JUDGMENT : U.C. Maheshwari , J.:- Itis settled proposition of Hindu Law that whereas the ancestral property isinherited by the Karta or member of any branch ofsuch family in his name even then the other male member of his branch the sonsbeing co- parcner and if they are/he is predeceasedthen their/his natural heirs had their vasted rightin such property and on arising the occasion the same be partitioned betweenthem according to their share as co- parceners of suchfamily. Inview of the aforesaid the concurrent approach of the courts below, holding thatin the life time of Roniya his sons Bhuta and Mallu the father ofrespondent No.2 and 1 respectively each of them had 1/3 share in the aforesaidentire land with the Roniya and after death of Roniya only his 1/3 share was inherited by the branch ofhis sons said Bhuta and Mallu and the respondent No.4 to 8. In such premises the concurrent findings of thecourts below holding the respondent No.5 to 8 had not any authority no salemore then their aforesaid share i.e. 1/21 each (1/7 out of the 1/3 of totalland) to the respondent No.3 and appellant/defendant No. 9 by was of above saledeed, appears to be based on proper appreciation of evidence and also inconformity with law. Pursuant to it,, the approach of the courts below holdingthe above mentioned sale deeds executed by respondent No.5 in favour of respondent No.3 and by respondent No.4 with 6 to8 in favour of appellant are not binding against therespondent No.1 till the extent of her right as stated above could not be saidcontrary to law in any manner. In such premises this appeal does not have anymaterial or substance giving rise to any substantial question of law requiringany consideration at this stage under Section 100 of CPC. In such premises this appeal does not have anymaterial or substance giving rise to any substantial question of law requiringany consideration at this stage under Section 100 of CPC. Sofar the arguments advanced by the appellant's counsel that in view of earlierpartition of the parties which had taken place on 19.6.1994 at subsequent stageby decreeing the suit of the respondent No.1 the courts below did not have anyauthority to pass the decree for repartition by holding the separate share ofthe parties with respect of the disputed land, specially when such partitionwas admitted by respondent No1 in her plaint is concerned, firstly theconcurrent findings of the courts below holding the alleged partition of19.6.1994 has not been proved by either of the parties by any document or otheradmissible evidence, based on appreciation of evidence being finding of factcould not be interfered at the stage of appeal under Section 100 of CPC andsecondly in view of the settled proposition of law that whenever anything is inwriting between the parties and such document in original is neither producednor proved by admissible evidence then mere on the basis of pleadings or oralevidence no inference could be drawn that some earlier partition had takenplace between the parties. In such premises the arguments of the appellant'scounsel in this regard has not appealed me and in such premises the concurrentfindings of the courts below do not require any interference at this stage byframing any substantial question of law under Section 100 of CPC. Apartthe above the concurrent approach of the courts blow based on appreciation ofevidence holding that no partition had taken place between the parties beingfindings of facts could not be interfered at this stage under section 100 ofCPC. My such view is fully fortified with the principle laid down by the ApexCourt in the matter of E. Mahboob Vs. N. Sabbarayan reported in AIR 1982 SC 679 , in which it washeld that the concurrent findings on the question of partition being finding offact is not interfere able under Section 100 of CPC. So on this question also Ihave not found any substance in the matter giving rise to any substantialquestion of law. Theappeal is dismissed as indicated above.