ORDER Abhay M. Naik, J. 1. This Civil Revision has been preferred by the plaintiffs against the impugned order dated 20.03.2010 passed by the Additional District Judge, Seondha, District Datia (M.P.) in M.J.C. No. 3/05 setting aside thereby ex-parte judgment and decree dated 26.06.2005 passed in Civil Suit 6A/04 by the Court of Additional District Judge, Seondha, District Datia in Lok-Adalat. 2. Natural pedigree of the parties seems to be important which is being reproduced below: Balram ___________________________|__________________________ | | | deenanath (D) Bhagwandas (D) Chhotelal (D) | | | Ratanbai (wife) Ramlali (wife) (D)| Dhankunwa | (wife) (D) Ramkumar (D) | ___________|________ | | Omprakash (D) | | | | Krishnagopal shpadevi (wife) | | _______________________ | | | Govind Ranjeet Dinesh [D= Deceased] Original plaintiffs, namely, Krishnagopal and Dhankunwar instituted a suit for declaration of title and perpetual injunction, mainly, with the allegations that there was no male issue to Deenanath, therefore, he adopted Omprakash as his son during his lifetime. Defendant No. 1 is the widow of Omprakash whereas defendants No. 2 to 4 are sons of Omprakash from defendant No. 1. Bhagwandas had separated himself about 50 years back. Chhotelal and Deenanath continued as joint family members. A partition took place between Chhotelal and Deenanath. Red coloured portion as shown in the plaint map was allotted to Deenanath whereas green coloured portion was allotted to Chhotelal. Deenanath died in the year 1984 whereas Omprakash died in the year 1986. Entire suit house was recorded in the name of Deenanath because he was the eldest brother. After the death of Deenanath, name of defendant/respondent No. 5 was entered in his place being widow. Defendants No. 1 and 5 collusively executed a registered partition deed wherein green coloured portion is shown to have been allotted to defendant/respondent No. 5. It is alleged that the said portion was already allotted to Chhotelal and the defendants have no right to interfere in it. Accordingly, a suit for declaration in respect of title and possession was instituted. Decree for perpetual injunction against interference in possession was also sought. 3. On 17.01.05, written statement on behalf of the defendants was submitted. It is alleged that the said portion was already allotted to Chhotelal and the defendants have no right to interfere in it. Accordingly, a suit for declaration in respect of title and possession was instituted. Decree for perpetual injunction against interference in possession was also sought. 3. On 17.01.05, written statement on behalf of the defendants was submitted. It is pertinent to note that the written statement on behalf of defendant/respondent No. 5 was signed by Power of Attorney Govindprasad who happened to be the son of Omprakash and Pushpadevi and the same was not signed by defendant/respondent No. 5 personally. 4. On 26.06.05, an application under Order XXIII Rule 3 of Code of Civil Procedure was submitted stating therein that plaintiffs claim may be accepted and defendants have no objection to it. Accordingly, a prayer was made for pronouncement of judgment and decree in accordance with the said compromise. It is pertinent to note that compromise petition did not contain the signatures of defendant/respondent No. 5 instead, it was signed on her behalf by power of attorney Govindprasad. In support of the compromise, statement of Govindprasad was recorded by the Lok-Adalat. His mother and other brothers also deposed in favour of compromise which was accepted by the Court of Additional District Judge, Seondha, District Datia (M.P.) in Lok Adalat. Accordingly, judgment on the basis of compromise was pronounced by the Lok Adalat on the same day i.e. on 26.06.05 declaring thereby that the plaintiffs are the owners of the disputed house i.e. [Green Coloured Portion] and defendants were declared owners of the remaining house. A decree was also framed in accordance with the said judgment on the same day. 5. On 29.07.05, defendant/respondent No. 5 submitted an application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC with allegations that she was threatened on 18.07.05 by plaintiffs that the disputed house will be entered in their names in the record of the Municipal Council, Seondha. On collecting information, she came to know about fraud and collusion played by the parties to the suit. She, inter alia, stated that the entire house in question was owned by Deenanath who had never adopted Omprakash. After the death of Deenanath, defendant/respondent No. 5 became exclusive owner and occupant of the entire house. Omprakash was real brother of Krishnagopal. He or his legal heirs had no right, title or interest in the property left by Deenanath. She, inter alia, stated that the entire house in question was owned by Deenanath who had never adopted Omprakash. After the death of Deenanath, defendant/respondent No. 5 became exclusive owner and occupant of the entire house. Omprakash was real brother of Krishnagopal. He or his legal heirs had no right, title or interest in the property left by Deenanath. They have colluded in a fraudulent manner to grab the property of defendant/respondent No. 5 who was not having any son adoptive or otherwise. She was never served with the summons in civil suit No. 6A/04. She had not appointed Govindprasad or anyone as power of attorney. The alleged compromise was not with her consent or even within her knowledge. Govindprasad, the alleged power of attorney, is the son of defendant No. 1 who in collusion with all other parties is trying to swallow the house of defendant/respondent No. 5.It was further stated that she was not a party to the alleged compromise which was entered into by Govindprasad and other parties with a malafide intention of depriving her of her property. Accordingly, a prayer was made for setting aside the ex-parte judgment and decree passed on the basis of alleged compromise. 