Judgment : The defendants in the Trial Court are the appellants herein and they are aggrieved by the suit of the plaintiff for declaration and permanent injunction being decreed by the Trial Court and confirmed by the lower Appellate Court by dismissing the appeal preferred by the appellants herein. 2. The facts which are not in dispute are that an extent of 3.39 acres of land in Sy.No.83 of Hosahalli Village, Yeldur Hobli, Srinivasapura Taluk had been attached to the imperial village of Talari and one Narasappa was the village office holder. The plaintiff’s uncle by name Nadumpalli Muneppa purchased the suit property measuring 2 acres out of the aforesaid extent from said village office holder by registered sale deed dated 28.5.1971. As the plaintiff’s uncle Nadumpalli Muneppa had no issues and had fostered the plaintiff from his childhood, the plaintiff’s father Nadumpalli Hanumanthappa and fostered father Nadumpalli Muneppa divided their properties under a registered partition deed dated 26.10.1983 and in the said partition. ‘A’ schedule properties fell to the share of Nadumpalli Muneppa and ‘B’ schedule properties fell to the share of Nadumpalli Hanumanthappa. The suit schedule property fell to the share of Nadumpalli Muneppa and after the death of said Nadumpalli Muneppa, plaintiff became the legal heir to the suit schedule property. 3. Following he suit property being re-granted in favour of Muni Papaiah @ Papanna on 31.3.82, the defendants claimed that the suit property therefore belongs to the legal heirs of aforesaid Muni Papaiah and as such, the plaintiff has no right or title over the same. 4. The defendants on the other hand contended that, following the re-grant made as aforesaid on 31.3.82, it was the defendants 1 to 4 who being the L.Rs of aforesaid Muni Papaiah have been in enjoyment of the suit property and they sold the same in favour of defendants 5 and 6 under a registered sale deed dated 1.1.2004 and on 7.1.2004. Therefore, the defendants contended that the plaintiff’s suit was liable to be dismissed as the plaintiff has no right or interest over the suit property. 5. Aforesaid pleadings of the parties led the Trial Court to frame issues numbering six as could be found in para 11 of the Trial Court’s judgment. Therefore, the defendants contended that the plaintiff’s suit was liable to be dismissed as the plaintiff has no right or interest over the suit property. 5. Aforesaid pleadings of the parties led the Trial Court to frame issues numbering six as could be found in para 11 of the Trial Court’s judgment. After evidence appreciation, learned Trial Judge relying on two decisions of this Court reported in 1994 (1) KLJ 385 and 1981 (1) K.L.J. page 1, decreed the suit of the plaintiff on the footing that the re-grant made will enure to the benefit of the alienee. 6. The lower Appellate Court concurred with the said view taken by the trial Court by dismissing the appeal filed by the defendants. 7. I have heard learned Counsel Sri. A. Krishna Bhat for the appellants and learned Counsel Sri Prasanna Kumar Nayaka for the respondent and perused the records of this case and the reasoning of the Courts below as well as the decisions upon which the Courts below had relied on. 8. Sri. Krishna Bhat, learned Counsel for the appellants submitted that the facts are not in dispute or that Narasappa was the village office holder and he sold the suit property in favour of the plaintiff’s uncle on 28.5.1971 under the sale deed Ex.P2. But however before the re-grant was made on 31.3.1982, the original alienee namely the uncle of the plaintiff had surrendered the possession on 24.9.1981 and this was pursuant to the eviction order passed on 28.8.81 under Ex.D9. Therefore, referring to the said proceedings of the Tahsildar dated 28.8.81 and the statement of Muneppa, the uncle of the plaintiff which is dated 24.9.81, produced at page 18 of the paper book, submission made is that, as on the date of re-grant i.e., 31.3.82, the plaintiff’s uncle was not in possession of the suit properly but had surrendered its rights in the same and therefore both the Courts below were in error in relying on the aforesaid decisions. 9. Referring on the said decisions, submissions made by the appellants Counsel is that in those two decisions, the situation which is confronted by the Court in the present case was not the focal point. In other words, there was no case of surrender of possession during the relevant period viz., 1.2.63 to 7.8.78 and therefore the Courts below were not justified in relying on the aforesaid decisions. 10. In other words, there was no case of surrender of possession during the relevant period viz., 1.2.63 to 7.8.78 and therefore the Courts below were not justified in relying on the aforesaid decisions. 10. Secondly, it is contended that when the eviction order was passed by the Tahsildar Ex.D9 pursuant to the provisions contained in Section 7 of the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961 (‘KVOA Act’ for short), the Trial Court could not have lost sight of the said fact and such, when the eviction was in accordance with the provisions contained under Section 7 of the KVOA Act and thereafter re-grant order was made on 31.3.82, the question of the original alienee viz., Muneppa being conferred with the benefit of re-grant does not arise. 