ORDER P.K. Musahary, J. 1. There is more of a sacred bond between the Hindu couples. Rose and roses all the way, sweet all the moments, sweeter at home but outside home sometime awaits unspeakable, for example at modem work places. The female spouse remains busy as house wife at home unaware about easy exposure to and conduct of her male partner with female co-worker and the likes. Unusually, sometime there grows something unholy. By the time the lady at home came to know about it, it is too late for retrieval. The man outside the home has already forgotten the once much adored sacred bond to live with till the last breath and beyond. Similar thing befell on the present Respondent No. 1, housewife who approached the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, West Tripura, Agartala with a complaint registered as C.R. Case No. 125/2004 against her husband, present Petitioner, alleging that during subsistence of marriage with her he has married another woman Smti. Piyali Choudhury, accused No. 2 on 9-5-2005 and committed a cognizable offence punishable under Section 494, IPC. Taking cognizance of the case, the learned trial Court issued summons to the present Petitioner. On his appearance, the learned trial Court framed charge on 28-5-2005 against the Petitioner under Section 494, IPC. He pleaded not guilty and claimed to stand trial. 2. In her complaint petition, the Respondent cited three names as witnesses to bring home the charge. The complainant examined herself and got cross-examined. Besides her, two other witnesses were also examined and cross-examined as witnesses. She produced one unlisted witness, Smti. Basanti Das on 15-7-2005 but due to serious objection of the accused-Petitioner, she could not be examined. The learned Counsel for the complaint prayed for and was granted adjournment till 22-7-2005 to place the decision. Even she filed a petition on 22-7-2005 for re-examination of P.W. 1. The date was fixed on 28-7-2005 for hearing of the said petition and ultimately it was heard and disposed of vide order dated 31-8-2005 allowing the prayer for re-examination of P.W. 1. This order is under challenge by the accused-Petitioner in this revision petition. 3. I have heard Mr. S. Talapatra, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. A. Das, learned Counsel for the revisional Petitioner, Mr. P. Roy Barman, learned Counsel for the Respondent No. 1 and Mr. A. Ghosh, learned Addl. This order is under challenge by the accused-Petitioner in this revision petition. 3. I have heard Mr. S. Talapatra, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. A. Das, learned Counsel for the revisional Petitioner, Mr. P. Roy Barman, learned Counsel for the Respondent No. 1 and Mr. A. Ghosh, learned Addl. P. P. appearing on behalf of the State of Tripura/Respondent No. 2. 4. The two-leg submission of Mr. Talapatra is that by way of passing the impugned order dated 31-8-2005, the learned trial Court has: (i) reviewed its own order dated 15-7-2005 whereby it refused to allow examination of a person who was neither cited as a witness in the complaint petition nor mentioned in the evidence of the prosecution, which is not sustainable under the law. (ii) allowed the prosecution to fill up the lacunae exceeding its jurisdiction conferred under Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure inasmuch as the discretion granted under the said law is not to the extent of allowing re-examination of the complainant's witnesses to prove a new fact or development to the prejudice and disadvantage of the accused. The learned Senior Counsel heavily relies upon the principles laid down in Mohanlal Shamjisoni v. Union of India, reported in 1991 Supp (1) SCC 271 : 1991 Cri LJ 1521. 5. Mr. Roy Barman, learned Counsel for the Respondent No. 1, opposing the first submission of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner contends that the first order dated 15-7-2005 is an interlocutory order only with a tentative opinion. It granted adjournment to a date for final hearing on the point of law involved and accordingly, the impugned order was finally passed on 31-8-2005, after hearing the parties concerned and, therefore, there occasioned no reviewing of its own order. The learned trial Court passed the impugned order in exercise of its discretionary and obligatory powers provided under Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in the matter of summoning, recalling or re-examining the witness essential to the just decision of the case relating to second marriage of the accused-Petitioner with another woman i.e. accused No. 2 during life time and subsistence of marriage with the complainant. The learned trial Court framed the charge in this regard and no prejudice would be caused to the Petitioner if her prayer for re-examining herself is allowed to bring on record as to how she desired the information from one Smti. Basanti Das. This, according to Mr. Barman, is permissible under Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure inasmuch as it does not amount to filling up the lacunae in the prosecution case. Relying principally on the decision in Rajendra Prasad v. Narcotic Cell, reported in (1999) 6 SCC 110 : (1999 Cri LJ 3529) he would submit that the proper evidence was not adduced or a relevant material was not brought on record due to inadvertence and the Court should be magnanimous in permitting such mistake to be rectified, after all, function of the criminal Court is administration of criminal justice and it has plenary power to summon or even recall any witness at any stage of the case if it is considered necessary for a just decision. He then explains the nature, scope and object of Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the light of the decision in the case of Zahira Habibullah (5) v. State of Gujarat, reported in (2006) 3 SCC 374 : (2006 Cri LJ 1694) and other host of decisions in Shailendra Kumar v. State of Bihar, reported in AIR 2002 SC 270 : (2002 Cri LJ 568, Gopal Jhunjhunwala v. Shuvra Teja Chaudhury, reported in (2008) 1 GLJ 712: (2008 Cri LJ (NOC) 793 (Gau), Md. Bilal Ahmed Barlaskar v. State of Assam, reported in (2010) 3 GLR 386 and Smti. Chhanda Debbarma v. Keshab Banik, reported in (2005) 1 GLJ 228: (2005 Cri LJ 2505). 