6. Plaintiffs, vide their reply, opposed the application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC stating therein that a compromise was entered at the house of defendant/respondent No. 5 and it was very much with her consent and within her knowledge. It is further stated that the judgment and decree having been passed by Lok Adalat is not open to challenge. 7. Plaintiff/revisionist No. 1 raised an objection about the maintainability of application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC by moving an application under Section 151 CPC contending therein that the judgment and decree passed on the basis of compromise is not an ex-parte decree, therefore, provisions of Order IX Rule 13 CPC are not invokable. Application was rejected by the trial court on 23.02.07 which was challenged in W.P.1762/2007. This Court vide its order dated 17.07.07 held that the learned court below shall first decide the question of maintainability of application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC and thereafter proceed in the matter for conducting enquiry if such an application was found to be maintainable. Application was rejected by the trial court on 23.02.07 which was challenged in W.P.1762/2007. This Court vide its order dated 17.07.07 held that the learned court below shall first decide the question of maintainability of application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC and thereafter proceed in the matter for conducting enquiry if such an application was found to be maintainable. As the said question was not decided by the learned trial court, this Court further observed that it would not be appropriate to decide the said question in writ petition. At the first instance, this question was to be considered and decided by the learned trial court. Accordingly, writ petition was disposed of with a direction to the Court to decide first application under Section 151 CPC after hearing the parties concerned. 8. Thereafter, learned trial judge again rejected the application under Section 151 CPC vide order dated 10.08.07 which was challenged before this Court in Civil Revision 134/2007 which was dismissed on 26.11.08. Thereafter, learned trial judge vide impugned order dated 20.03.10 allowed the application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC setting aside the judgment and decree dated 26.06.05 passed in Civil Suit No. 6A/2004 by the Court of Additional District Judge, Seondha, District Datia (M.P.) in Lok Adalat. Hence, the present civil revision. 9. Shri V.K. Bhardwaj, learned Senior Advocate, submitted that the decree having been passed on the basis of compromise cannot be legally termed as ex-parte decree and the provisions of Order IX Rule 13 CPC cannot be legally invoked. Reliance for this purpose is placed on paragraph 12 of Apex Court decision in the case of State of Punjab and Anr. v. Jalour Singh and Ors. (2008) 2 SCC 660 , which is reproduced below: 12. It is true that where an award is made by the Lok Adalat in terms of a settlement arrived at between the parties (which is duly signed by parties and annexed to the award of the Lok Adalat), it becomes final and binding on the parties to the settlement and becomes executable as if it is a decree of a civil court, and no appeal lies against it to any court. If any party wants to challenge such an award based on settlement, it can be done only by filing a petition under Article 226 and/or Article 227 of the Constitution, that too on very limited grounds. If any party wants to challenge such an award based on settlement, it can be done only by filing a petition under Article 226 and/or Article 227 of the Constitution, that too on very limited grounds. But where no compromise or settlement is signed by the parties and the order of the Lok Adalat does not refer to any settlement, but directs the respondent to either make payment if it agrees to the order, or approach the High Court for disposal of appeal on merits, if it does not agree, is not an award of the Lok Adalat. The question of challenging such an order in a petition under Article 227 does not arise. As already noticed, in such a situation, the High Court ought to have heard and disposed of the appeal on merits. 10. Sub-section 2 of Section 21 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 reads as under: Every award made by a Lok Adalat shall be final and binding on all the parties to the dispute, and no appeal shall lie to any court against the award. While passing the award, Lok-Adalat is empowered to take cognizance of cases in the manner as laid down in sub-section 3 and 4 of the Section 20 of the said Act which are reproduced hereunder: 20. Cognizance of cases by Lok-Adalats. 