Judgment : K. Sreedhar Rao, J., All these three petitions pertain to the same subject-matter regarding detention of one Narayanaswamy under the Karnataka Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug-Offenders, Gamblers, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Slum-Grabbers Act, 1985 (for short, ‘Act of 1985’). 2. Commissioner of Police, Bangalore-3rd respondent passed an order of detention dated 11.1.2010 vide Annexure-A under Section 3(1) of the Act of 1985. The detenue was arrested and served with a copy of the detention order along with the grounds of detention vide Annexure-B. In reply to the detention order, detenue submitted a representation to the Secretary, Home Department, through Superintendent of Jail on 24.01.2010. The Central Chief Superintendent of Jail sent it to DIG-Prisons on 25.1.2010 who in turn sent it to Inspector General-Prisons on 29.1.2010. The IG-Prisons sent the representation to the Home Secretary. Home Department received the representation on 2.2.2010. The representation was processed by the Under Secretary – Prisons in the Department of Home and sent to Under Secretary, Law and Order who in turn sent the file to the Joint Secretary, Department of Home, on 8.3.2010. Joint Secretary placed the file before the Home Minister on the same day. The representation of the detenue was considered by the Home Minister, but he refrained from passing any order on the ground that the matter is pending before Court, hence, issued an endorsement dated 22.4.2010 to that effect. 3. The petitioner who is the wife of the detenue, filed W.P.H.C. No. 20 of 2010 challenging the order of detention vide Annexure-A. In the meantime, Government approved the order of detention passed by 3rd respondent vide Annexure-C dated 20.1.2010. At that stage, proceedings of the detention were placed before the Advisory Board on 22.2.2010 for consideration. This Court dismissed W.P.H.C. No. 20 of 2010 on 4.2.2010 with the following observations: ‘The Government Advocate submits that the detention order is before the Advisory Board for consideration. In that view, the petition appears to be premature. Hence, the petition is dismissed with liberty to approach the Court if necessary after the order of the Advisory Board.’ 4. The Advisory Board confirmed the order of detention. Pursuant to the opinion of the Advisory Board, the Government confirmed the detention order vide Annexure-D dated 25.2.2010. The petitioner herein challenged the legality of Annexure-D in WPHC No. 36 of 2010. The Advisory Board confirmed the order of detention. Pursuant to the opinion of the Advisory Board, the Government confirmed the detention order vide Annexure-D dated 25.2.2010. The petitioner herein challenged the legality of Annexure-D in WPHC No. 36 of 2010. This Court allowed the petition and directed reconsideration of the matter by the Government. 5. Government, pursuant to the order in WPHC No. 36 of 2010, reconsidered the matter and confirmed the order of detention vide Annexure-B dated 29.4.2010 which is the subject-matter of challenge in WPHC No. 76 of 2010. 6. Meanwhile, Government filed review of the order passed in WPHC No. 36 of 2010 in R.P. No. 195 of 2010. This Court allowed the review petition and restored WPHC No. 36 of 2010 for fresh consideration. The wife of the detenue filed petition in WPHC No. 73 of 2010 contending that once the order is set aside and sent for reconsideration, the detenue should be set at liberty, and in this regard sought for a direction to the Government to release him. 7. Sri Kiran S. Javali, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner in all the petitions, strenuously submitted the following points to assail the order of detention: i) There is inordinate delay on the part of the Government in considering the representation. ii) The stated reason for non-consideration of representation in the endorsement dated 22.4.2010 is untenable. Independent of the opinion of the Advisory Board, Government should consider the representation and pass necessary orders. In this regard, he relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Jayanarayan Sukul v State of West Bengal AIR 1970 SC 675 : (1970) 1 SCC 219 : 1970 Cri.L.J. 743 (SC). iii) Pendency of the writ petition is not a valid ground on the part of the Government to refrain from consideration of representation. In that regard, he relied on the decision in the case of Jayanarayan Sukul. iv) The order of detention and grounds in support of detention made by the detaining authority, narration of events and language used in confirmation of the detention order are verbatim same. This suggests non-application of mind. v) In the grounds of detention at Annexure-A at page 17, reference is made to 42 persons as associates of the detenue along with the number of cases pending against each of them, without furnishing requisite details. This suggests non-application of mind. v) In the grounds of detention at Annexure-A at page 17, reference is made to 42 persons as associates of the detenue along with the number of cases pending against each of them, without furnishing requisite details. The said circumstance relied upon for passing the detention order has not been furnished to the detenue with necessary documentary material. Thus, there is failure on the part of the detaining authority in not furnishing all material relied upon documents. Therefore, the order of detention is vitiated. In this regard, the Counsel has relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Kirit Kumar Chamanlal Kundaliya V Union of India and Others AIR 1981 SC 1621 : (1981) 2 SCC 436 : 1981 SCC (Cri). 