ORDER Sanjay Yadav, J. 1. This order shall lead to final disposal of W.P. No. 5329/1999 and W.P. No. 5356/1999, wherein the issue raised for adjudication is common. 2. The issue is as to whether the Respondents are justified in their action in denying the benefit of commutation of pension because of an amendment in Jawaharlal Nehru Krishi Vishwa Vidyalaya, Additional Statutes (hereafter shall be referred to as 'Statutes') made effective from a retrospective date. 3. The Statute was enacted in pursuance to the provisions contained under Sub-section (1) of Section 37 of the Jawaharlal Nehru Krishi Vishwavidyalaya Adhiniyam, 1963, providing payment of pension and other non-effective benefits to its employees retiring after 1-4-1987. Para 1.1 of the Statute provided for that "the pension, gratuity, family pension and commutation of pension admissible to the Government servants of Madhya Pradesh, under the Madhya Pradesh Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1976 and the M.P. Civil Pension (Commutation) Rules, 1976 as amended from time to time may be made applicable to the officers, teachers and service personnel other than Chancellor and Vice Chancellor with effect from 1-4-1987". 4. A proviso was added to the aforesaid clause by the Board of Management, Jawaharlal Nehru Krishi Vishwavidyalaya in exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-section (2) of Section 37 of the Adhiniyam, 1963 to the following effect: Provided that the benefit of commutation of pension will be admissible only to those employees of the Vishwa Vidyalaya who retire on or after 1-1-1995. The cases already decided otherwise shall neither be reopened nor quoted as proceedings in other cases. The said decision of the Board was implemented vide notification dated 30-11-1999 and was made effective from a retrospective dated, i.e., 1-1-1995. 5. It is the retrospectively of the applicability of the proviso which deprived the Petitioners herein from the benefit of commutation of pension. 6. The Petitioner in W.P. No. 5329/1999 was in service with Respondent No. 1 and retired on attaining the age of superannuation w.e.f. 1-4-1987 and, as urged, was paid other dues but has been denied the benefit of commutation of pension. Similarly, the Petitioner in W.P. No. 5356/1999 retired on attaining the age of superannuation on 30-4-1994 and was deprived of the benefit of commutation of pension because of the said amendment. 7. Similarly, the Petitioner in W.P. No. 5356/1999 retired on attaining the age of superannuation on 30-4-1994 and was deprived of the benefit of commutation of pension because of the said amendment. 7. The Board as evident drew its powers from Sub-section (2) of Section 37 of the Adhiniyam, 1963, which stipulates: (2) The Board may from time to time make new or additional Statutes may amend or repeal the Statutes in the manner hereinafter in this section provided. 8. The Board was thus exercising the powers delegated to it by the Legislature. The question, therefore, which crops up for consideration is whether a delegatee is empowered to effect an amendment in a Statute from a retrospective date. 9. The law is trite on the issue. In The Income Tax Officer Alleppey v. M.C. Ponnoose and Ors. AIR 1970 SC 385 , Their Lordships were pleased to observe: Where any rule or regulation is made by any person or authority to whom such powers have been delegated by the Legislature it may or may not be possible to make the same so as to give retrospective operation. It will depend on the language employed in the statutory provisions which may in express terms or by necessary implication empower the authority concerned to make a rule or regulation with retrospective effect. But where no such language is to be found it has been held by the Courts that the person or authority exercising subordinate Legislative functions cannot make a rule, regulation or bye-law which can operate with retrospective effect [See Subba Rao, J., in Dr. Indramani Pyarelal Gupta v. W.R. Nathu (1963) 1 SCR 721 : AIR 1963 SC 274 ], the majority not having expressed any different opinion on the point; Modi Food Products Ltd. v. Commr. of Sales Tax U.P. AIR 1956 All 35 ; India Sugar Refineries Ltd. v. State of Mysore AIR 1960 Mys 326 and General S. Shivdev Singh v. The State of Punjab (1959) 61 Punj LR 514 : AIR 1959 P&H 453 . In Sri Vijayalakshmi Rice Mills New Contractors Co. etc. and Anr. v. State of A.P. AIR 1976 SC 1471 , it was observed by Their Lordships: 5. Mr. In Sri Vijayalakshmi Rice Mills New Contractors Co. etc. and Anr. v. State of A.P. AIR 1976 SC 1471 , it was observed by Their Lordships: 5. Mr. Nariman appearing on behalf of the Appellants has laid great emphasis on the word "substituted" occurring in Clause 2 of the Rice (Andhra Pradesh) Price Control (Third Amendment) Order, 1964, and has urged that the claim of the Appellants cannot be validly ignored. Elaborating his submission, Counsel has contended that as the prices fixed by the Government are meant for the entire season, the Appellants have to be paid at the controlled price as fixed vide the Rice (Andhra Pradesh) Price Control (Third Amendment) Order, 1964, regardless of the dates on which the supplies were made. We cannot accede to this contention. It is no doubt true that the literal meaning of the word "substitute" is 'to replace' but the question before us is from which date the