ORDER Ashok B. Hinchigeri - Sri K. M. Shivayogiswamy, the learned High Court Government Pleader, is directed to take notice for the respondents. The petitioner has raised the challenge to the order, dated February 3, 2010 (annexure E) passed by the second respondent. The advertence to the facts of the case may not be necessary. Ms. Vani, the learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that the impugned order is without the authority of law and without jurisdiction. The second respondent has passed the order notwithstanding the reassessment order, dated June 20, 2007 (annexure B) passed by the first respondent. She submits that the second respondent could have passed the impugned order provided, further evidence has come to his notice, which has not happened in the instant case. It is her grievance that by wrong assumption and by mere change of opinion, the impugned order is passed. That the earlier reassessment order at annexure B was also based on the returns filed by the petitioner has not been taken note of by the second respondent while passing the impugned order. As there is no change in the circumstances inasmuch as the audited books remain the same, the passing of the impugned order is not warranted, so contends Ms. Vani. Per contra, Sri K. M. Shivayogiswamy, the learned High Court Government Pleader appearing for the respondents, submits that the provision of law appears to have been inadvertently shown but that does not mean that the impugned order itself is unsustainable. He submits that it has to be taken that the impugned order is passed in exercise of the power conferred by section 39(2) of the Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003. He has also raised a threshold bar to the very maintainability of the writ petitions contending that, if the petitioner wants to challenge the impugned order, its remedy is by way of filing an appeal invoking section 62 of the said Act. He also submits that the additional evidence may have come to the notice of the second respondent based on the inspection conducted by him. The submissions of the learned counsel have received my anxious consideration. It is trite position in law that invoking of a wrong provision of law does not render the order invalid or unsustainable. He also submits that the additional evidence may have come to the notice of the second respondent based on the inspection conducted by him. The submissions of the learned counsel have received my anxious consideration. It is trite position in law that invoking of a wrong provision of law does not render the order invalid or unsustainable. As held by the apex court in the case of B.S.E. Brokers' Forum, Bombay v. Securities and Exchange Board of India reported in [2001] 3 SCC 482, wherein it is held that the omission or error in mentioning the correct provision of law will not vitiate the order. But the problem is even if it is assumed that the impugned order is passed by the second respondent in exercise of the power conferred by section 39(2) of the said Act, then also the order does not become upholdable, because under section 39(2), the prescribed authority may make further reassessment in addition to the earlier reassessment, only if further evidence has come to his notice. My perusal of the impugned order does not reveal that further evidence has indeed come to the notice of the respondent. On that short ground alone, the impugned order is liable to be quashed and accordingly it is quashed. Even assuming that the second respondent conducted the inspection and laid his hands on some additional evidence, the same has to serve as the foundation for further reassessment. The impugned order is silent on the additional evidence aspect of the matter. As held by the apex court in the case of Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner reported in AIR 1978 SC 851 , the order which is bad in law in the beginning cannot be made good by filing a comprehensive statement of objections or an affidavit. The relevant paragraph of the said judgment is extracted here-in-below : "8. The second equally relevant matter is that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out. We may here draw attention to the observations of Bose J., in Commissioner of Police, Bombay v. Gordhandas Bhanji AIR 1952 SC 16 : '... public orders, publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind, or what he intended to do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the actings and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself.' Orders are not like old wine becoming better as they grow older." As the pre-requirement for making further reassessment is not forthcoming from the impugned order, I have entertained these petitions notwithstanding the availability of the alternative remedy of filing an appeal. In the result, the impugned order is quashed. Further, it is made clear that no opinion whatsoever is expressed on the tax liability of the petitioner. Needless to observe that the prescribed authority can always exercise the power conferred upon it under section 39(2) of the said Act. No order as to costs.