Judgment :- The petitioner herein was appointed as a retail dealer of MS/HSD product by the Indian Oil Corporation Limited under the differently abled person category, for locating the outlet at Villupuram. In terms of the dealership agreement dated 17.7.2006, the petitioner had the benefit of the agreement for a period of 15 years commencing from 11.01.2006. For running the outlet, the petitioner took on lease an extent of 1.42 acres of land from one Haji Abdul Rowther. The petitioner had also gone in for sub-lease with the first respondent herein. 2. It is stated that on 16.9.2006, the first respondent conducted inspection of the petitioner’s retail outlet. Noting certain discrepancies, a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner on 16.9.2008 as to the cancellation of the dealership agreement. Rejecting the reply given to the show cause notice, the first respondent terminated the dealership under order dated 22.11.2006. The petitioner stated that the termination order dated 22.11.2006 was served on one Kamaludeen, son of the land owner and hence there was no proper service. 3. In the meantime, on 24.11.2006, the first respondent appointed yet another person as an ad hoc dealer with effect from 20.11.2006. Aggrieved by this and the order of termination, the petitioner called upon the first respondent to refer the dispute to arbitration. The petitioner made a claim petition contending that the cancellation of the dealership was a nullity in as much as it was contrary to the Marketing Discipline Guidelines. In the alternative, the petitioner prayed for compensation, apart from refund of the security deposit made. By award dated 12.2.2008, the second respondent rejected the petitioner’s petition. Hence, the present Original Petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 4. Learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner took me through the various provisions of the Marketing Discipline Guidelines and pointed out that as per Annexure 10, the first respondent should have worked out the alleged stock variation. In the absence of any compliance, the proceedings taken are liable to be set aside. Consequently, the award suffers a patent illegality and hence, liable to be interfered with. 5. Making strong objection to the appointment of an ad hoc dealer on 20.11.2006 even before the termination of the dealership agreement of the petitioner on and from 22.11.2006, learned senior counsel pointed out that the entire cancellation proceedings are writ with mala fides. Consequently, the award suffers a patent illegality and hence, liable to be interfered with. 5. Making strong objection to the appointment of an ad hoc dealer on 20.11.2006 even before the termination of the dealership agreement of the petitioner on and from 22.11.2006, learned senior counsel pointed out that the entire cancellation proceedings are writ with mala fides. Learned senior counsel pointed out that the first respondent has not adopted the procedure prescribed under the Marketing Discipline Guidelines. He further pointed out that the order passed on 22.11.2006 was made on the allegation of violation of dealership clauses, which was not stated to be the ground in the original show-cause notice issued to the petitioner. 6. Learned senior counsel pointed out that the dealership, reserved for differently abled persons, has been allotted to a dealer who does not fall under the reserved category. He further pointed out that the award passed is in violation of Section 28(2) and 28(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, since the award confirming the order terminating the petitioners dealership, had failed to take note of the established statutory norms and procedures followed by the first respondent. He pointed out that the learned Arbitrator failed to consider the merits of the case submitted, as regards the wrongful termination of dealership. He pointed out that the first respondent failed to carry out the stock reconciliation and any allegation on variation should go through the process as given under Annexure 10. He further pointed out that the test results were not furnished, thereby confirmation of the order of termination of dealership is in violation of the procedure prescribed under the Marketing Discipline Guidelines. 7. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records. 8. A perusal of the dealership agreement dated 17th July 2006 shows that the period of agreement was for 15 years from 11th January 2006. The dealership agreement further pointed out that the Corporation is the sole Judge as to whether there was a breach of covenants committed by the dealer. The dealer shall not be entitled to any compensation or damage to the Corporation on account of any such stoppage or suspension of supplies. 9. The dealership agreement further pointed out that the Corporation is the sole Judge as to whether there was a breach of covenants committed by the dealer. The dealer shall not be entitled to any compensation or damage to the Corporation on account of any such stoppage or suspension of supplies. 9. Clause 30 of the agreement states that the dealer shall not purchase, obtain or otherwise acquire possession from any person, firm or a company other than the Corporation, any product used, stocked or sold by the dealer or in connection with the dealer’s business without the prior consent of the Corporation. The agreement reserved the right to review or vary or withdraw its consent at any time or from time to time. 10. In the background of the clauses, the facts need to be noted. It is seen from the records that the petitioner’s retail outlet was subjected to inspection on 16.9.2006. At the time of inspection, the following discrepancies were noted, namely, (1) Density of MS and HSD not written for three days; (2) DSR not updated; (3) Filter paper not available; (4) Abnormal variation i.e., an excess of 3141 ltrs of HSD; and (5) Housekeeping not upto the mark. 11. The petitioner submitted his explanation under letter dated 25.9.2006 to the show cause notice issued dated 16.9.2006. The petitioner pointed out in his letter to the Chief Divisional Manager that since one of its customers booked for diesel and the same was not available, the petitioner borrowed diesel from a different dealer. The petitioner stated that due to his illness and admission in the hospital, he was not aware of this act of his staff. In the circumstances, the petitioner pleaded for condoning the lapse. While contending that the statement as to procuring from other stations as not a voluntary one, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner pointed out to the predetermined decision viz., the noting found in Annexure V to the inspection report dated 22.11.2006. 