ORDER 1. Leave granted. This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 17 -11-2008 rendered by the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Jabalpur (Madhya Pradesh) by which Criminal Appeal No. 2119 of 2008, filed by Respondent 2 against his conviction recorded under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and Section 201 read with Section 34 IPC and imposition of sentence of RI for life and a fine of Rs. 500, in default RI for four months for commission of the offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC as well as RI for seven years and a fine of Rs. 500, in default RI for four months for commission of the offence punishable under Section 201 read with Section 34 IPC, by the learned First Additional Sessions Judge, Damoh vide judgment dated 30-8-2008 in Sessions Trial No. 219 of 2005, is allowed and certain adverse remarks have been made against the appellant, who is a judicial officer. 2. The brief facts leading to filing of the present appeal may be noted. On 28-8-2005, an FIR was lodged at Police Station Nohta, District Damoh, Madhya Pradesh against Respondent 2 by the first informant, Achhe Lal Ahirwar alleging that Respondent 2 and others had committed an offence punishable under Section 302 IPC read with Section 34 and Section 201 IPC read with Section 34 for murdering one Reenu Ahirwar. 3. After usual investigation, charge-sheet was laid before the competent court and the case was committed for trial to the court presided over by the present appellant. It may be mentioned that several witnesses were examined by the prosecution and documents were also produced in support of its case against Respondent 2 and others. On appreciation of evidence adduced by the prosecution, the appellant concluded that it was proved by the prosecution beyond pale of doubt that deceased Reenu Ahirwar had die a homicidal death. The appellant further concluded that Respondent 2 herein was responsible for causing murder of the deceased and no case was made out by the prosecution against the other accused. 4. The appellant further concluded that Respondent 2 herein was responsible for causing murder of the deceased and no case was made out by the prosecution against the other accused. 4. In view of the above conclusions, the appellant by judgment dated 30-8-2008, rendered in Sessions Trial No. 219 of 2005, convicted Respondent 2 under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and Section 201 read with Section 34 IPC and sentenced him to undergo life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.500, in default RI for four months for commission of the offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and RI of seven years and a fine of Rs.500, in default RI for four months for commission of the offence under Section 201 read with Section 34 IPC. 5. Feeling aggrieved, Respondent 2 preferred Criminal Appeal No. 2119 of 2008 before the High Court of Judicature at Jabalpur (Madhya Pradesh). The appeal was heard by the Division Bench comprising Mr Justice R.S. Garg (as he then was) and Mr Justice V.C. Maheshwari. The Division Bench was of the view that the conviction of Respondent 2 recorded by the appellant was not justified at all. Therefore, by judgment dated 17-11-2008, the High Court acquitted Respondent 2. However, while acquitting Respondent 2, the learned Judges comprising the Bench made disparaging remarks against the appellant and, therefore, the appellant has approached this Court for expunging the same. 6. On service of notice, Mr M.K. Shrivastava, who is discharging duties as the Additional Superintendent of Police, District Damoh (M.P.), has filed a reply-affidavit mentioning inter alia that in the incident in question, murder of a young boy had taken place for which Respondent 2 and others were prosecuted. It is further pointed out in the reply that the High Court was not justified in setting aside the well-considered conviction of Respondent 2 nor was there any occasion for the High Court to pass unwarranted remarks against the appellant, who was discharging duties as the learned Sessions Judge. What is mentioned in the reply is that the High Court has made observations against the appellant without properly considering the witness account as well as the evidence against Respondent 2 and the fact is that Respondent 2 was a well-known bad element in the area and that a large number of cases against him were registered with the police. What is mentioned in the reply is that the High Court has made observations against the appellant without properly considering the witness account as well as the evidence against Respondent 2 and the fact is that Respondent 2 was a well-known bad element in the area and that a large number of cases against him were registered with the police. Mr Shrivastava, Additional Superintendent of Police has annexed a list of cases registered against Respondent 2 in support of his case that Respondent 2 is a well-known bad element in the area. 7. Mr Shrivastava has further pointed out that in view of several reported decisions of the Supreme Court, expressing the opinion that the superior court must not pass any comments on the judicial work of the subordinate a court except when the same is conducted in an extra-judicious matter, the disparaging remarks made by the High Court against the appellant, which are not justified at all, should be set aside and the appeal should be allowed. 8. This Court has heard Mr Jayant Kumar Mehta, learned counsel for the appellant as well as Ms Vibha Datta Makhija, learned Government Pleader for the respondent State. Though Respondent 2 is duly served, he has neither appeared through his lawyer nor in person nor has filed reply controverting the averments made in the SLP. 9. From the impugned judgment, it is evident that the High Court was not inclined to place reliance on the prosecution witnesses and on re-appreciation of evidence it has acquitted Respondent 2. However, this Court is of the firm view that there was no occasion for the High Court to make sweeping and disparaging remarks against the appellant, who had convicted Respondent 2 while discharging his duties as judicial officer. 