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2010 DIGILAW 853 (HP)

Vilaswati v. State of H. P.

2010-06-02

SURJIT SINGH

body2010
JUDGEMENT Surjit Singh, J(Oral) Present petition, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, has been filed by the petitioners for quashing order dated 11.7.2005 of Land Acquisition Collector, Rohroo, whereby their application, under Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, hereinafter called Act, has been dismissed, with the finding that the same is barred by limitation. 2. Relevant facts are like this. Land of certain persons situate in village Chak Pawli, Tehsil Rohroo, had been acquired for a public purpose. Petitioners’ predecessor Phool Chand was one of the persons, whose land had been acquired. Land Acquisition Collector assessed the compensation and made payments to all the land owners, including Phool Chand. Some of the land owners approached the Land Acquisition Collector for making a reference to the Court, under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, for enhancement of compensation. References were accordingly made and the District Judge, vide award dated 18.1.1997, enhanced the compensation. 3.Petitioner Phool Chand filed an application, under Section 28-A on 9.6.1997, i.e. to say on expiry of three months period, prescribed for filing application, under Section 28-A of the Act for extending the benefit of award dated 18.1.1997 of the Court. He also filed an application, under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Land Acquisition Collector allowed that application. However, petition, under Section 28-A of the Act was kept pending, till the decision by the High Court in appeal, filed by the State against the award, dated 18.1.1997, of learned District Judge. 4. In the meanwhile, orders, condoning delay in making applications, under Section 28-A of the Act, passed on some other applications moved by a few other land owners, were challenged by filing Civil Writ Petitions in this Court. Number of those petitions are 658/2000, 703/2000 and 704/2000. Those writ petitions were disposed of vide judgment dated 7.8.2004 and it was held that Collector being not a Court, but only a Statutory Authority, did not have the power to condone delay in making applications, under Section 28-A of the Act. 5. After passing of the judgment dated 7.8.2004 in the aforesaid Civil Writ Petitions, Land Acquisition Collector passed the impugned order, Annexure P-1. Before passing the order of dismissing the application, under Section 28-A of the Act, Land Acquisition Collector held that the earlier order of his predecessor condoning delay, by invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act, had become infructuous. 6. Before passing the order of dismissing the application, under Section 28-A of the Act, Land Acquisition Collector held that the earlier order of his predecessor condoning delay, by invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act, had become infructuous. 6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record. 7. Limitation for making application, under Section 28-A of the Act, is three months from the date of the award of the Court. ‘Court’ has been defined to mean a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction, vide Section 3(d) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Therefore, the term ‘Court’ used in Section 28-A of the Act has to be read as principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction to which reference, under Section 18 of the Act, is made and not the appellate Court, i.e. the High court or the Supreme Court. 8. Learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that limitation can be counted both from the date of the award of principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction as also from the date of decision of appellate Court in which the award of principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction is challenged. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance upon a judgment of Supreme Court in Union of IndiaVs. Munshi Ram (dead) by LRs and others, (2006) 4 SCC 538. The ratio of that judgment is that where in a reference petition, under Section 18 of the Act, principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction enhances the compensation and the award of that Court of original jurisdiction is modified by the superior Courts, i.e. High Court and/or Supreme Court, the enhanced compensation payable to a petitioner, under Section 28-A of the Act, will be the compensation as finally determined by the highest Court of appeal i.e. High Court or the Supreme Court, as the case may be upto which the matter is carried. The judgment does not say that the limitation for the purpose of Section 28-A of the Act would start from the date when the matter is finally disposed of by the High Court or the Supreme Court nor was such a point involved in that case. 9. The judgment does not say that the limitation for the purpose of Section 28-A of the Act would start from the date when the matter is finally disposed of by the High Court or the Supreme Court nor was such a point involved in that case. 9. Relying upon another judgment of the Supreme Court in Kendriya Karamchari Sehkari Grah Nirman Samiti Limited, NoidaVs.State of Uttar Pradesh and another and several other connected matters, (2009) 1 SCC 754, learned counsel submits that the object of enactment of Section 28-A is to do equitable justice to those land owners, who, on account of poverty or ignorance, fail to seek enhancement of compensation, under Section 18 of the Act, and if that is so, provision in Section 28-A, regarding limitation, is required to be construed and interpreted liberally and limitation should be counted from the date, when the matter regarding enhancement of compensation attains finality. In this judgment also, controversy raised was not as to from the date of award or order of which Court limitation is to be counted. The question was only with regard to extending the benefit of Section 28-A to those persons, who never asked for making a reference, under Section 18 of the Act. 10. Reliance has also been placed on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Santokh Singh and anotherVs.State of H.P. and another, 1996(1) SLC 191, wherein it has been held that District Judge had the power to condone delay in making reference, under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. This judgment will also not come to the rescue of the petitioner, because in the said case principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction (District Judge) had rejected the application, under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, for condoning delay, in a reference case, under Section 18 of the Act. Setting aside the order of principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction, this Court held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act was applicable. 11. In the present case, question is whether Land Acquisition Collector, who is not a Court, but only a statutory authority, can condone delay or not. Setting aside the order of principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction, this Court held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act was applicable. 11. In the present case, question is whether Land Acquisition Collector, who is not a Court, but only a statutory authority, can condone delay or not. This question has specifically been answered by this Court in the aforesaid three Civil Writ Petitions, disposed of vide judgment dated 7.8.204, Annexure P-8 and Arjun Singh and othersVs.Land Acquisition Collector and others, 1999(1) SLC 55, wherein it has been held that Collector, being only a statutory authority and not a Court, does not have the jurisdiction to condone delay. 12. However, as noticed hereinabove, delay in the present case had been condoned by the Land Acquisition Collector. No doubt the Land Acquisition Collector did not have the jurisdiction or the power to condone delay, in view of the above stated legal position, but that order could not have been reviewed or held to be infructuous by the successor of Land Acquisition Collector, who passed the order condoning delay, because the Land Acquisition Collector does not have the power to review his own order. 13. In fact, the Land Acquisition Collector ought to have decided the application, under Section 28-A of the Act, on merits once the delay had been condoned, even though illegally, and if opposite party were aggrieved by the final order on application under Section 28-A of the Act, it could have challenged the order of condonation of delay also, while challenging the final order on the said application. 14. In view of the observation that the land Acquisition Collector did not have the power to review his predecessor’s order condoning delay, present petition is allowed. Impugned order, Annexure P-1 is set aside and the Land Acquisition Collector is directed to decide the application, under Section 28-A of the land Acquisition Act, 1894, on merits.