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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2010 DIGILAW 829 (MP)

Maharani Ushadevi v. State of M. P.

2010-08-13

VINEY MITTAL

body2010
JUDGMENT Viney Mittal, J. 1. The present first appeal has been filed by the plaintiff-Maharani Ushadevi raising a challenge to judgment and decree dated August 17, 2001, passed by the trial Judge, whereby her suit for declaration and permanent injunction has been dismissed. 2. The facts leading to the present controversy, may be noticed. 3. The plaintiff filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction on September 7, 1964 before the trial Court. It was pleaded by her that she is the daughter of Maharaja Yeshwantrao Holkar, who was the erstwhile Ruler of Holkar State. Maharaja Yeshwantrao Holkar having died on December 5, 1961, was succeeded by the plaintiff, being his daughter and the sole heir. Accordingly, she became owner of the entire estate left behind by Maharaja Yeshwantrao Holkar and even became the last Ruler of the Holkar State. According to the plaintiff, her succession to Maharaja Yeshwantrao Holkar was even recognised by the President of India. 4. According to the plaintiff, the land comprised in three Beers, viz. Bijasan, Ashapura and Berchha, and one Ganjihata, were entered in the name of her father Maharaja Yeshwantrao Holkar, as an ordinary tenant. During his lifetime, Maharaja Yeshwantrao Holkar was depositing Tauzi assessment/revenue charges with the treasury of Holkar State. Later on, Holkar State, along with many other erstwhile princely States, was merged with the Dominion of India, and constituted a State of Madhya Bharat. Later on, the State of Madhya Bharat was re-organised and a new State of Madhya Pradesh came into existence. All through, Maharaja Yeshwantrao Holkar, as an ordinary tenant of the aforesaid properties, had been depositing the Tauzi earlier with the treasury of Holkar State, later on, with the Government of Madhya Bharat and, on re-organisation with the State Government of Madhya Pradesh. The plaintiff further pleaded that after the death of her father, she became a lessee of the said land and had been regularly paying the revenue charges/assessment to the State Government. 5. With regard to the land comprised in Mohana Beer, the plaintiff maintained that the said land was a free hold land, owned personally by Maharaja Yeshwantrao Holkar. The same continued to be the personal property of Maharaja Yeshwantrao Holkar, even after the merger of Holkar State with the State of Madhya Bharat, and on re-organisation into the State of Madhya Pradesh. The same continued to be the personal property of Maharaja Yeshwantrao Holkar, even after the merger of Holkar State with the State of Madhya Bharat, and on re-organisation into the State of Madhya Pradesh. Later on, the aforesaid land came to be assessed to land revenue, which was duly deposited, earlier by Maharaja Yeshwantrao Holkar, and later on, by the plaintiff, being their private property. 6. According to the plaintiff, the land comprised in four Beers, viz. Bijasan, Berchha, Ashapura and Mohana, and also of Ganjihata (hereinafter collectively referred to as the land in dispute), were in the jurisdiction and control of the Household Department of Holkar State, and after merger of the Holkar State with Madhya Bharat, as per Article XII of Covenant between Maharaja Yeshwantrao Holkar and Government of India, and as per Item No. 14 of list of private properties, the land in question, being managed by the Household Department, became the exclusive and individual property of father of the plaintiff, Maharaja Yeshwantrao Holkar, who became an absolute owner of the same. 7. The plaintiff pleaded that since the land in question was the private property, and under the ownership of Maharaja Yeshwantrao Holkar, therefore, the State Government of Madhya Bharat, even demanded land revenue qua the said land from him, which was duly deposited. 8. According to the plaintiff, when Holkar State was in existence prior to its merger, then in the year 1945, the work of harvesting the grass from the land in question was, temporarily and on experimental basis, handed over to Army Grass Farms, Indore, for a period of one year. Later on, on disbandment of the aforesaid Army Grass Farms, and as per the requirement of law, the possession of the aforesaid land in question was handed over by the State of Madhya Bharat (all the Beers and Ganji Hata) to Maharaja Yeshwantrao Holkar, through the Chief Administrative Officer, Household Department. The plaintiff specifically pleaded that all through, her father, and later on the plaintiff, had remained in actual physical possession of the land in question, as an owner. 9. The plaintiff specifically pleaded that all through, her father, and later on the plaintiff, had remained in actual physical possession of the land in question, as an owner. 9. The plaintiff raised a grievance that the State Government appears to have passed some orders on May 2, 1964, on the basis of which, the Collector, Indore, had issued a notice on May 15, 1964, requiring the plaintiff to handover the possession of the land in question, on the ground that the State Government had declared the same to be property of the State. According to the plaintiff, there was absolutely no justification for the State Government, or the Collector, to have ever declared the private property of the plaintiff as the State property. She accordingly, sought a declaration in this regard, and also sought a permanent injunction against the State of Madhya Pradesh, which was arrayed as a defendant. 10. The suit was contested by the defendant. Although, the relationship of the plaintiff-Maharani Ushadevi, with her father-Maharaja Yeshwantrao Holkar, was never disputed, nor it was disputed that on his death, the plaintiff had been recognised as the successor of Maharaja, the defendant disputed the ownership of the plaintiff over the suit land. 11. According to the defendant, Maharaja Yeshwantrao Holkar was never the owner of the suit property, and as such the plaintiff had never succeeded to the said property, as a private owner. The defendant maintained that the Beers in question were the property of the Forest Department of Holkar State, and the income therefrom was to be treated as income of Holkar State. According to the defendant, in the year 1922, the Household officer of Holkar State requested that the elephants and horses etc. required grass and therefore, the Bijasan Beer be given to Household Department on settlement of assessment. On August 21, 1926, the Cabinet of Holkar State transferred Bijasan Beer to Household Department. The defendant maintained that in similar fashion, the remaining Beers were also transferred, later on, to the Household Department of Holkar State. At some stage later, the land of Bijasan Beer was again transferred to Forest Department in the year 1930, but yet again, in the year 1943, the said Beer was re-transferred to the Household Department. 12. The defendant maintained that in similar fashion, the remaining Beers were also transferred, later on, to the Household Department of Holkar State. At some stage later, the land of Bijasan Beer was again transferred to Forest Department in the year 1930, but yet again, in the year 1943, the said Beer was re-transferred to the Household Department. 12. According to the defendant, in the year 1945, all Beers and Ganji Hata, were transferred to Army Department of the Holkar State, who was made responsible to supply grass to the Household Department. In the year 1948, the Holkar State, along with various other princely States, merged with the Dominion of India, and formed the State of Madhya Bharat, as per the Covenant dated May 19, 1948, which was later on re-organised as a part of the present State of Madhya Pradesh. The defendant alleged that at the time of merger of Holkar State, the land in question was with the Army Department and therefore, could not be treated to be the private property of Maharaja Yeshwantrao Holkar, and later on that of the plaintiff. The defendant, however, admitted that on May 30, 1951, all four Beers and Ganji Hata were handed over by the Army Grass Farms to the Chief Administrative Officer of the Household Department, but it was maintained that the said return of the land was wrong and unauthorised. 