471: 1981 Cri.L.J. 1267 (SC). vi) Detenue was furnished with relied upon documents in respect of 17 criminal cases registered against him. However, in respect of Crime No. 123 of 1997 on the file of Whitefield Police Station and Crime No. 90 of 2007 on the file of Sarjapur Police Station, he was acquitted. The detaining authority observes that the order of acquittal is out of fear, the material witnesses did not give evidence before Court. Detaining authority has not furnished copies of the evidence of witnesses and judgment in those cases for the detenue to make effective representation. vii) Approval of the order of detention by order dated 20.1.2010 at Annexure-C is deemed to be set aside by the order of this Court dated 15-4-2010 passed in WPHC No. 36 of 2010. Detention of the detenue after 15.4.2010 is illegal and he should have been set at liberty. The Government, pursuant to the order passed in WPHC No. 36 of 2010, confirmed the order of detention on 29.4.2010 vide Annexure-B which is passed beyond the prescribed period of limitation, and therefore, it is illegal. 8. Per contra, the State has filed five affidavits sworn to by the officials of Prisons Department and the officials of Home Department setting out in detail the dates of submission of the detenue’s representation and the procedural process the representation underwent before it reached the Home Minister for consideration. It is explained that the Home Minister was engaged in Budget Session between 25.2.2010 to 26.3.2010. It is explained that the Home Minister was engaged in Budget Session between 25.2.2010 to 26.3.2010. It is asserted that there is absolutely no mala fide on the part of the State or its officials in forwarding the representation to the Home Minister. 9. Learned Additional Advocate General, Sri K.M. Nataraj contended that the detaining authority is required to furnish all relied upon documents as also documents, but not all the documents we are of the opinion that which a reference is made in the order. In this regard, he relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Abdul Sathar Ibrahim Manik V Union of India and Others AIR 1991 SC 2261 : (1992) 1 SCC 1 : 1992 SCC (Cri.) 1. 10. Learned Additional Advocate General (AAG) further argued that with reference to Section 6-A of the Act of 1985, non-supply of documents in respect of irrelevant material would not vitiate the order of detention. In that regard, he relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and Another V Chaya Ghoshal and Another AIR 2005 SC 428 : (2005) 10 SCC 97 : 2006 SCC (Cri.) 257: 2004 AIR SCW 6999 to contend that the order of detention on the basis of solitary incident would also be a legal order. 11. In the instant case, 17 cases referred to in the grounds of detention would fully justify the detention order. The view taken by the Home Minister not to pass any order on the representation is perfectly legal since the matter is sub-judice. In fact, when the representation is submitted, writ petition was filed and pending. Even on the date when the representation was received by the office of Home Minister, writ petition was pending. The Home Minister has rightly declined to pass order on the representation on the ground of sub-judice. Mere fact that there was some time gap in passing the order does not vitiate the detention because the reason stated for not considering the representation was already there when the representation was received by the office of the Home Minister. Even if the order on the representation was passed by the Minister any time earlier, the reasons and result would have been the same and without any material difference. 12. Even if the order on the representation was passed by the Minister any time earlier, the reasons and result would have been the same and without any material difference. 12. Learned AAG further contended that the detenue does not made out a case of non-supply of relied upon documents and does not call for further particulars and further documents for making effective representation. He also does not deny the 17 criminal cases registered against him and others as being false. The detenue only states that he has been detained on false grounds without any details and reasons. 13. The delay in processing of the representation to the Home Minister and the delay in non-consideration of the representation on the ground that the matter is pending before the High Court is strenuously argued as one of the strongest circumstances to vitiate the order of detention. In para 2 of this order, date wise movement of the representation from the jail routed through several authorities to the Home Minister, is noted. Bureaucratic and Official Procedures of the representation vetted through several intermediary superior officers before it was finally sent to the Home Minister is shown as the reasonable excuse for the delay. 