Judgment Ranjit Singh, J. 1 The respondent, Ajit Singh, while working as Conductor in Punjab Roadways, Tarn Taran, was placed under suspension and subsequently terminated from services on 01.08.1978. The charge against him for which the charge sheet under the Punjab Civil Services- (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1970 (hereinafter referred to as Rules) was served appears to be that he had committed some misconduct while performing his duties as Conductor. In the suit filed, the respondent pleaded that the allegations are frivolous and were made by checking party. He denied the same in its entirety, He also pleaded that the charge sheet was defective and was not prepared in accordance with the rules and was vague and indefinite. Further plea was that respondent-plaintiff was not supplied copies of the reports and other documents relied upon by the Department. Even competency of the Inquiry Officer was also challenged, stating that he was not competent to hold the inquiry. Plea also was that the respondent-plaintiff was not allowed to cross examine the prosecution witnesses and was also not allowed to produce defence witnesses. It is pleaded that the respondent-plaintiff wanted to examine himself as witness, which was not permitted. Despite this, the Inquiry Officer had partly exonerated the respondent-plaintiff and had held him guilty partly only. It is thus stated that the findings were perverse and were based on the surmises. Even the challenge was made to the show cause notice issued to the respondent, to which he had submitted the reply. Grievance also is made that the impugned order is not a speaking one and does not give out any reason as to why the services of the respondent was terminated. 2 The appellant contesting the suit and raised an objection to the jurisdiction of the civil Court to decide the civil suit. The other allegation made in the suit was also disputed and was also prayed that the order was illegal, void or without jurisdiction in any manner. Trial proceeded on following two issues: "1. Whether the impugned order dated 1.8.1978 passed by the General Manager, Punjab Roadways Tarn Taran is illegal, ultravires, cryptic without jurisdiction etc. and is, therefore, null and void? OPP 2. Whether this court has got no jurisdiction to try this suit? OPD 3. Trial proceeded on following two issues: "1. Whether the impugned order dated 1.8.1978 passed by the General Manager, Punjab Roadways Tarn Taran is illegal, ultravires, cryptic without jurisdiction etc. and is, therefore, null and void? OPP 2. Whether this court has got no jurisdiction to try this suit? OPD 3. Relief." 3 The appellant did not press the second issue in regard to the jurisdiction of the civil Court and accordingly the same was dismissed as not pressed. The appellate Court confirmed this finding accordingly. However, issue No.l was decided against the respondent-plaintiff and his suit was dismissed. He had accordingly filed an appeal against the same before the First Appellate Court, where it was pleaded that while issuing show cause notice to the respondent-plaintiff for his removal from service, the necessary formalities were not complied with. Plea was that while issuing show cause notice, tentative view or the proposed punishment was not expressed. His past record was also taken into consideration for which he was given no opportunity to explain. It was pleaded that punishing authority had recorded the finding on basis of some charges, for which the respondent had been exonerated. While issuing show cause notice, the view expressed by the punishing authority as contained in the show cause notice reads as under.- "The conductor be issued final notice for termination alongwith previous punishment imposed on him. However, 1 do not fully agree to the finding of the E.O." 4 From this, it was emphasized that the punishing authority had not formed any tentative opinion but had decided to remove the respondent-plaintiff from service. Reference is also made to Rule 9 (4)(l)(a) of the Punjab Civil Services Rules, which provides that, in case penalties as contained in clauses (v) to (ix) of Rule 5 are to be imposed then the delinquent employee is required to be supplied all documents alongwith some brief reasons for its disagreement, if any, with the finding of the Inquiry Officer. On this basis, it is pointed out that the punishing authority had only mentioned that he did not fully agree with the findings of the Inquiry Officer, and issued a final notice of termination, without giving any reason for disagreement and giving an opportunity to the respondent-plaintiff to contest the same. On this basis, it is pointed out that the punishing authority had only mentioned that he did not fully agree with the findings of the Inquiry Officer, and issued a final notice of termination, without giving any reason for disagreement and giving an opportunity to the respondent-plaintiff to contest the same. 5 The Inquiry Officer infact had come to the conclusion that the charge regarding receipt of an amount of Rs,7.05p was not proved. In the termination order, there is no indication that respondent-plaintiff was exonerated of this charge and that this fact was kept in view while directing his removal from service. Rather the order would show that it was observed that the Inquiry Officer had held the respondent-plaintiff guilty of all the charges. The submission accordingly is that the punishing authority did not apply its mind to the facts and circumstances of the case, while passing the impugned order of termination. Reference is made to the law laid down in the case of Narayan Misra v. State. of Orissa 1969 S.L.R 657 S.C., where it is observed that when there are several charges against the delinquent official and he is acquitted of some and found guilty of others and where the punishing authority differs with the finding of the Inquiry Officer, the notice or opportunity is required to be given to the delinquent official about this view of the punishing authority. It was also held that if no such notice or opportunity is given, the order of punishment like removal is liable to be set aside, being violative of principles of natural justice and fair play. 6 Even on the aspect of taking into consideration the previous record of the respondent-plaintiff, it is observed that the punishing authority indeed took the same into consideration but it was not brought to the notice of the respondent-plaintiff in the show cause notice issued. Rather it was noticed that the show cause notice issued was cyclostyled document and thus would reveal non application of mind and would indicate that it was issued mechanically. So much so that even the year of the order cyclostyled in the show cause notice was changed from 1977 to 1978. Taking this aspect into consideration, it was held that there was violation of statutory and mandatory requirement. 7 It has rightly been observed that punishing authority had not acted in accordance with the mandatory rules. So much so that even the year of the order cyclostyled in the show cause notice was changed from 1977 to 1978. Taking this aspect into consideration, it was held that there was violation of statutory and mandatory requirement. 7 It has rightly been observed that punishing authority had not acted in accordance with the mandatory rules. The mandatory provisions contained in the Rules and the order of punishment passed on 1.8.1978, terminating the services of the respondent plaintiff was set aside. The issue was accordingly decided. The appeal was accepted and the decree passed by the trial Court was set aside. As a result, the suit was decreed. v 8 Learned State counsel has not been able to point out any substantial question of law, in view of the facts noticed above. In fact, no substantial question has been formulated, though the Regular Second Appeal was admitted in the year 1985. With the passage of time, it will not also be fair now to interfere in the order, which is otherwise just and reasonable. 9 The Regular Second Appeal is accordingly dismissed. Appeal dismissed.