12. As already noted, in the face of specific Clause 30, it stands to reason that the statement made by the dealer in his first objection that he had gone for an accommodation, rightly came up for condemnation by the first respondent. 12. As already noted, in the face of specific Clause 30, it stands to reason that the statement made by the dealer in his first objection that he had gone for an accommodation, rightly came up for condemnation by the first respondent. It is no doubt true that in the notice issued on 16.9.2006, the first respondent alleged that as per NDG 2005, action had been action taken by stopping the sales and supplies and samples have been sent to the laboratory for testing. The petitioner, however, took a different stand from the one taken in his letter dated 25.9.2006. On 12.10.2006, the petitioner took a stand that the excess stock of diesel was due to the fact that the dispensing unit was hit by a vehicle, which could have resulted in the ‘totalizer jumping’. The Tribunal pointed out to the inconsistencies in the stand taken by the petitioner in explaining the stock variation. Since the petitioner had sufficient opportunity to produce the stock calculation and the service report to the first respondent, the failure to explain the stock variation was taken serious note of by the Tribunal to uphold the contention of the first respondent. 13. It is seen further in the discussion of the Tribunal that the petitioner had accepted the meter reading by sending the inspection report on the stock position based on which the excess stock was arrived at. The Tribunal further pointed out that the Daily Sales Record did not contain proper details, nor any enclosure produced to substantiate the plea that there was no excess stock. As to the submission of the petitioner that the second pump was damaged and was not in operation, the Tribunal pointed out that the claimant had sold the diesel through the pump as demonstrated by the meter reading given in the Daily Sales Record produced by the claimant. Though the petitioner had stated that the first respondent had not stamped Pump No.2 and hence the petitioner was not authorized to use the pump for sale of the diesel, the meter reading as regards Pump No.2 clearly showed that the petitioner had been using the pump which was stated to be under repair, thereby indicated an inconsistent stand which the petitioner had been taking as regards the operation of the said pump. Going by the above-said fact, rightly the Arbitral Tribunal held that the termination of dealership by the first respondent could not be faulted with. 14. It is no doubt true that in the notice originally issued, it was stated that the samples had been sent to the laboratory for testing. The petitioner contends that one of the clauses under the Marketing Discipline Guidelines is Clause 6.1.10 that the variation in the stock, if any, has to be established by taking into consideration, factors which are given in Annexure V, viz., the method of allowing shrinkage allowance in stock variation. However, contrary to the contention of the petitioner, Annexures IX, X and XI deal with shrinkage loss and temporary variation losses only in those cases or locations where and when the shrinkage allowance is applicable. In case of variation in stocks beyond the permissible limit, the guidelines also provide for penal action to be visited on the erring dealer. 15. Learned senior counsel pointed out that in the face of the allegation as to the stock, the first respondent should have waited for the report on the samples sent to the laboratory for testing and should not have acted hurriedly. It may be noted that the question of relevancy of a sample test to be the basis for the action on the stock variation would arise only if and when the petitioner takes a defence on the basis of evaporation or any other cause like adulteration which are relevant to sample testing. In the case of the petitioner, the first of the replies stated that the excess stock had arisen on account of its employees going for procuring diesel from other petrol pumps, followed by the different stand as seen in the letter dated 12.10.2006. In the light of the specific facts as seen above, I do not find any justifiable ground to accept the plea of the petitioner as to the relevancy of the test report to touch on the aspect of stock variation. Consequently, I do not accept the case of the petitioner that the termination needs to be set aside, it being not in compliance of the Regulations. 16. Consequently, I do not accept the case of the petitioner that the termination needs to be set aside, it being not in compliance of the Regulations. 16. As to the appointment of an ad hoc dealer, the Tribunal pointed out that the sub lease in favour of the first respondent Oil Corporation entitled the first respondent to reappoint and substitute any dealer in respect of the premises without the consent of the petitioner. Learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner pointed out to the mala fide conduct of the first respondent that taking advantage of the landlord’s notice, issued to the petitioner terminating the lease, the first respondent had gone for termination. He made particular reference to the letter from Abdul Salam Rowther dated 06.01.2007 to the first respondent, wherein, he had stated that the petitioner had not paid the monthly rental amount even after several reminders and that he had terminated the lease on 06.10.2006 and having received the termination letter, he had not paid the rental arrears. The landlord further expressed his agreement to lease the said land to the first respondent and the same rental amount was accepted by the landlord in respect of the sub-lease to the first respondent. 