14. On a stern scrutiny, we find that the intermediary officers who have detail with the representation before finally placing it before the Home Minister have absolutely no effective role to play in dealing with the representation. Yet unnecessary blind-folded procedural practice is rigidly adhered to in processing the representation of the detenue for consideration by the Home Minister, which we feel, although not mala fide, but wholly unnecessary. 15. The purport of law is to see that the communication of grounds of arrest with relied upon documents has to be supplied to the detenue within five days and the representation of the detenue has to be considered at the earliest. The Supreme Court in the above referred cases, has held that there can be no precise definition of the time for consideration of the representation, but emphasized that it should be at the earliest without any delay. In this regard, we feel that the procedures for considering the representation of the detenue have to be rationalized. The representation when once submitted to the Superintendent of Central Prison, he should immediately place it before the Additional DIG-Prisons in a day or two. In this regard, we feel that the procedures for considering the representation of the detenue have to be rationalized. The representation when once submitted to the Superintendent of Central Prison, he should immediately place it before the Additional DIG-Prisons in a day or two. The Additional DIG, Prisons should forward the representation to the Home Minister in a day or two, in other words, the representation should reach the office of the Home Minster within 2 to 4 days, however with an exception when holidays intervene. The Home Minister should consider the representation at his earliest without any delay and if there is any delay in considering the representation, it should be explained before the Court with proper reasons. The Current procedure of routing the representation through several bureaucratic authorities should be done away with because none of the bureaucratic authorities should be done away with because none of the bureaucratic authorities have any say or can offer their comments on the representation in law. Therefore, the representation received by the Superintendent of Jail should be placed before the Additional DIG, Prisons and he should directly sent it to the office of the Home Minister. 16. The representation in question reaches the Home Minister on 25.2.2010. The minister was engaged in Budget Session of the Assembly between 25.2.2010 to 26.3.2010. In this regard, Sri Kiran S. Javali, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, relied upon the decision of Kundanbhai Dulabhai Shaikh V District Magistrate, Ahmedabad and Others AIR 1996 SC 2998 : 1996 SCC (Crl.) 470 (1996) 3 SCC 194 : 1996 Cri. L.J. 1981 (SC). In the cited case, the Minister was engaged in official tour. The said reason was pleaded as an excuse for delay in considering the representation. We, however, feel that the ratio laid down is inapplicable to the facts of this case. The duty of a Minister to be present in assembly session is a constitutional duty and that cannot be equated to official tour. Assembly Sessions assume constitutional and public importance. Ministers have to sincerely and effectively participate in the sessions. It is necessary that a minister has to equip himself with all necessary facts and details for effective participation in the sessions. In that view, it cannot be said that the Home Minister would have leisure time to devote to consider representations of this nature during assembly sessions. 17. Ministers have to sincerely and effectively participate in the sessions. It is necessary that a minister has to equip himself with all necessary facts and details for effective participation in the sessions. In that view, it cannot be said that the Home Minister would have leisure time to devote to consider representations of this nature during assembly sessions. 17. We are of the opinion that the Minister engaged in Assembly Budget Session is a valid reason for exclusion of the delay of the said period. The Home Minister, after completion of sessions and after 28 days thereafter has taken note of the representation and passed an order to the effect that the matter is pending before the High Court. At this stage, we find that there is some delay on the part of the Minister, but the reason stated by him for not passing the order on the representation appears to be well-founded. 