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2010 DIGILAW 800 (GAU)

Dilip Debbarma v. State of Tripura

2010-10-05

TINLIANTHANG VAIPHEI, UTPALENDU BIKAS SAHA

body2010
JUDGMENT U.B. Saha, J. 1. Two accused persons namely, Shri Dilip Debbarma (A1) and Shri Bipin Debbarma (A2) faced trial on charges under Sections 449, 364 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code ('IPC') for kidnapping and murdering deceased Bipul Debbarma and Ramabrata Debbarma. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, Khowai, West Tripura upon trial held the charges under Sections 449, 364 and 302, IPC proved against them and they being held guilty under the aforesaid sections were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 3,000 each, in default, to undergo simple imprisonment for three months. The aforesaid conviction and sentence were passed vide judgment and order dated 6.5.2005 in Case No. ST 56(WT/K) of 2003. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order of conviction and sentence, the accused preferred the aforesaid two appeals. As the aforesaid two appeals are from a common judgment and order of conviction and sentence those were taken up for hearing by us together and are being disposed of by this common judgment and order. 2. Heard Mr. A.K. Bhowmik learned senior counsel appearing for the Appellant in Crl.A. No. 33/06 Shri Dilip Debbarma and Mr. R. Dutta learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant in Crl.A. No. 72/09, Shri Bipin Debbarma. Also heard Mr. D. Sarkar, learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the Respondent State. 3. According to the written complaint lodged by one Shri Kritibash Debbarma (PW1) on 24.8.1998 to the Officer-in-Charge of Khowai Police Station, on 23.8.1998 at around 10/10.30 p.m. a group of unidentified men stormed into his house and dragged his elder brother Bipul Debbarma and his neighbour Ramabrata Debbarma on the point of gun. While searching on 24.8.1998 at about 9/9.30 a.m. the dead bodies of his elder brother Bipul and his neighbour Ramabrata were recovered from the east of Otlabari with bullet and multiple cut injuries on their person. On receipt of the aforesaid information the O/C. of Khowai Police Station S.I. Sukhamoy Shil (PW14) treated the same as FIR and registered a police case being Khowai PS Case No. 84/98 under Sections449/364/302 read with Section 34, IPC and 27 of the Arms Act and took up the investigation. After taking the investigation the aforesaid Sub-Inspector (PW14) rushed to the spot. 4. After taking the investigation the aforesaid Sub-Inspector (PW14) rushed to the spot. 4. In the course of investigation, PW14 first prepared the inquest report of the dead bodies of the deceased and arranged for holding post mortem examination. He also seized some bloodstained earth from the place of occurrence by preparing seizure list. Thereafter, he visited the house of PW1 wherefrom the deceased were kidnapped and the place wherefrom subsequently the dead bodies of the deceased were recovered and accordingly, he prepared site plans with separate indexes. He also examined the available witnesses and recorded their statement under Section161, Code of Criminal Procedure. On 6.10.1998, he (PW14) arrested accused Dilip Debbarma. Again, on his prayer made to the court on 21.10.1998, the other two accused namely, Ratan Debbarma and Bipin Debbarma were shown arrested in connection with the case who were detained in custody in connection with another case. Thereafter, the investigation of the case was handed over to PW15, Inspector Priya Lal Majumder who recorded the statement of the remaining witnesses under Section 161, Code of Criminal Procedure and on completion of the investigation filed charge sheet against the accused persons under Sections 449/364/302 read with Section 34, IPC against the accused persons namely, Dilip Debbarma, Appellant in Crl.A. (J) No. 33 of 2006. Ratan Debbarma, Bipin Debbarma, Appellant in, Cri.A. (J) No. 72 of 2009 and Bijoy Debbarma showing the last two accused persons absconders. 5. Upon receipt of the charge sheet, the learned S.D.J.M. Khowai being satisfied took cognizance of the offence as mentioned in the charge sheet and the case being exclusively triable by the court of sessions committed the same to the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Khowai, West Tripura who ultimately having found a prima facie case framed, charges under the aforesaid Sections against the present Appellants as follows: - That you, on or about the 23rd day of August, 1998 at about 2200 his, at Nutan Tablabari, committed house trespass by entering into the building of Kritibash Debbarma used as a human dwelling in order to the committing of the offence punishable with death, to wit kidnapping and murder of Bipul Debbarma and Ramabrata Debbarma and that you thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 449 of the Indian Penal Code and within my cognizance. Secondly, that you on the same date and at the same time and place as noted above, kidnapped Bipul Debbarma and Ramabrata Debbarma in order that they might be murdered and that you thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 364 of the Indian Penal Code and within my cognizance. Lastly, that you, at the same date and at me same time and place as noted above, did commit murder by intentionally causing me death of Bipul Debbarma and Ramabrata Debbarma that you thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and within my cognizance. 6. In the course of trial to prove the case, the prosecution examined as many as fifteen witnesses including the official witnesses of whom PW1, the informant, Shri Kritibash Debbarma is the younger brother of deceased Bipul and neighbour of deceased Ramabrata, PW2, Smt. Kiran Mala Debbarma is an eye witness and also the star witness of prosecution case as she is the mother of deceased Bipul and PW1, and both the deceased were abducted from her house. It PW3, Shri Benoy Debbarma is a hearsay witness and also the brother-in-law of deceased Ramabrata, PW4, Shri Arun Debbarma is also a hearsay witness, mainly he is the witness of inquest report and seizure list of blood stained earth. PW5 is Shri Krishna Debbarma who was informed by PW12. Upendra Debbarma regarding the incident of kidnapping of deceased Bipul and Ramabrata by a group of extremists, PW6 Gopesh Munda alias Gopen is allegedly an eye witness who ultimately turned hostile. PW7. Shri Surjya Mani Debbarma is another hearsay witness 7. Mr. Bhowmik, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of Shri Dilip Debbarma (A1) has challenged the conviction of A1 and has argued that the evidence adduced by the prosecution is not sufficient to warrant the conviction of A1 and to establish his complicity. According to him, the learned trial court ought not to have convicted the A1 only on the basis of alleged solitary eye witness, PW2 as she is firstly an interested witness being the mother of one of the deceased and while was trying to implicate the accused-Appellants exaggerated the prosecution story which is not fully corroborated by the other witnesses including the doctor (PW13). While he was referring to the evidence of PW2 he pointed out that according to PW2, a group of miscreants armed with sharp cutting weapons entered into her room by breaking out the window whereas PW6 Gopesh Munda who was working in her (PW2) house as a casual labour stated that deceased Bipul opened the door. He contended that the plea of PW2 regarding the entry into the dwelling hut by the miscreants by breaking open the window is further falsified by the evidence of PW14. I/O. of the case who in his cross specifically stated that he did not find any broken window in the house of PW2. He further pointed out that PW2 also did not disclose the names of the extremists to PW6 whom she could recognize. Such a conduct is also improbable and on that count also the learned trial court ought to have disbelieved PW2 as alleged solitary eye witness. In support of his aforesaid contention Bhowmik placed reliance on Lallu Manjhi and Anr. v. State of Jharkhand, (2003) 2 SCC 401 . 