JUDGMENT R.N. BISWAL, J. : In this writ petition, the petitioner has assailed the judgment dated 28.3.2009 passed by learned Addl. District Judge, Bhadrak in Election Misc. appeal no. 54 of 2008 confirming the judgment dated 26.9.2008 passed by learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) Bhadrak in Election Misc. Case No. 121 of 2007 wherein he allowed the election petition and the election of the writ petitioner was declared illegal and void. 2. The present opp. party was the election petitioner and the petitioner was the opp. party in Election Misc. Case No. 121 of 2007. As per the case of election petitioner, she along with opp. party and two others contested for the office of Sarpanch of Guamal Gram Panchayat in the last election. The said office was reserved for women candidate belonging to Socially and Economi¬cally Backward Class (hereinafter referred to as “S.E.B.C.”). Opp. party was born in a Karana family and as such she was Karana by caste, which does not come under S.E.B.C. category and as such she was not duly qualified to contest the election. Her father Prafulla Chandra Mohanty was a native of village Tangi, but migrated to Puri town around 20 years back. At present, he resides in Bhoodan Nagar, Penthakata under Sea Beach Police Sta¬tion of Puri town. On 15.1.2007 at about 1.30 P.M. opp. party filed her nomination paper falsely stating that she belonged to Baishya caste. The petitioner made objection to it at the time of scrutiny, but the Returning Officer did not pay any heed to it and illegally accepted her nomination paper. It is the further case of election petitioner that an application was made to the Tahasildar, Tihidi to issue a caste certificate in favour of opp. party and the Tahasildar on enquiry came to know that she is the daughter of Dr. Prafulla Chandra Mohanty, who is practicing at Puri town. Accordingly, the Tahasildar, Tihidi sent information in his letter dated 21.2.2007 to the Tahasildar Puri. The con¬cerned Revenue Inspector under Puri Tahasildar made enquiry regarding the caste of Dr. Prafulla Chandra Mohanty vis-a-vis that of the opp. party. In his statement before the R.I. Dr. Mohanty admitted to be the father of opp. party and further stated that they belonged to Karan caste. The opp. party won in the election, so the election misc. case. 3. Opp. Prafulla Chandra Mohanty vis-a-vis that of the opp. party. In his statement before the R.I. Dr. Mohanty admitted to be the father of opp. party and further stated that they belonged to Karan caste. The opp. party won in the election, so the election misc. case. 3. Opp. party in her counter denied all the allegations averred against her in the election petition. It is her specific stand that she is not the daughter of Dr. Prafulla Chandra Mohan¬ty but daughter of late Prafulla Mohanty, who is the son of Lingaraj Mohanty. Late Prafulla Mohanty was Baisya Bania by caste. The father of opp. party is a native of Krupasagar Patna under Puri sadar Police Station. She was born to and brought up by late Prafulla Mohanty. It is the further stand of opp. party that she married to one Jayanta Samal of village Modasahi under Guamal G.P. in the year 1999 and since then she has been staying there. Her husband is Khetriya by caste and as such comes under the category of S.E.B.C. Opp. party defeated the petitioner in the election by a margin of 197 votes and was elected as Sar¬panch. Being envious the election petitioner filed the election Misc. case just to harass her and accordingly, she prays to dismiss the election petition. 4. On the basis of above pleadings of the parties learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) Bhadrak framed 7 issues. To prove her case, election petitioner examined herself as P.W. no.1 and did not prefer to examine any other witness. On the other hand, Opp. party examined 5 witnesses including herself as O.P.W.no.1. Both the parties also adduced some documentary evidence. After assessing the evidence on record, learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) held that opp. party is the daughter of Dr. Prafulla Mohanty son of Sadhu Mohanty of Puri and that she is Karan by caste and accordingly allowed the election misc. case and de¬clared the election of opp. party to the office of sarpanch of Guamal G.P. as void. 5. Being aggrieved with the said judgment opp. party in the election misc. case preferred election misc. appeal no. 54 of 2008 before learned Addl. District Judge, Bhadrak, who dismissed the appeal and confirmed the judgment of the trial court. The present writ petition has been filed by the unsuccessful appel¬lant. 6. 