substitution or replacement of the new Schedule took effect. There is no deeming clause or some such provision in the Rice (Andhra Pradesh) Price Control (Third Amendment) Order, 1964, to indicate that it was intended to have a retrospective effect. It is a well recognized rule of interpretation that in the absence of express words or appropriate language from which retrospectivity may be inferred, a notification takes effect from the date it is issued and not from any prior date. The principle is also well settled that Statutes should not be construed so as to create new disabilities or obligations or impose new duties in respect of transactions which were complete at the time the Amending Act came into force. [See Nani Gopal Mitra v. State of Bihar (1969) 2 SCR 411 : AIR 1970 SC 1636 ]. In Chairman Railway Board and Ors. v. C.R. Rangadhamaiah and Ors. AIR 1997 SC 3829, it was observed by Their Lordships: 20. [See Nani Gopal Mitra v. State of Bihar (1969) 2 SCR 411 : AIR 1970 SC 1636 ]. In Chairman Railway Board and Ors. v. C.R. Rangadhamaiah and Ors. AIR 1997 SC 3829, it was observed by Their Lordships: 20. It can, therefore, be said that a rule which operates in future so as to govern future rights of those already in service cannot be assailed on the ground of retrospectivity as being violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, but a rule which seeks to reverse from an anterior date of a benefit which has been granted or availed, e.g., promotion or pay scale, can be assailed as being violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution to the extent it operates retrospectively. 31. The Respondents in these cases are employees who had retired after January 1, 1973 and before December 5, 1988. As per Rule 2301 of the Indian Railway Establishment Code they are entitled to have their pension computed in accordance with Rule 2544 as it stood at the time of their retirement. At that time the said rule prescribed that Running Allowance limited to a maximum of 75% of the other emoluments should be taken into account for the purpose of calculation of average emoluments for computation of pension and other retiral benefits. The said right of the Respondents-employees to have their pension computed on the basis of their average emoluments being thus calculated is being taken away by the amendments introduced in Rule 2544 by the impugned notifications dated December 5, 1988 inasmuch as the maximum limit has been reduced from 75% to 45% for the period from January 1, 1973 to March 31, 1979 and to 55% from April 1, 1979 onwards. As a result the amount of pension payable to the Respondents in accordance with the rules which were in force at the time of their retirement has been reduced. 34. As a result the amount of pension payable to the Respondents in accordance with the rules which were in force at the time of their retirement has been reduced. 34. Apart from being violative of the rights then available under Articles 31(1) and 19(1)(f), the impugned amendment, insofar as they have been given retrospective operation, are also violative of the rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution on the ground that they are unreasonable and arbitrary since the said amendments in Rule 2544 have the effect of reducing the amount of pension that had become payable to employees who had already retired from service on the date of issuance of the impugned notifications, as per the provisions contained in Rule 2544 that were in force at the time of their retirement. 35....... The Full Bench of the Tribunal has, in our opinion, rightly taken the view that the amendments that were made in Rule 2544 by the impugned notifications dated December 5, 1988, to the extent the said amendments have been given retrospective effect so as to reduce the maximum limit from 75% to 45% in respect of the period from January 1, 1973 to March 31, 1979 and reduce it to 55% in respect of the period from April 1, 1979, are unreasonable and arbitrary and are violative of the rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. In Bejgam Veeranna Venkata Narasimloo v. State of A.P. and Ors. AIR 1998 SC 542 , Their Lordships of the Apex Court were pleased to observe: 17. The High Court was of the view that merely because a subordinate Legislation was given effect to from an anterior date, it cannot be treated as a piece of retrospective subordinate legislation. It was held that a subordinate Legislation can be said to be retrospective only when it took away or impaired any vested right acquired under existing laws or created new obligations or imposed a new duty or attached a new disability in respect to transactions or considerations already past. Reliance was placed upon Craies on Statute Law, 6th Edition p. 386. Reliance was placed upon Craies on Statute Law, 6th Edition p. 386. It was held that by notification dated 24-2-1977, the Government did not reduce in any way the price legally payable to the Appellants because there was no such price in existence nor did it alter in any way the legal rights of the Appellants with regard to their sales for the second year. 18. We are unable to follow how the High Court could come to the conclusion that the vested right of the Appellants had not been disturbed in any way by the subordinate Legislation. Rice has been sold under a procurement order and a right to be paid in terms of that order had accrued to the seller as soon as sale of rice was effected. As a matter of fact, the FCI did pay the Appellants the price for the rice purchased. If a portion of the price paid by the FCI is taken away, the Appellants will be prejudicially affected. They not only had acquired a vested right to be paid but actually received payment for the rice sold. If the rice was delivered without any valid procurement order, the sellers were entitled to be paid at the market rate in terms of Section 70 of the Contract Act. The retrospective subordinate Legislation has tried to take away a portion of the money the Appellants had lawfully obtained. 