8. He contended that PW1 being not an eye witness lodged the complaint with the police after hearing the prosecution story from PW2 allegedly to be an eye witness and he did not mention name of any of the assailants who abducted his deceased brother Bipul and neighbour Ramabrata meaning thereby till the lodging of 3 the complaint neither PW1 nor PW2 was aware about the involvement of the Appellants in the alleged crime. He contended that the whole prosecution story is an after thought and even knowing the names of the accused non-discloser of the same in the FIR itself is a fatal for prosecution and it creates a doubt regarding its story. 9. In support of his aforesaid contention, learned senior counsel placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Bhimappa Jinnappa Naganur v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1993 SC 1469 . 9. In support of his aforesaid contention, learned senior counsel placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Bhimappa Jinnappa Naganur v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1993 SC 1469 . particularly para 6 of the said judgment wherein it is noted by the Apex Court, inter alia, 'It may be noticed that the complaint Ext.P.1 on the basis of which the FIR was registered was as written document prepared before being submitted to the Police Station yet it did not mention Ajith (PW2) or Jinnappa (PW3) as eye witnesses and the trial court had, therefore, disbelieved the presence of P Ws 2 and 3 as eye witnesses. On the facts of the case it cannot be said that the reasons are far fetched. 10. Mr. Bhowmik urged that as admittedly the Appellants are the residents of the same locality of the deceased and normally a person living the same locality would not involve himself in an offence like dacoity and/or kidnapping without concealing his identity. In the instant case according to PW2, she could identified the Appellants out of 10-12 extremists whereas according to PW4, the faces of the extremists were covered with black cloth and as such if PW4 is believed then the evidence of PW2 has to be disbelieved. Hence, a doubt is created regarding the identification of the miscreants including the present Appellants. 11. He finally urged that from the evidence of prosecution witnesses two views are possible, one in favour of the prosecution and the other in favour of the accused-Appellants and it is a settled law that when two views are possible then the view which supports the accused that should be accepted by the court. In support of his aforesaid contention he placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Subodh Debbarma and Ors. v. State of Tripura, (2009) 6 GLR 707, particularly para 4 of that judgment wherein this Court held - 4. It is well settled law in the administration of justice and criminal case that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case (i) one pointing to the guilt of the accused and (ii) another to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. The paramount jurisdiction of the court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. The paramount jurisdiction of the court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may rise from acquittal of the guilt is not less than from the conviction of the innocence. 12. Mr. Dutta, learned Counsel appearing from the A2 namely, Shri Bipin Debbarma while adopting the submission of Mr. Bhowmik contended that PW14 who recorded the oral FIR and registered the same as a police case is not entitled to investigate the prosecution "case in view of the decision of the Apex Court in Megha Singh v. State of Haryana, AIR 1995 SC 2339 . He specially referred to para 4 of that judgment wherein the Apex Court held, thus - 4... We have also noted another disturbing feature in this case. PW3, Siri Chand, head Constable arrested the accused and on search being conducted by him a pistol and the cartridges were recovered from the accused. It was on his complaint a formal first information report was lodged and the case was initiated. He being complainant should not have proceeded with the investigation of the case. But it appears to us that he was not only the complainant in the case but he carried on with the investigation and examined witnesses under Section 161, Code of Criminal Procedure. Such practice, to say the least, should not be resorted to so that there may not be any occasion to suspect fair and impartial investigation. 13. He urged that in the FIR and even in the charge nowhere it is stated that the assailants involved in the abduction and murder of the deceased are extremists, but in the evidence the word extremists has been used by the prosecution witnesses and as such the same has to be treated as improvement of the earlier statement. 13. He urged that in the FIR and even in the charge nowhere it is stated that the assailants involved in the abduction and murder of the deceased are extremists, but in the evidence the word extremists has been used by the prosecution witnesses and as such the same has to be treated as improvement of the earlier statement. Therefore, the court should not treat the present Appellants as extremists and if the court comes to a conclusion that they were not extremists then PW2 obviously could have informed the names of the assailants to PW1 who met with her before lodging the FIR and PW1 also ought to have disclosed the names of those miscreants in the FIR, but fact remains that he did not disclose the name of any of the miscreants in the FIR meaning thereby PW2 did not disclose any name of the miscreants to PW1 as she could not identify any of the miscreants on the night of the alleged incident and if the present Appellants could not be identified by PW2 at the time of alleged kidnapping/abduction of the deceased then they cannot be connected with the alleged murder of the deceased. 