JUDGMENT Learned trial Court found the appellant guilty of the offence of uxoricide, convicted him under Section 302 IPC and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment for life and to pay fine of Rs.1000/- (Rupees one thousand), in default, to suffer further R.I. for three months more. The aforesaid judgment and order of sentence passed by learned Ad hoc Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Rourkela in S.T. Case No. 89/32/40/02 is impugned in this appeal. 2.A compendium of the prosecution case is as follows: The occurrence happened at about 12 Noon on 11.8.2001 in the rented house of the appellant. It is alleged that the appellant used to quarrel with his deceased-wife and used to assault her for money. The informant (P.W.6), who happens to be the mother of the deceased used to intervene to subside the matter. At the time and date of occurrence as found from the prosecution case, the appellant is alleged to have poured kerosene on the deceased and set her on fire. The incident was intimated to the informant (P.W.6) by one Padma Patra, who happens to be the sister of P.W.6’s husband. P.W.6 immediately rushed to the rented house of the appellant. She heard from a girl namely, Deepa Kumari Pradhan (P.W.3) that the appellant had already shifted the victim wife to Ispat General Hospital, Rourkela. Thereafter, P.W.6 went to the hospital with her son (P.W.7). In the Burn Centre of the Hospital the deceased was lying unconscious. There was none near her. At about 4 P.M. the appellant arrived and disclosed before her (P.W.6) that the deceased caught fire accidentally by bursting of stove. But thereafter he admitted that he quarrelled with the deceased-Susila and set her on fire. At about 10 P.M. in the night of occurrence day the victim Susila succumbed to the injury. Coming to the rented house of the appellant, P.W.6 learnt from the land lady (P.W.8) and from her husband’s sister that the appellant after assaulting the deceased set fire by pouring kerosene on her. P.W.6 reported at the P.S. After investigation, charge-sheet was filed implicating the appellant in offence punishable U/ss. 498-A & 302 IPC. The defence plea is one of complete denial and it is the specific plea of the defence that the deceased caught fire accidentally by bursting of stove and succumbed to the injury. P.W.6 reported at the P.S. After investigation, charge-sheet was filed implicating the appellant in offence punishable U/ss. 498-A & 302 IPC. The defence plea is one of complete denial and it is the specific plea of the defence that the deceased caught fire accidentally by bursting of stove and succumbed to the injury. 3.Prosecution examined 9 witnesses to prove the charge out of whom P.Ws. 1, 2 and 3 have turned hostile and they have been cross-examined by the prosecution U/s. 154 Evidence Act. P.W.4 is the owner of the house which the appellant had taken on rent and is a witness to the seizure of stove, match box, match stick, two plastic bottles, one half burnt saree etc. by the I.O.(P.W.9) during investigation. P.W.5 is the Medical Officer, who treated the deceased Susila on her admission at Ispat General Hospital, Rourkela. P.W.6 is the informant. P.W.7 is brother of the deceased-Susila. P.W.8 is the land lady and wife of P.W.4. P.W.9 is the I.O. Defence has examined none in support of the plea taken. 4.Learned trial Court found the appellant guilty U/s. 302 IPC solely on the basis of the evidence of P.W.8 and the circumstances that there was no mark of violence or sign of bursting of the stove seized during investigation. Learned trial Court, however, acquitted the appellant of the charge under Section 498-A, I.P.C. 5.Learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that in view of the contradictory evidence of P.W.8 and the Medical officer (P.W.5), who speaks of a declaration by the deceased to the effect that she caught fire by bursting of stove, learned trial Court has erred in finding the appellant guilty U/s. 302 IPC. Learned Addl. Government Advocate, on the other hand, supported the impugned judgment. 6.Evidence of P.W.8 being the basis on which learned trial Court found the appellant guilty, we propose to address the evidence of the said witness with care. P.W.8 in her evidence has stated thus: “I was in my house. One and half years back at about 12 noon I got the smell of burning coming from the house of the accused. I knocked the doors of the house of the accused. The accused opened the doors. I found his wife was sitting while burning inside the room. I found Sushila had no sense. Accused ran away from the spot. One and half years back at about 12 noon I got the smell of burning coming from the house of the accused. I knocked the doors of the house of the accused. The accused opened the doors. I found his wife was sitting while burning inside the room. I found Sushila had no sense. Accused ran away from the spot. Accused again came and shifted his wife to the I.G.H. Subsequently I learnt wife of accused died in the night in the hospital”. 