P. K. Musahari, J.;- Heard Mr. P. Kalita, learned counsel for the appellants (defendants) and also heard Mr. C.K. Sarma Baruah, learned senior coun­sel appearing for the respondents (plaintiffs). 2. This is defendants' second appeal pre­ferred under Order 41 Rule 1 read with Sec­tion 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, against the judgment and decree dated 06.07.2001 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Nagaon, in Title Appeal No. 6 of 1999 dismissing the appeal and af­firming the judgment and decree dated 03.02.1999 passed in Title Suit No. 64 of 1995. 3. The present respondents are legal heirs of Manik Chandra Bora, who was the sole plainiff in T.S. No. 64 of 1995, who insti­tuted the said Title Suit against the present appellant Nos. 1 &2 for declaration of right, tile and interest in respect of suit property as described in schedule A & B and also for khas possession of the land and houses as described in schedule A & B respectively by evicting and ejecting them therefrom. 4. The facts of the case are that one late Jonaram Bora, predecessor in interest of the plaintiff was the absolute owner of the plot of land measuring 1 Bigha 2 Kathas 10 Lechas out of 2 Bighas covered by periodic patta No. 30 and Dag No. 57 of Nij Sahar, Mouza under Norttan Kissam in the district of Nagaon, Assam. Late Jonaram Bora constructed Assam Type house with asbestos roof, pucca floor and half wall with six rooms. The total home is about 24' x 45' in size with a kitchen, one thatched cowshed, one thatched chali, one chali with asbestos and CI sheet roof, one thatched roof chali, one thatched roof home with kacha floor along with a tank nearby for his residential purpose. 5. The Principal-defendant No. 1 (present appellant No. 1) Smti. Sewali Saikia got mar­ried with defendant No. 2 (present appellant No. 2) without the consent of their family and after their marriage they used to reside in a rented house. Out of love and affection, late Jonaram Bora allowed the defendant Nos. 1 & 2 to stay in the houses over the suit land in the year 1990 with a condition that they would vacate the house as and when asked by him. The Principal defendant also accepted the proposal and started living therein as licensee. Out of love and affection, late Jonaram Bora allowed the defendant Nos. 1 & 2 to stay in the houses over the suit land in the year 1990 with a condition that they would vacate the house as and when asked by him. The Principal defendant also accepted the proposal and started living therein as licensee. The plaintiff claimed that he is the only son of Late Jonaram Bora and in the early part of 1992, late Janaram Bora asked the defen­dants to vacate the suit house but the principal-defendant on various pretext avoided the said demand and finally on 01.05.1992, re­fused to vacate the house of the plea that they proposed to purchase the land and the house and paid a part of the consideration money to late Jonaram Bora. The defendants initi­ated proceeding against the plaintiff and late Jonaram Bora, which was registered as M.R. Case No. 139 of 1992 under Section 145 CrPC. 6. The plaintiff and late Jonaram Bora con­tested the case by filing written statement. Dur­ing proceeding of the said case, Jonaram Bora died. Before his death, late Jonaram Bora ex­ecuted a registered WILL on 07.07.1993 whereby an area of land measuring 10 Bighas 2 Kathas 4 Lechas including the suit land cov­ered under Dag No. 57 and the suit houses standing thereon were bequeathed to the plain­tiff and the daughters of late Jonaram Bora were also given separate land property in periodic patta No. 51 and Dag No. 60. The plaintiff obtained the probate of the said WILL from the Court of District Judge, Nagaon, on 26.09.1994. The plaintiff also got his name mutated in the revenue record and after the death of his father late Jonaram Bora, the plain­tiff became the owner of the suit property. The plaintiff claimed that principal defendants No. 1 & 2 are permissive occupier under Late Jonaram Bora with a promise to vacate the suit property as and when called for by him. The defendants not only refused to vacate the land and house but also denied the title of late Jonaram Bora as well as the plaintiff in the aforesaid proceeding under Section 145 CrPC. The defendants not only refused to vacate the land and house but also denied the title of late Jonaram Bora as well as the plaintiff in the aforesaid proceeding under Section 145 CrPC. The plaintiff, therefore, filed the title suit for declaration of his right, title and interest and also recovery of khas possession of the suit land and houses mentioned in the schedule A and B by evicting and ejecting the defendants No. 1 & 2. 