13. Objections with regard to the maintainability of the suit, as well as the jurisdiction of the Court, were also taken. 14. During pendency of the suit, in the year 1979, a new Section 158(2) was inserted in M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959, vide M.P. Act 8 of 1979, with retrospective effect from October 2, 1959. The aforesaid newly added provision provided that a Ruler of an Indian State forming part of the State of Madhya Pradesh, who at the time of coming into force of the Code was holding land or was entitled to hold land by virtue of the Covenant, shall, as from the date of coming into force of the Code, become a Bhumi Swami of such land. 15. On the basis of the detailed pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed twenty issues. The parties were required to lead evidence. 16. 15. On the basis of the detailed pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed twenty issues. The parties were required to lead evidence. 16. The trial Court appreciated the evidence led by the parties, and vide judgment and decree dated March 9, 1992, partly allowed the suit filed by the plaintiff for the entire land comprised in three Beers and Ganji Hata, except the land comprised in Mohana Beer. The plaintiff was declared to be a Bhumi Swami of the land of the aforesaid three Beers and Ganji Hata. However, her claim for Mohana Beer was not accepted. A consequential permanent injunction was also issued against the defendant-State, not to interfere in the possession of the plaintiff over the said land. 17. Two separate appeals were preferred against the aforesaid judgment and decree of the trial Court before this Court. First Appeal No. 148 of 1992 was preferred by the State of M.P. Even the plaintiff filed a first appeal No. 119 of 1992, raising a grievance against the rejection of her claim qua the land of Mohana Beer. Both the aforesaid appeals were taken up together for consideration by a learned Single Judge of this Court on March 24, 2000. The learned Single Judge, in those two appeals, framed four additional issues with regard to the bar of the jurisdiction of the Court, as per Article 363 of the Constitution of India, and as to whether the properties in question fell under Item No. 14 of the list of the private properties. In view of framing of the aforesaid additional issues, vide a judgment dated March 24, 2000, the judgment of the trial Court was set aside and the case was remanded to the trial Court for a fresh adjudication on all the issues, including the issues additionally framed. 18. At this stage, it would be relevant to notice, as follows, the additional issues framed by the learned Single Judge in his judgment dated March 24, 2000, while setting aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court, dated March 9, 1992. 21. Whether in view of bar contained in Article 363 of Constitution the suit is maintainable? 22. 18. At this stage, it would be relevant to notice, as follows, the additional issues framed by the learned Single Judge in his judgment dated March 24, 2000, while setting aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court, dated March 9, 1992. 21. Whether in view of bar contained in Article 363 of Constitution the suit is maintainable? 22. Whether the relief claimed by the plaintiff relate to or/and arise out of any of the provisions of treaty which is entered into by the plaintiffs predecessor in title with the government of India, thereby, attracting the provisions of Article 363, which bars the jurisdiction of all courts in country including civil court? 23. Can the civil court try a dispute of ownership of suit land between ex-Ruler and state and if so, whether the dispute raised by the plaintiff can be said to be a dispute so as to bar the jurisdiction of court by virtue of Article 363 ibid.? 24. Whether suit properties fall under item No. 14 of the list or under any item of this list and if so its effect? 19. After the remand of the case, the trial Court has re- adjudicated the controversy, and has also determined the issues framed by the High Court. Vide judgment and decree dated August 17, 2001, the suit filed by the plaintiff has been dismissed. Besides holding that the suit property was not shown to be the private property of Maharaja Yeshwantrao Holkar, and as such of the plaintiff, the jurisdiction of the Court has been held to be barred under Article 363 of the Constitution of India. 20. It is in these circumstances that the plaintiff has filed the present appeal before this Court. 21. I have heard Shri B.L. Pavecha, learned senior counsel for the appellant and Shri L.N. Soni, learned Additional Advocate General, appearing for the respondent State, at a considerable length. With their able assistance, I have also gone through the record of the case, minutely. In fact, both the parties have presented written arguments in the matter, as well. I have taken into consideration the aforesaid written arguments also. 22. With their able assistance, I have also gone through the record of the case, minutely. In fact, both the parties have presented written arguments in the matter, as well. I have taken into consideration the aforesaid written arguments also. 22. Shri B.L. Pavecha, learned senior counsel for the plaintiff-appellant has argued that the entire approach of the trial Court, in considering the controversy between the parties, is totally erroneous, and even lop-sided, in as much as, the evidence on record clearly reflected that the land of all four Beers, and that of Ganji Hata, was, all through, belonging to Household Department of the Holkar State, and as such, was to be treated as the private property of Maharaja Yeshwantrao Holkar. Shri Pavecha has referred to the pleadings of the defendant itself in the written statement, wherein it had been conceded that the Beers in question, right from the year 1922, had been treated to be that of the Household Department of the Holkar State, and also that defendant has specifically admitted that a resolution was passed by the Cabinet of the Holkar State on August 21, 1926 , that Bijasan Beer had been transferred to Household Department, and that later on, the remaining Beers and the Ganji Hata were also so transferred. On that basis, Shri Pavecha has argued that once, the defendant had conceded that the aforesaid Beers and Ganji Hata were belonging to the Household Department of the Holkar State, then it was not open to the trial Court to have drawn a contrary conclusion, to hold that the land in question was not proved to be the land of Household Department, and as such, the private property of Maharaja Yeshwantrao Holkar. The learned senior counsel has also referred to the document Ex.P-1, dated August 7, 1945, which is an order No. 62 of Huzur Military Shri Shankar. The learned senior counsel maintains that as per the said order, only the management, for the purposes of the harvesting grass, had been handed-over to Army Grass Farms, on experimental basis for a period of one year, but the aforesaid document did not change the actual control and management of the lands in question, which remained with the Household Department. 23. 23. In the aforesaid backdrop, Shri Pavecha has referred to the communication Ex.P-78, which is a communication from the Ministry of States, New Delhi, to Maharaja Yeshwantrao Holkar, and is dated May 7, 1948. In the said communication, Annexure-A a list of private properties of the Maharaja, as per Article 12 of the Covenant governing the Madhya Bharat Union, had been forwarded, as finally approved accepted and signed by the Government of India. My pointed attention has been drawn to Item No. 14 of the aforesaid Annexure-A, being the list of private property of the Maharaja, which indicated all properties under the administrative control of the Household Department of the Holkar State, except excluded therein. Shri Pavecha argues that since the properties in question were clearly proved to be under the administrative control of the Household Department of the Holkar State, at the time of the Covenant, and there was no dispute with regard to the said properties, at any stage, either prior to the Covenant, or even thereafter, the said properties were the private properties of Maharaja Yeshwantrao Holkar, and after his death, that of the plaintiff. 