Anil Kumar, J.- Heard Sri Piyush Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner. The factual matrix involved in the present case are that initially Sri Arvind Kumar Gupta, opposite party no.3 had filed a complaint (complaint case no.219 of 2007) under Section 12 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986(hereinafter referred to as 'Act') before the District Consumer Forum, Unnao and the same was decided ex parte by order dated 14.5.2008. Thereafter, the petitioner moved an application for recalling of the ex parte judgment and order dated 14.5.2008 passed by opposite party no.1 on 17.2.2009, the same was dismissed by order dated 21.5.2009. Aggrieved by the orders dated 14.5.2008 and 21.5.2008 passed by opposite party no.1, the petitioner filed an appeal (Appeal No. 1828 of 2009) under Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 before the State Consumer Dispute Redressal Commission, Lucknow and at the admission stage without issuing notice to the respondent in appeal, the opposite party no.2 by order dated 27.10.2009 dismissed the same on the ground that the appeal has been filed beyond the period of limitation as provided under Section 15 of the Act, hence the present writ petition. Sri Piyush Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner, while assailing the orders which are under challenged in the present writ petition submits that initially the District Consumer Forum had passed an ex parte order dated 14.5.2008 against the petitioner without providing opportunity to him, thereafter an application for restoration of the said order was also dismissed by the opposite party no.1 on the ground that the same was barred by statutory period of limitation as provided under the Consumer Protection Act. Subsequently, the appeal filed by the petitioner before the State Commission Lucknow (opposite party no.2) was also dismissed on the ground of limitation, as such the petitioner was not afforded any opportunity of hearing whatsoever to put forward his case at any point of time before the opposite parties no. 1 and 2 so the orders which are under challenged in the present writ petition are arbitrary in nature and against the principles of natural justice. Accordingly the same are liable to be set aside. 1 and 2 so the orders which are under challenged in the present writ petition are arbitrary in nature and against the principles of natural justice. Accordingly the same are liable to be set aside. He further submits that the present writ petition filed by the petitioner in spite of the statutory remedy available to him under the Act is maintainable before this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in view of the law as laid down by this Court in the case of M/S Rapti Commission Agency, Lucknow Vs. State of U.P. and another, 2010 (28) LCD 161. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the record as in the present case the order dated 27.10.2009 passed by the opposite party no.2 in the appeal at the admission stage without issuing notice to the respondent no.3 keeping in view the said fact and the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case that the appeal of the petitioner was dismissed on the ground of limitation and the order which is proposed to be passed by this Court the notice to contesting respondent is dispensed with. In the present case, initially a complaint was filed by the respondent no.3 under Section 12 of the Consumer Protection Act which was allowed ex party by order dated 14.5.2008 and thereafter an application for restoration moved by the petitioner on 17.2.2009, was also dismissed as barred by statutory period of limitation by order dated 21.5.2009 passed by opposite party no.1 thereafter the said orders were challenged by the petitioner before opposite party no.2 by way of appeal (Appeal No. 1828 of 2009, Vimal Tewari Vs. Arvind Kumar Gupta) the same was dismissed by order dated 27.10.2009 on the ground that the appeal has been filed by the petitioner at belated stage i.e. after the expiry of the period of limitation as provided under Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act for filing an appeal against the order passed by the District Forum. Arvind Kumar Gupta) the same was dismissed by order dated 27.10.2009 on the ground that the appeal has been filed by the petitioner at belated stage i.e. after the expiry of the period of limitation as provided under Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act for filing an appeal against the order passed by the District Forum. Further while passing the order dated 27.10.2009 dismissing the appeal on the ground of limitation, the opposite party no.2 had also adjudicated and decided the matter after considering and discussing the facts of the case at some length on merit and held that the appellant has got no case on merit, as there was a deficiency in rendering the service on the part of the petitioner in the matter in question so there is no justification to interfere in the order passed by the District Forum. In view of the said facts once the opposite party no.2 has found that the appeal filed by the petitioner was beyond the statutory period of limitation then in that circumstances the action on the part of opposite party no.2 to adjudicate and decide the appeal on merit without calling a response from other side and summoning the records of the court below (District Forum) is an action which is contrary to law. Further, the matter regarding alternative remedy available to the petitioner before the National Commission constituted under the provisions of Consumer protection Act is concerned, as in the present case the order dated 27.10.2009 passed by opposite party no.2 (State Consumer Redressal Commission, Lucknow) is in contravention of principles of natural justice so the alternative remedy is not a bar in order to do justice or to prevent injustice and the present writ petition filed by the petitioner challenging the order dated 27.10.2009 passed by opposite party no.2 is maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in view of the law as laid down by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of M.P. State Agro Industries Development Corporation Ltd. v. Jahan Khan, reported in (2007) 10 SCC 88 has held: "The rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction due to availability of an alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion. In an appropriate case, in spite of the availability of an alternative remedy, a writ court may still exercise its discretionary jurisdiction of judicial review, in at least three contingencies, namely (i) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights; (ii) where there is failure of principles of natural justice; Or (iii) Where the orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. In these circumstances, an alternative remedy does not operate as a bar." Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Rabindra Singh v. Financial Commissioner Co-operation, Punjab and others, reported in (2008) 7 SCC 663 has held: "All Courts in a situation of present nature have the incidental power to set aside an ex-parte order on the ground of violation of the principles of natural justice even in the absence of any express provision, having regard to the principles of natural justice in such a proceedings, the courts will have ample jurisdiction to set aside an ex-parte decree." The above said view has been held by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of M/s Rapti Commission Agency, Lucknow Vs. State of U.P. and another, 2010(28) LCD 161. accordingly the matter in question is decided and adjudicated by me on merit in the instant case. The impugned action on the part of opposite party no.2 thereby dismissing the petitioner's appeal on the ground of limitation is contrary to law as laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in respect to the matter relating to the condonation of delay wherein the Apex Court has consistently held that pragmatic view should be taken and the matter should be heard and disposed of on merit and not on the ground of technicalities. In Shakuntala Devi Jain Vs. Kuntal Kumari, AIR 1969 SC 575 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that unless want bona fides of such inaction or negligence as would deprive a party of the protection of section 5 is proved, the application must not be thrown out of any delay cannot be refused to be condoned. In New India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Smt. Shanti Misra, AIR 1976 SC 237 Hon'ble Supreme Court held that discretion given by section 5 should not be defined or crystallized so as to convert a discretionary matter into a rigid rule of law. In New India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Smt. Shanti Misra, AIR 1976 SC 237 Hon'ble Supreme Court held that discretion given by section 5 should not be defined or crystallized so as to convert a discretionary matter into a rigid rule of law. The expression" sufficient cause" should receive a liberal construction. In O.P. Kathpalia Vs Lakhmir Singh, AIR 1984 SC 1744 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that if the refusal to condone the delay results in grave miscarriage of justice, it would be a ground to condone the delay. In the case of Collector Land Acquisition Vs. Mst. Kati Ji and others,1987(13) ALR 306 (SC) Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:- "The legislator has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting section 5 of the Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable th Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matter on "merits". The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the Legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice - that being the life - purpose of the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that: 1. Ordinarily, a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this; when delay is condoned, the highest that can happen is that a cause would he decided on merit after hearing the parties. 3. "Every " day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational, common sense and pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side can not claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. The doctrine must be applied in a rational, common sense and pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side can not claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact, he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grapped that the judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injsutice and is expected to do so." In Smt. Prabha Vs. Ram Praskash Kalra, 1987 (Suppl.) SCC 338 the Supreme Court took the view that the Court should not adopt an injustice- oriented approach in rejecting the application for condonation of delay. In N. Balakrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy,(1998) 7 SCC 133 the Apex Court explained the scope of limitation and condonation of delay, observing as under: - " The primary function of a Court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The time- limit fixed for approaching the Court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy." In Vedabai alias Vaijayanatabai Baburao Patil Vs. Shantaram Baburao Patil and others, 2001 (44) ALR 577 (SC) the Apex Court made a distinction in delay and inordinate delay observing as under:- " In exercising discretion under section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Courts should adopt a pragmatic approach. A distinction must be made between a case where the delay is inordinate and a case where the delay is of a few days. A distinction must be made between a case where the delay is inordinate and a case where the delay is of a few days. Whereas in the former case the consideration of prejudice to the otherwise will be a relevant factor so the case calls for a more cautious approach....." In view of the above said fact the appeal filed by the petitioner was dismissed by opposite party no.2 vide order dated 27.10.2009 on the ground of limitation is an action which is contrary to principles of natural justice as well as settled proposition of law as stated hereinabove, so the same cannot be sustained and the matter in question requires consideration before the appropriate forum in accordance with law as it is the golden principle of law that justice should not be done but appears to be done and if any action by any authority which prevent justice form being seen to be done is nothing but amounts to any action which is against the fair play and is in violation of principles of natural justice. Further, it is also well settled proposition of law that all the rules of procedure are the handmaid of justice. The language employed by the draftsman of law may be liberal or stringent, but the facts remains that the object of prescribing procedure is to advance the cause of Justice. In an adversarial system, no party should ordinarily be denied the opportunity of participating in the process of justice dispensation. Unless compelled by express and specific language of the Statute, the provisions of the CPC or any other procedural enactment ought not to be construed in a manner which would leave the court helpless to meet extraordinary situations in the ends of justice. The morality of justice at the hands of law troubles of judge's conscience and points an angry interrogation at the law reformer. The processual law so dominates in certain systems as to overpower substantive rights and substantial justice. The humanist rule that procedure should be the handmaid, not the mistress, of legal justice compels consideration of vesting a residuary power in judges of act ex debito justitial where the tragic sequel otherwise would be wholly inequitable- justice is the goal of jurisprudence- processual, as much as substantive. [See Sushil Kumar Sen Vs. The humanist rule that procedure should be the handmaid, not the mistress, of legal justice compels consideration of vesting a residuary power in judges of act ex debito justitial where the tragic sequel otherwise would be wholly inequitable- justice is the goal of jurisprudence- processual, as much as substantive. [See Sushil Kumar Sen Vs. State of Bihar 1975 (1) SCC 774 ] A procedural law should not ordinarily be construed as mandatory, the procedural law is always subservient to and in aid to justice. Any interpretation which eludes or frustrates the recipient of justice is not to be followed. [See Shreenath and Another Vs. Rajesh and others, AIR 1998 SC 1827 ] Processual law is not to be a tyrant but a servant, not an obstruction but an aid to justice. Procedural prescriptions are the handmaid and not the mistress, a lubricant, not a resistant in the administration of justice. Accordingly, I am of the opinion that keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner should be given a liberty/ chance to agitate the matter in question before an appropriate forum for seeking his grievance. For the forgoing reasons, the petition is allowed. The order dated 27.10.2009 passed by the State Consumer Dispute Redressal Commission, Lucknow opposite party no.2 is set aside. The matter is remitted back to the opposite party no.2 to decide afresh on merit after hearing the learned counsel for the parties in accordance with law. No order as to costs.