14. Mr. Sarkar, learned Public Prosecutor while supporting the impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence would contend that there is no doubt that the appellate court has the power to re-appreciate the evidence of prosecution witnesses even in the appellate stage, but at the, time of re-appreciation of the evidence, this Court should keep in mind that the alleged incident of kidnapping/abduction and murder of the deceased was happened in a terrorist infested area and it is natural that in the prevalent situation in the tribal village wherefrom the deceased were abducted the people of that area were suffering from fear psychosis in their mind and except the nearest relation normally nobody would come forward to give evidence against the extremists like the present Appellants even if they are the eye witnesses. To justify his aforesaid contention Mr. Sarkar referred to the evidence of PW6 who is an eye witness of the alleged incident and made statement to the investigating authority disclosing the names of the Appellants but subsequently turned hostile before the learned trial court and intentionally avoided to divulge the names of the accused. To justify his aforesaid contention Mr. Sarkar referred to the evidence of PW6 who is an eye witness of the alleged incident and made statement to the investigating authority disclosing the names of the Appellants but subsequently turned hostile before the learned trial court and intentionally avoided to divulge the names of the accused. He contended that P Ws 1 and 2 initially did not disclose the names of the assailants including the present Appellants as PW2 was it threatened by the miscreant extremists, inter alia, that if she disclosed the names of the miscreants then her entire family would be finished. He submitted that normally a mother would not disclose the names of the miscreants at the cost of lives of her other sons and family members. Therefore, initial non-disclosure of the names of the assailants in the FIR should not be treated as fatal in nature rather non-disclosure of the names of the miscreants is a normal human psychology. He also contended that the first information report is not the encyclopedia of the prosecution story rather an information regarding the cognizable offence and always in the FIR the names of the assailants may not be disclosed. He again contended that the evidence of PW4 in his cross, inter alia, "later I came to know that the extremists were armed with gun, tackle, spear and their faces were covered with pieces of black cloth" cannot be believed as he was not an eye witness of the alleged incident, rather he is the witness of the inquest and seizure of blood stained earth from the place wherefrom the dead bodies of the deceased were recovered. 15. Mr. Sarkar further contended that PW2 on the night of alleged incident admittedly went to the nearby police camp and sought for help to rescue her abducted son and neighbour and not for lodging any complaint. Therefore, question of withholding of FIR by the prosecution does not arise at all. 16. According to Mr. 15. Mr. Sarkar further contended that PW2 on the night of alleged incident admittedly went to the nearby police camp and sought for help to rescue her abducted son and neighbour and not for lodging any complaint. Therefore, question of withholding of FIR by the prosecution does not arise at all. 16. According to Mr. Sarkar, PW2 though is a solitary eye witness but she is a natural and believable one as she being the mother of one of the deceased would always try to punish the actual culprits not any other else and in the instant case, PW2 is the witness of one part of the prosecution case, i.e., the abduction of her son Bipul and her neighbour Ramabrata, which is an offence under Section 364, IPC and if this Court believes the statement of PW2 as corroborated by P Ws 1, 4 and 5 then the other part of the prosecution case, i.e., the murder of the deceased by the accused-Appellants and their associates has also to be believed as none other than the persons who abducted the deceased could have murdered them. Therefore, the offence under Section 302, IPC is also proved in the instant case. 17. He further contended that minor defect in the investigation of the prosecution case cannot be a ground for fully disbelieving the prosecution case. According to him, it is almost impossible to come across a single case wherein the investigation was conducted completely flawless or absolutely full proof and not only that the investigating agency is also not above the criticism of the defence and if for the flaws or defects in the investigation, the offenders are acquitted then the cause of criminal justice would become a victim. The court should bear in mind that even the responsible persons in the society now-a-days are not coming forward for giving evidence in the criminal cases far too the people who are living in the extremist area and in every moment whose lives are in danger. He urged that the court is to see whether the flaws in the investigation are such in nature that would affect the defence case in any way and if not then those flaws should be ignored by the court for the interest of justice. He urged that the court is to see whether the flaws in the investigation are such in nature that would affect the defence case in any way and if not then those flaws should be ignored by the court for the interest of justice. In support of his aforesaid contention he relied upon a decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of West Bengal v. Mir Mohammad Omar and Ors., (2000) 8 SCC 382 , particularly para 41 of that report. He also relied upon paragraphs 31 and 33 of the said report while contending about the doctrine of presumption. 18. While placing the aforesaid observation of the Apex Court, Mr. Sarkar contended that the second part of the prosecution case, i.e., the murder of the deceased caused by the Appellants comes within the purview of the doctrine of presumption as regarding that part no direct evidence is available, rather for that part court has to base on the circumstantial evidence. 19. He finally urged that though PW6 was declared hostile, but he corroborated the evidence of PW2, inter alia, that extremists entered into the hut of PW2 and abducted the deceased Bipul and Ramabrata forcible on the point of gun and in his cross-examination by the prosecution though this witness denied the fact of making a statement to the I/O. of the case, inter alia, that there were 10/15 extremists and out of them Bipul's mother could identify Dilip, Ratan and Bipin of Nutantablabari as told by her and the said portion of the 164 statement was marked as Exbt.4 and was subsequently proved by the I/O. of the case. Therefore, it can be easily held that PW6 though initially stated that PW2 recognised the Appellant, but subsequently out of fear of the accused extremists declined to disclose the same before the court and on that count alone the story of abduction of the deceased by the accused-Appellants should not have been disbelieved by this Court. 