24. A strong reliance has been placed by the learned senior counsel for the plaintiff on the newly inserted provision, Section 158(2) of M.P. Land Revenue Code. Shri Pavecha argues that on account of the fact that the aforesaid properties were held by Maharaja Yeshwantrao Holkar by virtue of the Covenant, the said Ruler is to be treated as having become a Bhumi Swami of the said properties under the provisions of the Code. 25. With regard to the application of Article 363 of the Constitution of India, the learned senior counsel has argued that the said Article had absolutely no application to the controversy in question, in as much as, the plaintiff has claimed her right to the property in question, as a citizen of India, not under the Covenant or under any agreement with the Dominion of India, but has clearly pleaded that she had succeeded to the said property from her father, who had a pre-existing right in the same. Shri Pavecha has referred to the language of Article 363 of the Constitution of India and maintains that a bare perusal of the aforesaid provision would indicate that although the said Article comprises of two limbs, but in the present case, neither the first limb of the said provision, nor the second limb of the same is attracted. In this regard, the learned senior counsel has referred, in-extenso, to the observations made by the Apex Court, in the majority judgment, in the case of Madhav Rao Scindia v. Union of India AIR 1971 SC 530 . According to the learned senior counsel, the trial Court has completely erred in law in misconstruing the provisions of Article 363 of the Constitution of India, and as such has wrongly held that the jurisdiction of the Court, in entertaining the suit filed by the plaintiff, was barred. 26. To elaborate the aforesaid arguments Shri Pavecha has contended that in the present case, the plaintiff is not claiming any right arising out of the Covenant, nor is claiming any right under any provisions of the Constitution of India, relating to any such Covenant or agreement etc, but is merely claiming her title to the suit property, on the basis of the succession from her father, and is primarily aggrieved against an executive order dated May 2, 1964 passed by the State Government, on the basis of which, a notice had been issued by the Collector, Indore, on May 15, 1964, Ex.P-56, whereby the property in question had been declared to be the State property, and the plaintiff had been required to hand over the possession. The learned senior counsel has maintained that since the aforesaid executive order of the State Government or the Collector, had been passed without any justification, and without having any sanction of law, therefore, the suit filed by the plaintiff is clearly maintainable before a civil Court. 27. The aforesaid arguments have been refuted by Shri L.N. Soni, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent-State. Shri Soni has supported the judgment of the trial Court, and has defended all the findings recored by it. 27. The aforesaid arguments have been refuted by Shri L.N. Soni, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent-State. Shri Soni has supported the judgment of the trial Court, and has defended all the findings recored by it. According to the learned senior counsel, neither the properties in question could be treated to be the private properties of Maharaja Yeshwantrao Holkar at the time of the merger of Holkar State with Madhya Bharat State, and therefore, Maharaja Yeshwantrao Holkar could not be treated to have become either the owner or the government tenant of the said properties, nor on that basis the plaintiff could be taken to have succeeded to the said properties. The learned Additional Advocate General has argued that the possession of the property in question had been handed over to the Army Grass Farms on August 31, 1945, through document Ex.P-1, and thereafter, the possession, till the time of the merger, had continued with the aforesaid Army Grass Farms. The learned senior counsel has maintained that on that basis alone, since the Household Department of the Holkar State was not in possession of the said properties at the time of merger with Madhya Bharat, therefore, Item 14 of Annexure-A of Ex.P-78 (list of private properties of Maharaja) would not even be applicable to the properties in question. 28. The learned Additional Advocate General has argued that mere payment of Tauzi by Maharaja Yeshwantrao Holkar to the State of Madhya Bharat, or later on to the State of Madhya Pradesh, and payment of land revenue and other charges by the plaintiff to the State Government, qua the land in question, would be of no consequence, in as much as, the same could not be taken to have crated any rights in the plaintiff. Shri Soni has argued that since the possession of the land in question had wrongly been handed over back to Maharaja Yeshwantrao Holkar, in the year 1951, therefore, the same was required to be returned to the State Government now, when the order Ex.P-56, had been passed by the Collector, Indore, on May 15, 1964, on the basis of the directions of the State Government dated May 2, 1964. 29. 29. With regard to the application of Article 363, the learned Additional Advocate General has argued that the bar contained in Article 363 of the Constitution, is fully attracted to the controversy in question, and the jurisdiction of all Courts, including the civil Court, is barred and as such the trial court has rightly rejected the suit filed by the plaintiff, while upholding the objection raised by the defendant. To support the aforesaid contention, the learned senior counsel has placed reliance upon the judgments of the Apex Court in the cases of Colonel His Highness Sawai Tej Singhji of Alwar v. The Union of India and Anr. AIR 1979 SC 126 ; Draupadi Devi and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. AIR 2004 SC 4684 and Dr. Karan Singh v. State of J&K and Anr. (2004) 5 SCC 698 . According to the learned Senior counsel, as per the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgments, the suit filed by the plaintiff was not maintainable in a Court of law, since the jurisdiction of all Courts was barred. 30. I have given my anxious consideration to the rival contentions of the learned senior counsel for the parties. Besides that, I have also gone through the written arguments presented by the learned Counsel for the parties in the case. I have also perused the relevant record of the case. 31. As noticed above, in the present case, as many as twenty four issues have been framed for adjudication. As a matter of fact, twenty issues had been framed by the trial Court originally in the suit, but later on, four more issues had been framed by the High Court, when the earlier judgment dated March 9, 1992 passed by the trial Court was set aside and the matter was remanded to the trial Court for fresh adjudication. The aforesaid additional issues framed by the High Court have also been noticed in the above portion of the present order. The trial Court, in the impugned judgment, while dismissing the suit, has held that the property in question is not shown to be the private property of Maharaja Yeshwantrao Holkar, nor he could be treated to be a government tenant, and as such the plaintiff has never succeeded to the same, as an owner/Bhumi-Swami. The trial Court, in the impugned judgment, while dismissing the suit, has held that the property in question is not shown to be the private property of Maharaja Yeshwantrao Holkar, nor he could be treated to be a government tenant, and as such the plaintiff has never succeeded to the same, as an owner/Bhumi-Swami. It has also been held that the plaintiff had also never acquired the rights of Bhumi Swami under the provisions of Section 158(2) of M.P. Land Revenue Code. The jurisdiction of civil Court has also been held to be barred under Article 363 of the Constitution of India. 