11. Another limb of his argument was that the eviction order passed by the Tahsildar was not called in question by the plaintiff’s uncle at any point of time and therefore it was impermissible for the plaintiff in the present suit to have called in question the said eviction proceedings and relying on two decisions of the Apex Court, submission made is that the collateral attack is not permissible and the decisions relied in this regard are AIR 1991 S.C. 1233 and AIR 1991 S.C. 2219. 12. Yet another submission put forward by the appellant Counsel is that when the possession was surrendered by the uncle of the plaintiff as far back as in the year 1981 and pursuant to that, eviction order was passed and thereafter the defendants 1 to 3 also having sold the suit schedule property in favour of two purchasers i.e. defendants 5 and 6 under two sale deeds, the question of the plaintiff being in possession of the suit property does not arise and consequently suit for declaration without seeking the relief of possession is also hit by provision to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. On these grounds, learned Counsel sought for the appeal being allowed by setting aside the judgments of the Courts below. 13. On these grounds, learned Counsel sought for the appeal being allowed by setting aside the judgments of the Courts below. 13. On the other hand, learned Counsel Shri S. Hanumanthaiah for the respondent supported the view taken by the Courts below by submitting that Section 7 of the KVOA Act has no application in the instant case and moreover, as the alienation was made in favour of the plaintiff’s uncle during the period from 1.2.1963 to 7.8.1978, the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in Syed Basheer Ahmed Vs. State of Karnataka, reported in 1994 (1) Kar.L.J. 385 , is applicable and, therefore, both the Courts below have not committed any error in accepting the plaintiff’s case. In support of the aforesaid submission, the learned Counsel also took me through the decision rendered by this Court in Lakshmana Gowda Vs. State of Karnataka, reported in 1981 (1) Kar.L.J. 1 , and also to the relevant observations of the Full Bench in Syed Basheer Ahamed’s case. Hence, it was contended that the re-grant made enures to the benefit of the plaintiff’s uncle Muneppa and consequently to the plaintiff. He also referred to the sale deed Ex.P-2 to contend that the said sale deed has remained unchallenged. Therefore, the appeal be dismissed. 14. This Court, while admitting this appeal, had raised the following substantial question of law for consideration: “Whether the Courts below were justified in granting relief of declaration and for permanent injunction following Lakshmana Gowda’s and Basheer Ahmed’s case, when admittedly the alienee from the holder of the office had surrendered possession after receiving back the premium which he had paid for grant and subsequently when the land is regranted to the office holder who in turn has sold the property to the appellant herein and put him in possession?” 15. The undisputed facts indicate that though Narasappa was the village office holder, there was a sale deed effected in favour of the plaintiff’s uncle as per Ex.P-2 on 28.5.1971. The undisputed facts indicate that though Narasappa was the village office holder, there was a sale deed effected in favour of the plaintiff’s uncle as per Ex.P-2 on 28.5.1971. It is also not in dispute that the said uncle of the plaintiff surrendered the possession of the land in S.No.83 which he had purchased from Narasappa and this is clear from Ex.D-9, which is the order of the Tahsildar dated 28.8.1981 and the said order of the Tahsildar is to the effect that, by virtue of Sections 7 and 7-A of the KVOA Act, the plaintiff’s uncle was evicted from the land in question i.e. two acres of land, and the said document Ex.D-9 is also accompanied by the statement of Muneppa and it is dated 24.9.1981 and the said statement makes it clear that, on coming to know of the order passed on 28.8.1981, Muneppa had surrendered the land in question. It is also an admitted fact that regret was made in favour of Papanna on 31.3.1982. In the face of these undisputed material placed before the Trial Court, the surrender of the suit land by Muneppa following eviction order passed by the Tahasildar, therefore, is an established fact. 16. This Court, in Lakshmana Gowda Vs. State of Karnataka, has held that the alienee of a service inam land from its holder of the authorized holder, did not acquired any title to such land if the alienation had taken place prior to the coming into force of the Village Offices Abolition Act and he did not also acquire any title to such land subsequently by his alienor obtaining its regrant. 17. After considering the aforesaid law laid down in Lakshmana Gowda’s case, a Full Bench of this Court, in Syed Bhasheer Ahamed Vs. 17. After considering the aforesaid law laid down in Lakshmana Gowda’s case, a Full Bench of this Court, in Syed Bhasheer Ahamed Vs. State of Karnataka, has held thus: “(c) Alienation of service Inam land between 1-2-1963 and 7-8-1978, by a holder or an authorized holder before re-grant, is not invalid, as he had a vested right to get re-grant and as there was no bar regarding alienation during that period; but the alienee will be a person with imperfect title entitled to continue in possession and when the land is re-granted to the alienor, the title obtained by the alienor will enure to the benefit of the alienee; (d) The date of re-grant, whether before or after 7-8-1978, will not be relevant to determine the