1. XX XX XX 2. XX XX XX 3. Where any case is referred to a Lok Adalat under Sub-section (1) or where a reference has been made to it under Sub-section (2), the Lok Adalat shall proceed to dispose of the case or matter and arrive at a compromise or settlement between the parties. 4. Every Lok Adalat shall, while determining any reference before it under this Act, act with utmost expedition to arrive at a compromise or settlement between the parties and shall be guided by the principles of justice, equity, fair play and other legal principles. In the case of Jalour Singh (Supra), it is made clear that where no compromise or settlement is signed by the party and the parties are not in agreement, it is not an award of the Lok-Adalat. 11. In the instant case, it has clearly been averred and found proved that defendant/respondent No. 5 was not served with the summons. Written statement on her behalf was not signed by her. Alleged compromise was equally not signed by her. 11. In the instant case, it has clearly been averred and found proved that defendant/respondent No. 5 was not served with the summons. Written statement on her behalf was not signed by her. Alleged compromise was equally not signed by her. She was not present in the Court/Lok-Adalat when the alleged compromise was accepted. Entire house property in question was owned by Deenanath after whose death it devolved upon defendant/respondent No. 5. Thus, her allegations about fraud having been committed on her are found proved. Effect of fraud has already been explained by the Apex Court in the case of A.V. Papayya Sastry and Ors. v. Govt. of A.P. and Ors. (2007) 4 SCC 221 in the following words: 22. It is thus settled proposition of law that a judgment, decree or order obtained by playing fraud on the court, tribunal or authority is a nullity and non est in the eye of the law. Such a judgment, decree or order -by the first court or by the final court - has to be treated as nullity by every court, superior or inferior. It can be challenged in any court, at any time, in appeal, revision, writ or even in collateral proceedings. 12. In the case of A.A. Gopalakrishnan v. Cochin Devaswom Board and Ors. (2007) 7 SCC 482 , it has been held that the power contained in Rule 3A of Order XXIII CPC will not come in the way of High Court to examine the validity of compromise decree when allegations of fraud, collusion are made against a party which entered into such compromise. This being so, it is not open for the revisionists to contend that Order IX Rule 13 CPC cannot be invoked. This objection was already raised in Civil Revision No. 134/2007 which was rejected by imposing cost of Rs. 5,000/-. This order operates as res judicata so far as question of applicability of Order IX Rule 13 read with Section 151 CPC is concerned in view of the law laid down by the Honble Apex Court in the case of Commissioner of Endowments and Ors. v. Vittal Rao and Ors. (2005) 4 SCC 120 . 13. This Court long back in the case of Naraindas (since deceased) by L.Rs v. Bhagwandas (since deceased) by L.Rs and Ors. 1993 MPLJ 1005 observed as follows: 8. v. Vittal Rao and Ors. (2005) 4 SCC 120 . 13. This Court long back in the case of Naraindas (since deceased) by L.Rs v. Bhagwandas (since deceased) by L.Rs and Ors. 1993 MPLJ 1005 observed as follows: 8. The law is settled that when an ex parte decree is passed, a defendant to get rid of the said decree can avail either of the four remedies, he may pray for review; or he may apply for setting aside of the ex parte decree under Order 9, Rule 13, Civil Procedure Code on the ground of existence of sufficient cause for his non-appearance or because of the non-service or defective service of summons; or he may file an appeal; or he may also institute a civil suit on limited ground of fraud. To get rid of ex parte decree, as obtained by fraud, if a suit is instituted, such a suit would be maintainable notwithstanding the fact that it has not been preceded by an application under Order 9, Rule 13, Civil Procedure Code. It will not be out of place to mention the following observations of the Apex Court in the case of Banwari Lal v. Chando Devi (Smt) (through Lrs) and Anr. (1993) 1 SCC 581 , paragraphs 11, 13 and 14 of which are reproduced below: 11. The present case depicts as to how on February 27, 1991 the court recorded the alleged agreement and compromise in a casual manner. It need not be impressed that Rule 3 of Order 23 does not require just a seal of approval from the Court to an alleged agreement or compromise said to have been entered into between the parties. The statute requires the Court to be first satisfied that the agreement or compromise which has been entered into between the parties is lawful, before accepting the same. Court is expected to apply its judicial mind while examining the terms of the settlement before the suit is disposed of in terms of the agreement arrived at between the parties. It need not be pointed out that once such a petition of compromise is accepted, it becomes the order of the Court and acquires the sanctity of a judicial order. 13. It need not be pointed out that once such a petition of compromise is accepted, it becomes the order of the Court and acquires the sanctity of a judicial order. 