Division Bench of Orrisa High Court in Khalli Rath’s case (supra), wherein there was no stipulation that defendant will deliver back possession at the end of the stipulated period as has been noticed in the judgment itself. The aforesaid condition is in direct contrast of terms of compromise considered by the Division Bench of Orrisa High Court in Khalli Rath’s case (supra), wherein there was no stipulation that defendant will deliver back possession at the end of the stipulated period as has been noticed in the judgment itself. Condition No. 3 in the Memorandum of Understanding in the case in hand, clearly provide for vacation of the premises on 30.09.2009, which was not there in the case before the Orrisa High Court and, thus, the judgment is also clearly distinguishable on facts. 21. Much stress has been laid by Shri Tripathi on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Bibekananda Bhowal (dead) by L.Rs. v. Satindra Mohan Deb (dead) by L.Rs. , AIR 1996 SC 1985 . In the aforesaid case before the Hon’ble Apex Court, title suit was decided in terms of compromise arrived at between the parties at the appellate stage, and accordingly, decree was drawn. 22. The terms of compromise were as under : “A. That the defendant-appellant will give up possession of an area of 7x7 more or less in the south-western corner of the room in suit in his possession in favour of the plaintiff within one month from the date of this compromise and will allow the plaintiff within that period an access to that area. The said space will be walled up to the ceiling at the cost of the plaintiff and within one month. In the event of non-compliance with the terms contained above for his default the defendant-appellant will be liable to ejectment in execution of the decree passed in the suit in terms of the compromise. B. That the plaintiff will be entitled to build the upper storey above the building in suit at his expense and a stair-case in the aforesaid south-western portion given up by the appellant through the opening already in existence for access to the said upper storey. The defendant-appellant will have no manner of right or claim for possession in the aforesaid upper storey after construction. The defendant-appellant will have no manner of right or claim for possession in the aforesaid upper storey after construction. C. Than on compliance of the terms mentioned in paragraph 1 the defendant-appellant shall remain in possession of the room in suit minus the area mentioned in paragraph 1 as a monthly tenant according to English Calendar month for a period of 10 years from 1st May, 1965 till 30th April, 1975 at a rent of Rs. 225/- per month, rent for each month being payable within the 14th day of the succeeding month. The defendant-appellant also undertakes to pay as he had been paying the Municipal Tax in respect of the room in his possession. D. That the defendant-appellant shall not sublet any portion of the said room in his occupation nor transfer his tenancy right to any one else. The defendant-appellant will vacate and deliver possession of the room in his possession to the plaintiff or his assign or representative in interest on the expiry of the said period of 10 years without any notice from the plaintiff. E. The defendant-appellant will have also the right to vacate the room or surrender the tenancy even before the expiry of the aforesaid period of 10 years on giving one month’s previous notice to the plaintiff. I. In the event of any breach of any condition mentioned above the defendant-appellant will be liable to ejectment by appropriate action in a Court of law.” 23. One of the terms of compromise provided that the defendant will give up possession of some area in the south-western corner of the room in the suit in his possession in favour of the plaintiff within one month from the date of compromise and in respect of other part of the property, there was a stipulation in the compromise that in the event of any breach of any condition, the defendant-appellant will be liable to be ejectment by appropriate action in a Court of law. The Hon’ble Apex Court finding that there is striking difference in the language used in clause ‘A’, which provided for execution of the decree, whereas clause ‘I’ contained a stipulation of ejectment by appropriate action in a Court of law, held that ejectment by appropriate action in a Court of law can only mean ejectment by taking action by filing a suit or taking any other proceedings in a Court of law and the parties did not contemplate ejectment by execution of the compromise decree in relation to a breach of clause ‘C’. 