20. Before discussion on the submission of the learned Counsel for the parties, it would be proper for us to go through the evidence of the solitary eye witness, PW2 as well as the evidence of P Ws 1, 4, 5, 6 and 13 as the learned trial court mainly relied upon the evidence of PW2 and the corroborative evidence of the rest of the witnesses as stated supra. Accordingly, the material part of the evidence of the aforesaid prosecution witnesses are reproduced herein below: - PW2, Smt. Kiran Mala Debbarma deposed that on the date of alleged occurrence some persons knocked at her door but she did fell, not open the door out of fear. Then a group of about 10/12 miscreants armed with sharp cutting weapons made their entry into her room by breaking open the window. Out of them she could recognize Dilip Debbarma, Ratan Debbarma and Bipin Debbarma in the electricity light who are the residents of her locality. They dragged away her, elder son Bipul Debbarma and her neighbour Ramabrata Debbarma forcibly. One of the miscreants restrained her on the point of a dagger. After departure of the miscreants from her house with her son and the neighbour she raised alarm and ran to the nearby police camp and sought their help for rescue of her son and aforesaid neighbour. On the following morning, the dead bodies, of her son Bipul and neighbour Ramabrata were recovered from Otlabari about 4 k.m. away from her house with multiple cut injuries on their bodies. She identified the present Appellants in the court. PW1, Shri Kritibash Debbarma, the informant in his evidence stated that at the relevant time of occurrence, he used to stay at Khowai Town to prosecute his studies. On 24.8.1998 in the morning he was informed by his cousin Bimal Debbarma that on the previous night at around 10.30 p.m. a group of extremists trespassed into their house armed with deadly weapons and dragged his elder brother Bipul and maternal uncle Ramabrata away from the house. On learning about the said incident at once he started for his house at Natun Tablabari and on arriving there he met his mother (PW2) who narrated the whole incident to him. He stated that he was told his mother that on 23.8.1998 at about 10.30 p.m. a group of extremists knocked at the door of their house but his mother did not open the door out of fear. Then the extremists, made their entry into their dwelling hut by breaking open the window and dragged his brother and maternal uncle away from the house forcibly and at that time a good number of extremists were standing in the courtyard. Then the extremists, made their entry into their dwelling hut by breaking open the window and dragged his brother and maternal uncle away from the house forcibly and at that time a good number of extremists were standing in the courtyard. He stated that he was told by his mother that out of the extremists who entered their house she could identify Ratan Debbarma, Bipin Debbarma and Dilip Debbarma. In his evidence this witness also stated that at the time of lodging the FIR he did not disclose the names of the assailants as divulged by his mother for fear of lives of the members of his family and himself. On the following day, i.e., on 24.8.2998 the dead bodies of the deceased were found lying at Utlabari about 4 k.m. away from their house with multiple cut injuries on their person. The police seized some bloodstained earth from the place where the dead bodies of the deceased were found by drawing seizure list. PW4, Shri Arun Debbarma has stated in his evidence that he was reported by PW1, the son of PW2 that the extremists had kidnapped his brother Bipul and maternal uncle Ramabrata from their house and having got the information he rushed to the house of PW2, the mother of the deceased when he was told by PW2 that a group of extremists kidnapped Bipul and Ramabrata from her house on the point of gun and amongst the extremists she could identify Dilip Debbarma, Bipin Debbarma and Ratan Debbarma. Then they made a search for the kidnapped persons but they could not be traced out. On the following morning, at about 10 a.m. they got an information that the dead bodies of Bipul and Ramabrata had been lying at Utlabari with multiple cut injuries on their person. On being informed police came and they went to the spot along with the police and the dead bodies of the deceased were recovered from Utlabari and the police prepared the inquest report of both the dead bodies in his presence. He also identified the accused persons in the court. PW5, Shri Krishna Debbarma, a hearsay witness, stated in his evidence that on the following morning of the night of the occurrence he was reported by PW12, Shri Upendra Debbarma that on the previous night a group of extremists had kidnapped Bipul and Ramabrata. He also identified the accused persons in the court. PW5, Shri Krishna Debbarma, a hearsay witness, stated in his evidence that on the following morning of the night of the occurrence he was reported by PW12, Shri Upendra Debbarma that on the previous night a group of extremists had kidnapped Bipul and Ramabrata. Having heard the incident he rushed to the house of PW2 when she (PW2) narrated to him that her son Bipul and another Ramabrata were kidnapped by the extremists from her house. After about 1 or 2 days of kidnapping he was told by PW2 that at the time of kidnapping of her son and Ramabrata she could identify three miscreants, namely, Dilip, Bipin and Ratan Debbarma. This witness also corroborated the evidence of P Ws. 1 and 2, inter alia, that on the following day the dead bodies of deceased Bipul and Ramabrata were recovered from Utlabari and being a member of local Panchayat he also accompanied the police to the spot wherefrom the dead bodies of the deceased were recovered. PW6, Shri Gopesh Munda alias Gopen who turned hostile also corroborated the evidence of PW2 that at the relevant time of alleged incident he used to stay in the house of PW2 as at that time he was working as casual labourer in the house of PW2. He stated that on the relevant night, Bipul, Ramabrata, PW2 and he were sleeping in the same house. At around 9 p.m. someone knocked at the door of the house. Then Bipul opened the door and as soon as Bipul went out of the room one of the extremists gave him a kick and thereafter, the extremists took away Bipul and Ramabrata forcibly on the point of gun. He could not recognize any of the miscreants. PW13, Dr. Debasish Nath the medical officer who conducted the post mortem examination of the dead bodies of the deceased found the following injuries on their person: - (i) Deceased Ramabrata Debbarma - (1) One entry wound measuring 1" x 1", Stelate shaped surrounded by grease collar and soots over left side of neck at level of adam's apple. (2) One exit wound at same level on right side measuring 3'5" x 2'5" stelate in shape everted tissue blackened. (2) One exit wound at same level on right side measuring 3'5" x 2'5" stelate in shape everted tissue blackened. (3) One incised wound measuring 1'5" x 1/4th" x 1/2" horizontally over right side of face cutting right-ala-nasi (4) One lanceolate shaped stab wound over left side of neck measuring 1/2" x 1/4th x 2" about one inch above lest on No. 4 (5) One round wound measuring 1/4th" x 1/4th" x 1" near lest on No. 4. (6) Three parallel vertical Incised wound over right side of head measuring 3" x 1/4th" x 1/2" x 1/4" x 1/2 and 2 x 1/4th" x 1/2" extending from front to behind. (ii) Deceased Bipul Debbarma - (1) One incised wound horizontally over front of neck cutting from structures including larynx, esophagus left common carotid artery wound measuring 4" x 1.5" x 1". (2) One stab wound round in appearance measuring 1/4th in diameter 1" below angle of jaw, depth 2. (3) One stab wound round in appearance measuring 1/2" in diameter 1/2" depth, below left ear. (4) One stab wound 1/4th x 1/4th" x 2 just below xiphisternum. (5) One stab wound 1/2" x 1/4th" x 1/2" at mid-clavicular line, 1" below costal margin." 