JUDGEMENT S.K.Katriar, J. 1. This writ petition is directed against the order dated 19.2.2005, issued under the signature of the Registrar General, conveying the decision of the Patna High Court that the petitioners pension to the extent of 25% has been withheld. 2. A brief statement of facts essential for the disposal of the writ petition may be indicated. The petitioner was at the relevant point of time posted as Additional District & Sessions Judge, Nalanda, at Biharsharif. He was due to superannuate on 31.5.2002, on completion of 60 years of age. He was served with charge-sheet dated 28.5.2002 (Annexure-2), incorporating therein five charges against the petitioner which in substance meant that he had seriously erred in granting bail to different accused persons. The petitioner had shown cause by his communication dated 10.6.2002. The enquiry was conducted by the learned District & Sessions Judge, Nalanda. The petitioner participated in the enquiry proceeding. On a consideration of the materials before him including the defence of the petitioner, the learned District Judge submitted his enquiry report on 4.4.2003, whereby he held that the petitioner had seriously erred in granting bail in all the five cases. The matter was considered by the High Court, and it was resolved to withhold his pension to the extent of 25%. The order was communicated by the learned Registrar General by his aforesaid communication dated 19.2.2005. Hence this writ petition. 3. While assailing the validity of the impugned order, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that a perusal of the charge-sheet and the enquiry report shows that it was a case of bona fide exercise of discretion in granting bail. No motive is discernible in granting bail to the different accused persons. 4. Learned counsel for respondent nos. 3 and 4 has made detailed submissions in support of the impugned order. 5. We have perused the materials on record and considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties. We propose to examine the matter charge-wise. Charge Nos. 1 and 2 are with respect to the grant of bail to two different accused persons in the same case, i.e. in Manpur P.S. Case No. 19/2001, under the provisions of Section 307 read with various provisions of the Arms Act. The learned Sessions Judge had rejected the bail application of one Gandhi Prasad @ Lulha vide order dated 18.6.2001, passed in B.P. No. 720/01. The learned Sessions Judge had rejected the bail application of one Gandhi Prasad @ Lulha vide order dated 18.6.2001, passed in B.P. No. 720/01. Thereafter, co-accused in the same case, namely, Kishore Kumar, applied for bail preferring B.P. No. 865/01. The petitioner granted him bail by order dated 12.7.01. Thereafter the said Gandhi Prasad @ Lulha, filed a second bail application seeking bail, inter alia, on the ground that the said Kishore Kumar, a similarly circumstanced accused in the same case, had been granted bail. Instead of transferring this bail application to the learned Sessions Judge who had earlier rejected the first application, he dealt with the matter on merits and granted bail. The learned enquiry officer has concluded as follows so far as these two inter-connected charges are concerned: "The aforesaid relevant bail orders of Mr. K.M. Singh evidentially seems to be injudicious, desperate, and improper exercise of judicial discretion." We entirely agree with this finding, inter alia, for the reason that it was incumbent on the petitioner to transfer the second bail application of Gandhi Prasad @ Lulha to the learned Sessions Judge who had applied his mind to this case and rejected his earlier bail application. 5.1. Charge No. 2 is with respect to grant of bail to one Satish Kumar Sinha, an accused in Harnaut P.S. Case No. 169/2000 under Section 304, IPC. That was a case where the wife of Satish Kumar Sinha had died an unnatural death in her matrimonial home within less than one year of her marriage. The petitioner granted him bail by order dated 25.6.2001, in B.P. No. 760/01. The learned enquiry officer concluded as follows in his enquiry report: "Her mysterious death just after 10-11 months of her marriage with Satish Kumar and repeated demand of her in-laws and husband for one lac rupees from her and her viscera report awaitingall the facts do not justify the proper rather hasty exercise of judicial discretion in allowing the bail to aforesaid husband of the deceased." We entirely agree with the finding in a situation where the death of the wife had taken place in her matrimonial home in less than one year of her marriage. The entire situation was enveloped with the allegation of persistent demands of dowry. 5.2. The entire situation was enveloped with the allegation of persistent demands of dowry. 