JUDGMENT 1. Being aggrieved by the judgment dated 20.9.2001 passed by IV, ADJ, Mandsaur in Civil Regular Appeal No. 11 A/2001 whereby the judgment dated 4.12.2000 passed by I Civil Judge class-I, Mandsaur in civil suit No. 74-A/96 whereby the suit filed by the appellant for eviction of the respondent was decreed, was set aside the present appeal has been filed. 2. Short facts of the case are that appellant filed a suit for eviction against the respondent on 9.11.94 alleging that appellant is a Trust registered under the provisions of M.P. Public Trust Act. It was alleged that an open piece of land measuring 40x20 ft. was set out by the appellant to the respondent for a sum of Rs. 30/- per month w.e.f. 25.10.88. It was alleged that initially the rent was paid by the respondent for a period of one month on 25.10.88 itself. It was alleged that thereafter no rent is being paid by the respondent inspite of demand dated 3.8.92 which was duly served on the respondent on 4.8.92. It was prayed that decree of eviction be passed. Vide an amendment in the plaint it was also alleged by the appellant that respondent has denied the title of the appellant over the suit property and is alleging that suit property belongs to Municipality which adversely affects the rights of the appellant. 3. The suit was contested by the respondent by filing the written statement wherein the title of the appellant was denied. It was also denied that status of the respondent is of tenant of the appellant. By way of amendment it was alleged in the written statement that suit property is the ancestral property of the respondent. It was alleged that respondent is in occupation oftl1e suit property since last long and name of the respondent is recorded in the Municipal record, Mandsaur. In alternate, it was also alleged that since the suit property belongs to the appellant-Trust, therefore, suit filed by one of the trustees is not maintainable. It was prayed that suit be dismissed. 4. After framing of issues and recording of evidence learned trial Court decreed the suit, against which an appeal was filed which was allowed and decree passed by the learned trial Court was setaside, against which the present appeal has been filed. 5. It was prayed that suit be dismissed. 4. After framing of issues and recording of evidence learned trial Court decreed the suit, against which an appeal was filed which was allowed and decree passed by the learned trial Court was setaside, against which the present appeal has been filed. 5. The appeal was admitted for final hearing on 14.5.2002 on the following substantial question of law : 1.Whether lower Appellate Court was justified in reversing the decree passed by the trial Court which had decreed the suit? 2. Whether finding of the lower Appellate Court that the plaintiff is not competent to file a suit is legally sustainable? 3. Whether the finding with regard to creation of tenancy not being proved is legal and proper? 6. Learned counsel for appellant submits that impugned judgment passed by the learned appellate Court is illegal and deserves to be set aside. Learned counsel submits that suit was filed by Manderam Namdeo Vaishnav Samaj Trust through Hukumchand Bagherwar who was President of the appellant Trust at the relevant time. It is submitted that appellant has produced the resolution Ex. P/2 dated 2.11.95 and Ex. P/3 dated 18.5.94. Ex P/3 is the resolution whereby Jagdish Andhera was authorised by the appellant for taking the steps in the Court proceedings. It is submitted that document Ex.P/3 was duly proved by the appellant by examining Jagdish PW-1. It is submitted that since the suit has been filed by the Trust through one of the Trustees, therefore even if there was no resolution, then too it cannot be said that suit as filed is not maintainable. For this contention reliance is placed on Order XXXI Rule 1 CPC, which reads as under:- Representation of beneficiaries in suits concerning property vested in trustees, etc. -- In all suits concerning property vested in a trustee, executor or administrator, where the contention is between the persons beneficially interested in such property and a third person, the trustee, executor or administrator shall present the persons so interested, and it shall not ordinarily be necessary to make them parties to the suit. But the Court may, if it thinks fit, order them or any of them to be made parties." 7. But the Court may, if it thinks fit, order them or any of them to be made parties." 