13. When the amending Act introduced a proviso along with an explanation to Rule 3 of Order 23 saying that where it is alleged by one party and denied by the other that an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, "the Court shall decide the question", the Court before which a petition of compromise is filed and which has recorded such compromise, has to decide the question whether an adjustment or satisfaction had been arrived at on basis of any lawful agreement. To make the enquiry in respect of validity of the agreement or the compromise more comprehensive, the explanation to the proviso says that an agreement or compromise "which is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act...." shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of the said Rule. In view of the proviso read with the explanation, a Court which had entertained the petition of compromise has to examine whether the compromise was void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act. Even Rule 1(m) of Order 43 has been deleted under which an appeal was maintainable against an order recording a compromise. As such a party challenging a compromise can file a petition under proviso to Rule 3 of Order 23, or an appeal under Section 96(1) of the Code, in which he can now question the validity of the compromise in view of Rule 1A of Order 43 of the Code. 14. The application for exercise of power under proviso to Rule 3 of Order 23 can be labelled under Section 151 of the Code but when by the amending Act specifically such power has been vested in the Court before which the petition of compromise had been filed, the power in appropriate cases has to be exercised under the said proviso to Rule 3. It has been held by different High Courts that even after a compromise has been recorded, the court concerned can entertain an application under Section 151 of the Code, questioning the legality or validity of the compromise. Reference in this connection may be made to the cases Tara Bai (Smt) v. V.S. Krishnaswamy Rao; S.G. Thimmappa v. T. Anantha; Bindeshwari Pd. Reference in this connection may be made to the cases Tara Bai (Smt) v. V.S. Krishnaswamy Rao; S.G. Thimmappa v. T. Anantha; Bindeshwari Pd. Chaudhary v. Debendra Pd.; Mangal Mahton v. Behari Mahton and Sri Sri Iswar Gopal Jew v. Bhagwandas Shaw where it has been held that application under Section 151 of the Code is maintainable. The court before it is alleged by one of the parties to the alleged compromise that no such compromise had been entered between the parties that court has to decide whether the agreement or compromise in question was lawful and not void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act. If the agreement or the compromise itself is fraudulent then it shall be deemed to be void within the meaning of the explanation to the proviso to Rule 3 and as such not lawful. The learned Subordinate Judge was perfectly justified in entertaining the application filed on behalf of the appellant and considering the question as to whether there had been a lawful agreement or compromise on the basis of which the court could have recorded such agreement or compromise on February, 27, 1991. Having come to the conclusion on the material produced that the compromise was not lawful within the meaning of Rule 3, there was no option left except to recall that order. 14. From the aforesaid, it is quite clear that the objection about the inapplicability of Order IX Rule 13 CPC was overruled by this Court by imposing a cost of Rs. 5,000/-. Respondent No. 5 is 83 years old widow who is being compelled to face the objection about applicability of Order IX Rule 13 CPC repeatedly despite the bar of res judicata as well as the position of law settled by the Apex Court as well as by this Court. Revisionist by raising again the aforesaid objection has virtually abused the process of law and has made himself liable to pay exemplary cost. This being so, abovementioned objection is rejected this time by imposing an exemplary cost of Rs. 10,000/. 15. Coming to the merits of the case, it may be seen that defendant/respondent No. 5 was not served with summons by process server of the Court. She was allegedly served in Dasti manner by the plaintiffs themselves. Written Statement as well as verification on behalf of defendant/respondent No. 5 does not bear her signature. 10,000/. 15. Coming to the merits of the case, it may be seen that defendant/respondent No. 5 was not served with summons by process server of the Court. She was allegedly served in Dasti manner by the plaintiffs themselves. Written Statement as well as verification on behalf of defendant/respondent No. 5 does not bear her signature. Execution of the alleged Power of Attorney dated 24.07.95 has been denied by defendant/respondent No. 5. Even if it is considered for the sake of arguments, it authorizes the power of attorney to act on behalf of the principal in respect of the agricultural land bearing survey numbers 383 to 393 situated in Kasba Seondha. The suit in question is in respect of the house property and not in respect of any agricultural land. Thus, the action on behalf of the alleged power of attorney is prima facie unauthorized and without competence. Otherwise also a power of attorney by virtue of Order III Rule 2 CPC has limited powers. He may act on behalf of the principal mainly within the degree of consent accorded by such principal. He at his own cannot enter into a compromise without knowledge or consent of the principal. In the case in hand, the consent and/or knowledge about alleged compromise is not found proved. 