7. The present appellants as defendants No. 1 & 2 contested the case by filing writ­ten statement. Their case is that the appel­lant-defendant No. 1 is the daughter of late Jonaram Bora and the appellant defendant No. 2 is the husband of defendant No. 1. Late Jonaram Bora proposed to sell the suit land to them. The consideration of the said suit land was fixed verbally on 16.08.1994 at Rs. 25,000/- only. The defendant No. 1 paid Rs. 15,000/- only towards consideration money to late Jonaram Bora and on 16.08.1984, he gave the possession of the said land to her with promise to execute the registered sale deed later on, which she agreed to as late Jonaram Bora is her father. But unfortunately, Jonaram Bora died on 12.07.1993 before execution of the unregistered sale deed. The defendants claim that after taking possession of the suit land, they constructed permanent residential houses on the suit land and had been living therein for more than 12 years with their family. The appellant defendant No. 1 claims that even otherwise she is entitled to the said land by way of right of inheritance as one of the daughters of late Jonaram Bora, who left about 20 Bighas of land, even though no title to the said land accrued to her by way of sale. On the basis of the aforesaid plead­ings of the parties, the learned trial Court framed the following issues: (1) Whether there is any cause of ac­tion for this suit? (2) Whether the suit is maintainable in its present form? (3) Whether the suit is bad for non­joinder of necessary parties? (4) Whether the suit is barred by ad­verse possession? (5) Whether the suit is properly valued and proper Court fee has been paid? (6) Whether the defendant orally pur­chased the suit land from late Jonaram Bora and paid Rs. 15,000/- as part con­sideration from late Jonaram Bora? (3) Whether the suit is bad for non­joinder of necessary parties? (4) Whether the suit is barred by ad­verse possession? (5) Whether the suit is properly valued and proper Court fee has been paid? (6) Whether the defendant orally pur­chased the suit land from late Jonaram Bora and paid Rs. 15,000/- as part con­sideration from late Jonaram Bora? (7) Whether the plaintiff have right, title and interest over the suit land? (8) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any relief as prayed for? (9) To what relief the plaintiff is entitled? 8. The learned trial Court decided all the issues in favour of the plaintiff and accord­ingly decreed the suit. The learned appellate Court below while disposing the appeal, took up the following points for consideration. (i)Whether the suit land was properly valued on the actual value of the suit land? (ii) Whether the suit is defective for non­joinder and mis-joinder of necessary par­ties? (iii) Whether the defendant No. 1 orally purchased the suit land from late Jonaram Bora and paid Rs. 15,000/-? The above points were decided in favour of the plaintiff/respondent (present respondent). In the present appeal, this Court formulated the following substantial questions of law: - (i) Whether the learned Courts below wrongly construed the Will Ext. 3, which was the document of title of the plaintiff for the claim in the suit? (ii) Whether the learned Courts below were right in not considering the alterna­tive plea of the defendant No. 1 claiming right over the land on the basis of inherit­ance, which opened on the death of Jonaram Bora? (iii) Whether a decree for khas pos­session without partition among the co-owners including the plaintiff and the de­fendant No. 1, could be legally passed? 9. Mr. Kalita, learned counsel for the ap­pellants has 3-fold submissions:- (1) The Will, in question, Ext. 3, has been misinterpreted by the Courts below. As no boundary has been described in the Will, the plaintiff/respondent cannot claim right, title and interest on the portion of land in possession of the appellants/defendants. The total area of land measuring 5 Bighas 0 Kathas 12 Lechas is covered by Dag No. 57, Patta No. 30, out of which, 3 Bighas was bequeathed by the Will Ext. 3, over which, the plaintiff/ respondent can very well claim right, title and interest but not over the specified portion as claimed by him. According to Mr. The total area of land measuring 5 Bighas 0 Kathas 12 Lechas is covered by Dag No. 57, Patta No. 30, out of which, 3 Bighas was bequeathed by the Will Ext. 3, over which, the plaintiff/ respondent can very well claim right, title and interest but not over the specified portion as claimed by him. According to Mr. Kalita, the mis-interpretation of the will is a substantial question of law. (2) The appellant defendant No. 1, being one of the daughters, has a claim over the portion of land of her father by way of right to inheritance and, therefore, an alternative claim was made in the written statement to declare her as a co-owners in case she fails to establish the fact of sale and purchase of the suit land but unfortunately, the learned Courts below did not consider her aforesaid alternative claim. Failure to consider such alternative claim or relief, according to Mr. Kalita, has given rise to a substantial question of law. In this regard, he would rely on the decisions of the Apex Court in Firm Sriniwas Ram Kumar Vs. Mahabir Prasad & Ors. as reported in AIR 1951SC177. He further submits that the alternative claim of the ap­pellants/defendants is not inconsistent with the original claim so as to call them mutually de­structive to each other. In this regard, he per­suaded this Court by referring to Devasahayam Vs. P. Savithramma & Ors., reported in (2005) 7 SCC 653 and Vimal Chand Gheverchand Jain Vs. Ramakant Eknath Jadoo, (2009) 5 SCC 713 . (3) No decree for a specified area of land left by the predecessor-in-interest could be passed by the learned Courts below without partition among the co-sharers or co-owners including the present appellant-defendant No. 1 and the respondent-plaintiff. The appellant-defendant No. 1 being one of the daughters of the predecessor-in-interest is a co-owner of the landed and other properties and she, being a legitimate co-sharers, has right to own and possess the part of the property after partition. 