6. In reply to above, it is argued by Mr. Talapatra, learned senior counsel for the Petitioner that there is no conflict with the above law but the Court has to take into account the exigency of situation of a given case before exercising the power under Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and also the caution of the Apex Court in Mohanlal's case (supra), in para 9 to the effect that discretionary power should be invoked as the exigencies of justice require and exercised judicially with circumspection and consistently with the provisions of the Code. The aforesaid consideration and caution, according to Mr. The aforesaid consideration and caution, according to Mr. Talapatra, learned senior counsel, are lacking apparently in the present case and as such, the impugned order is liable to be quashed and set aside. 7. At the outset, little attention is to be paid to the question if the order passed on 15-7-2005 preceding the impugned order of 31-8-2005 is interlocutory or final in nature. It could be understood well from the full text of the order as quoted hereunder: 15-7-2005. Complainant is present with 2 P.Ws. Out of the present P.Ws. complainant was duly cross-examined and another witness P.W. 2 was duly cross-examined and discharged. The another P.W. namely Smti. Basanti Das was not examined today due to objection by the defence as she is not a cited witness and her name has also not transpired in the prosecution evidence. So, this Court at this stage could not find any material to opine that examination of that witness is essential to come to a just decision invoking the power of Section 311, Code of Criminal Procedure. Learned Counsel for the prosecution, however, prays for a short adjournment to show the decision in this regard. Considered. Fix the next date after seven days for hearing on the point of law regarding examination of witness Smti. Basanti Das. Fix 22-7-2005 for hearing on the point of law. 8. For better appreciation, the legal meaning of the term interlocutory order is to be found. An interlocutory order, in simple legal term is one which is made pending the cause and before final hearing on merit. As held in Amarnath v. State of Haryana, reported in AIR 1977 SC 2185 : (1977 Cri LJ 1891) the terms interlocutory order merely denotes order of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not touch the important right or liability of the parties. So, interlocutory order has to be construed in contradiction to or in contrast to final order, it means not a final order, but an intermediate order. It is made between the commencement of an action and the entry of the judgment as explained in V.C. Shukla v. State through CBI, reported in AIR 1980 SC 962 : (1980 Cri LJ 690). It is made between the commencement of an action and the entry of the judgment as explained in V.C. Shukla v. State through CBI, reported in AIR 1980 SC 962 : (1980 Cri LJ 690). The illustration given in Madulimayee v. State of Maharashtra, reported in AIR 1978 SC 47 : 1978 Cri LJ 165 would be appropriate for the instant case, according to which, the order taking cognizance of an offence of a Court whether it is done illegally or without jurisdiction, is an interlocutory order. A careful reading of order dated 15-7-2005 makes it abundantly clear that the learned trial Court accepted the legal question raised by the Petitioner for examination and fixed a date for hearing as prayed for by the prosecution. Except adjourning the case for hearing, the Court passed no order touching the right and liability of the parties. Even no discussion has been made on the legal provision and consequence of exercising the power under Section 311, Code of Criminal Procedure such order cannot even come to the footing of an interlocutory order, far less the final order. For this reason, I do not accept the submissions of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the learned trial Court has reviewed its own order by way of passing the impugned order dated 31-8-2005. The core issue in this case is whether the Respondent/complainant is attempting to fill up the lacunae or correcting her default/mistake in proving the case against the accused Petitioner. There are inherent mistakes in conducting the case which may be noted below: (i) In the list of witnesses attached to the complaint petition, the name of important witness, Smti. Basanti Das, from whom the Respondent-complainant came to know about the second marriage and through whom it is sought to be proved, has not been incorporated. (ii) The Respondent complainant while being examined and cross-examined did not make even a whisper about Smti. Basanti Das, not to speak of deriving information about her second marriage. So also in the oral evidence of other P.Ws. (iii) The prosecution intended to adduce Smti. Basanti Das along with other listed witnesses without any leave from the Court. It was objected by the accused-Petitioner and due to such objection the said Smti. Basanti Das could not be examined as reflected from order dated 15-7-2005. So also in the oral evidence of other P.Ws. (iii) The prosecution intended to adduce Smti. Basanti Das along with other listed witnesses without any leave from the Court. It was objected