18. It was strenuously contended in the course of arguments that the representation should be sent to the Advisory Board for consideration. However, for peculiar reasons found in the case, the representation reaches the Secretariat after the Advisory Board has given its opinion. Therefore, the question of sending the representation to the Advisory Board does not arise. The detenue has also not submitted any representation before the Advisory Board. The representation given by the detenue discloses that he denies the allegations made against him and prays for release. The detenue in the representation does not make out any of the grounds urged in this writ petition to challenge his detention, nor makes out a grievance of non-supply of relied-upon documents to him. Assuming that the Minister had considered the representation on 26.3.2010, the reason given for non-consideration in the endorsement dated 22.4.2010 would be the very same reason in currency as on 26.3.2010. Therefore, the delay in considering the representation by the Minister would be of no consequence because the petitioner had already filed writ petition challenging his detention. When the mater is sub-judice before the High Court, the Minister is justified in staying his hands from considering the representation. 19. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner secondly laid thrust upon non-supply of relied-upon documents to the detenue. When the mater is sub-judice before the High Court, the Minister is justified in staying his hands from considering the representation. 19. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner secondly laid thrust upon non-supply of relied-upon documents to the detenue. In this regard, reference is made to the grounds of detention wherein it refers to 17 cases registered against the detenue and also to the names of 42 associates of the detenue and the number of cases filed against them, without giving the case numbers and other details. Non-supply of material with regard to cases filed against the associates of the detenue, it is argued, is a fatal flaw and would vitiate the detention. It is also argued that in respect of Crime Nos. 123 of 1997 (on the file of Whitefield Police Station) and 90 of 1997 (pertaining to Sarjapur Police Station), the said cases have ended in acquittal, and the detaining authority has observed that witnesses have turned hostile out of fear. In that regard, necessary documents like evidence of witnesses, judgment of the Trial Court are not furnished. Hence, it is argued that on this court also the order of detention is vitiated. 20. We have carefully considered the submissions made at the Bar. In respect of Crime Nos. 123 and 90 of 1997, trial is held and the detenue is acquitted. A copy of the charge- sheet and copy of FIR are furnished. FIR and the contents of column (7) of the charge- sheet do refer to unlawful and incriminating acts of the detenue. It is not in dispute that the detenue is acquitted. Non-furnishing of judgment copy, we feel, does not affect the order of detention. In respect of other 15 cases referred to, all necessary documents have been furnished and they are cases pending trial. Reference to 17 cases against the detenue are like 17 circumstances put forth by the detaining authority to support the order of detention. In respect of a couple of circumstances, if necessary documents are not furnished, it is not a ground to hold that the detention is vitiated when other circumstances are convincingly established and there is proper compliance of procedure of supplying relied-upon documents in respect of the other circumstances relied upon. The detenue in fact in his representation does not make out any grievance in this regard nor call upon to furnish further documents. The detenue in fact in his representation does not make out any grievance in this regard nor call upon to furnish further documents. The averments in the representation make out a cryptic denial of the allegations. 21. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh V Hari Singh Thakur AIR 1987 SC 2080 : 1987 Cri. L.J. 1923 (SC): 1987 Supp. SCC 190 has held as under: “2. The High Court might have apprised itself of the aforesaid judgment State of Rajasthan V Shamsher Singh, AIR 1985 SC 1082 : 1985 SCC (Cri.) 421, and decided the matter after taking into account the law laid down therein. We hope that the High Court will realize that there is no particular virtue in quashing an order for in a given case a detention order may be fully justified and absolutely necessary for the protection of the society. The approach has to be an objective approach taking into account all the relevant circumstances and consideration in order to strike a balance between the need to protect the community on the one hand and the need to preserve the liberty of a citizen. We hope this aspect will be borne in mind in future. Subject to these observations, the special leave petition fails and is dismissed.” 