24. A reading of the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court clearly goes to show that the said view has been taken not only on account of difference in the phraseology of clause ‘A’ and ‘I’, but also because there was certain protections provided to the tenant under Section 5 of the Assam Non-agricultural Urban Areas Tenancy Act, 1955 which neither can be taken away nor there was any contemplation in the compromise decree to indicate that the said protection was meant to be taken away. The same becomes clear from the following observation of the Hon’ble Apex Court. “There is a striking difference in the language used in clause A relating to ejectment and in clause I relating to ejectment. Clause A clearly contemplates ejectment of the Bhowals in execution of the compromise decree if they do not hand over possession of an area of 7’x7. However, in respect of their tenancy relating to the rest of the building, if they commit any breach of any of the conditions stipulated in the compromise decree (which would presumably include the condition relating to handing over possession on expiry of ten years) the Bhowals are liable to ejectment by appropriate action in a Court of law. This is in contradistinction to the ejectment in execution of the compromise decree contemplated under clause A. In this context, ejectment by appropriate action in a Court of law can only mean ejectment by taking action by filing a suit or taking any other proceeding in a Court of law. This is in contradistinction to the ejectment in execution of the compromise decree contemplated under clause A. In this context, ejectment by appropriate action in a Court of law can only mean ejectment by taking action by filing a suit or taking any other proceeding in a Court of law. Clearly, the parties did not contemplate ejectment of execution of the compromise decree in relation to a breach of clause C. This difference in the phraseology of clause A and I is understandable because a tenant who may otherwise be liable to ejectment, may be protected by provisions of the Rent Act or by any other provision of law. This issue can only be adjudicated properly in an appropriate proceeding and not in the execution of a decree................” It has further been observed in paragraph 15 as under : “Learned counsel for the appellants (Bhowals) has also contended that just as Debs were held to be protected tenants under Section 5 of the Assam Non-agricultural Urban Areas Tenancy Act, 1955, the Bhowals, in turn, are also protected by the same Section 5 assuming that they are tenants of the Debs. There is evidence to show that the building on 1 Katha, 7 Chataks of land was constructed by Bhowals and/or their predecessor-in-interest after the execution of the lease. Within the period permissible under Section 5 of the said Act. The rights which are available to a lessee against a lessor are also made available under the said Act to a sub-lessee as against his lessee. There is nothing in the compromise decree to indicate that this protection of Assam Non-agricultural Urban Areas Tenancy Act, 1955 was meant to be taken away. This contention has considerable merit. The consent decree of 10.5.1965 had created and/or continued the relationship of landlord and tenant as between the Deb and the Bhowals for a further period of ten years. If the Bhowals are entitled to the protection of Section 5 of the Assam Non-agricultural Urban Areas Tenancy Act, 1955, they are entitled to avail of this protection in a Court of law. Such a question cannot be decided in execution proceedings. The compromise decree did not contemplate ejectment of the Bhowals from the suit building in execution of the compromise decree. It provided that they would be ejected by taking an appropriate proceeding in accordance with law.........” 25. Such a question cannot be decided in execution proceedings. The compromise decree did not contemplate ejectment of the Bhowals from the suit building in execution of the compromise decree. It provided that they would be ejected by taking an appropriate proceeding in accordance with law.........” 25. Clearly, the view taken by the Hon’ble Apex Court is on account of the difference in the language used in the two clauses of the same compromise and also because of the protection extended to tenant under a statute. In the present case, the Memorandum of Understanding between the parties, which became a part of the decree, clearly provides that the applicant shall hand over vacant possession on 30.9.2009. It is also undisputed that the building is out of the purview of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 and the protection extended by the said Act to statutory tenants is not available to the applicant. 26. In view of above, the case of Bibekananda Bhowal (supra) is clearly distinguishable on facts and the law laid down therein is of no help to the applicant. 27. In the case of Pushpa Devi Bhagat (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court while considering the nature of and means of enforcement of compromise/consent decree has held if there is a settlement and a consent decree that tenant will vacate the premises within specified time, the possession could be recovered in execution of such decree in the event of tenant failing to vacate within time. It has been observed in paragraph 21 as under : “21. In this case, under the settlement, the tenant undertook to vacate the suit property on a future date (that is 22.1.2002) and pay the agreed rent till then. The decree in pursuance of such settlement was an “executable” decree. Therefore the settlement did not fall under the second part, but under the first part of Rule 3. The High Court obviously committed an error in holding that the case fell under the second part of Rule 3.” 