32. On consideration of the entire controversy, in my considered view, primarily, two questions arise for consideration in the present appeal. A. As to whether the property in question could be treated to be the private property of Maharaja Yeshwantrao Holkar, at the time of merger of Holkar State with the State of Madhya Bharat on June 16, 1948? B. Whether the bar contained in Article 363 of the Constitution of India applies to the controversy in question, so as to hold jurisdiction of the Courts as barred? 33. As a matter of fact, all issues, originally framed by the trial Court, or additionally framed by the High Court, in one way or the other, revolve around the aforesaid two questions. Question A. 34. The plaintiff has given the detailed facts indicating that the land in question comprised in Beers, as well as Ganji-Hata, was under the private tenancy of her father- Maharaja Yeshwantrao Holkar, the then Ruler of Holkar State. According to the plaintiff, Maharaja Yeshwantrao Holkar was paying Tauzi qua the land in question of Beers, except Mohana Beer , with the treasury of the Holkar State, till the Holkar State had merged with the State of Madhya Bharat, as per the Covenant dated June 16, 1948. The Covenant is Ex. P-79 on record of the case. As per the said Covenant, a list of private properties of Maharaja was issued by the Government of India. The aforesaid list was sent to Maharaja, as per the communication dated May 7, 1949, Ex.P-78. The list of private properties of Maharaja was appended as Annexure A to the said communication. 35. P-79 on record of the case. As per the said Covenant, a list of private properties of Maharaja was issued by the Government of India. The aforesaid list was sent to Maharaja, as per the communication dated May 7, 1949, Ex.P-78. The list of private properties of Maharaja was appended as Annexure A to the said communication. 35. Through the Covenant, Ex.P-79, dated June 16, 1948, the Rulers of Gwalior, Indore and certain other States in Central India, agreed to form a United State of Gwalior, Indore and Malwa (Madhya Bharat). The erstwhile Princely States were thus merged in the aforesaid new State of Madhya Bharat, forming a part of Dominion of India. Article XII of the Covenant provided that "(1) The Ruler of each Covenanting State shall be entitled to the full ownership, use and enjoyment of all private properties, (as distinct from State properties), belonging to him, on the date of his making over the administration of that State to the Raj Pramukh". Clause (3) of Article XII may be extracted as follows. (3) If any, dispute arises as to whether any item of property is the private property of the Ruler or State property, it shall be referred to the such person as the Government of India may nominate in consultation with the Raj Pramukh and the decision of that person shall be final and binding on all parties concerned. Provided that no such dispute shall be so referrable after the first day of July, 1949. 36. At this stage, it would be relevant to extract the communication dated May 7, 1949, Ex. P-78, addressed by the Ministry of States, New Delhi, to Maharaja Yeshwantrao Holkar as follows: With reference to the inventories of Your Highness' private properties submitted in pursuance of Article XII of the Covenant governing the Madhya Bharat, Union, I send herewith, as Annexure-A to this letter a list of Your Highness' private properties as finally approved accepted and signed in pursuance of the above mentioned Article. The maps mentioned in Annexure-B have not been signed by me but they will be signed after verification by the Government of Madhya Bharat. 37. The said communication Ex.P-78, as reflected therein, was also accompanied by Annexure-A, containing the list of private properties of Maharaja. The maps mentioned in Annexure-B have not been signed by me but they will be signed after verification by the Government of Madhya Bharat. 37. The said communication Ex.P-78, as reflected therein, was also accompanied by Annexure-A, containing the list of private properties of Maharaja. Item No. 14 of Annexure-A may be relevant to be extracted as below: All properties under the administrative control of the Household Department of the Holkar State, except such of the aforementioned property with the Household Department, as has already been transferred to the two guest houses at Indore viz. the one situated in the building which was known as the Indore Hotel and the other is Rajendra Bhawan on the Bombay Agra Road. 38. A perusal of the Covenant clearly indicates that it had clearly provided for private properties (as distinguished from the State properties) to be retained by a covenanting Ruler. It was as a result of the aforesaid Covenant that the communication Ex.P-78 was issued by the Ministry of States, indicating to Maharaja Yeshwantrao Holkar, a list of his private properties. Item 14 of Annexure-A clearly provided that all properties, under the administrative control of Household Department of the Holkar State, except such of the aforementioned property with the Household Department, as had already been transferred to the two guest houses at Indore, were to be treated as the private property of Maharaja Yeshwantrao Holkar. 39. In the aforesaid backdrop, the only question, which arises for consideration is as to whether the property in question, i.e. the lands in four Beers and land of Ganji Hata, could be held to be under the administrative control of the Household Department of the Holkar State or not? 40. The plaintiff has produced PW-5, Harishankar, who was her Private Secretary. In his statement, Harishankar has stated that he had been working with the Holkar State as a Supervisor since the year 1932 and in the year 1947, had been appointed as an Assistant Household Officer, till the year 1960. The said witness has also proved the Tauzi receipts, Ex. P-10 to Ex. P-53, whereby Tauzi had been paid qua the land of all the aforesaid Beers. The aforesaid receipts had been duly signed by the village Patel Umrao Singh. The said witness has clearly stated that he was managing the aforesaid Beers as an Estate Officer. The said witness has also proved the Tauzi receipts, Ex. P-10 to Ex. P-53, whereby Tauzi had been paid qua the land of all the aforesaid Beers. The aforesaid receipts had been duly signed by the village Patel Umrao Singh. The said witness has clearly stated that he was managing the aforesaid Beers as an Estate Officer. The said witness has indicated that the said Beers had been given to Army Grass Farms in the year 1945, but were under the control of Household Department. In the year 1951, the possession of the Beers had been handed over by the Army Grass Farms to Maharaja Yeshwantrao Holkar, and thereafter, till the year 1960, Maharaja Yeshwantrao Holkar was paying Tauzi to the State of Madhya Bharat. 41. PW-7 is one Ganesh, who had been working with Holkar State since the year 1940. He had also been working with the Household Department and has detailed out the history of the land in question. The statement of the said witness is also to the similar effect, as the statement of PW-5. 