validity of the alienation between 1-2-1963 and 7-8-1978, as what is prohibited after 7-8-1978 prospectively for a period of 15 years is alienation and not re-grant. (e) The alienee between 1-2-1963 and 7-8-1978 has no right to seek re-grant in his own name and his right is only to claim the benefit of doctrine of feeding the grant by estoppel as and when re-grant is made to his alienor under Section 5(1) or 6; and for this purpose he may support or pursue any application for re-grant in favour of his alieor; (f) There is no provision in the Act authorizing the State Government on its authorities to evict an alienee under an alienation made between 1-2-1963 and 7-8-1978. Section 7 is not an “unauthorized holder”. If the land alienated between 1.2.1963 and 7.8.1978, is subsequently, regranted to the alienor, the benefit of such re-grant, namely, title will ensure to the benefit of the alienee. If the land is not regranted to the alienor, but to some one else on the ground that the alienor is not a ‘holder’ or ‘authorised holder’, then the alienee will be in the position of a transferee from a person without any title, and the grantee to whom the re-grant is made, will be entitled to obtain possession from the alienee and the limitation for such grantee to dispossess the alienee will commence from the date re-grant.” 18. What is clear from the aforesaid law laid down by the Full Bench is that, if the land is alienated between the period mentioned i.e., between 1.2.1963 and 7.8.1978, if the land in question is subsequently regranted to the alienor, the benefit of such regrant will enure to the benefit of the alienee. In the instant case, what we are concerned is as regards the surrender of the land in question by the alienee himself and the said surrender being pursuant to the order passed under Section 7 of the KVOA Act and, thereafter, if regrant is made, can it be said that the original alienee will get the benefit of regrant. 19. In the two decisions referred to above, the question of considering a case where there was surrender of possession was not involved. In the instant case, the eviction order was passed as per Ex.D-9 on 28.8.1981 pursuant to Section 7 of the KVOA Act. The said Section-7 reads as under: “7. Eviction of unauthorized holders, etc:- (1) Where any land resumed under clause (3) of Section 4 is in the possession of an unauthorized holder such unauthorized holder shall be summarily evicted therefrom and the land shall be taken possession of by the Deputy Commissioner in accordance with law: Provided that no such summary eviction shall be made except after giving the person affected a reasonable opportunity of making representation. (2) Any order or eviction passed under sub-section (1) shall be final and shall not be questioned in any Court of law and no injunction shall be granted by any Court in respect of any proceeding taken or about to be taken by the Deputy Commissioner in pursuance of the power conferred by subsection (1) (3) The land from which an unauthorized holder is evicted under sub-section (1) shall, (a) if it was granted or continued in respect of or annexed to a inferior village office be regranted to the holder of such village office; and (b) inother cases be disposed of in accordance with the law applicable to the disposal of unoccupied unalienated lands: 20. Section 7 came into force with effect from 24.12.1975 and the order of eviction was passed on 28.8.1981. The plaintiff’s uncle Muneppa surrendered his possession on 24.9.1981. It was after all these events, regrant was made on 31.3.1982. Section 7 came into force with effect from 24.12.1975 and the order of eviction was passed on 28.8.1981. The plaintiff’s uncle Muneppa surrendered his possession on 24.9.1981. It was after all these events, regrant was made on 31.3.1982. The eviction order passed by the Tahsildar had remained unchallenged as the plaintiff’s uncle did not question the same. 21. What is clear from the aforesaid facts is that, as on the date of regrant, the uncle of the plaintiff viz., Muneppa, was not in possession of the suit land as there was an eviction order operating against him and he also surrendered the land. Therefore, the question of the order of regrant ensuring to the benefit of the plaintiff’s uncle Muneppa will not and cannot arises as, on the date of regrant, plaintiff’s uncle was not at all in possession of the suit land. 22. Apart from the above, in the present suit, the plaintiff, while seeking the relief of declaration and injunction, has also questioned the order of regrant. In other words, when the original alienee viz., uncle of the plaintiff, himself had not questioned the eviction order passed by the Tahasildar, whether it is open to the plaintiff in a collateral proceeding to question the same is the point to be considered at this juncture. The Apex Court has held that no such challenge can be made in a collateral proceeding. The two decisions referred to by the learned Counsel for the appellants, therefore, will have to be taken note of. 23. In the case of Pankaj Bhargava Vs. Mohinder Nath, reported in AIR 1991 SC 1233 , the Apex Court has held that the doctrine of collateral challenge will not apply to a decision which is valid ex-hypothesi and which has some presumptive existence, validity and effect in law and such a decision can be invalidated by the right person in right proceedings brought at the right time. The Court further made the following observations: “……. Such a decision can be invalidated by the right person in right proceedings brought at the right time. It is only a nullity stemming from lack of inherent jurisdiction or a proceeding that wears the brand of validity on its forehead that might afford a defence even against enforcement……..” 