28. The decree in pursuance of such settlement was an “executable” decree. Therefore the settlement did not fall under the second part, but under the first part of Rule 3. The High Court obviously committed an error in holding that the case fell under the second part of Rule 3.” 28. The next contention advanced by Shri K.N. Tripathi is that in view of clause 11 of the Memorandum of Understanding (quoted above), since the parties had agreed to withdraw and file appropriate proceeding for withdrawing all cases between the parties with respect to agreement, the suit also stood dismissed as withdrawn and the decree passed on the basis of the said Memorandum of Understanding can only be declaratory in nature and, hence, inexecutable. 29. This argument is based only on clause 11 of the Memorandum of Understanding, which cannot be read in isolation. Under clause 3 of the Memorandum of Understanding, applicant undertook to vacate the premises and handover all equipments on 30.09.2009 without any let or hindrance or without any demur or litigation. Again in clause 12, it was agreed by the parties that this Memorandum of Understanding would be filed before the concerned Court in the Original Suit No. 874 of 2007 “with a request to pass a compromise decree in terms of this Memorandum of Understanding”. In order to interpret any document, be it a contract or agreement or MOU, the entire document is to be read as a whole and not just one clause in isolation of others. One of the cardinal principle in the construction of the contract is that entire contract must be taken as constituting an organic synthesis embodying provisions which balance the reciprocal rights and obligation of the parties to the contract. 30. A complete and full reading of the Memorandum of Understanding between the parties dated 14th January, 2008 clearly goes to show that the applicant agreed to vacate the premises in question and hand over the premises and all equipments on 30.09.2009 and also the Memorandum of Understanding had to be filed in the original suit with a request to pass a compromise decree in terms of the Memorandum of Understanding. Thus, the argument advanced on behalf of the applicant that in view of clause 11 of the Memorandum of Understanding, the suit was stood withdrawn and the decree was declaratory in nature merely recording the terms of compromise and hence inexecutable, is without any force and is not liable to be accepted. 31. The next submission advanced is that since the opposite party has accepted the cheques of rent sent by applicant up to 4th February, 2010 and it is continuing in possession even after 30.9.2009, and thus, becomes a lessee by ‘holding over’ in view of Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act. 32. In reply, it has been submitted by Shri Rakesh Dwivedi that cheques have actually neither been legally tendered to the opposite party nor have been accepted nor encashed and as a matter of fact, envelop containing the cheques were handed over with the gate security/receptionist and the same does not amount to acceptance of the rent by the opposite party and, hence, provision of Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act are not attracted. 33. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Shanti Prasad Devi and another v. Shankar Mahto and others, (2005) 5 SCC 543 has held as under : “We fully agree with the High Court and first appellate Court below that on expiry of period of lease, mere acceptance of rent for the subsequent months in which the lessee continued to occupy the lease premises cannot be said to be a conduct signifying “assent” to the continuance of lease, even after expiry of lease period.” 34. In the present case, the tender of cheques kept in a envelop, was a unilateral act of the applicant, and it cannot amount to consent of the opposite party to the continuance of lease. In view of this fact and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the applicant is devoid of any merit and is liable to be rejected. 35. Shri Tripathi next contended that since vide order dated 5.2.2010, the objection filed under Section 47, C.P.C. have been taken on record and registered as miscellaneous case, the executing Court ought to have recalled the order dated 4.2.2010 issuing writ of possession and ought to have decided the objections first. 36. 35. Shri Tripathi next contended that since vide order dated 5.2.2010, the objection filed under Section 47, C.P.C. have been taken on record and registered as miscellaneous case, the executing Court ought to have recalled the order dated 4.2.2010 issuing writ of possession and ought to have decided the objections first. 