7. Learned counsel placed reliance on a decision in the matter of Idol Shri v. Gappulal, 1977 JLJ 87, wherein this Court has observed that "a notice to terminate a tenancy need not be given by all the trustees or, to say in other words, it is not necessary that all the trustees must join in issuing the notice of termination of a tenancy. Even in a case where there are more than one trustee who are managing the trust property and these trustees are the landlords of a particular tenant, and if anyone of them is not -willing to continue the tenancy and terminates it, the termination cannot be held to be illegal since others did not join him in that." 8. Reliance is also placed on a decision in the matter of Agrawal Hosiery Shop v. Deity Radhakishan, 1963 MPLJ Note 46, wherein this Court has observed that "Quit notice given by one of the managing trustees of a temple is a valid. All trustees need not be joined as plaintiffs in suit by temple and managing trustees for deity is competent to sue." 9. Learned counsel submits that learned Court below committed error in holding that appellant is not owner of the suit property. It is submitted that since the suit was filed for eviction on the basis of relationship of landlord and tenant, therefore, it was not required to prove the ownership over the land. It is submitted that it is respondent who moved the application wherein it was prayed that suit accommodation be given to the respondent on rent. It is also not disputed by the respondent that rent of one month was deposited by the respondent of which a receipt was given by the appellant. It is submitted that respondent himself has stated that he has stopped payment of rent. It is submitted that in the circumstances there was no justification on the part of learned appellate Court in dismissing the suit filed by the appellant. Learned counsel submits that since the respondent has admitted that accommodation was provided by the appellant, therefore, respondent is estopped from challenging the ownership of the appellant. It is submitted that in the circumstances there was no justification on the part of learned appellate Court in dismissing the suit filed by the appellant. Learned counsel submits that since the respondent has admitted that accommodation was provided by the appellant, therefore, respondent is estopped from challenging the ownership of the appellant. For this contention reliance is placed on a decision of this Court in the matter of Babulal v. Ganpatlal, 2005 (1) MPACJ 34 wherein this Court observed that defendant had admitted that he is tenant in suit premises and it is proved that the respondent plaintiff is the landlord. It was held that tenant cannot challenge the ownership of his lessor, therefore, tenant is estopped from challenging the title of the lessor during the continuation of the tenancy." 10. Learned counsel for appellant further submits that learned appellate Court committed error in decreeing the suit on the basis of evidence which was recorded, which is against the pleadings. It is submitted that no such evidence can be looked into by the Court which is contrary to the pleadings. For this contention, reliance is placed on a decision of Hon. Apex Court in the matter of Mrs. Om Prabha Jain v. Abnash Chand, AIR 1968 SC 1083 wherein it was held that "The ordinary rule of Jaw is that evidence is to be given only on a plea properly raised and not in contradiction of the plea." Reliance is also placed oil a decision in the matter of State of West Bengal v. M/r Fakir Mohammad, AIR 1977 Calcutta 29, wherein Calcutta High Court in a case where there was variance between pleadings and proof, held that "Petitioner cannot be allowed to adduce evidence for setting up a case inconsistent with one alleged in pleadings." 11. Learned counsel for appellant further submits that position of a trustee is of a co-owner and position of law is well settled that co-owner has a right to file the suit on his behalf and also on behalf of others. Learned counsel for appellant further submits that position of a trustee is of a co-owner and position of law is well settled that co-owner has a right to file the suit on his behalf and also on behalf of others. For this contention, reliance is placed on a decision of Hon. apex Court in the matter of Pal Singh v. Sunder Singh, AIR 1989 SC 758 wherein in a suit filed by only one of co-owners and others co-owners not objecting to claim of eviction, the Hon 'ble Apex Court held that "suit tiled by co-owner is maintainable." Reliance in also placed on a Full Bench decision of this Court in the matter of Harbans Singh v. Smt. Margrat G. Bhingardive, 1990 JLJ 97 = 1990 MPLJ 112 wherein the eviction petition was filed by widow alone through co-owner along with others on ground of her bona fide need or joint need along with married sons and children who were members of her family. A Full Bench of this Court held that such an application would be incompetent. In the matter of Gangadhar v. Smt. Ramrati Bai 1990 (II) MPWN 149, this Court has held that "co-landlord need not be impleaded." Lastly reliance was placed on a decision in the matter of Smt. Kanta Goel v. B.P. Pathak, AIR 1977 SC 1599 , wherein this Court held that "one co-heir of deceased landlord can sue for eviction in absence of other co-heirs who have no objection." 