10. This Court has, time and again, laid down in several reported decisions that while hearing an appeal, the High Court must exercise restraint and should not pass unwarranted and disparaging remarks against the judicial officers. However, from the impugned judgment it appears that the reported decisions had no sobering effect on the learned Judges constituting the Division Bench and the following disparaging remarks have been made by them against the appellant: "It has also come on the record that the accused Dallu does not have palms. However, from the impugned judgment it appears that the reported decisions had no sobering effect on the learned Judges constituting the Division Bench and the following disparaging remarks have been made by them against the appellant: "It has also come on the record that the accused Dallu does not have palms. When this argument was raised before the learned court below e surprisingly the court in its zeal to convict the accused recorded an absurd finding that after providing liquor to the deceased the accused murdered him and nail marks found on and around the neck could be caused by toenails. Before parting with the case, we propose to observe that in a criminal matter the benefit of every doubt has to go to the accused. There is no burden upon the accused to discharge any liability and the prosecution is required to prove the allegations made by them. The conviction of a person cannot be recorded on the basis of whims of a particular Judge or on a particular understanding. We are also forced to observe that recording of the conviction by a Judge is no guarantee that the Judge is honest and acquittal recorded by the Judge cannot lead to an allegation that the Judge is not conducting himself fairly. When in a case like the present one, the accused is convicted then a wrong message is conveyed to the society and the people who are interested in the matter start believing that the judges/the courts do not appreciate the true facts and are deciding the matter on their own whims and fancies. The observation made by the learned Judge in relation to the nail marks caused by the toenail is not only fanciful but is absolutely perverse and shocks the human understanding and prudence. Even while acquitting the accused, we must observe that acquittal or conviction should be recorded on the strength of the evidence available on the record. There must be proper blending of facts, law and understanding. If people start doubting the understanding of the court then that would be a serious dent to the respect of the court. If the public loses confidence in the system then that again would be a bad day for all of us. There must be proper blending of facts, law and understanding. If people start doubting the understanding of the court then that would be a serious dent to the respect of the court. If the public loses confidence in the system then that again would be a bad day for all of us. We direct that a copy of this judgment be sent to the Judge concerned for his future guidance and a copy be kept in his service record." 11. In this connection, the learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on the decision in Samya Sett v. Shambhu Sarkar. After review of the law on the point, this Court has made the following pertinent observations in SCC paras 9 to 20 of the reported decision: (SCC pp. 772-75) "9. This Court has, in several cases, deprecated the practice on the part of judges in passing strictures and in making unsavoury, undeserving, disparaging or derogatory remarks against parties, witnesses as also subordinate officers. 10. In Alok Kumar Roy v. Dr. S.N. Sarma the vacation Judge of the High Court of Assam and Nagaland passed an interim order during vacation in a petition entertainable by the Division Bench. After reopening of the Court, the matter was placed before the Division Bench presided over by the Chief Justice in accordance with the High Court Rules. The learned Chief Justice made certain remarks as to 'unholy haste and hurry' exhibited by the learned vacation Judge in dealing with the case. When the matter reached this Court, Wanchoo, C.J., observed: (AIR pp. 456-57, para 8 : SCR pp. 819 F-820 A) '8. ... It is a matter of regret that the learned Chief Justice thought fit to make these remarks in his judgment against a colleague and assumed without any justification or basis that his colleague had acted improperly. Such observations even about Judges of subordinate courts without the clearest evidence of impropriety are uncalled for in a judgment. When made against a colleague they are even more open to objection. We are glad that Goswami, did not associate himself with these remarks of the learned Chief Justice and was fair when he assumed that Dutta, J. acted as he did in his anxiety to do what he thought was required in the interest of justice. When made against a colleague they are even more open to objection. We are glad that Goswami, did not associate himself with these remarks of the learned Chief Justice and was fair when he assumed that Dutta, J. acted as he did in his anxiety to do what he thought was required in the interest of justice. We wish the learned Chief Justice had equally made the same assumption and had not made these observations castigating Dutta, J. for they appear to us to be without any basis. It is necessary to emphasise that judicial decorum has to be maintained at all times and even where criticism is justified it must be in language of utmost restraint, keeping always in view that the person making the comment is also fallible. (emphasis in original) 11. In State of M.P. v. Nandlal laiswal disparaging and derogatory remarks were made by the High Court against the State Government. When the matter came up before this Court and a complaint was made against these remarks, it was observed by this Court that the remarks were totally unjustified and unwarranted'. 