5. Being aggrieved with the said judgment opp. party in the election misc. case preferred election misc. appeal no. 54 of 2008 before learned Addl. District Judge, Bhadrak, who dismissed the appeal and confirmed the judgment of the trial court. The present writ petition has been filed by the unsuccessful appel¬lant. 6. At the out set, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the election of the petitioner was challenged only on the ground of improper acceptance of her nomination paper. There is no pleading challenging the election on the ground of disqualification. It is the fundamental principle of law that in absence of pleadings evidence cannot be looked into. So the trial court ought not to have declared the election of the petitioner void on the ground of her alleged disqualification. But in the present case, on perusal of the election petition it is found in paragraph-10 thereof that the opp. party has pleaded that Karan caste does not come under S.E.B.C. and as such the opp. party is not duly qualified to contest for the office of Sarpanch of Guamal G.P. as the same has been reserved for S.E.B.C. woman. Issue no.5-”whether opp. party is disqualified to the post of sarpanch of Guamal G.P. which has been reserved for women S.E.B.C. candidate?” was also framed by learned trial court. So, the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is wrong in this respect. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that Exts. A,J and K, three vital documents, filed by the peti¬tioner were not discussed at all by the appellate court. Those documents show that the petitioner belongs to Baisya caste, which comes under S.E.B.C. category. Since, it is a triable issue; the appeal should not have been summarily dismissed. In support of his submission, he relied on the decision B.K. Sri Barsha (D) By L.R. & another Vs. M/s. Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd., Sureme-I(2008) 615. On the other hand, learned counsel for the opp. party contended that the appellate court confirmed the judgment of learned Civil Judge (Junior Division). So, it was not required to restate the effect of the evidence or the reasons given by the trial court. Expression of general agreement with reasons given by the lower court decision is sufficient. In support of his submission, he relied on the decision Girijanandin Devi and others Vs. Bijendra Narain Choudhary (1967) 1 SCR-93. So, it was not required to restate the effect of the evidence or the reasons given by the trial court. Expression of general agreement with reasons given by the lower court decision is sufficient. In support of his submission, he relied on the decision Girijanandin Devi and others Vs. Bijendra Narain Choudhary (1967) 1 SCR-93. On perusal of the judgment of the appellate court it is found that the appellate court has not discussed the documents Exts. A, J & K. But it has stated that the documentary evidence led by appellant (writ petitioner) never conclusively established that the appel¬lant belongs to S.E.B.C. category. In the decision B.K. Shri Harsha (supra) the apex court held that when triable issues are involved the appeal should not be summarily dismissed or disposed of in the manner done. In the decision Girija nandin Devi (supra) the apex court held as follows:- “It is not the duty of the appellate court when it agrees with the view of the trial court on the evidence either to re¬state the effect of evidence or to reiterate the reasons given by the trial court. Expression of general agreement that reasons given by the court decision of which is under appeal court ordi¬narily suffice.” 8. In the decision B.K. Sri Harsha (supra) the suit was for specific performance and the trial court recorded findings about adverse possession. So it was held that when triable issues were involved, the appeal should not summarily be dismissed. In my considered opinion, none discussion of the documents Exts. A, J. and K would not render the judgment of the appellate court nugatory. Moreover, those documents can not improve the case of petitioner. Ext. A is the certified copy of M.S.R.O.R. bearing khata no. 280, which shows that Prafulla Mohanty son of Lingaraj Mohanty is the recorded owner of said khata and his caste is Baisya Bania. Learned Civil Judge (Junior Division)did not give weightage to this document in view of Exts. 1, 2 and other docu¬ments, filed by the present opp. party which clearly proved that the writ petitioner is Karan by caste. It is found from Ext. 1, the voter list of the year 1995, that name of Prafulla Kumar Mohanty son of Sadhu Mohanty, residing in holding no. 44 of Penthakata,Puri has been recorded at Sl. no. 171 thereof. 