16. Although, it is stated in paragraph 8-9 in reply to application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC that the compromise was entered at the house of Ratanbai herself and in her presence, her signatures were not obtained on any of the papers submitted by the alleged power of attorney holder who is not an independent person but happens to be the son of defendant No. 1 who is beneficiary to the extent of half of the house belonging to defendant/respondent No. 5. In the statement of Govindprasad, alleged power of attorney holder, it was nowhere deposed that Ratanbai had entered into a compromise. It is interesting to read statement of power of attorney which was recorded by the Lok Adalat. He has merely stated that he has entered into a compromise with the plaintiffs and the ownership of the plaintiffs in respect of the disputed portion has been acknowledged in the compromise which is not opposed by him or other defendants. He has further stated that the compromise was duly signed by him after reading and understanding the same. He has merely stated that he has entered into a compromise with the plaintiffs and the ownership of the plaintiffs in respect of the disputed portion has been acknowledged in the compromise which is not opposed by him or other defendants. He has further stated that the compromise was duly signed by him after reading and understanding the same. Thus, it is clear that the power of attorney has nowhere stated that the alleged compromise was made known to Ratan Bai or it was ever agreed in her presence. He has not even deposed that Ratan Bai was aware of the compromise and the same was acceptable to her. Thus, there is absolute no iota on record to hold that the alleged compromise was made in the presence of Ratan Bai or she was aware of it. There is no iota to further hold that the alleged compromise was with the consent of Ratan Bai or the same was ever made known to her. In the application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC, Ratan Bai has clearly stated which has been substantiated in her statement also that Omprakash was never adopted by Deenanath, the deceased husband of Ratan Bai. Entire house property was owned by Deenanath alone which was inherited by his widow. Omprakash or his legal heirs i.e. defendants No. 1 to 4 have no right, title or interest in it but for the alleged compromise. The result of the alleged compromise and hence, of the judgment and decree impugned under Order IX Rule 13 CPC is that Ratan Bai would be defrauded and would be deprived of her immovable house property. 17. Lastly, I may mention that scope of revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is quite limited as observed by the Apex Court in the case of Punjab National Bank, Rajpura Township v. Amrit Industries and Ors. 2000 (10) SCC 38 in following words: 3. In our opinion, this was not an appropriate case where the High Court should have interfered under Section 115 CPC. It cannot be said that the order passed by the trial court was without jurisdiction or suffered from any such error which warranted interference of the High Court under Section 115 CPC. 2000 (10) SCC 38 in following words: 3. In our opinion, this was not an appropriate case where the High Court should have interfered under Section 115 CPC. It cannot be said that the order passed by the trial court was without jurisdiction or suffered from any such error which warranted interference of the High Court under Section 115 CPC. Even in the matter of setting aside the decree the revisional powers of the High Court are to be exercised keeping in view the following observations of the Apex Court in the case of Praveen Kumar and Ors. v. Suresh Chand and Ors. (2000) 8 SCC 491 : When the trial court after taking into consideration the evidence on the record including the opinion of the handwriting expert came to the conclusion that there was no service and allowed the application, then the High Court could only under its revisional power have interfered if the trial court committed any jurisdictional error, or its decision would have resulted in any manifest injustice. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, no error jurisdictional or otherwise is found to have been committed by the court below. Resultantly, Civil Revision is dismissed by imposing an exemplary cost of Rs. 10,000/- for the reasons stated in the preceding paragraphs which shall be paid by the revisionists to respondent No. 5 within one month from today. Respondent No. 5 is an old widow aged 83 years. It seems that plaintiffs are making repeated efforts not to allow the suit to proceed on merits so that respondent No. 5 looking to her age may not get a chance to rebut the plaintiffs' case and prove her own defence. Keeping the same in mind, learned Trial Judge is directed to decide the suit on merits in an expeditious manner latest by 31st December, 2010. No further order as to costs.