42. Ex.P-1, is an order of Huzur Military Shri Shankar, dated August 7, 1945, based upon an order of the General Officer Commanding dated March 15, 1945. The said order indicates that His Highness, the Commander-in-Chief, had ordered that with a view to expanding the Army Grass Farms, the Beers "belonging to the Household Department" be taken over by the Army Department, as an experimental measure, for one year, and the requirements of grass for the Household Department be met by the Army Grass Farms Department. Whereas the plaintiff has maintained that the aforesaid order clearly reflected that the Beers in question were belonging to the Household Department and had been merely given for management to Army Grass Farms, on experimental basis for one year, and the actual control always remained with the Household Department, even till the time of merger, the defendant has maintained that the said order clearly reflected that at the time of merger, the lands in dispute were not with Household Department, but with the Army Department. However, in my considered view, the entire reading and interpretation of the said document Ex.P-1, leads to an irresistible conclusion that the land of the Beers in question and Ganji Hata, actually belonged to the Household Department of the Holkar State, but as a temporary measure, and merely on experimental basis, the possession of the same had been handed over to Army Grass Farms, to meet the requirements of the grass of Household Department. Merely because the possession of the said land had been transferred to the Army Grass Farms, for a specific purpose and for a specified time, could not be interpreted to mean that the land in question had ceased to be belonging to Household Department, thereafter. Therefore, it must be inferred that at the time of merger of the Holkar State with the State of Madhya Bharat, as per Covenant, Ex. P-79, and as per Item No. 14 of the list of private properties, Ex. P-78, the land in question was to be treated as under "the administrative control of Household Department" and therefore, had been rightly treated to be the private property of Maharaja Yeshwantrao Holkar. On that basis, Maharaja Yeshwantrao Holkar was required to pay the land revenue, and had even duly paid the same. After his death, his daughter, the present plaintiff, had continued to pay the land revenue and other charges, qua the land in question, being their private property. 43. The defendant has produced D.W.-1 Shri Vankyat Vishwanath, who was, at the relevant time on May 25, 1948, the Chief Secretary to the Government of Madhya Bharat. The said witness has stated that the properties of Indore State were distributed in two parts. One, private property of Maharaja, the other, public property. The aforesaid witness, in his cross-examination, has stated that as per the Covenant, the properties which were under the direct administrative control of Household Department, would be private property of the Maharaja. The said witness has further stated that "It appears from the letter that the Holkar Army transferred some of the Bids to the Household Department. The possession of the Bids was with the Household Department ". According to the said witness "if after the merger, any property was in the list of Household Department, and does not appear in the other list, must belong to the Ruler". 44. The possession of the Bids was with the Household Department ". According to the said witness "if after the merger, any property was in the list of Household Department, and does not appear in the other list, must belong to the Ruler". 44. The pleadings of the defendant in the written statement have already been noticed in the earlier paragraphs of this order. It has been noticed that while denying the claim of the plaintiff, the defendant has itself admitted that the earlier, Beers in question were with the Forest Department of the Holkar State, and the income thereof was treated to be the income of the Holkar State, but in the year 1922, the Household Officer of the Holkar State, requested that for the consumption of elephants and horses etc. of the Household Department, the Bijasan Beer be transferred to Household Department, on settlement of assessment charges. On August 21, 1926, the Cabinet of Holkar State, transferred the Bijasan Beer to the Household Department. The defendant has admitted that similarly the land of other Beers, as well as the Ganji Hata, was transferred to Household Department later on. In the year 1930, according to the defendant, Bijasan Beer was re- transferred, and again in the year 1943, the said land was transferred back to Household Department. Thus, the fact, that the lands in question belonged to Household Department till the year 1945, is not even disputed by the defendant. The only reliance placed by the defendant is upon the order Ex. P-1, whereby for a period of one year, on experimental and temporary basis, the management of the said Beers had been handed over to Army Grass Farms, for supplying the grass to Household Department. In my considered view, the entire evidence led by the plaintiff, clubbed with the stand taken by the defendant in its written statement, leads only to one conclusion that the effective and administrative control of the land in question always, since the year 1926, remained with the Household Department, till the merger of the Holkar State with the State of Madhya Bharat. It was on that account, that the property was to be treated as the private property of Maharaja Yeshwantrao Holkar, and therefore, treating the same to be so, the possession of the same was handed back by Army Grass Farms on May 3, 1951, after the formation of the State of Madhya Bharat. Handing back of the possession by Army Grass Farms of Madhya Bharat Government, on its disbandment, has to be taken to be conformity with the Item 20 of Annexure-A of Ex.P-78, which provided that "the Madhya Bharat Government shall take immediate steps to hand over such of the properties mentioned in the list, as may be with the Madhya Bharat Government to His Highness Maharaja Yeshwantrao Holkar... .". The aforesaid handing back of the possession of the land in question to Household Department, by the Authorities of the Madhya Bharat Government, could not be treated to be unauthorised or illegal, in any manner, as has been maintained by the defendant. Documents in this regard are Exs.P-2 to P-5 on record. 45. As noticed above, Section 158(2) was inserted in M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 with retrospective effect from October 2, 1959. The aforesaid provision may be extracted below for convenience. 158(2) A Ruler of an Indian State forming part of the State of Madhya Pradesh who, at the time of coming into force of this Code, was holding land or was entitled to hold land as such Ruler by virtue of the covenant or agreement entered into by him before the commencement of the Constitution, shall, as from the date of coming into force of this Code, be a Bhumiswami of such land under the Code and shall be subject to all the rights and liabilities conferred and imposed upon a Bhumiswami by or under this Code. 46. Although, the present suit had been filed by the plaintiff in the year 1964, but since the aforesaid provision had become effective with effect from the year 1959, therefore, obviously the benefit of the aforesaid provision had also become available to the plaintiff. 46. Although, the present suit had been filed by the plaintiff in the year 1964, but since the aforesaid provision had become effective with effect from the year 1959, therefore, obviously the benefit of the aforesaid provision had also become available to the plaintiff. In these circumstances, since the plaintiff has been able to prove that her father-Maharaja Yeshwantrao Holkar, a Ruler of an Indian State, at the time of coming into force of the Code in the year 1959, who was holding the land by virtue of the Covenant, was to be treated as having become Bhumi-Swami of the land in question, under the provisions of the Code. Since Maharaja Yeshwantrao Holkar is to be treated as having become Bhumi-Swami of the land in question, prior to his death on December 5, 1961, therefore, the plaintiff being his daughter, and sole heir, obviously has succeeded to the aforesaid rights of Bhumi-Swami, qua the land in question. 