22. With regard to non-supply of material regarding 42 associates of the detenue, we find that the said material is only by way of reference. The unlawful activates of the associates, by no stretch of imagination, can be a ground to support the detention of the detenue. A person under this law can be detained only for unlawful activities he commits and he cannot vicariously be liable or responsible for the acts of his associates when there is no charge of conspiracy, abetment or sharing of common object or intention. Reference to names of 42 associates is a totally irrelevant material for passing the order of detention of the detenue in question. When the reference to the said facts is irrelevant, the question of supplying documents of those cases is also not warranted. Reference to names of 42 associates is a totally irrelevant material for passing the order of detention of the detenue in question. When the reference to the said facts is irrelevant, the question of supplying documents of those cases is also not warranted. In the decision of the Supreme Court in Abdul Sathar Ibrahim Manik’s case, the following observations are made: “7……… In Mst L.M.S. Ummu Saleema v. B.B. Gujaral and Another, AIR 1981 SC 1191 : (1981) 3 SCC 317 , after referring to some of the earlier decisions of this Court, it was held thus: (SCC P.320, para 5) “It is, therefore, clear that every failure to furnish copy of a document to which reference is made in the grounds of detention is not an infringement of Article 22(5), fatal to the order of detention. It is only failure to furnish copies of such documents as were relied upon by the detaining authority, making it difficult for the detenue to make an effective representation, that amounts to a violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed by Article 22(5). In our view it is unnecessary to furnish copies of documents to which casual or passing reference may be made in the course of narration of facts and which are not relied upon by the detaining authority in making the order of detention.” It will therefore be seen that failure to supply each and every document merely referred to and not relied upon will not amount to infringement of the rights guaranteed under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution. We may of course add that whether the document is casually or passingly referred to or whether it has also formed the material for arriving at the subjective satisfaction, depends upon the facts and grounds in each case. In the instant case we are satisfied that these two documents were not placed before the detaining authority nor they were referred to or relied upon.” The ratio laid down in the said decision makes it very clear that depending upon the facts of the case, a single incident is also sufficient ground for detention. 23. The provisions of Section 6-A of the Act 1985 deals with several grounds to legally justify detention when the detenue is involved in committing different types of prohibited activities. 23. The provisions of Section 6-A of the Act 1985 deals with several grounds to legally justify detention when the detenue is involved in committing different types of prohibited activities. Section 6-A makes it clear that if the detention is on one or more of the grounds mentioned in Section 6-A, the detention on each of the ground would be distinct and separate. Even if detention is found illegal on one ground, if the detention on the other grounds is valid, the order of detention does not get vitiated. In the instant case, the detenue is detained only on the one ground i.e., goonda activities supported by several circumstances pertaining to the said ground. Therefore, for the present case, the provisions of Section 6-A are not germane for consideration. 24. The third leg of argument was that the confirmation order dated 29.4.2010 is beyond the prescribed period of time and hence, the order of detention is vitiated. We do not agree with the argument because at the earliest the petitioner filed WPHC No. 20 of 2010 challenging the order of detention. This Court dismissed the petition as premature. The second writ petition was filed in WPHC No. 36 of 2010. This Court set aside the order and remitted the matter to the detaining authority for fresh consideration. The petitioner contended that the consequence of the order would mean that the detenue has to be released since the order of detention is set aside. The petitioner before the Supreme Court contended that in view of the order passed in WPHC No. 36 of 2010, this Court had set aside the order and as a consequence the detenue has to be released. The said case came to be withdrawn with liberty to approach this Court. Consequently, WPHC No. 76 of 2010 is filed. The order passed by this Court in WPHC No. 36 of 2010 came to be reviewed by this Court on 31-05-2010. In review, the first order made in WPHC No. 36 of 2010 is set aside and the writ petition is restored to file for further hearing. In view of the order in review, the earlier order of detention sustains and the subsequent order of detention pursuant to the order in WPHC No. 36 of 2010 would become extinct and of no consequence in law. In view of the order in review, the earlier order of detention sustains and the subsequent order of detention pursuant to the order in WPHC No. 36 of 2010 would become extinct and of no consequence in law. In the result, in law it is deemed that the detention is continued on the basis of the order dated 25.2.2010. For the reasons and discussions made above, all the petitions are dismissed. The registry is directed to send a copy of the order to the Home Secretary for compliance of the observations made in paragraph-15 of the order.