10. When the case at hand is examined on the touchstone of the law as above, it is amply clear that the exercise of power by the Board in pursuance to the provisions contained under Sub-section (2) of Section 37 which may from time to time make new or additional Statutes and may amend or repeal the Statutes in the manner provided in the aforesaid Section is indicative of the fact that the Board is not donned with the power to amend or repeal the Statute from retrospective date taking away the accrued or vested right of an employee. 11. This lead to another aspect of the matter. 11. This lead to another aspect of the matter. Pursuant to Para 1.1 of the Statute, 1989, a right accrued in favour of an employee to draw benefit under M.P. Civil Pensions (Commutation) Rules, 1976 and the right having accrued in favour of the Petitioner to reap benefit under the said Rule cannot be taken away retrospectively as has been done by Respondents by issuing a notification dated 30-11-1999 from a retrospective date. The judgment relied upon by the Respondents, i.e., Rao Somashekara v. State of Karnataka AIR 1998 SC 97 and State of Punjab and Ors. v. Amar Nath Goyal and Ors. (2005) 6 SCC 754 , is of no aid to the Respondents. The case of Rao Somashekara (supra), was pertaining to fixing of cut off date by State of Karnataka for implementing the report of Justice Tukol Commission which recommended for removal of pay scales' disparity which arose out of State Organization between teachers in the erstwhile State and the teachers in allotted State. In the context, Their Lordships were pleased to observe: 12. We are of the view that the State Government had before it the report of the Commission and on that basis it took a decision that the disparities should stand eliminated prospectively from 1-1-1970 and not retrospectively from 1-1-1957. The question as to whether the date from which the scales ought to have been equated should be 1-1-1970 or an anterior or a later date was a matter which had to be arrived at by taking all factors into account. It will be difficult for this Court to decide as to from what date the continuance of the existing scales should be treated as discriminatory or the continuance would loose its temporary character arising out of Section 119 of the States Reorganisation Act. It may be that the State of Karnataka felt that the grievance of the non-allotted primary school teachers whose salaries were lesser than the salaries of non-allotted Secondary School teachers was a matter of graver concern requiring redressal even as late as 1979 or 1986. Merely because the grievances of non-allotted primary teachers were remedied even after considerable lapse of time, we cannot say that grievances of secondary school teachers - even if it was late - should have also been redressed for the period 1-1-1957 to 31-12-1969. Above all, the financial burden involved was also matter of relevant consideration. Merely because the grievances of non-allotted primary teachers were remedied even after considerable lapse of time, we cannot say that grievances of secondary school teachers - even if it was late - should have also been redressed for the period 1-1-1957 to 31-12-1969. Above all, the financial burden involved was also matter of relevant consideration. We are not therefore inclined to hold that the cut-off date of 1-1-1970 fixed after the report of Justice Tukol Commission, in regard to Secondary School Teachers, is arbitrary or violative of Article 14. In any event, principle of laches applies equally to applications under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, Rabindra Nath v. Union of India (UOI) (1970) 2 SCR 697 : AIR 1970 SC 479 . Thus, the principle of law laid down in Rao Somashekara (supra), being in different set of facts are not attracted in the present case at hand. 12. Similarly in the matter of Amar Nath Goyal (supra), the issue pertained to financial constraint leading to fixation of cut off date of increased quantum of death-cum-retirement gratuity. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of State Government in fixing a cut off date while taking into consideration the financial constraint which the State had to undergo while granting the benefit. This principle of law is also no help to the Respondent in the case at hand. 13. In view of above, it is held that the right of the Petitioners for commutation of pension having accrued in their favour on the date of their respective retirement cannot be retrospectively taken away by the Respondents vide notification dated 30-11-1999. The Petitioners are, therefore, entitled to avail the benefit of commutation of pension, if they so opt for. The petitions are allowed to the extent above. However, no costs.