47. At this stage, it would be relevant to notice that since the impugned order Ex.P-56, had been passed by the Collector, Indore, on May 15/16, 1964, based upon an order of the State Government dated May 2, 1964, declaring the property in question to be the State property, therefore, the onus of proving that the property in question was infact the State property, and not the private property of the Maharaja, or subsequently of the plaintiff, was upon the defendant- State. The defendant-State was required to lead cogent evidence, indicating the foundation for the aforesaid declaration issued by the State on May 2, 1964, on the basis of which, the notice Ex.P-56 was issued by the Collector, Indore, on May 15/16, 1964. However, no evidence, whatsoever, has been produced by the defendant in this regard. Inspite of a large number of opportunities having been granted by the trial Court to the defendant to produce the list of the State properties, at the time of merger of the Holkar State, the said evidence has not been produced. In these circumstances, an adverse inference is liable to be drawn against the defendant-State. Inspite of a large number of opportunities having been granted by the trial Court to the defendant to produce the list of the State properties, at the time of merger of the Holkar State, the said evidence has not been produced. In these circumstances, an adverse inference is liable to be drawn against the defendant-State. Thus, not only on the basis of the evidence led by the plaintiff, but also on the basis of the aforesaid adverse inference drawn against the defendant, it must be held that the property in question was always treated as the private property of Maharaja Yeshwantrao Holkar, at the time of merger of Holkar State with the State of Madhya Bharat, and therefore, has continued to remain as the private property of Maharaja Yeshwantrao Holkar, duly succeeded to by his daughter, the present plaintiff. 48. Thus, question (A) has to be answered in the aforesaid manner in favour of the plaintiff. Question B 49. Whether or not, the bar contained in Article 363 of the Constitution of India, is attracted to the present case, is the matter for adjudication, at this stage. 50. Article 363 of the Constitution of India is extracted below. 363. Bar to interference by Courts in disputes arising out of certain treaties, agreements, etc.-(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution but subject to the provisions of Article 143, neither the Supreme Court nor any other Court shall have jurisdiction in any dispute arising out of any provision of a treaty, agreement, covenant, engagement, sanad or other similar instrument which was entered into or executed before the commencement of this Constitution by any Ruler of an Indian State and to which the Government of the Dominion of India or any of its predecessor Governments was a party and which has or has been continued in operation after such commencement, or in any dispute in respect of any right accruing under or any liability or obligation arising out of any of the provisions of this Constitution relating to any such treaty, agreement, covenant, engagement, sanad or other similar instrument. (2) In this article- (a) "Indian State" means any territory recognized before the commencement of this Constitution by His Majesty or the Government of the Dominion of India as being such a State; and (b) "Ruler" includes the Prince, Chief or other person recognized before such commencement by His Majesty or the Government of the Dominion of India as the Ruler of any Indian State. 51. The bar contained in Article 363 is absolute in terms, and starts with a non-obstante clause. Any dispute arising out of any provision of a treaty, agreement, covenant engagement, sanad or other similar instrument, which was entered into or executed between a Ruler of an Indian State and the Government of the Dominion of India, cannot be entertained by a Court. Similarly, a dispute in respect of any right accruing under or any liability or obligation arising out of any of the provisions of the Constitution, relating to any such treaty etc. is also barred. In the aforesaid two situations, the jurisdiction of all Courts to entertain any such dispute is barred by the said provision. However, if a controversy arises between the parties, which is not covered under either of the two situations, can it still be held that the Court will have no jurisdiction to entertain the said suit? 52. Article 363 comprises of two parts. The first limb of Article 363 refers to a dispute arising out of the provisions of the Covenant. Under second limb of Article 363, the jurisdiction of the Court is barred, if the dispute is with regard to a right, arising out of a provision of the Constitution, relating to a Covenant. 53. The provisions of Article 363 came up for interpretation before a Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court in Madhav Rao Scindia v. Union of India AIR 1971 SC 530 . By a majority judgment, it was held by the Apex Court that a dispute, that an order of executive body is unauthorised or a legislative measure is ultra vires, is not one arising out of any Covenant, under the first limb of Article 363. The said dispute could also not be treated to be falling under the second limb of Article 363. 54. At this stage, it would be relevant to extract, in detail, certain observations made by the Supreme Court in Madhav Rao Scindia's case (supra). 127. The said dispute could also not be treated to be falling under the second limb of Article 363. 54. At this stage, it would be relevant to extract, in detail, certain observations made by the Supreme Court in Madhav Rao Scindia's case (supra). 127. ...A Ruler seeking to enforce privileges which parliamentary statutes have recognised relies for right to relief upon the mandate of the statutes, and not of the covenant. After extracting the provisions of Article 363, the Supreme Court observed. 128. ...Exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Courts is emphasized by the non obstante clause with which the Article commences. Notwithstanding the investment of jurisdiction upon this Court by Article 32, notwithstanding the jurisdiction conferred upon the High Courts by Article 226, and notwithstanding the competence of all Civil Courts to decide disputes in respect of the obligations of the Union, it is declared that the Courts have no jurisdiction in respect of the two classes of disputes. The exception carved out of the exclusion in respect of the jurisdiction conferred upon this Court by Article 143 is not a real exception for the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 143 is merely advisory. The non obstante clause however, does not enlarge the filed of exclusion of judicial authority. Still further, it was held. 129. ...The Rulers who were before integration of their States aliens qua the dominion Government are now citizens. Their rights and obligations which arose from an act of State are now recognized and accepted by the Union of India. Enforcement of those rights and obligations is governed by the municipal laws, and unless the jurisdiction of the Courts is excluded in respect of any dispute, the Courts will be competent to grant relief. It was further held as follows. 132. Jurisdiction of the Courts in matters specified is excluded not because the Union of India is a successor to the paramountcy of the British Crown, nor because the rights and obligations accepted and recognized by the Constitution may still be regarded as flowing from acts of State; it is only excluded in respect of specific matters by the express provision in Article 363 of the Constitution. Jurisdiction of the courts even in those matters is not barred "at the threshold" as contended by the Attorney General. The President cannot lay down the extent of this Court's jurisdiction. Jurisdiction of the courts even in those matters is not barred "at the threshold" as contended by the Attorney General. The President cannot lay down the extent of this Court's jurisdiction. He is not made by the Constitution the arbiter of the extent of his authority, nor of the validity of his acts. Action of the President is liable to be tested for its validity before the Courts unless their jurisdiction is by express enactment or clear implication barred. To accede to the claim that the jurisdiction of the Court is barred in respect of whatever the executive asserts is valid is plainly to subvert the Rule of Law. It is therefore within the province of the Court alone to determine what the dispute brought before it is, and to determine whether the jurisdiction of the Court is, because it falls within one of the two limbs of Article 363, excluded qua that dispute. 