12. Bhagwati, C.J. stated: (Nandlal laiswal case, SCC p.615, para 43) 43. We may observe in conclusion that judges should not use strong and carping language while criticising the conduct of parties or their witnesses. They must act with sobriety, moderation and restraint. They must have the humility to recognise that they are not infallible and any harsh and disparaging strictures passed by them C against any party may be mistaken and unjustified and if so, they may do considerable harm and mischief and result in injustice.' 13. In A.M. Mathur v. Pramod Kumar Gupta4 which was an offshoot of Nandlal Jaiswal certain observations were made by the High Court against the conduct of Advocate General of the State. Quoting Justice Cardozo and Justice Frankfurter, the Court stated that the judges are flesh and blood mortals with individual personalities and with normal human traits. Still judicial restraint and discipline are as necessary to the orderly administration of justice as they are to the effectiveness of the army. The duty of restraint should be the constant theme of the judges, observed the Court: 'This quality in decision making is as much necessary for judges 6 to command respect as to protect the independence of the judiciary.' 14. The duty of restraint should be the constant theme of the judges, observed the Court: 'This quality in decision making is as much necessary for judges 6 to command respect as to protect the independence of the judiciary.' 14. The Court further added: (A.M. Mathur case4, SCC p.539, para 14) '14. The Judge's Bench is a seat of power. Not only do judges have power to make binding decision, their decisions legitimate the use of power by other officials. The judges have the absolute and f unchallengeable control of the court domain. But they cannot misuse their authority by intemperate comments, undignified banter or scathing criticism of counsel, parties or witnesses. We concede that the court has the inherent power to act freely upon its own conviction on any matter coming before it for adjudication, but it is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of 9 justice that derogatory remarks ought not to be made against persons or authorities whose conduct comes into consideration unless it is absolutely necessary for the decision of the case to animadvert on their conduct.' 15. In 'K', A Judicial Officer, In re one of us (R.C. Lahoti, J.), (as His Lordship then was) again considered the relevant decisions on the point and said: (SCC p. 62, paras 6-7) '6. Several cases are coming to our notice wherein observations are being made against the members of subordinate judiciary in the orders of superior forums made on judicial side and judicial officers who made orders as Presiding Judges of the subordinate courts are being driven to the necessity of filing appeals to' this Court or petitions before the High Courts seeking expunging of remarks or observations made and sometimes strictures passed against them behind their back. We would therefore like to deal with a few aspects touching the making of observations or adverse comments against judicial officers and methodology to be followed if it becomes necessary. 7. A Judge entrusted with the task of administering justice should be bold and feel fearless while acting judicially and giving expression to his views and constructing his judgment or order. 7. A Judge entrusted with the task of administering justice should be bold and feel fearless while acting judicially and giving expression to his views and constructing his judgment or order. It should be no deterrent to formation and expression of an honest opinion and acting thereon so long as it is within four corners of law that any action taken by a subordinate judicial officer is open to scrutiny in judicial review before a superior forum with which its opinion may not meet approval and the superior court may upset his action or opinion. The availability of such fearlessness is essential for the maintenance of judicial independence. However, sobriety, cool, calm and poise should be reflected in every action and expression of a Judge.' (emphasis in original) 16. In State of Bihar v. Nilmani Sahu while disposing of the special leave petition against an order passed by a Single Judge of the High Court of Patna, this Court observed: (SCC p. 212, para 1) '1. ... "we find that the view taken by the learned Single Judge, Justice P.K. Dev, with due respect, if we can say so, is most atrocious" . 17. Feeling aggrieved by the remarks, an application was made in a disposed of special leave petition and it was submitted to this Court that the remarks were not necessary. Allowing the application and deleting the remarks, this Court stated that they were 'wholly inappropriate'. 