1, 2 and other docu¬ments, filed by the present opp. party which clearly proved that the writ petitioner is Karan by caste. It is found from Ext. 1, the voter list of the year 1995, that name of Prafulla Kumar Mohanty son of Sadhu Mohanty, residing in holding no. 44 of Penthakata,Puri has been recorded at Sl. no. 171 thereof. In that holding name of other voters including the name of the opposite party (writ petitioner) are there. Similarly, in Sl. 177 of Ext. 2, the voter list of the year 2001, the name of Prafulla Mohanty son of Sadhu Mohanty residing in holding no. 44 finds place. The name of the writ petitioner also finds place in it. Exts. 3 and 4, the voter lists of the years 1995 and 2001 respectively, show that Prafulla Mohanty son of Lingaraj Mohanty resides in holding no. 89, in which name of the writ petitioner does not find place. If she is the daughter of Prafulla Mohanty son of Lingaraj Mohan¬ty,her name was expected to be there in those voter lists. There is also documentary evidence to show that Dr. Prafulla Mohanty son of Lingaraj Mohanty admitted that the writ petitioner is his daughter. So in view of these overwhelming evidence, the trial court did not give much importance to Ext. A. Ext. J is the enquiry report of Tahasildar, Puri with regard to caste of the writ petitioner and Ext.K is the R.I. report in that regard. The R.I. submitted his report on 27.6.2008 during trial of the Elec¬tion Misc. Case. Both Exts. J and K show that the writ petitioner belongs to Baisya caste. It was argued before learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) that in response to letter no. 1124 dated 5.6.2008 of the Tahasildar, Tihidi the Addl. Tahasildar enquired into the matter through the local R.I., but the said letter was not proved. There is also no material to show as to on whose application, the Tahasildar, Tihidi requested the Addl. Tahasil¬dar, Puri to enquire about the caste of the writ petitioner. If, in fact, the writ petitioner is Baisya by caste, there was no reason why she could not obtain a certificate to that regard from the concerned Tahasildar. On all these grounds the trial court did not give much weightage to Exts. J and K also, and it has rightly done so. 9. If, in fact, the writ petitioner is Baisya by caste, there was no reason why she could not obtain a certificate to that regard from the concerned Tahasildar. On all these grounds the trial court did not give much weightage to Exts. J and K also, and it has rightly done so. 9. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner further submits that as envisaged under Section 39 (1) (c) read with sub-section (2) of the Orissa Gram panchayat Act, 1964 (in short G.P. Act) election of the returned candidate cannot be declared void on the ground of improper acceptance of nomination, unless it is proved that such illegal acceptance of nomination materially affected the result of the election. In support of his submission he relied on the decision Santosh Yadav vs. Narendra Singh, AIR 2002 (S.C.) - 2041. In that decision, which relates to Section 100 (1) (c) and (d) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, the apex court held that the Parliament has drawn a clear distinction between improper rejection and improper acceptance of nominations. In the former case, to declare an election void,it is not necessary to further prove that the result of the election was materially affected. An improper rejection of any nomination paper is conclusive proof of the election being void. On the other hand, in the case of an improper acceptance of a nomination paper, proof is required by way of evidence demonstrating that the coming into the arena of an additional candidate has had the effect on the election in such a manner that the best choice of the electorate was excluded. At this stage, it would be profita¬ble to quote Section 100 (1) (c) and (d) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Section 100 (1) (c) and(d) reads as fol¬lows:- “100. Grounds for declaring election to be void. At this stage, it would be profita¬ble to quote Section 100 (1) (c) and (d) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Section 100 (1) (c) and(d) reads as fol¬lows:- “100. Grounds for declaring election to be void. - (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), if the High Court is of opinion- (a) xx xx xx xx (b) xx xx xx xx (c) that any nomination has been improperly rejected; or (d) that the result of the election, insofar as it concerns a returned candidate, has been materially affected- i) by the improper acceptance of any nomination, or ii) by any corrupt practice committed in the interests of the returned candidate by an agent other than his election agent, or iii) by the improper reception, refusal or rejection of any vote or the reception of any vote which is void, or iv) by any non-compliance with the provisions of the Consti¬tution or of this Act or of any rules