21. Now, let us examine on what basis, the learned trial court arrived at the conclusion that the murder of the deceased was committed by the accused-Appellants. 22. While recording its findings regarding non-mentioning the names of the accused persons in the FIR, the learned trial court in the impugned judgment observed that the FIR is not a substantive piece of evidence and it can only be used to corroborate or contradict the evidence of the informant given in the court or to impeach his credit. The substantive piece of evidence is the statement of a witness in the court. The substantive piece of evidence is the statement of a witness in the court. It is further observed that it is true that omission to State the names of the assailants in the FIR despite having the scope to know the names of the culprits is relevant under Section 11 of the Evidence Act, but at the same time it cannot lost sight of the court under what circumstances the informant had omitted to name the culprits in the FIR, PW1 in his examination-in-chief has stated that he did not disclose the names of the assailants as divulged to him by his mother (PW2) to the police for fear of his life including the members of, him family, PW2, the mother of the deceased Bipul in her cross-examination has unequivocally stated that she was threatened by the accused persons by saying that if she disclosed their names to the police, her entire family would be finished. According to the learned trial court, from the evidence of P Ws 1 and 2 it is very much apparent that they were threatened by the accused persons to face dire consequence if they divulged their names to the police and for this reason PW1 did not disclose the names of the assailants to the police at the first instance for fear of the lives of the members of the family and also probably due to the mental condition of PW1 who had just lost his elder brother by dastardly acts of the extremists and, hence, the learned trial court did not attach much importance for being omitted to name the miscreants in the FIR and observed that for this reason alone the whole prosecution case should not be thrown away if it is otherwise found to be trustworthy. 23. While assessing the evidence of PW2, the solitary witness, the learned trial court in the impugned judgment also stated "it appears that on 24.8.1998, immediately after recovery of the dead bodies of Bipul Deb Barma and Ramabrata Debbarma, the statement of PW2 Smt. Kiran Mala Deb Barma was recorded by the Police under Section 161, Code of Criminal Procedure wherein she vividly narrated the whole incident and also disclosed the names of the accused persons and others who had kidnapped her son from her house. Therefore, it cannot be said that PW2 has given her evidence before the court improving her statement made to the police during investigation." In her cross-examination, the evidence of PW2 remained un-rebutted and unshaken in material particular and for that reason, the learned trial court did not find any ground to disbelieve the evidence of PW2, particularly when no material could be elicited from her cross-examination casting doubt on her credibility. 24. The learned trial court further noted that the offence of kidnapping had taken place at night at around 10/10.30 p.m. in a remote secluded tribal village and it cannot be expected that at the time of occurrence any independent person would remain present at the site of occurrence to witness the incident and that being so the inmates of the house from where the victims had been kidnapped would be the natural witnesses. As it is seen that at the time of occurrence, besides PW2, Smt. Kiran Mala Debbarma, PW6, Gopesh Munda who had turned hostile and the two kidnapped persons were sleeping in the house, therefore. PW2 would be the natural witness. Though PW6 had turned hostile yet from his evidence one thing is clear that on the fateful night of occurrence a group of extremists had stormed into the house of PW2 and kidnapped Bipul and Ramabrata forcibly on the point of gun. The evidence of PW2 has received corroboration from the evidence of PW4 as well as PW5. The learned trial court also took note of non-seizure of the broken window from the house of PW2 by the I.O. and while discussing- on that point, it has stated in the impugned judgment that P Ws 1 and 2 in their evidence have consistently stated that the accused persons made their entry into their dwelling hut by breaking open the window. The evidence of P Ws 1 and 2 in this regard, thus, appeared to be more reliable than that of PW14. Non-seizure of broken window from the place of occurrence by the I.O. might be a lapse on the part of the investigating agency and for that reason, P Ws 1 and 2 could not be blamed and in doing so it would be tantamount to playing in the hands of the investigating agency. 25. Non-seizure of broken window from the place of occurrence by the I.O. might be a lapse on the part of the investigating agency and for that reason, P Ws 1 and 2 could not be blamed and in doing so it would be tantamount to playing in the hands of the investigating agency. 25. In Kartik Malhar v. State of Bihar, (1996) 1 SCC 614 the Apex Court while discussed about Section 134 of the Evidence Act, which provides, inter alia, no particular number of witnesses shall in any case be required for the proof of any fact also took note of its earlier decision in Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras, AIR 1957 SC 614 and ultimately held that there has been no departure from the principles laid down in Vadivelu Thevar (supra) and, therefore, a conviction can be recorded on the basis of the statement of a single eye witness provided his credibility is not shaken by any adverse circumstance appearing on the record against him and the court, at the same time, is convinced that he is a truthful witness. The court will not then insist on corroboration by any other eye witness particularly as the incident might have occurred at a time or place when there was no possibility of any other eye witness being present. Indeed, the courts insist on the quality, and, not on, the quantity of evidence. 26. The case of Kartik Malhar (supra) has subsequently been followed by the Apex Court in Chittar Lal v. State of Rajasthan, (2003) 6 SCC 397 wherein the Apex Court again noted that the legislative recognition of the fact that no particular number of witnesses can be insisted upon is amply reflected in Section 134 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 ('the Evidence Act'). Administration of justice can be affected and hampered if number of witnesses were to be insisted upon. It is not seldom that a crime has been committed in the presence of one witness, leaving aside those cases which are not of unknown occurrence where determination of guilt depends entire on circumstantial evidence. If plurality of witnesses would have been the legislative intent, cases where the testimony of a single witness only could be available in number of crimes the offender would have gone unpunished. If plurality of witnesses would have been the legislative intent, cases where the testimony of a single witness only could be available in number of crimes the offender would have gone unpunished. It is the quality of evidence of the single witness whose testimony has to be tested on the touchstone of credibility and reliability. If the testimony is found to be reliable, there is no legal impediment to convict the accused on such proof. It is the quality and not the quantity of accused on such proof. It is the quality and not the quantity of evidence which is necessary for proving or disproving a fact, (emphasis supplied). 