7.From the aforesaid evidence, it is found that when P.W.8 went to the house, the house was closed from inside and she found that the deceased was sitting while burning inside the room. She has further testified that Susila (deceased) had no sense. P.W.8 is not corroborated by any other witness and even by P.W.4, who happens to be her husband. The person, namely, Padma Patra, who informed the informant (P.W.6) regarding the incident, has not been examined. From the cross-examination of P.Ws. 1 and 2 by the Public Prosecutor U/s. 154 Evidence Act, the prosecution case is revealed to the effect that P.Ws. 1 and 2 went to the house of the appellant on hearing hulla of the deceased-Susila and they saw the deceased burning and the appellant was available in the room. It is further case of the prosecution that before them (P.Ws. 1 and 2) Susila disclosed that the appellant set her on fire by pouring kerosene. Evidence of P.W.8 is contrary to the consistent prosecution case as found from the cross-examination of P.Ws. 1 and 2 by the Public Prosecutor. P.W.8 has testified that she came to the house of the appellant on getting smell of burning and she further testified that she found the door locked from inside and on her knocking, the appellant opened the door. When consistent prosecution case is to the effect that the witnesses were attracted to the spot by hearing cries of the deceased, evidence of P.W.8 hunts our ingenuity how she (P.W.8) being the land lady did not hear any cry of the deceased and she became attracted only by smell of burning. It further cannot be believed that a person on being burnt was sitting silently without raising any shout. It cannot also be believed that when P.Ws. It further cannot be believed that a person on being burnt was sitting silently without raising any shout. It cannot also be believed that when P.Ws. 1, 2 and 3 as per the prosecution case, came to the spot on hearing shout, how P.W.8 who is the land lady did not hear such shout of the deceased. In view of such nature of evidence as deposed by P.W.8, she cannot be relied upon without corroboration in material particulars. Learned Addl. Government Advocate fairly submitted that there is no corroboration to the evidence of P.W.8 in material particulars except the circumstances as relied on by the trial Court to the effect that there was no mark of bursting of stove as seized by the I.O. (P.W.9). It is the further peculiarity of the prosecution case that P.W.5, who is the Medical Officer and who is the person attending to the treatment of the deceased immediately on her admission in the Burn Ward of the I.G. Hospital, Rourkela has deposed about possibility of accidental death of the deceased. In his evidence P.W.5 testified thus “....I tried to collect the history of the injury sustained by the patient but the patient was unable to give the history. Being repeatedly asked, the patient disclosed with difficulty that she sustained burn injury on account of bursting of stove at 12.30 P.M. of last night”. Such evidence of P.W.5 points to possibility of accidental death by the deceased. Further, it might have so happened that on being disgusted by the ill-treatment meted out to her by the appellant, the deceased might have committed suicide. The conduct of the appellant, who immediately brought the deceased to Ispat General Hospital, Rourkela for treatment cannot also be lost sight of inasmuch as such a conduct on the part of the appellant, in absence of any materials to show such conduct to be a feigned one, militate against the finding of guilt in respect of the appellant. 8.In a case of such nature as the present one, duty is cast on the Court to arrive at a finding as to whether the death of the deceased was homicidal, suicidal or accidental. Learned trial Court on the basis of evidence of P.W.8, has held the death of the deceased to be a homicidal death. 8.In a case of such nature as the present one, duty is cast on the Court to arrive at a finding as to whether the death of the deceased was homicidal, suicidal or accidental. Learned trial Court on the basis of evidence of P.W.8, has held the death of the deceased to be a homicidal death. Evidence of P.W.5, as discussed supra on the other hand points out the possibility of accidental death of the deceased. Absence of mark of bursting of the stove either in the stove or in the spot room/house and coming of kerosene smell from the dead body, coupled with promptness on the part of the appellant to rush the deceased to Ispat General Hospital, Rourkela for treatment immediately after the occurrence are factors indicative of commission of suicide by the deceased. In view of such evidence brought on record and in view of the unreliability of the sole testimony of P.W.8, it is difficult to arrive at a conclusion as to whether death of the deceased was homicidal, suicidal or accidental. In absence of the finding on the aforesaid aspect, it is not possible to fasten the liability under Section 302, I.P.C. on the appellant. Accordingly, we are constrained to set aside the impugned judgment and the consequent sentence recorded against the appellant. 9.In view of our discussions supra, the appeal is allowed. The appellant be released forthwith from custody, if this detention is not required in any other case. Appeal allowed.