10. Opposing the submission of the ap­pellant-defendant No. 1, Mr. C. Sharma Baruah, learned senior counsel for the respon­dent/plaintiff contends that there are concur­rent findings by the Courts below and the same are not assailable in the second appeal. The points raised in this appeal are not at all pertaining to substantial questions of law. 10. Opposing the submission of the ap­pellant-defendant No. 1, Mr. C. Sharma Baruah, learned senior counsel for the respon­dent/plaintiff contends that there are concur­rent findings by the Courts below and the same are not assailable in the second appeal. The points raised in this appeal are not at all pertaining to substantial questions of law. The Courts below have already discussed and decided all the major issues like description of the suit land, status of the appellants/de­fendants, their right, title and interest by way of adverse possession and therefore alterna­tive claim on the suit land by way of right of inheritance etc. No other important issue has been left out for discussion and decision by the Courts below and as such, the appeal is liable to be dismissed. 11. As regards the first substantial ques­tions of law, there is no denial of the fact of execution of the registered Will Ext. 3, duly probated by the District Judge concerned. There was no objection from any quarter in­cluding the principal defendants (present appellants) to granting the probate Exhibit-2. There cannot be any doubt that the respondent/plaintiff got the Will land mutated in his name unopposed by other heirs or parties, not even by the present appellants and thereby the plaintiff accrued the right, title and interest on the strength of the probated will and mu­tation of land. If the execution of registered will and the grant of probate are admitted, it is not understood as to how it could be said that the learned Courts below wrongly con­strued or misconstrued the Will Ext. 3. It is notable that there is no allegation of fraud, forgery or suspicious circumstances in the execution of the Will. In other words, the genuineness of the Will has never been chal­lenged by the appellants/defendants. 12. Will has been defined under Section 2(h) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 as "the legal declaration of the intention of the testator with respect to his property which he desires to carry into effect after his death". In other words, the genuineness of the Will has never been chal­lenged by the appellants/defendants. 12. Will has been defined under Section 2(h) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 as "the legal declaration of the intention of the testator with respect to his property which he desires to carry into effect after his death". From the pleadings set up in the written state­ment and the submissions made, it is under­stood that she has been deprived of her pa­rental property inasmuch as her other 4 sis­ters and lone brother have been given the landed property by executing separate Wills but she being one of the children and heirs, has been discriminated simply because she happened to get married to the defendant appellant No. 2 against the consent/wish of her father. Court cannot act on sympathy or emotion. It has to act in accordance with the last wishes of the maker of the Will because a Will is considered nothing but the last desire of the testator. In Rabindranath Mukherjee Vs. Panchanan Banerjee, AIR 1995 SC 1984 , it is firmly held that Courts are to act in accordance with wishes of the maker of the Will, otherwise, the very purpose of making the Will could be made nugatory. Applying the aforesaid law, this Court in Smti. Bishnumaya Vs. Smti. Kishoridevi, 1997 (2) GUT 182, held that the deprivation of natural heirs alone should not be a case of suspicion as the very idea behind execution of a Will is to interfere with the normal line of succession. 13. As regards the second substantial question of law, the discussions made in the aforesaid paragraph makes it amply clear that there is no scope for the learned trial Court or the appellate Court below to take into consideration the alternative plea of the principal defendant No. 1 claiming right over the land on the basis of inheritance, nobody can deny her land of her father by way of right of inher­itance or on adverse possession or agreement of sale and payment of advance consider­ation, but they have no application to the li­ability of Will and Will property. The Court is helpless in the present case because the tes­tator lost love for his daughter, present ap­pellant defendant No. 1, as she got married against his wish/consent, to the appellant-de­fendant No. 2, and for that matter, the testa­tor father wished to deprive her of the share of his property, no matter, even if she is in possession or occupation of the suit land as a "permissive occupier". The probated Will must rule over the matter. The Court cannot act otherwise. If the Court makes any effort to dislodge the probated Will by way of in­troducing alternative plea or alternative claim like inheritance, adverse possession etc. it would amount to making an effort to chang­ing the last wish of the testator and furstrating the purpose of Will and the law relating to it. 14. The same consideration and applica­tion of law would follow