27. Moreso, in Harbans Kaur and Anr. v. State of Haryana, (2005) 9 SCC 195 , the Apex Court held, inter alia, that there is no proposition in tow that relatives are to be treated as untruthful witnesses. On the contrary, reason has to be shown when a plea of partiality is raised to show that the witnesses had reason to shield the actual culprit and falsely implicate the accused. 28. In view of the decisions of the Apex Court in Kartik Malhar, Chittar Lal and Harbans Kaur and Anr. (supra), we are of the considered view that the learned trial court did not commit any wrong on relying upon the evidence of PW2 as corroborated by P Ws 1, 4 and 5. Mere relationship of the witness with the deceased should not be a ground to discard his testimony, if it is otherwise found to be reliable and trustworthy. In the normal course of events a close relation would be the last person to spare the real assailant and implicate a false person. At the same time, no doubt there is a possibility of implicating some innocent persons along with the real culprits. But in the instant case at the first instance PW2 disclosed the names of the accused-Appellants before the investigating authority when her statement was recorded under Section 161, Code of Criminal Procedure. Therefore, it cannot be said that she (PW2) falsely implicated the accused-Appellants with the alleged incident. Hence, we are unable to accept the contention of Mr. Bhowmik, inter alia, that the accused-Appellant cannot be convicted on the basis of the evidence of the solitary eye witness, PW2 who is the relative of the deceased, particularly the mother of deceased Bipul. 29. Hence, we are unable to accept the contention of Mr. Bhowmik, inter alia, that the accused-Appellant cannot be convicted on the basis of the evidence of the solitary eye witness, PW2 who is the relative of the deceased, particularly the mother of deceased Bipul. 29. The learned trial court also considered what should be the standard of proof in the extremist related case and while considering that aspect, it also take note of the decision of the Apex Court in Tarun Bora alias Alok Hazarika v. State of Assam (2002) Crl. LJ 4076 wherein the Apex Court held - ... it is quite but natural that in a prevalent situation obtaining in area surcharged with the insurgency activities, striking a terror and fear psychosis in the mind of the people, the Investigating Officer would definitely find difficulties to collect sufficient corroborative evidence. Witnesses will be reluctant to come to the court to depose or appear before the Investigating Officer to give statement for fear of reprisals. Rarely, one comes across any corroborative evidence in such type of offence. This would be no ground to throw away otherwise trustworthy evidence of prosecution witnesses. 30. In Lallu Manjhi (supra), the Apex Court in paras 10 and 11 of that judgment held, thus - 10. The law of evidence does not require any particular number of witnesses to be examined ion proof of a given fact. However, faced with the testimony of a single witness, the court may classify the oral testimony into three categories, namely, (i) wholly reliable, (ii) wholly unreliable, and (iii) neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. In the first two categories there may be no difficulty in accepting or discarding the testimony of the single witness. The difficulty arises in the third category of cases. The court has to be circumspect and has to look for corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial, before acting upon the testimony of a single witness. 11. In the case at hand, we can neither place implicit reliance on nor totally discard the testimony of Mannu (PW9) as it can neither be called wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. Mannu is a witness who could have been naturally present with his brother while ploughing the field. 11. In the case at hand, we can neither place implicit reliance on nor totally discard the testimony of Mannu (PW9) as it can neither be called wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. Mannu is a witness who could have been naturally present with his brother while ploughing the field. However, we find his testimony to have been substantially improved at the trial than what it was to begin with then the first information report of the incident was lodged. Though at the trial Mannu alleges all the 10 accused persons to have dealt blows with their respective weapons on the body of his brother Suphal Hansda, but that is certainly not correct. If 10 accused persons had dealt even one blow each there would have been a minimum of 10 injuries on the person of the deceased. It is the specific case of Mannu that so far as the chest injuries (fracture of ribs) are concerned, it was the result of the accused Gurua having climbed upon the body of the deceased after he had fallen down and then having pressed him against the ground. As the fracture of ribs is not accompanied by any apparent injury, on the body in all probability such injuries were not caused by any weapon. The injuries could have been caused either by pressing bard as alleged or even by forcefully pushing the deceased during the course of any scuffle. The deceased has suffered only two other injuries which obviously were not caused by three persons. So far as the assault on the deceased is concerned, thee is so much of chaff collected by Manny (PW9) In his deposition that it becomes very difficult, almost impossible, to sift the grains of truth from out of the mass of chaff of falsehood and exaggerations. 31. In the aforesaid case the Apex Court neither placed implicit reliance nor totally discarded the testimony of Mannu (PW9), the solitary eye witness as the same could neither be called wholly "reliable nor wholly unreliable. 