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2010 DIGILAW 844 (ORI)

SHIBA ` PURNA SAHOO AND ` PURNA CHANDRA SAHOO v. NISHAMANI SAHOO AND TWO OTHERS

2010-12-10

M.M.DAS

body2010
ORDER M.M. Das, J. - 10.12.2010 The Second Appeal No. 137 of 2006 has been admitted on the substantial question of law, as mentioned in the ground no. 9 at page-7 of the appeal memo and R.S.A. No. 146 of 2006 has not yet been admitted. 2. The respondent no. 1 Nishamani Sahu, as the plaintiff, filed a suit for partition. The appellant was defendant no. 1. 3. The case of the plaintiff is that the defendant no. 1 is her son and the suit land stands recorded in their name along with the house standing thereon which have been let out to defendants 2 and 3 on monthly rent basis. Defendant no. 1 being her son, is collecting the rent from the tenants and not giving any amount to her. She is an old ailing lady and, as the defendant no. 1 is not willing for partition of the property, she has come up with the suit for partition. 4. The specific case of the defendant no. 1 is that Radhamohan Sahu was the original owner in respect of the suit land. He died in the year 1953. The plaintiff is the wife of Radhamohan Sahu and defendant no. 1 is the son through the plaintiff, when the defendant no. 1 was only three years old, Radhamohan expired in 1953 and subsequently, the plaintiff got married to one Balabhadra Sahu, who was the younger brother of Radhamohan Sahu. Since the plaintiff remarried prior to 1956, she lost her right over the property of Radhamohan Sahu. It was also pleaded that in connivance with the settlement authorities, she got her name entered in the major settlement Record of Rights along with defendant no. 1 on the strength of a compromise decree, which she obtained after conniving with others, when the defendant no. 1 was a minor. It is further pleaded by the defendant no. 1 that the said compromise decree was fraudulent obtained during his minority, though in fact, the plaintiff was not entitled to any share in the property of Radhamohan as she remarried before the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came into force. He being the only son of Radhamohan, is entitled to succeed to the entire property of Radhamohan. 5. A counter claim was filed by the defendant no. 1 after the parties adduced evidence. He being the only son of Radhamohan, is entitled to succeed to the entire property of Radhamohan. 5. A counter claim was filed by the defendant no. 1 after the parties adduced evidence. The learned trial Court framing seven issues, decreed the suit preliminarily and dismissed the counter claim filed by the defendant no. 1. The defendant no. 1 carried an appeal against the said judgment in the suit as well as another appeal against the dismissal of the counter claim. Both the appeals were dismissed by the learned appellate Court for which, the above Second Appeals have been filed. 6. The learned trial Court relying upon Exts. 6 and 7, came to the conclusion that the defendant no. 1 has admitted the other defendants to be the co-owners in respect of the suit land and dealt with the property as such, pursuant to the decree passed in the previous suit i.e. O.S. No. 34 of 1966-1. While answering Issue No. 6, the learned trial Court found that the plaintiff and defendant no. 1 had inherited the suit land on the strength of the decree passed in the previous suit on the basis of which, the Record of Rights was prepared jointly. The appellate Court, while confirming the judgment passed by the learned trial Court, arrived at a finding of fact that there was a marriage of the plaintiff with Balabhadra Sahu in the year 1956. 7. In the deposition of the plaintiff recorded in the year 1988, which was referred to by the appellate Court, she stated that 31 years before, she was married to Balabhadra Sahu. Calculating that, the learned appellate Court found that she married Balabhadra Sahu in the year 1957. 8. Dr. Panda, learned counsel for the appellant submits that in her evidence in the present suit, the plaintiff has referred to Balabhadra Sahu as her brother-in-law, though in the earlier suit, she mentioned Balabhadra Sahu, as her husband and, therefore, adverse inference should have been drawn against the plaintiff. 9. In the Second Appeals, according to me, no substantial question of law arises for determination. 10. In view of the finding of fact that balabhadra Sahu died in the year 1956, even assuming that the plaintiff was married to Balabhadra Sahu, which she has admitted in the previous suit, such marriage has taken place after 1956. 9. In the Second Appeals, according to me, no substantial question of law arises for determination. 10. In view of the finding of fact that balabhadra Sahu died in the year 1956, even assuming that the plaintiff was married to Balabhadra Sahu, which she has admitted in the previous suit, such marriage has taken place after 1956. She acquired absolute right over the property, which was inherited by her from her first husband Radhamohan in 1956 and such right cannot be divested. Further, the compromise decree passed in the earlier suit was confirmed in the appeal and, as it appears from the record, the defendant no. 1, though a minor at the time of the compromise entered into between Balabhadra Sahu and the defendant no. 1 represented by his mother, who is the plaintiff in the present suit, was never challenged by the defendant no. 1 within three years after attaining his majority. 11. In the case of Pulavarthi Venkata Subba Rao and Others Vs. Valluri Jagannadha Rao and Others the Supreme Court laid down that a compromise decree is not a decision by the Court. It is the acceptance by the Court of something to which, the parties had agreed. A compromise decree merely sets the seal of the Court on the agreement of the parties. The Court does not decide anything. Nor can it be said that a decision of the Court was implicit in it. Only a decision by the Court can be res judicata, whether statutory u/s 11 of the C.P.C., or constructive as a matter of public policy on which, the entire doctrine rests. Such a decree cannot strictly be regarded as decision on a matter, which was heard and finally decided and cannot operate as res judicata. Such a decree might create an estoppel by conduct between the parties, but such an estoppel must be specifically pleaded. 12. In the present case also, basing on the said compromise, the Record of Rights has been prepared jointly in the name of the plaintiff and defendant no. 1, which has never been challenged under the Orissa Survey and Settlement Act. 13. 12. In the present case also, basing on the said compromise, the Record of Rights has been prepared jointly in the name of the plaintiff and defendant no. 1, which has never been challenged under the Orissa Survey and Settlement Act. 13. Considering such findings of the learned Courts below, I do not find any reason to interfere with the same and accordingly, while confirming the judgments and decrees passed by the learned Courts below in the suit as well as in the counter claim, dismiss the Second Appeals but, in the circumstances without cost. The LCR be sent back immediately. Final Result : Dismissed