in the case of third substantial question of law. It is irrelevant to consider as to whether a Court can legally pass a decree for khas possession without partition among the co-owners including the plaintiff and defendant No. 1. The Court is concerned only with the last wish of the testator i.e. the Will, its genuineness and validity of the probate. In the present case as stated and discussed earlier, the same are not in question. The property in question has already been transferred and the name of the respon­dent/plaintiff has already been mutated or re­corded in the land records. The appellant/ defendants have not reached the status of co-owners of the suit land. As per the findings of the learned Courts below, the appellants/de­fendants failed to prove their case of payment of some consideration amount towards oral agreement for sale and purchase of the suit land. The appellants/defendants have been making efforts to make out a case that the suit land is not included in the Will property inasmuch as there is no boundary or proper description of the Will property. Whether the suit land is included in the Will property is a serious and most important question. It may be treated as a "core" issue and when a core issue is not considered and adjudicated upon, it results in a substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure as was held in Achintya Kumar Saha Vs. Nanee Printers, reported in (2004) 12 SCC 368 . 15. It may be treated as a "core" issue and when a core issue is not considered and adjudicated upon, it results in a substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure as was held in Achintya Kumar Saha Vs. Nanee Printers, reported in (2004) 12 SCC 368 . 15. The learned trial Court and lower ap­pellate Court have not framed any issue in this regard. But on perusal of the judgment and orders of the Courts below, I find that sufficient discussions have been made on the basis of evidence led by the parties. The prin­cipal defendant No. 1 is the daughter of the testator. She was examined as DW-1. Her husband was also examined as DW-2. They filed a joint written statement. On consider­ation of their written statement and oral evi­dence, the learned trial Court came to a find­ing that the suit land is included in the Will land. For coming to this finding, the learned trial Court referred to the evidence of DW-1, who, in her examination-in-chief, stated that "in the probate proceeding I came to know that the suit land measuring 2 Bighas is included in the will land....." (as translated from original deposition in Assamese). The learned trial Court also observed in the judgment that the defendant No.1 was silent about the boundary of the suit land and did not adduce any witness in re­gard to boundary to establish her case that suit land is different from the land bequeathed to plaintiff vide Will Ext. 3. The lower appel­late Court in the similar line, on the basis of deposition of DW 1, came to a conclusion that the disputed land in under the bequeathed land. The above core issue having found to have been discussed and answered by both the Courts below, there remains nothing more to discuss by this Court expect to accept the findings of the said Courts. 16. This Court is alive with the present law that failure of the trial Court and the lower appellate Court in discharging their duties may result in substantial question of law. This ques­tion is not relevant at all in the present case inasmuch as no such failure in discharging duties has been brought against the learned Courts below. Even if such ground is taken, it is not backed by any evidence or material on records. This ques­tion is not relevant at all in the present case inasmuch as no such failure in discharging duties has been brought against the learned Courts below. Even if such ground is taken, it is not backed by any evidence or material on records. The decisions placed by the learned counsel for the appellants are not at all found relevant and applicable to the facts and cir­cumstances of the present case. The case of Firm Srini was (supra) relates to suit for spe­cific performance of a contract to sell a house involving inconsistent plea and alternative case/prayer and scope for granting relief. The case of Devasahayam (supra) is about an oral agreement of sale between the tenant and the landlord. The main question involved in the said case was regarding permissibility of raising mutually destructive pleas and inconsistent defences. The case of Vimal Chand (supra) is also about a sale deed involving question of permissibility to raise alternative and incon­sistent plea and mutually destructive pleas. The last case Mordern Hotel Gudor Vs. K. Radha Krishaiah, AIR 1989 SC 1510 pertains to an action for eviction from a commercial premises involving a question as to whether a tenant can be evicted during subsistence of lease period. None of the cited cases relates to will and bequeathed property. The laws decided in the above cases are good laws in the civil suits except the suit of the present nature. There is no necessity to repeat the reasons for rejecting the submis­sions of learned counsel for the appellants as enough has been explained earlier. The an­swer to the above substantial question of law must go in the negative. 17. Appeal, thus, fails and stands dis­missed. Parties to bear their own costs. Re­turn the LCR forthwith.