18. It is universally accepted and we are conscious of the fact that judges are also human beings. They have their own likes and dislikes; their preferences and prejudices. Dealing with an allegation of bias against a Judge, in J.P; Linahan Inc., In re Frank, J. stated: 'If, however, "bias" and "partiality" be defined to mean the total absence of preconceptions in the mind of the Judge, then no one has ever had a fair trial, and no one ever will. The human mind, even at a infancy, is no blank piece of paper. We are born with predispositions and the processes of education, formal and informal, create attitudes which precede reasoning in particular instances and which, therefore, by definition are prejudices. ' 19. Justice John Clarke has once stated: 'I have never known any judges, no difference how austere of b manner, who discharged their judicial duties in an atmosphere of pure, unadulterated reason. Alas! ' 19. Justice John Clarke has once stated: 'I have never known any judges, no difference how austere of b manner, who discharged their judicial duties in an atmosphere of pure, unadulterated reason. Alas! we are "all the common growth of the Mother Earth"-even those of us who wear the long robe.' (emphasis in original) 20. Similar was the view of Thomas Reed Powell, who said: 'Judges have preferences for social policies as you and They form their judgments after the varying fashions in which you and I form ours. They have hands, organs, dimensions, senses, affections, passions. They are warmed by the same winter and summer and by the same ideas as a layman is.' " 12. Similarly, Ms Vibha Datta Makhija, learned counsel for the State I Government, has drawn attention of this Court to the decision in 1shwari Prasad Misra v. Mohd. Isa. In the said case, the appellant had instituted a suit for specific performance of an agreement of sale executed by the respondent. The genuineness of the said agreement was disputed by the respondent. The trial court had decreed the suit. But, on appeal the High Court had reversed the findings of the trial court and dismissed the suit. While dismissing the suit, this Court found that disparaging remarks were made by the High Court against the learned Judge of the trial court, therefore, this Court was compelled to lay down guidelines as to how the Hon'ble High Court Judges should conduct themselves while hearing an appeal and refrain from making unwarranted observations against the learned Judges of the trial court. 13. It would be apt to reproduce those weighty observations in 1shwari Prasad Misra case which are found as under: (AIR pp. 1736-37, para 27) "27. Before we part with this appeal, it is necessary that we should make some observations about the approach adopted by the High Court in dealing with the judgment of the trial court which was in appeal before' it. In several places the High Court has passed severe strictures against the trial court and has, in substance, suggested that the decision of the trial court was not only perverse but was based on extraneous considerations. In several places the High Court has passed severe strictures against the trial court and has, in substance, suggested that the decision of the trial court was not only perverse but was based on extraneous considerations. It has observed that the mind of the learned Subordinate Judge was already loaded with bias in favour of the plaintiff and that the plaintiff had calculated that such of the evidence as he would produce 'along with the pull and weight that would be harnessed from behind would be sufficient to carry him through'. Similarly, in criticising the trial court for accepting the evidence of Jamuna Singh, the High Court has observed that the presumption made by the trial court that teacher, as a rule, is a respectable person, 'is not any legal appreciation of the evidence but a way found to suit the convenience of the court for holding in favour of the plaintiff'. It would thus be seen that in reversing the decision of the trial court, the High Court has suggested that the trial court was persuaded by extraneous considerations and that some pull and weight had been used in favour of the appellant from behind. We are constrained to observe that the High Court was not justified in passing these strictures against the trial Judge in dealing with the present case. Judicial experience shows that in adjudicating upon the rival claims brought before the courts it is not always easy to decide where truth lies. Evidence is adduced by the respective parties in support of their conflicting contentions and circumstances . are similarly pressed into service. In such a case, it is, no doubt, the duty of the Judge to consider the evidence objectively and dispassionately, examine it in the light of probabilities and decide which way the truth lies. The impression formed by the Judge about the character of the evidence will ultimately determine the conclusion which he reaches. But it would be unsafe to overlook the fact that all judicial minds may not react in the same way to the said evidence and it is not unusual that evidence which appears to be respectable and trustworthy to one Judge may not appear to be respectable and trustworthy to another Judge. That explains why in some cases courts of appeal reverse conclusions of facts recorded by the trial court on its appreciation of oral evidence. That explains why in some cases courts of appeal reverse conclusions of facts recorded by the trial court on its appreciation of oral evidence. The knowledge that another view is possible on the evidence adduced in a case, acts as a sobering factor and leads to the use of temperate language in recording judicial conclusions. Judicial approach in such cases should always be based on the consciousness that one may make a mistake; that is why the use of unduly strong words in expressing conclusions or the adoption of unduly strong intemperate, or extravagant criticism against the contrary view, which are often founded on a sense of infallibility should always be avoided. In the present case, the High Court has used intemperate language and has even gone to the length of suggesting a corrupt motive against the Judge who decided the suit in favour of the appellant. In our opinion, the use of such intemperate language may, in some cases, tend to show either a lack of experience in judicial matters or. an absence of judicial poise and balance. We have carefully considered all the evidence to which our attention was drawn by the learned counsel on both the sides and we are satisfied that the imputations made by the High Court against the impartiality and the