12. On the strength of aforesaid position of law, learned counsel submits that appeal be allowed and impugned judgment passed by the learned appellate Court be set aside and the judgment passed by learned trial Court be restored. 13. Learned counsel for respondent submits that no illegality has been committed by the learned Court below in allowing the appeal and in setting aside the judgment passed by the trial Court. It is submitted that suit property belongs to the Municipality and lease deed was executed in favour of respondent. It is submitted that since the appellant has failed to prove its title, therefore, learned appellate Court has rightly dismissed the suit filed by the appellant. Learned counsel further submits that suit was filed by one of the trustees alleging himself authorised to file the suit on the basis of resolution Ex. P/3. From perusal of Ex. It is submitted that since the appellant has failed to prove its title, therefore, learned appellate Court has rightly dismissed the suit filed by the appellant. Learned counsel further submits that suit was filed by one of the trustees alleging himself authorised to file the suit on the basis of resolution Ex. P/3. From perusal of Ex. P/3, it can be seen by naked eyes that resolution has been inserted by interpolation. It is submitted that since the trustees have not been impleaded as party to the suit, therefore the suit filed by one of the trustees is not maintainable because no authorisation has been proved in his favour. For this contention reliance is placed on a decision in the matter of Laxman Prasad v. Shri Dea Janaki Raman, 1973 JLJ 904 wherein the Division Bench of this Court has held that "Where a temple where an idol is installed is registered, together with its endowed properties, as a public trust under the Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act, 1951, the suit must be brought in the name of the idol. by all the trustees acting together. However, such a suit may be brought by one trustee with the sanction and approval of other trustees. But sanction or approval must be strictly proved." 14. It is submitted that in the facts and circumstances, no illegality has been committed by the learned appellate Court in dismissing the suit. 15. From perusal of record, it is evident that suit was filed by Manderam Yaishnav Samaj Trust through Hukmichand Bagherwal, President of the trust. To prove the facts stated in the plaint. the appellant has produced documentary evidence EX.P/1 which is the order dated 20.8.97 passed by Registrar, Public Trust, Mandsaur, whereby the appellant-trust was registered as public trust. Ex. P/2 is the proceedings of the trust dated 2.11.95 whereby Jagdish Andhera was elected as President. Ex. P/3 is the resolution dated 18.5.94. Resolution No.8 which was passed on 25.5.94 reads as under: ** U;k;ky; ds izdj.kksa esa loZlEefr ls Jh txnh'k th vU/ksjk dks vko';d dk;Zokgh djus dk vf/kdkj iwoZ dh Hkafr ;Fkkor vf/kdkj izkIr gksxsa** 16. Ex. P/4 is the application dated 20.1.1985 which has been submitted by the respondent whereby the respondent has prayed the appellant-trust to allot a piece of land for raising construction of residential accommodation. Ex. P/3 is the rent receipt whereby rent of Rs. Ex. P/4 is the application dated 20.1.1985 which has been submitted by the respondent whereby the respondent has prayed the appellant-trust to allot a piece of land for raising construction of residential accommodation. Ex. P/3 is the rent receipt whereby rent of Rs. 30/- was paid by the respondent to the appellant. Ex. P/6 is the notice dated 3.8.92 and Ex. P/7 is the acknowledgment. Apart from this. in evidence appellant has examined Jagdish as PW-1. Respondent has filed document Ex. Oil on the basis of which it is claimed that land is given to the respondent on lease. Ex. D/2 is the spot map. Ex. D/3 is the record of the Municipality, Mandsaur wherein the suit property is shown as property owned by Municipal Council Mandsaur. Ex. D/6 is the reply. Apart from this, respondent has examined himself as DW-1. 17. In the matter of Laxn/mzprasad v. Dca J. Raman (supra), the Division Bench of this Court has taken into consideration the law laid down in the matter of Agrawal Hosiery Shop (supra) held that "taking a view to the contrary must be overruled as not laying down good law. It was also observed by the division Bench that in their opinion anyone of the trustees without reference to the other trustees, may maintain a suit in the name of the idol or in invoking Order XXXI, rule 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure which, in terms, are not applicable to a suit of this kind. It was also observed that rule 1 deals with a suit between the beneficiaries and a third person while rule 2 pertains to a suit against the trustees. The Division Bench also observed the correct legal position which reads as under :- "When a temple where an idol is installed is registered, together with its endowed properties, as a public trust under the Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act, 1951, the suit must be brought in the name of the idol, by all the trustees acting together. However, such a suit may be brought by one trustees with the sanction and approval of his co-trustees. But sanction or approval must be strictly proved." 