31. In the aforesaid case the Apex Court neither placed implicit reliance nor totally discarded the testimony of Mannu (PW9), the solitary eye witness as the same could neither be called wholly "reliable nor wholly unreliable. Mannu was a witness who could have been naturally present with his brother while ploughing the field, but the Apex Court found that his testimony was substantially improved at the trial than what it was to begin with when the first information report of the incident was lodged and not only that at the time of trial he alleged that all the ten accused persons to have dealt blows with their respective weapons on the body of his brother Suphal Hansda, but the same was not believed by the court as if ten accused persons had dealt even one blow each, there would have been a minimum of ten injuries on the person of the deceased. As the fracture of ribs is not accompanied by any apparent injury on the body, in all probability such injuries were not caused by any weapon and ultimately, the Apex Court did not place reliance on the sole testimony of Mannu (PW9) for the purpose of recording the conviction. But in the instant case even if we disbelieve the story related by PW2, inter alia, that the extremists entered her room after breaking open the window then also we cannot disbelieve the fact that the extremists entered inside the house of PW2 on the relevant night of occurrence and forcibly kidnapped the deceased Bipul and Ramabrata as the said story has also been corroborated by PW6, a witness turned hostile. It is settled, by this time that the evidence of hostile witness can be used for the purpose of corroboration and PW2 specifically stated in her deposition that she identified the accused-Appellant with the help of electric light. Therefore, the case of Lallu Manjhi (supra) is a distinguishable one and in no way helps the case of the accused-Appellants. 32. In Bhimappa Jinnappa Naganur (supra), no explanation was given by the prosecution witnesses why in the FIR submitted to the police station they did not mention the names of Srimanti (PW1) and Ajith (PW2) as eye witnesses for which the learned trial court disbelieved the presence of P Ws 2 and 3 in the place of occurrence as eye witnesses. In Bhimappa Jinnappa Naganur (supra), no explanation was given by the prosecution witnesses why in the FIR submitted to the police station they did not mention the names of Srimanti (PW1) and Ajith (PW2) as eye witnesses for which the learned trial court disbelieved the presence of P Ws 2 and 3 in the place of occurrence as eye witnesses. But in the instant case, PW1 specifically stated in his evidence why and in what circumstances he did not mention the names of the accused in the first information report. Therefore, the aforesaid case has also, no bearing in the case in hand. 33. There is no quarrel about the proposition laid down by a Division Bench of this Court in which one of us was a party (Vaiphei, J) in Subodh Debbarma (supra) as it is settled that when two views are possible then the view which favours the accused should be accepted. The case in hand is not a case where two views are possible on the evidence adduced by the prosecution. Therefore, the said decision also in no way helps the accused-Appellants. 34. In Megha Singh (supra) the Apex Court held that the complainant should not have proceeded with the investigation of the case, but in the instant case none of the investigating officers was either complainant or the informant regarding the alleged incident. Therefore, the said case of Megha Singh (supra) has no application in the present case. 35. In Mir Mohammad Omar (supra) as referred to by the learned Public Prosecutor, the Apex Court in para 41 of that report observed as follows: - 41. Learned Judges of the Division Bench did not make any reference to any particular omission or lacuna in the Investigation. Castigation of investigation unfortunately seems to be a regular practice when the trial courts acquit the accused in criminal cases. In our perception it is almost impossible to come across a single case wherein the investigation was conducted completely flawless or absolutely foolproof. The function of the criminal courts should not be wasted in picking out the lapses in investigation and by expressing unsavory criticism against investigating officers. If offenders are acquitted only on account of flaws or defects in investigation the cause of criminal justice becomes the victim. Efforts should be made by courts to see that criminal justice is salvaged despite such defects in investigation. If offenders are acquitted only on account of flaws or defects in investigation the cause of criminal justice becomes the victim. Efforts should be made by courts to see that criminal justice is salvaged despite such defects in investigation. Courts should bear in mind the time constraints of the police officers in the present system, ill-equipped machinery they have to cope with, and the traditional apathy of respectable persons to come forward for giving evidence in criminal cases which are realities the police force have to confront with while conducting investigation in almost every case. Before an Investigating officer is imputed with castigating remarks the courts should not overlook the fact that usually such an officer is not heard in respect of such remarks made against them. In our view the court need make such deprecatory remarks only when it is absolutely necessary in a particular case, and that too by keeping in mind the broad realities indicated above. 36. The Apex Court while discussing the doctrine of presumption in Mir Mohammad Omar (supra) noted in paragraphs 31 and 33 of that judgment as follows: - 31. The pristine rule that the burden of proof is on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused should not be taken as a fossilized doctrine as though it admits no process of intelligent reasoning. The doctrine of presumption is not alien to the above rule, nor would it impair the temper of the rule. On the other hand, if the traditional rule relating to burden of proof of the prosecution allowed to be wrapped in pedantic coverage, the offenders in serious offences would be the major beneficiaries and the society would be the casualty. 33. Presumption of fact is an inference as to the existence of one fact from the existence of some other facts, unless the truth of such inference is disproved. Presumption of fact is a rule in law of evidence that a fact otherwise doubtful may be inferred from certain other proved facts. When inferring the existence of a fact from other set of proved facts, the court exercises a process of reasoning and reaches a logical conclusion as the most probable position. The above principle has gained legislative recognition in India when Section 114 is incorporated in the Evidence Act. When inferring the existence of a fact from other set of proved facts, the court exercises a process of reasoning and reaches a logical conclusion as the most probable position. The above principle has gained legislative recognition in India when Section 114 is incorporated in the Evidence Act. It empowers the court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely, to have happened. In that process the court shall have regard to the common course of natural events, human conduct, etc., in relation to the facts of the case. 37. In view of the above discussion, the cumulative effect of the prosecution evidence as well as the findings of the learned trial court is that it is conclusively established that the accused-Appellants are guilty of the offences so far the first part of the prosecution case is concerned, i.e., house trespass and kidnapping as covered by the provisions under Sections 449 and 364 respectively of the, IPC. Now remains the second part of the prosecution case, i.e., the murder of the deceased. 