133. In dealing with the dimensions of exclusion of the exercise of judicial power under Article 363, it is necessary to bear in mind certain broad considerations. The proper forum under our Constitution for determining a legal dispute is the Court which is by training and experience, assisted by properly qualified advocates, fitted to perform that task. A provision which purports to exclude the jurisdiction of the Courts in certain matters and to deprived the aggrieved party of the normal remedy will be strictly construed, for it is a principle not to be whittled down that an aggrieved party will not unless the jurisdiction of the Courts is by clear enactment or necessary implication barred, be denied recourse to the Courts for determination of his rights. The Court will interpret a statute as far as possible, agreeably to justice and reason and that in case of two or more interpretation, one which is more reasonable and just will be adopted, for there is always a presumption against the law maker intending injustice and unreason. The Court will avoid imputing to the Legislature an intention to enact a provision which flouts notions of justice and norms of fairplay, unless a contrary intention is manifest from words plain and unambiguous. A provision in a statute will not be construed to defeat its manifest purpose and general values which animate its structure. The Court will avoid imputing to the Legislature an intention to enact a provision which flouts notions of justice and norms of fairplay, unless a contrary intention is manifest from words plain and unambiguous. A provision in a statute will not be construed to defeat its manifest purpose and general values which animate its structure. In an avowedly democratic polity, statutory provisions ensuring the security of fundamental human rights including the right to property will, unless the contrary mandate be precise and unqualified, be construed liberally so as to uphold the right. These rules apply to the interpretation of constitution and statutory provisions alike. 134. Article 366(22) defines a "Ruler" as a Prince, Chief or other person who has entered into a covenant or agreement as is referred to in Article 291, and is recognized for the time being by the President and includes the Successor of such ruler. Article 291 in defining the sum guaranteed or assured to the Ruler as Privy Purse refers to covenants and agreements entered into by the Rulers which guarantee or assure the payment of sums as Privy Purse free from tax. It was contended on behalf of the Union that the expression "relating to" in Article 363 means "referring to", and since Articles 291, 362 and 366(22) refer to covenants, the Courts have no jurisdiction to entertain disputes with respect to rights arising from those provisions. In support of that argument counsel for the Union referred us to the diverse meanings in which the expression "relating to" is used. But a constitutional provision will not be interpreted in the attitude of a lexicographer, with one eye on the provision and the other on the lexicon. The meaning of a word or expression used in the Constitution often is coloured by the context in which it occurs: the simpler and more common the word or expression, the more meanings and shades of meanings it has. It is the duty of the Court to determine in what particular meaning and particular shade of meaning the word or expression was used by the Constitution makers and in discharging the duty the Court will take into account the context in which it occurs, the object to serve which it was used, its collocation, the general congruity with the concept or object it was intended to articulate and a host of other consideration. Above all, the Court will avoid repugnancy with accepted norms of justice and reason. The expression "provisions of this Constitution relating to" in Article 363 means provisions having a dominant and immediate connection with": it does not mean merely having a reference to. A wide meaning of the expression may exclude disputes from the jurisdiction of the Courts in respect of rights or obligations, however indirect or tenuous the connection between the constitutional provision and the covenant may be. 135. Jurisdiction to try a proceeding is barred under the first limb of Article 363 if the dispute arises out of the provision of a covenant: it is barred under the second limb of Article 363 if the Court holds that the dispute is with respect to a right arising out of a provision of the Constitution relating to a covenant. A dispute that an order of an executive body is unauthorised, or a legislature measure is ultra vires, is not one arising out of any covenant under the first limb of Article 363, merely because the order or the measure violates the rights of the citizen which, but for the act or measure, were not in question. The dispute in such a case relates to the validity of the acts or the vires of the measure. Exclusion of the Courts jurisdiction by the terms of the relevant words in the second limb lies in a narrow field. If the constitutional provision relating to a covenant is the source of the right claimed to accrue, or liability claimed to arise, then clearly under the second limb the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain a dispute arising with respect to the right or obligation is barred. We need in the present case express no opinion on the question whether a dispute that an executive act or legislative measure operating upon a right accruing or liability arising out of a provision is invalid falls within the second limb of Article 363. (Emphasis Supplied) 55. In view of the aforesaid law laid down by the Apex Court, it must be held that the jurisdiction of the Court is not barred in respect of the executive orders passed by the State Government, which are not shown to be in accordance with law, in as much as, such an interpretation would lead to a complete subversion of Rule of Law. In these circumstances, it is within the exclusive domain of the Court to determine whether the dispute brought before it falls within one of the two limbs of Article 363. A dispute, which does not fall within the strict parameters of Article 363, cannot be taken to have been excluded from the jurisdiction of the Court. It has also been noticed by the Apex Court that the Rulers, who prior to their integration of their States with the Dominion of India, were sovereign, after the integration, have become citizens of India. Their rights and obligations, as such citizen of India, are recognised by the Constitution, and are enforceable under the provisions of law, before the Courts, competent to try the same. 56. In the present case, the plaintiff has filed the suit, claiming a title to the suit property. She has claimed the aforesaid title, being the daughter and the sole surviving heir to her father-Maharaja Yeshwantrao Holkar. Maharaja Yeshwantrao Holkar was holding the aforesaid property as his private property. While integrating with the State of Madhya Bharat, through the Covenant Ex.P-79, the right of Maharaja Yeshwantrao Holkar to hold the private property was duly recognised, and was even protected. Thereafter a list of private property was issued, vide Ex. P-78. Item No. 14 of Annexure A of Ex.P-78, duly includes the land in question. In these circumstances, it must be held that the claim made by the plaintiff in the present case does not arise from any provision of the Covenant, and is not based thereupon, but in fact, is based upon the pre-existing rights of Maharaja Yeshwantrao Holkar, in the property in question. Thus, it cannot be suggested at all that the dispute falls either under the first limb of Article 363, or is barred under the second limb of Article 363. 57. The property in question was treated to be the private property, on the basis of the aforesaid pre-existing rights, even by the State of Madhya Bharat. Treating the same to be so, the possession of the same was handed over to the Chief Administrative Officer of Household Department of Holkar State in the year 1951. Maharaja Yeshwantrao Holkar was required to pay the land revenue and other charges qua the aforesaid private property. The aforesaid demand was duly met by him. Treating the same to be so, the possession of the same was handed over to the Chief Administrative Officer of Household Department of Holkar State in the year 1951. Maharaja Yeshwantrao Holkar was required to pay the land revenue and other charges qua the aforesaid private property. The aforesaid demand was duly met by him. Therefore, also, it is clear that rather than Maharaja Yeshwantrao Holkar or his successor, the present plaintiff, ever raising a dispute under the Covenant, it is the State Government, who for the first time has raised a claim to the said property in the year 1964. There is no basis, whatsoever, projected by the State Government for the aforesaid claim. A mere executive order, Ex.P-56, passed by the State, cannot be sustained unless it is duly supported on the basis of some authority or provision of law. Moreover, under proviso to Clause 3 of Article XII of the Covenant, no such dispute could have been raised, even by the State, after July 1, 1949. 58. After merger of the Holkar State with the State of Madhya Bharat, Maharaja Yeshwantrao Holkar became a citizen of India, having relinquished his sovereignty. Thereafter the rights of Ruler-ship were abolished by the Constitutional (26th amendment) Act, 1971, with effect from December 28, 1971. Thus, immediately after merger, Maharaja Yeshwantrao Holkar, having become a citizen of India, and later on, through Constitutional amendment having lost all the privileges, even as the erstwhile Ruler, the plaintiff is to be treated as an ordinary citizen of India. Her right to hold private property, as a citizen, is a Constitutional guarantee. By any stretch of imagination, the aforesaid right cannot be denied to her, merely under the garb of Article 363 of the Constitution of India, without following the due process of law. The stand taken by the defendant-State, as accepted by the trial Court, is clearly misconceived and cannot be subscribed to at all. 59. At this stage, it must be noticed that the learned Additional Advocate General has relied upon three judgments of the Apex Court, which have already been noticed above. However, in my considered view, the facts and circumstances of the aforesaid judgments are totally inapplicable to the controversy in question, and do not help the case setup by the defendant at all. 60. In the case of Sawai Tej Singhji v. Union of India and Anr. However, in my considered view, the facts and circumstances of the aforesaid judgments are totally inapplicable to the controversy in question, and do not help the case setup by the defendant at all. 60. In the case of Sawai Tej Singhji v. Union of India and Anr. AIR 1979 SC 126 , the controversy was that the private properties of the erstwhile Ruler had never been finalised at the time of the merger of the State, qua the Dominion of India. Certain claims had been made by Maharaja, claiming certain properties to be his private properties. However, the said claims were kept pending for consideration by the Government of India. Later on, a decision was communicated on September 14, 1949, indicating the final inventory, which did not include the aforesaid private properties. Some objections were raised by Maharaja, which were rejected by the Government of India on December 24, 1959. The aforesaid decision of the Government of India was challenged by Maharaja. It was in those circumstances that the jurisdiction of the Courts was held to be barred under Article 363 of the Constitution of India. 61. However, in the present case, the private properties of Maharaja Yeshwantrao Holkar, having already been finalised at the time of merger, the said judgment of the Apex Court is not even applicable. 62. The next case of Draupadi Devi and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. AIR SC 4684, relied upon by the learned Additional Advocate General, is also not applicable to the present controversy in question. In Draupadi's case, as well, the property in controversy, at no stage, had been declared as a private property of the Ruler. However, even after merger, the Ruler was requesting that the aforesaid property be so declared as his private property. Before the said request could be accepted, the Ruler sold the said property through a private transaction. The transferees, then, claimed the said property to be the private property of the Maharaja and approached the Court. It was in those circumstances that the jurisdiction of the Courts was held to be barred under Article 363 of the Constitution of India. 63. Lastly, the reliance placed by the learned Additional Advocate General on the case of Dr. Karan Singh v. State of J&K and Anr. (2004) 5 SCC 698 is also misplaced. It was in those circumstances that the jurisdiction of the Courts was held to be barred under Article 363 of the Constitution of India. 63. Lastly, the reliance placed by the learned Additional Advocate General on the case of Dr. Karan Singh v. State of J&K and Anr. (2004) 5 SCC 698 is also misplaced. In the aforesaid case, the property in question was never claimed to be the private property by Maharaja Hari Singh, the erstwhile Ruler of J&K State. Maharaja Hari Singh died on April 26, 1961, to be succeeded by Dr. Karan Singh. Ruler-ship was abolished with effect from December 28, 1971, through the Constitutional Amendment Act. The abolition, however, did not affect the ownership of the Rulers of their private property, as distinct from State property. At that stage, a representation was made by Dr. Karan Singh to Government of India to treat certain jeweleries etc. lying in the Toshakhana, to be the private property of Maharaja, and consequently, his private property. The aforesaid claim was rejected by the Government of India on September 24, 1984. It was in these circumstances that the writ petition filed by Dr. Karan Singh was rejected by the High Court, and even the Supreme Court held that the claim made by Dr. Karan Singh was barred under Article 363 of the Constitution. 64. Obviously, the facts and circumstances of the present case, as noticed above, are clearly distinguishable from the facts and circumstances of all the above cases, and therefore, none of the aforesaid cases are applicable to the controversy involved in the present case. 65. The details of the claims made by the plaintiff in the present case, and the facts leading to the controversy, have already been discussed in detail. In my considered view, the bar contained under Article of the Constitution of India is not attracted at all to the suit filed by the plaintiff. The observations made by the Trial Court, that the suit filed by the plaintiff could not be entertained and the jurisdiction of the Court is barred, are apparently erroneous. The aforesaid findings are thus set aside. 66. In these circumstances, Question (B) has also to be answered in favour of the plaintiff-appellant and against the defendant-respondent. It must be held that the jurisdiction of the Court in entertaining the suit filed by the plaintiff is not barred. 67. The aforesaid findings are thus set aside. 66. In these circumstances, Question (B) has also to be answered in favour of the plaintiff-appellant and against the defendant-respondent. It must be held that the jurisdiction of the Court in entertaining the suit filed by the plaintiff is not barred. 67. No other point has been urged. 68. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the present appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree dated August 17, 2001, passed by the trial Court are set aside. As a consequence thereof, the suit filed by the plaintiff, as prayed, is decreed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.