18. However, such a suit may be brought by one trustees with the sanction and approval of his co-trustees. But sanction or approval must be strictly proved." 18. In view of the aforesaid position of law, it is clear that suit must be brought in the name of the Trust and suit can be brought by one of the Trustees with the sanction and approval of co-trustees and sanction and approval is required to be proved strictly. It is true that in para-6 of its judgment, the Hon. Division Bench has observed that "When there are more she baits than one, they constitute one body, in the eye of law, and all of them must act together. The management of the trust properties may be for practical purposes, in the hands of one of the she baits who is called the managing she bait or the she baits themselves may exercise their right of management by trusts, but in neither case it is competent for one of the she baits to do anything in relation to the Debutter estate without the concurrence either express or implied by his co-she baits. 19. In the present case the suit was filed by the appellant-Trust through its President Hukumchand Bagherwar. In para-1 of the plaint it is mentioned that President is having a right to file the suit but no documentary evidence is filed to show such authority. On the contrary, the resolution is filed which is dated 25.5.94 i.e. after filing of the suit and in that resolution one Jagdish Andhera was authorised to take part in the pending litigations. Learned appellate Court has made certain observations about the document Ex. P/3 to the effect that ink of resolution No.8 whereby Jagdish Andhera has been authorised is in a different colour. It has also been observed that resolution No.8 has been mentioned in a small place which was left over. Since the findings recorded by the learned appellate Court regarding the document Ex. P/3 are the findings of fact, therefore this Court is not required to interfere into it. There is nothing on record to show that President of appellate-trust was having the implied authority to file the suit, therefore, it cannot be said that suit was rightly filed by the President of the Trust. P/3 are the findings of fact, therefore this Court is not required to interfere into it. There is nothing on record to show that President of appellate-trust was having the implied authority to file the suit, therefore, it cannot be said that suit was rightly filed by the President of the Trust. So far as the law as cited by the learned counsel for appellant relating to co-owner is concerned, that is all together different. In that case each of the co-owner is having the ownership right over the suit property, while in the trust property, no trustee is having personal interest in the trust property. In the facts and circumstances of the case it is always preferable to have a resolution of the Trust which is being passed by the trustees thereby authorising one not two of the trustees to take steps in the Court of law. 20. Coming on merits, the appellant has placed reliance on document EX.P/4 and P/5 on the basis of which the appellant is claiming relationship of landlord and tenant. Ex. P/4 is the application submitted by the respondent wherein it is stated that an open piece of land is lying for residential purpose. It is further stated that respondent also intends to construct the house, therefore he may also be allotted a piece of land. In the said application it is nowhere stated that respondent wants to take the land on rent. Ex. P/5 is the receipt which is alleged to have been issued by the appellant-trust in favour of the respondent. In the said receipt it is mentioned that a sum of Rs. 30/- is being paid as advance. On the basis of these two documents, it cannot be said that respondent was tenant of the appellant -trust. 21. In the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is of the view that no illegality has been committed by the learned appellate Court in reversing the decree passed by the learned trial Court which had decreed the suit. This Court is also of the view that learned appellate Court has rightly held that suit filed by the appellant was not maintainable. 22. In view of this, the appeal has no force and is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs.