JUDGMENT : SURJIT SINGH, J. 1. Present appeal by the plaintiffs is directed against the judgment and decree, dated 18.12.1998, of learned Additional District Judge, Mandi, by which setting aside the decree, dated 28.9.1992 of the trial Court, whereby suit of the plaintiffs for possession of two portions of Khasra No.321, to the extent of 1 Biswa 1 Biswansi, had been decreed, the suit of the plaintiffs-appellants was dismissed. 2. Appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law: "1. Whether the lower Appellate Court has absolutely misunderstood the true concept of adverse possession, could mere long possession without asserting the animus of hostility ripen into adverse possession? 2. Whether the lower Appellate Court has committed grave procedural illegality in not issuing the notice of appeal and application under Order 22, Rule 4 read with section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure to the proposed legal representatives? 3. Whether the lower Appellate court has further wrongly allowed the application of the respondents without there being any prayer for condonation of delay or setting aside the abatement, is not the appeal abated in its entirety?" 3. Facts relevant for the disposal of appeal may be stated. Plaintiffs claiming themselves to be the owner of land measuring 1 Bigha 9 Biswas and 17 Biswansi, bearing Khasra No. 321, situate in Muhal Bhour, Tehsil Sundernagar, District Mandi, filed a suit for possession of two small portions of this Khasra number, depicted by Khasra Nos. 321/1 and 321/2 in the Tatima attached with the plaint, alleging that these portions, total area of which measured 1 Biswa 1 Biswanis, had been encroached upon by respondent-defendant in the year 1980 and that on one portion he had raised construction and the other portion was occupied by him as vacant site. Suit was filed in the year 1991. 4. Defendant-respondent contested the suit and pleaded that he was in occupation of the suit land for the last 30 years, when he had construed a house thereon and that his possession was open, hostile and as of right. Suit was filed in the year 1991. 4. Defendant-respondent contested the suit and pleaded that he was in occupation of the suit land for the last 30 years, when he had construed a house thereon and that his possession was open, hostile and as of right. It was claimed by him that land bearing Khasra No.322 situated adjacent to Khasra No.321 had been purchased by him about 30 years back and that soon after purchasing that Khasra No.322, he constructed his house and before starting construction he got Khasra No.322 demarcated and the portion on which he constructed his house as also the portion, which was in his occupation as vacant site, were shown to form part of Khasra No.322. 5. Trial Court rejected the plea of adverse possession and decreed the suit. Appeal was carried to the Court of District Judge, who allowed the same upholding the plea of respondent-defendant that he had acquired title by prescription. 6. Appeal was filed against that judgment of the District Judge in this Court. It was brought to the notice of this Court, in the course of hearing of that appeal, that one of the plaintiffs, namely Lachhman, who was respondent in the appeal before the District Judge, had died during the pendency of appeal in the Court of District Judge and his legal representatives had not been brought on record. This Court remitted the case to the learned Additional District Judge after setting aside the judgment and directed that the matter be decided afresh, after passing appropriate orders on the application for representation of the estate of deceased respondent-plaintiff Lachhman. 7. Learned Additional District Judge decided the aforesaid application in favour of the respondent-defendant and allowed substitution of the legal representatives of deceased plaintiff-respondent Lachhman. 8. Appellants-plaintiffs allege that application for substitution of legal representatives of deceased plaintiff Lachhman had been moved after the expiry of period of limitation and there was no application for setting aside abatement and, hence, the order of first Appellate Court is bad. Also, it is alleged that order of substitution was passed ex-parte and that after passing that order no notice of the appeal was sent to the legal representatives of deceased plaintiff Lachhman, substituted as respondents in the first appeal. 9. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record. 10. Also, it is alleged that order of substitution was passed ex-parte and that after passing that order no notice of the appeal was sent to the legal representatives of deceased plaintiff Lachhman, substituted as respondents in the first appeal. 9. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record. 10. It is true that in the application for substitution of legal representatives of Lachhman, who was respondent in the first appeal before the District Judge, it was not mentioned in the heading of the application that it was under rule 9 of Order 22 CPC, but in the body of the application, prayer had been made for setting aside abatement, which prayer is made only, under the provision of rule 9 of order 22 CPC. Therefore, it cannot be said that there was any procedural illegality in setting aside the abatement and substituting the legal representatives of deceased Lachhman. 11. It is true that after the order for substitution of legal representatives of deceased Lachhman had been passed and his LRs had been ordered to be brought on record, no notice of the appeal was sent to them, despite the fact that the order of their substitution had been passed ex parte, but that by itself is not a ground for setting aside the judgment of the first Appellate Court, because a brother of Lachhman, who was joint owner with him in the suit property and was a party to the suit as plaintiff, was present through counsel, when the matter was heard and decided by the learned Additional District Judge. Said brother of Lachhman, whose name is Parkash, effectively represented the estate of Lachhman also. 12. In any case, legal representatives of deceased plaintiff Lachhman are now before this Court and are represented by a counsel and the only substantial question of law, touching the merits of the case, is with respect of the plea of defendant regarding adverse possession, for answering which question, entire evidence is required to be gone into by this Court and the prejudice, if any, which Lachhmans legal representatives, appellants herein, may have the feeling to have been caused to them, would get neutralized. 13. Now coming to the merits of the case, suit was filed in the year 1991. 13. Now coming to the merits of the case, suit was filed in the year 1991. In the plaint it was specifically pleaded that portions of Khasra No.321, which are subject matter of the lis, had been encroached upon in the year 1980. Defendant denied this averment of the plaintiffs and pleaded that he had purchased Khasra No.322, adjacent to Khasra No.321, about 30 years back and soon thereafter he constructed a house thereon, after obtaining demarcation from the revenue officials, in the course of which, portions of Khasra No.321, which are now subject matter of the suit, were shown to form part of Khasra No.322. 14. During the course of evidence, defendant Dhannu (now dead and represented by his legal representatives) appeared as DW-1 and testified, in no uncertain terms, that he had constructed the house about 25 years back and that when he was constructing the same, plaintiff Lachhman (now dead and represented by his legal representatives) had objected to the construction of the house, saying that portion of his land bearing Khasra No.321 was being utilised under that construction and despite such objection he constructed the house. 15. Lachhman appeared as PW-4 to rebut the testimony of defendant Dhannu (DW1). Though he stated that the house had been constructed only 8-9 years back, yet he deposed that at the time when house was constructed, he objected to its construction, meaning thereby that he accepted the statement of Dhannu that there was an objection by Lachhman, when the house was constructed and despite that objection, he completed the construction of the house. 16. Statement of Lachhman that the house was constructed 8-9 years back is not true, even according to the pleadings. Suit was instituted in the year 1991 in which it was stated that the house was constructed in the year 1980. Plaintiff Lachhman appeared in the witness box in the year 1992 or say more than a year after the institution of the suit and while in the witness box, he testified that house was constructed 8-9 years back, though according to averments in the plaint, the house was supposed to have been constructed 12 years prior to his entering the witness box. 17. 17. Parkash, the other plaintiff, who became joint owner with Lachhman, only 2-3 years before the institution of the suit, appeared as PW-1 and testified that the house was constructed about 9-10 years back and that he had objected to the construction being raised by Dhannu. When Parkash had become joint owner with Lachhman only 2-3 years before the institution of the suit, where was the occasion for him to have objected to the construction of house by defendant Dhannu. 18. A suit had earlier been filed by Dhannu against Parkash for issuance of permanent prohibitory injunction, restraining him from interfering in his possession of the house constructed by him. In that case, Parkash appeared as DW-1 and made statement Ext. DA. In the said statement, he categorically stated that the house, in question, had been constructed by Dhannu (defendant in this case) about 18-20 years back. He was duly confronted with the said statement Ext. DA. He did not deny having made such statement. He stated that such statement was incorrect. However, he offered no explanation for making such an incorrect statement, except for saying that he happened to make such statement by mistake. The aforesaid statement is an admission by plaintiff Parkash and can be used as a piece of substantive evidence in favour of respondent-defendant. 19. Above discussed evidence, thus, proves, beyond doubt, that the defendant-respondent had encroached upon the suit land more than 12 years prior to the institution of the suit and his possession was hostile, because he completed the construction despite objection by the plaintiffs and, thus, acquired title by prescription. 20. In view of the above discussion, all the three substantial questions of law, on which appeal was admitted, are answered against the appellants-plaintiffs and consequently, appeal is dismissed.