5.2. The third charge is with respect to the order dated 6.7.2001, passed by the petitioner in B.P. No. 885/01, whereby he granted bail to one Abhuday @ Udai Krishna arising out of Bihar (Sohsarai) P.S. Case No. 199/01 under Section 364A, IPC. Allegation had been levelled for kidnapping Pintu Kumar Bhadani. Abhuday @ Udai Krishna had been made a co-accused in the case. He was part of the conspiracy for abduction. His defence was that he was the owner of the studio. He had submitted that his telephone in the studio had once been used by the accused persons for the commission of the offence. On the other hand, the prosecution case was that the accused persons were frequent visitors to his studio giving rise to a very strong suspicion of conspiracy. It was in this background that bail was granted to Abhuday @ Udai Krishna. The learned enquiry officer has concluded as follows: "...in course of investigation, the materials available as memo of evidence suggesting frequent visits of the culprits to his studio, the nexus and conspiracy with them for kidnapping with his consent, the communication to the culprits through his mobile about the movement of police and his hand in kidnapping of Pintu Kumar Bhadani on 6.6.01 and his subsequent recovery all these facts indicate his complicity in the kidnapping for ransom but Mr. Singh seems to had liberated Abhuday Kumar Singh on 6.7.2001 injudicially." It appears to us that much can be said on both sides. The plea taken by Abhuday @ Udai Krishna may be an effort to oversimplify the matter, because the prosecution case was that he was a party to the conspiracy for abduction. However, in view of the position that the boy was recovered before grant of bail to Abhuday Kumar @ Udai Krishna, it was perhaps an exercise of judicial discretion. However, we are of the view that better exercise of discretion would have been to deny bail to Abhuday Kumar @ Udai Krishna. 5.3. Charge no. 4 relates to grant of bail to Md. Iliyas, aged 75 years, who was granted bail by order dated 2.8.01, in B.P. no. 1032/01, arising out of Islampur P.S. Case No. 85/01, under Sections 379, 411/34 IPC, wherein allegations were levelled against Md. 5.3. Charge no. 4 relates to grant of bail to Md. Iliyas, aged 75 years, who was granted bail by order dated 2.8.01, in B.P. no. 1032/01, arising out of Islampur P.S. Case No. 85/01, under Sections 379, 411/34 IPC, wherein allegations were levelled against Md. Iliyas, aged 75 years, and his son for theft of 70 kgs. of aluminum wire. It was alleged that the son was running a business of sale and purchase of scrapped materials, who was perhaps the main accused, and allegation had also been levelled against Md. Iliyas, the father. Learned enquiry officer concluded as follows: "Mr. Singh did not observe the grave nature of the theft of electrical wire on large scale. This act of Mr. Singh betrays his lacking not as a judicial officer." This case also appears to be a case of judicial discretion in a situation where the main accused was the son, a young person, and Md. Iliyas, the father, was not the main accused, who was aged 75 years of age and had remained in custody for some time. Yet we feel that the better exercise of discretion would have been to deny bail to Md. Iliyas. 5.4. As to the fifth charge, the petitioner had granted anticipatory bail by order dated 7.8.01, passed in A.B.P. No. 296/01 (Anjani Singh vs State of Bihar), arising out of Hilsa P.S. Case No. 241/01, under Section 307, IPC, and 27 of the Arms Act. He granted bail to the accused person in the face of the allegation that he had been hired to kill somebody. It was surely not a case of anticipatory bail. Therefore, the learned enquiry officer rightly concluded against him. 5.5. On an overall summary of the matter, as to the five charges, the learned enquiry officer concluded as follows: "On the over-all consideration of the aforesaid bail orders, I find that the acts of Mr. K.M. Singh were cryptic and unsincere, beyond proper exercise of judicial discipline and discretion, betraying his unbecoming of a judicial officer." 6. We have exhaustively dealt with every charge and entirely agree with the learned enquiry officer that grant of bail to various persons were not mere exercise of judicial discretion that one could say that, in view of two possible views, the petitioner had taken one view. We have exhaustively dealt with every charge and entirely agree with the learned enquiry officer that grant of bail to various persons were not mere exercise of judicial discretion that one could say that, in view of two possible views, the petitioner had taken one view. All the cases were such that grant of bail was surely improper and the same were actuated by ulterior motives. 7. No grievance has been raised before us about improper conduct of the enquiry proceeding. We are convinced on a perusal of the entire materials before us that fully crystallized charge-sheet was served on the petitioner, he had submitted his show-cause before the learned enquiry officer, and he was afforded full opportunity to defend his position and, on a thoughtful consideration of the matter, the learned enquiry officer submitted his report. We are convinced that prescribed procedure was followed, and the principle of natural justice was observed. As to the quantum of punishment, we are left with a feeling that the petitioner has been let off lightly. He deserved a harsher punishment. However, in view of the position that the respondents have not challenged the order, we would to leave the matter at that. 8. In the result, the writ petition is dismissed. 9. Before we part with the records, we must state that learned counsel for respondent nos. 3 and 4 on enquiry stated that they appear for respondent nos. 3 and 4 gratis. We acknowledge the gesture. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, let the High Court Legal Services Committee, Patna, pay a sum of Rs. 10,000/- (ten thousand) to Mr. Abhinay Raj, learned Junior Counsel for respondent nos. 3 and 4. 10. Let a copy of this judgment be passed on to the Secretary, High Court Legal Services Committee, Patna.