objectivity of the approach adopted by the trial Judge are wholly unjustified. It is very much to be regretted that the High Court should have persuaded itself to use such extravagant language in criticising the trial court, particularly when our conclusion in the present appeal shows that the trial court was right and the High Court was wrong. But even if we had not upheld the findings of the trial court, we would not have approved of the unbalanced criticism made by the a High Court against the trial court. No doubt, if it is shown that the decision of the trial court in a given case is a result of corrupt motive, the High Court must condemn it and must take due further steps in the matter. But the use of strong language and imputation of corrupt motives should not be made light heartedly because the Judge against whom the imputations are made has no remedy in law to vindicate his position." 14. But the use of strong language and imputation of corrupt motives should not be made light heartedly because the Judge against whom the imputations are made has no remedy in law to vindicate his position." 14. In view of the clear proposition of law laid down in the abovementioned cases, this Court is of the firm opinion that the High Court was not justified at all in making unwarranted, uncharitable, disparaging and derogatory remarks, which have a tendency to affect adversely the judicial career of the appellant. The criticism of the appellant by the High Court was not necessary at all for the disposal of the criminal appeal filed by Respondent 2. As observed earlier, Mr M.K. Shrivastava, Additional Superintendent of Police, District Damoh, Madhya Pradesh, in his reply-affidavit has asserted that the High Court was not justified in reversing the well-considered conviction of Respondent 2. There is every possibility that in an appeal against the judgment of the High Court acquitting Respondent 2 this Court may restore the judgment of the trial court. 15. The question, which arises for consideration, would be whether this Court would be justified in criticising the learned Judges of the High Court while reversing their judgment as they have done while upsetting the judgment delivered by the appellant. The answer must be an emphatic "no". 16. It is no doubt, the duty of the Judge to consider the evidence e objectively and dispassionately, examine it in the light of probabilities and decide which way the truth lies. The impression formed by the Judge about the character of evidence will ultimately determine the conclusion which he reaches. But it would be unsafe to overlook the fact that all judicial minds may not react in the same way to the said evidence and it is not unusual that evidence which appears to be respectable and trustworthy to one Judge may not appear to be respectable and trustworthy to another Judge. That explains why in some cases courts of appeal reverse conclusions of facts recorded by the trial court on its appreciation of oral evidence. 17. The knowledge that another view is possible on the evidence adduced in the present case should have acted as a sobering factor and led the learned Judges of the High Court to the use of temperate language in recording judicial conclusions. 17. The knowledge that another view is possible on the evidence adduced in the present case should have acted as a sobering factor and led the learned Judges of the High Court to the use of temperate language in recording judicial conclusions. The remarks, if not expunged as prayed for, are likely to do more harm to the learned Judges of the subordinate courts and would deter them from performing their judicial functions independently and boldly which in terms is likely to affect their judicial independence. 18. The observations made by the High Court "we are forced to observe that recording of the conviction by a Judge is no guarantee that the Judge is honest and acquittal recorded by the Judge cannot lead to an allegation that the Judge is not conducting himself fairly. When in case like present the accused is convicted then a wrong message is conveyed to the society and the people who are interested in the matter start believing that the Judges/courts do not appreciate the true facts and are deciding the matter on their own whims and fancies" are totally unwarranted and should not have been made while disposing of the appeal filed by Respondent 2. While deciding the appeal filed by Respondent 2, the High Court was concerned with the question of appreciating the evidence, whether the appellant was justified in convicting Respondent 2 or not and if the High Court was of the opinion that the evidence did not inspire confidence of the Court, was entitled to acquit Respondent 2 but there was no occasion for the High Court to personally criticise and go on making thoroughly unwarranted remarks suggesting about the character of the appellant. 19. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, this Court is of the opinion that the remarks made by the High Court against the appellant will have to be expunged and the appeal will have to be allowed. 20. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal succeeds. The remarks made by the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Jabalpur (Madhya Pradesh) in Criminal Appeal No. 2119 of 2008 decided on 17-11-2008 against the appellant are hereby expunged. 20. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal succeeds. The remarks made by the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Jabalpur (Madhya Pradesh) in Criminal Appeal No. 2119 of 2008 decided on 17-11-2008 against the appellant are hereby expunged. The direction given by the High Court that a copy of the judgment of the High Court be sent to the appellant for his future guidance and a copy be kept in his service record is hereby set aside. The appeal accordingly stands disposed of.