36. A sequence of events before the executing Court goes to show that in spite of opportunities on four occasions, the applicant did not avail the same by filing any objection and it was only on 4.2.2010 when the writ of possession was issued, the alleged objections were filed on 5.2.2010 along with the application to recall the order dated 4.2.2010. No doubt under the provisions of Civil Procedure Code, the judgment-debtor is entitled to resist the execution proceeding on such legal grounds as may be available in law, but he cannot be permitted to linger on and forestall the proceeding by seeking adjournment and not filing objections within time. 37. A perusal of the application dated 5.2.2010 and the alleged objections go to show that there is not even an explanation for not filing the same at the earlier occasion. Thus, the Court below committed no illegality in refusing the prayer to recall the order dated 4.2.2010 issuing writ of possession on the ground that objection under Section 47, C.P.C. are to be decided first. 38. Lastly, it was contended by Shri Tripathi that due to delay in allotment of land by the Noida Authority over which the applicant planned the construction of its own building, the entire project got delayed, on account of which, he could not vacate the premises within time. Besides, the delay in clearance from several government and Non-Government agencies for frequency transfer etc. has also created a situation in which the applicant could not vacate the premises as per the Memorandum of Understanding and if a reasonable time is allowed to the applicant, he shall vacate the premises.. An affidavit has also been filed giving details of vacating the premises in a phased manner. By means of the said affidavit, time has been sought till 31st January, 2011 to vacate the entire premises. 39. The request for grant of time has been very vehemently opposed by Shri Rakesh Dwivedi appearing for the opposite party. An affidavit has also been filed giving details of vacating the premises in a phased manner. By means of the said affidavit, time has been sought till 31st January, 2011 to vacate the entire premises. 39. The request for grant of time has been very vehemently opposed by Shri Rakesh Dwivedi appearing for the opposite party. It has been stated that they are also running a commercial T.V. channel and on account of delay in vacating the premises, their plans of expansion have got delayed resulting in severe financial losses. 40. Actually the applicant has over stayed in the premises and is under an obligation to vacate the same. However, having regard to fact that shifting is a highly technical process and involves clearance from the Government and other authorities, some reasonable time must be allowed to the applicant to vacate the premises, lest it may result into closure of its activities and business. However, the time prayed for till January 2011 appears to be highly excessive. 41. In one of the letters dated 1st October 2009 written by the Managing Director of the applicant filed as Annexure 2 to the counter affidavit, the applicant agreed to vacate the entire premises by 31st October, 2009 and also to pay rent and hire charges to the tune of Rs. 66,50,000/- per month in respect of the area remaining in their possession w.e.f. 1st October, 2009 onwards. Subsequently, vide letter dated 14th January, 2010 written by Managing Director of the applicant filed as Annexure 5 to the affidavit filed in support of the stay application, the applicant agreed to hand over the vacant possession of the remaining area in his possession on 31st July, 2010 and to pay Rs. 50 lacs per month from 1st February, 2010 onwards. 42. In view of the stand taken by the applicant itself in letter dated 14.1.2010, the Court feels it appropriate to grant time to vacate the premises up to 31st July, 2010, subject to the condition that the applicant files an undertaking on affidavit within three weeks from today before the executing Court that it shall hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the entire leased out premises and all equipments in its possession under the hire purchase agreement by 31.7.2010. The applicant shall also be liable to pay a sum of Rs. The applicant shall also be liable to pay a sum of Rs. 60 lacs per month w.e.f. 1.2.2010 for use and occupation of the premises and other equipments in their possession. The dues for the month of February and March may be deposited with the executing Court by 20th March, 2010 and thereafter by 10th of every month. The opposite party shall be entitled to withdraw the amount so deposited. 43. In case of default in complying with any condition mentioned hereinabove, the order allowing time shall be discharged automatically and the writ of possession issued by the executing Court shall hold good for eviction of the applicant. 44. Subject to aforesaid directions, the civil revision stands dismissed. ————