24. Inanother decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of Punjab Vs. It is only a nullity stemming from lack of inherent jurisdiction or a proceeding that wears the brand of validity on its forehead that might afford a defence even against enforcement……..” 24. Inanother decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of Punjab Vs. Gurdev Singh, reported in AIR 1991 SC 2219, the observations of the Court, which are relevant, are paragraphs-6 to 8 and they read as under: “6. But nonetheless the impugned dismissal order has at least a de facto operation unless and until it is declared to be void or nullity by a competent body or Court. In Smith Vs. East Elloe Rural District Council, (1956) AC 736 at p.769 Lord Rdcliffe observed: “An order even if not made in good faith is still an act capable of legal consequences. It bears no brand of invalidity upon its forehead. Unless the necessary proceedings are take at law to establish the cause of invalidity and to get it quashed or otherwise upset, it will remain as effective for its ostensible purpose as the most impeccable of orders.” 7. Apropos to this principle, Prof. Wade states: “the principle must be equally true even where the ‘brand of invalidity’ is plainly visible; for there also the order can effectively be resisted in law only by obtaining the decision of the Court (see: Administrative Law 6th Ed. P.352). Prof. Wade sums up these principles: “The truth of the mater is that the Court will invalidate an order only if the right remedy is sought by the right person in the right proceedings and circumstances. The order may hypothetically a nullity, but the Court may refuse to quash it because of the plaintiff’s lack of standing, because he does not deserve a discretionary remedy, because he has waived his rights, or for some other legal reason. In any such case the ‘void’ order remains effective and is in reality valid. It follows that an order may be void for one purpose and valid for another, and that it may be void against one person but valid against another.” (Ibid p.352). 8. It will be clear from these principles, the party aggrieved by the invalidity of the order has to approach the Court for relief of declaration that the order against him is inoperative and not binding upon him. He must approach the Court within the prescribed period of limitation. 8. It will be clear from these principles, the party aggrieved by the invalidity of the order has to approach the Court for relief of declaration that the order against him is inoperative and not binding upon him. He must approach the Court within the prescribed period of limitation. If the statutory time limit expires the Court cannot give the declaration sought for.” 25. Therefore, in the light of the aforesaid law laid down by the Apex Court, in the case on hand, the person who can said to be aggrieved by the order of eviction was none other than the uncle of the plaintiff i.e., Muneppa. He not only allowed the eviction order to stay, by not challenging it, but also, by his own act of surrendering possession, reinforced the eviction order itself. At no point of time thereafter, was the eviction order questioned in any Court of law and as the said order was passed pursuant to Section 7 of the KVOA Act, the plaintiff in the present suit, therefore, could not have questioned the said eviction order in a collateral proceeding. 26. Another aspect of the matter which was lost sight of by the Courts below was the fact of the plaintiff’s uncle having surrendered possession on 24.9.1981 and thereafter, following the regrant order passed on 31.3.1982, the suit property also came to be sold by defendants – 1 to 4 in favour of defendants – 5 and 6 under two sale deeds. In other words, the possession had passed off to the purchasers under the said sale deeds. Therefore, when the plaintiff failed to establish his possession, mere suit for declaration and permanent injunction, therefore, will not be maintainable in view of the bar contained in the proviso to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. Both the Courts below did not take into consideration this important aspect of the matter, which goes to the root of the suit of the plaintiff itself. 27. For the aforesaid reasons, the substantial question of law is answered by holding that the Courts below were in error in granting the relief of declaration and permanent injunction and the decisions in Lakshmana Gowda’s case and Syed Bhasheer Ahamed’s case could not have been applied to the case on hand, as already mentioned above. 27. For the aforesaid reasons, the substantial question of law is answered by holding that the Courts below were in error in granting the relief of declaration and permanent injunction and the decisions in Lakshmana Gowda’s case and Syed Bhasheer Ahamed’s case could not have been applied to the case on hand, as already mentioned above. In those two cases, the question did not revolve around the effect of surrender of possession before the regrant order was made. 28. The appeal, therefore, stands allowed and the judgments of the Courts below are set aside and the suit of the plaintiff is dismissed.