38. So far the second part of the prosecution case is concerned, admittedly there is no direct evidence regarding the commission of murder of the deceased by the accused-Appellants and when there is no direct evidence then the court is to take note of the circumstantial evidence from which an inference of guilt can be drawn and reasonably and firmly established against the accused persons and it can be concluded that the alleged crime was committed only by the accused persons and nobody else. 39. As this Court has already held on the basis of the evidence of PW2, an eye witness of the alleged incident which was corroborated by P Ws 1, 4 and 5 that the accused-Appellants committed the offence of house trespass by entering into the house of PW2 on the night of 23.8.1998 to commit kidnap of deceased son of PW2 and another Ramabrata in order to murder them and from the evidence of prosecution witnesses it is also proved that on the following day the dead bodies of the deceased were found lying at Utlabari about 4 k.m. away from the house of PW2 with multiple cut injuries on their person caused by sharp cutting weapons as well as bullet as evident from the inquest report and the statement of PW13. Therefore, now we have to see as to how and by whom the Injuries were caused to the person of the deceased as a result of which they succumbed. 40. As it has already been proved by the prosecution that the accused-Appellants along with others kidnapped the deceased from the house of PW2 with the intention for being murdered. The existence of intention at the time of offence is a matter of inference from the acts and conduct of the accused at the time of offence or thereafter. In a case of indirect evidence and/or circumstantial evidence we are to see whether the circumstances from which the conclusion of the guilt of the accused is to be drawn is fully established from the facts of the case and if established whether the same is consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt of the accused and not of any other person and whether the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt of the accused is to be drawn has complete its chain of evidence without leaving any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused as noted by the Apex Court in Manivel v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2008) 12 SCC 748 wherein a reference is also made to the decision in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116 . 41. From the evidence of prosecution witnesses, it appears that the prosecution established the following circumstances: - (i) On the night of the alleged incident, i.e., on 23.8.1998 the Appellants along with others trespassed the house of PW2 with arms where the deceased were sleeping and P Ws 2 and 6 were present; (ii) The Appellants and their associates by way of dragging kidnapped both the deceased Bipul and Ramabrata from the house of PW2; (iii) At the time of kidnapping the deceased persons by way of dragging from the house of PW2, the Appellants and the other persons of their gang were armed with gun, tackkal, etc. (iv) After kidnapping of the deceased persons from their house, i.e., the house of PW2 on the next morning their dead bodies were found lying with multiple cut injuries at Utlabari, about 4 k.m. away from the house of PW2 and between the incident of their kidnapping and recovery of their dead bodies evidence of no other incident is available; 42. The coupling of the fact of trespassing the house of PW2 at night by the accused-Appellants along with others armed with gun, etc., and kidnapping the deceased persons from the house of PW2 also establishes the intention as well as motive of the accused-Appellants of committing the offence of murder of the deceased persons as their dead bodies were found lying at Utlabari about 4 k.m. away from the house of PW2. 43. The existence of intention at the time of occurrence is a matter, of inference from the acts and conduct of the accused at the time of offence or thereafter. Kidnapping of the deceased persons by the accused-Appellants who were the members of the extremist group with intention to murder them has been confirmed from the evidence of PW2 and by their subsequent acts and conduct when, admittedly the intended murder took place. In every case of circumstantial evidence it is not necessary for the prosecution to prove the motive as the circumstantial evidence is sometimes contrasted with direct evidence in that facts in issue are indirectly inferred rather than directly perceived. In a case of circumstantial evidence the question of motive assumes importance, but atrocious crimes have been committed from very slight motives as would be evident from the decision of a Division Bench of Delhi High Court in Harish J. Mal v. State 1982 Crl. LJ 2123 wherein their lordships of that High Court noted, inter alia, Motive in this sense is not relevant to responsibility (guilt or innocence), though it may be relevant to proof or to the quantum of punishment the prosecution may prove motive for the crime if it helps them to establish their case, as a matter of circumstantial evidence: but they are not legally bound to prove motive, because a 'motiveless' crime is still a crime. 44. According to us, the learned trial court has rightly held that the standard of proof in an extremist related case cannot be treated at par with the ordinary criminal cases and the approach of appreciation of the evidence in extremist related cases is also to be differed from the other criminal cases and it has rightly relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in Tarun Bora (supra). Hence, it is not necessary for us to discuss the aforesaid case law in details as we are of the same view. 45. Hence, it is not necessary for us to discuss the aforesaid case law in details as we are of the same view. 45. As it is seen from the evidence of PW2 that the Appellants were among the extremists while they trespassed her house at night and from the evidence of PW6 it also appears that the extremists gave a kick to deceased Bipul and thereafter, took away both the deceased forcibly on the point of gun and the prosecution witnesses came forward with vivid story of the incident and also identified the accused-Appellants knowing fully well that they and their associates belonged to extremist group and against the extremist normally people do not come forward to adduce evidence as after adducing evidence their lives would be under threat, therefore, if we cumulatively take the aforesaid facts with the evidence of doctor PW13, then there is no other option except to come to a conclusion that within all human probability the alleged murder was committed by the Appellants and their associates and no other else. Therefore, it can be easily said that the Appellants committed the offences punishable under Section 302 read with Sections 449 and 364, IPC, and resultantly the impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence passed by the learned trial court does not suffer from any infirmity calling for interference by us. 46. In view of the above, we do not find any merit in these appeals. Hence, both the appeals are dismissed. The Appellants shall serve out the remaining part of their sentences. Transmit the L.C. records forthwith. Appeal dismissed