17. It is no doubt true that the landlord had addressed a letter to the first respondent on 06.01.2007. However, considering the allegations contained herein, the said letter of the landlord cannot be taken as a circumstance to assess the merits of the termination of the dealership granted to the petitioner. Whatever might have been the differences between the petitioner and the landlord, the fact remains that this letter has nothing to do with the stock variation. In the circumstances, I do not agree with the submission of the petitioner. Going by the award passed, I do not find any justifiable ground to interfere with the award passed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 18. The Tribunal pointed out that the petitioner has a right to get compensation for the stock taken over on 23.11.2006 and the first respondent was directed to pay the claimant/petitioner a sum of Rs.1,38,435.44 towards the stock taken over on 23.11.2006 along with applicable interest from 23.11.2006 till the date of the award. 19. 18. The Tribunal pointed out that the petitioner has a right to get compensation for the stock taken over on 23.11.2006 and the first respondent was directed to pay the claimant/petitioner a sum of Rs.1,38,435.44 towards the stock taken over on 23.11.2006 along with applicable interest from 23.11.2006 till the date of the award. 19. Learned senior counsel pointed out that in the wake of the ad hoc dealer appointed, effective from 20.11.2006, when the dealership was in vogue, the action of the first respondent is liable to be condemned. The appointment of an ad hoc dealer is a consequence of the decision of the first respondent to terminate the dealership of the petitioner. The fact that the first respondent had passed an order appointing an ad hoc dealer from 20.11.2006 when the dealership of the petitioner was there till 22.11.2006 is, no doubt, a wrongful exercise of its jurisdiction; but that, by itself, does not, in any manner, interfere with the grounds of termination of the agreement with the petitioner. Consequently, the petition stands rejected. 20. Learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner made a faint plea as to the Arbitral Tribunal showing bias in dealing with the issues, since the Arbitrator is none other than the staff of the first respondent Corporation. It is well settled that the question of bias is a fact which must be proved by the petitioner by leading necessary evidence. In the absence of any proof for substantiating such claim, I do not find any justification in accepting this plea. It may be noted that a person alleging mala fides or bias must make out a strong case at the earliest point of time on the Arbitrator being a member in the service of the first respondent. Having failed to do so despite the opportunities available and in the absence of any material to substantiate the same, the plea now taken by the petitioner is only a cry in vain and hence, liable to be rejected. Having failed to do so despite the opportunities available and in the absence of any material to substantiate the same, the plea now taken by the petitioner is only a cry in vain and hence, liable to be rejected. Further, the petitioner is a party to the agreement, wherein, under Clause 61(a), it is specifically provided as follows: "Any dispute or difference of any nature whatsoever, any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim or set-off or regarding any right, liability, act, omission or account of any of the parties hereto arising out of or in relation to this agreement shall be referred to the sole arbitration of the Director (Marketing) of the Corporation who may either himself act as the Arbitrator or nominate some other officer of the Corporation to act as the Arbitrator. The Dealer will not be entitled to raise any objection to any such Arbitrator on the ground that the Arbitrator is an officer of the Corporation." In view of the above, the said plea stands rejected. 21. After the hearing of the case, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner pointed out that the petitioner being a differently abled person, deserves sympathetic treatment at the hands of the first respondent and that he may be considered for grant of a licence to run the retail vending station. He also placed reliance on the provisions of (The) Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation etc.) Act, 1995 and submitted that the case of the petitioner be considered for allocation of a retail outlet if and when any availability arises in future. 22. Considering such a request, this Court directed the petitioner to address a letter to the first respondent Corporation. Learned counsel appearing for the first respondent, however, informed that the prayer for allotment of the petrol bunk from the very same region has been rejected by the first respondent. It is no doubt true that the grant of a retail outlet licence is subject to the availability of location to vend the products of the first respondent. 23. Learned counsel appearing for the first respondent, however, informed that the prayer for allotment of the petrol bunk from the very same region has been rejected by the first respondent. It is no doubt true that the grant of a retail outlet licence is subject to the availability of location to vend the products of the first respondent. 23. Considering the nature of the disability and admittedly on an earlier occasion, he was considered for grant of the licence, taking note of the provisions of (The) Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation etc.) Act, 1995, this Court feels that if and when any application is made by the petitioner, the first respondent shall consider the same sympathetically to grant him a retail outlet if and when available, so that the purport of the provisions of (The) Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation etc.) Act, 1995 is fulfilled. It is also hereby made clear that the grant of the outlet is subject to the availability and if and when such accommodation is given by the first respondent, it is open to them to impose such conditions as are normally found in any dealership. Accordingly, the award stands confirmed and Original Petition stands dismissed.