or orders made under this Act, the High Court shall declare the election of the returned candidate to be void.” Sub-section (2) of Section 100 of the Representation of the People Act 1951 reads as follows:- “(2) If in the opinion of the High Court, a returned candi¬date has been guilty by an agent other than his election agent, of any corrupt practice but the High Court is satisfied (a) that no such corrupt practice was committed at the election by the candidate or his election agent, and every such corrupt practice was committed contrary to the orders, and with¬out the consent, of the candidate or his election agent; (b) xx xx xx (c) that the candidate and his election agent took all rea¬sonable means for preventing the commission of corrupt practices at the election; and (d) that in all other respects the election was free from any corrupt practice on the part of the candidate or any of his agents, then the High Court may decide that the election of the returned candidate is not void”. It would also be profitable to quote Section 39 (1) (c) and Section 39(2)of the G.P. Act. Section 39 (1) (c) reads as follows “39. It would also be profitable to quote Section 39 (1) (c) and Section 39(2)of the G.P. Act. Section 39 (1) (c) reads as follows “39. Grounds for declaring election void - (1) The Civil Judge (Junior Division) shall declare the election of a returned candidate void, if he is of the opinion- (a) xx xx xx (b) xx xx xx (c) that any nomination paper has been improperly rejected or accepted” Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the G.P. Act reads as follows:- “The election shall not be declared void merely on the ground of any mistake in the forms required thereby or of any error, irregularity or informality on the part of the officer or officers charged with carrying out the provisions of this Act or of any rules made there under unless such mistake, error,irregu¬larity or informality has materially affected the result of the election.” 10. So, as per Section 39 (1) (c) of the G.P. Act the election of a returned candidate shall be declared void if any nomination paper has been improperly rejected or accepted. Here there is no provision akin to Section 100 (1) (d) of the Repre¬sentation of the People Act. In the present case, the opp. party shall not require to prove that because of improper acceptance of nomination paper the result of the election insofar as it con¬cerns the returned candidate was materially affected. So, the decision cited by learned counsel for the petitioner will not be applicable to the instant case. Section 39 (1) of the G.P. Act is not subject to Sub-section 2 thereof. The said sub-section can not be regarded as a proviso to the main section. In fact there is a proviso to Section 39 (1) of the G.P. Act. If it was the intention of the Legislature to make sub-section (2) a proviso to section 39 (1), it would have,in its wisdom inserted it in sec¬tion 39 (1) itself. Moreover, as quoted earlier Section 100 (1) of the Representation of the People Act 1951 reads that “subject to provisions of sub-section (2) ..........”. But there is no such provision in Section 39 (1) of the G.P. Act. So, it is clear that Section 39 (1) of G.P. Act is not subject sub-section (2) thereof. Moreover, as quoted earlier Section 100 (1) of the Representation of the People Act 1951 reads that “subject to provisions of sub-section (2) ..........”. But there is no such provision in Section 39 (1) of the G.P. Act. So, it is clear that Section 39 (1) of G.P. Act is not subject sub-section (2) thereof. Otherwise also, considering the nature of the present case, sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the G.P. Act,in no way would be helpful to the writ petitioner. Furthermore, opp. party in her election petition has taken the stand that the opp. party is disqualified to contest the election since she does not come under S.E.B.C. category. As per Section 39 (1) (a) of the G.P. Act the Civil Judge (Junior Division) shall declare the election of returned candidate void, if he is of the opinion that on the date of his election the candidate was not qualified or was disqualified to be elected. In the case at hand, since the present petitioner does not come under the category of S.E.B.C. as she is Karana by caste, she was not qualified to contest in the election. On this ground also, election of the writ petition¬er can be declared void. 11. Therefore, on the aforesaid premises, I do not find any illegality or perversity in the judgment of the appellate court, confirming the judgment of the trial court, so as to be inter¬fered with by this Court in writ jurisdiction. Accordingly,the writ petition stands dismissed being devoid of merit. No cost. Petition dismissed.