ORDER : 1. Heard learned counsel appearing for the parties. Leave granted. 2. A challenge is made in this appeal to the judgment and order dated 4.9.2009, passed by the Division Bench of the Gauhati High Court in W.A. No. 216 of 2009, holding that the power to condone delay is vested only for a maximum period of 30 days in terms of the provisions to Section 35 of the Central Excise Act. 3. The appellant herein challenged the order dated 9.7.2003 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Central Excise, Gauhati by filing an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals). The said appeal was filed on 6.10.2004 and by an order dated 15.10.2004, the Commissioner (Appeals) rejected the application filed by the petitioner seeking condonation of delay on the ground that the appeal is barred under the provisions of Section 35 of the Central Excise Act. 4. The aforesaid order of the Commissioner (Appeals) was challenged before the learned Single Judge of the Gauhati High Court. By an order dated 3.6.2008, the learned Single Judge held that sufficient ground is not made out for condonation of delay, even assuming that such a power is vested on the Commissioner (Appeals) to condone delay beyond a period of 30 days. The said order of the learned Single Judge was challenged before the Division Bench of the High Court, which dismissed the appeal holding that the Commissioner (Appeals) did not have the power and jurisdiction to condone such delay beyond a maximum period of 30 days after expiry of the earlier 60 days as contemplated in the said provisions. 5. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant sought to submit that the language used in Section 35, it could be presumed there is power to condone the delay on showing of sufficient cause. Necessarily then, the provisions of Section 5 would apply and, hence the Commissioner (Appeals) would have the power and jurisdiction to condone the delay even beyond a period of 30 days as laid down in Section 35. 6. We are unable to agree with the aforesaid view propounded by the learned counsel for the appellant for the simple reason that under the proviso to Section 35 a period of limitation came to be prescribed, which being a special law would override the general law as provided in Section 35 of the Act. 6. We are unable to agree with the aforesaid view propounded by the learned counsel for the appellant for the simple reason that under the proviso to Section 35 a period of limitation came to be prescribed, which being a special law would override the general law as provided in Section 35 of the Act. In this connection we may rely on a decision in Singh Enterprises vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jamshedpur and Others, (2008) 3 SCC 70 , wherein this Court has held that the proviso to Sub-Section (1) of Section 35 makes the position crystal clear that the Appellate Authority has no power to condone the delay beyond the period of 30 days and that the language used makes the position clear that the Legislature intended to entertain the appeal by condoning the delay only upto the 30 days and not 60 days. 7. In our considered opinion, the aforesaid decision of this Court fully applies to the facts of the present case also and, therefore, we find no error in the judgment and order of the High Court. 8. With the aforesaid observations, it is held that the appeal has no merit and, is accordingly, dismissed. Appeal dismissed.