by the accused-Petitioner and due to such objection the said Smti. Basanti Das could not be examined as reflected from order dated 15-7-2005. (iv) Then the complainant filed an application on 22-7-2005 praying for re-examination of herself as P.W. 1. The purpose behind such prayer as reflected in the impugned order dated 31-8-2005 is to get the name of Smti. Basanti Das transpired as prosecution witness so that the Respondent-Petitioner (prosecution) "would get a chance to prove her case. 9. The undisputable position is that the complainant (prosecution) did not file any application seeking permission of the Court to examine Smti. Basanti Das as a prosecution witness. She was produced as a prosecution witness without the leave of the Court. It was incumbent upon the prosecution to apply for permission giving valid reason and get summons issued as required under Section 204(2) Code of Criminal Procedure requiring appearance of the witnesses desired to be examined. The learned trial Court in exercise of discretionary power under Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is entrusted with power to issue summons to such person or witness. The complainant, admittedly, without trying to satisfy the trial Court the need for calling the said uncited witness, filed the application for re-examination of herself. Whether such re-examination of the complainant (P.W. 1) is permissible under the law ? The core issue mentioned above is dependent upon the answer to this question. If the answer is in the negative, there is no need to go into the core issue. 10. The complainant is unhesitatingly demanding re-examination of herself as P.W. 1 to prove the charge against the accused-Petitioner. Chapter X of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 deals with examination of witnesses. Section 137 provides for examination-in-chief, cross-examination and re-examination of witnesses. Under Section 138, the witness shall be first examined-in-chief, then cross-examined, if the adverse party so desires and then re-examined by the party calling him, if so desired. It is specifically provided that the re-examination shall be directed to the explanation of matters referred to in cross-examination, and, if new matter is, by permission of the Court, introduced in the re-examination, the adverse party may further cross-examine upon that matter. It is specifically provided that the re-examination shall be directed to the explanation of matters referred to in cross-examination, and, if new matter is, by permission of the Court, introduced in the re-examination, the adverse party may further cross-examine upon that matter. The said provision makes it clear that a witness after being cross-examined cannot be re-examined as a matter of course and as a matter of right but the party who wants to re-examine a witness must confine only to explanation of matters arising in the cross-examination without introducing new facts. In re-examination, no new facts can be introduced without due permission of the Court. The law of evidence provides limited scope in re-examination of a witness. It does not permit the party to put question beyond what is necessary to clarify a position brought in cross-examination. Nothing has been stated or indicated by the complainant as to which position in her cross-examination needs further clarification/explanation by way of re-examination. From the impugned order, it is, however, revealed that the complainant wants to produce Smti. Basanti Das as an important witness, who is well conversant with the fact of second marriage of the accused Petitioner with Smti. Piyali Choudhury (Dhar) but "due to inadvertence and unawareness" it could not be stated about the aforesaid "development" as she came to know about it after institution of the complaint case. 11. The case of the Respondent-complainant is that she came to know about second marriage after institution of the complaint case and as such, she may be re-examined so that the name of Smti. Basanti Das can be transpired as prosecution witness and a chance be given to prove her case against the accused-Petitioner. I am afraid that a party can ask for re-examination of a witness for the said purpose under the present scheme in the Evidence Act, particularly, in regard to production and examination of witness as provided in Chapter-X of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The existing law of evidence clearly prohibits re-examination of witness in the situation like the one in the present case and on the ground taken by the complainant-Respondent. The existing law of evidence clearly prohibits re-examination of witness in the situation like the one in the present case and on the ground taken by the complainant-Respondent. Once it is found that the re-examination of a witness cannot be permitted under the law, it becomes redundant to consider the other aspect like possibility of filling up the lacunae or mistake in the present prosecution case or making out a new case by way of re-examining the witness to the prejudice of the defence and for that reason I would refrain from entering into it. My above discussion leads me to hold that the learned trial Court misinterpreted the law relating to production and examination of witness, particularly in relation to re-examination of witnesses and misdirected itself in passing the impugned order dated 31-8-2005 allowing re-examination of the complainant (P.W. 1). Such order is unsustainable under the law and liable to be set aside. The impugned order dated 31-8-2005 passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, West Tripura, Agartala in C.R. Case No. 125/2004, is, accordingly set aside and quashed. 12. The petition stands allowed. Petition allowed