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2010 DIGILAW 86 (PNJ)

Sudhir Kumar v. Omwati

2010-01-06

VINOD K.SHARMA

body2010
Judgment VINOD K.SHARMA, J. 1. The appellant-owner of the motor cycle No. HR-12f-1504 has filed this appeal against the award passed by the learned Motor Accident claims Tribunal, Rohtak allowing the claim petition filed under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 . 2. The claimant-respondent sought compensation for death of rakesh Kumar, on the pleadings that on 5.7.2004 the appellant along with rakesh Kumar was travelling on motor cycle No. HR-12f-1504 to Bharat colony, Rohtak. The motor cycle was being driven by deceased Rakesh kumar. When the motor cycle reached near the red light of Shiela Bye-pass the motor cycle slipped, and resultantly Rakesh Kumar and the appellant fell on the ground. Rakesh Kumar died due to the injuries suffered in the accident. 3. In spite of service the appellant did not appear to contest the claim petition. The award was passed by the learned Tribunal against the insurance Company. However, keeping in view the fact that no licence of rakesh Kumar was produced on record, the Insurance Company was given liberty to recover the amount from the owner i. e. the appellant. 4. The appellant has challenged the impugned award, by placing on record, the Driving licence of Rakesh Kumar showing that late Rakesh kumar had driving licence. The learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, therefore, was not justified in permitting the insurance company to recover the amount from the appellant, though the liability fixed was joint and several. 5. The appeal is contested by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No.3-Insurance Company on the plea that, as per the admitted fact, no liability could be fixed on the Insurance Company for the accident. Admittedly the motor cycle was handed over to the deceased by the appellant, who was owner of the motor cycle and he was a pillion rider with him. Therefore late Shri Rakesh Kumar was to be treated as owner for all intents and purposes. 6. In support of this contention the learned counsel for the respondent placed reliance on the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Ningamma and another Vs. United India Insurance Co. Therefore late Shri Rakesh Kumar was to be treated as owner for all intents and purposes. 6. In support of this contention the learned counsel for the respondent placed reliance on the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Ningamma and another Vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. 2009 ACJ 2020, wherein the Honble Supreme Court has answered the following question:- "Whether the legal representatives of a person, who was driving a motor vehicle, after borrowing it from the real owner meets with an accident without involving any other vehicle, would be entitled to compensation under section 163-A of MVA or under any other provision (s) of law and also whether the insurer who issued the insurance policy would be bound to indemnify the deceased or his legal representative? The question raised has been answered as under :- Before dwelling further, it would be useful to discuss the relevant paras of section 163-A and 166 of the MVA applicable in the present case. "163-A. Special provisions as to payment of compensation on structured formula basis.-- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force or instrument having the force of law, the owner of the motor vehicle of the authorised insurer shall be liable to pay in the case of death or permanent disablement due to accident arising out of the use of motor vehicle, compensation, as indicated in the Second Schedule, to the legal heirs or the victim, as the case may be. X X X X X X X X X (2) In any claim for compensation under sub-section (1), the claimant shall not be required to plead or establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other person. (3) The Central government may, keeping in view the cost of living by notification in the official Gazette, from time to time amend the Second Schedule." 166. (3) The Central government may, keeping in view the cost of living by notification in the official Gazette, from time to time amend the Second Schedule." 166. Application for compensation- (1) An application for compensation arising out of an accident of the nature specified in sub-section (1) of section 165 may be made- (a) by the person who has sustained the injury; or (b) by the owner of the property; or (c) where death has resulted from the accident, by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased; or (d) by any agent duly authorised by the person injured or all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased, as the case may be: Provided that where all the legal representatives of the deceased have not joined in any such application for compensation, the application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased and the legal representatives who have not so joined, shall be impleaded as respondents to the application. . . . . " "19. We have already extracted Sec.163-A of the MVA hereinbefore. A bare perusal of the said provision would make it explicitly clear that persons like the deceased in the present case would step into the shoes of the owner of the vehicle. In a case wherein the victim died or where he was permanently disabled due to an accident arising out of the aforesaid motor vehicle in that event the liability to make payment of the compensation is on the insurance company or the owner, as the case may be as provided under Sec.163-A. But if it is proved that the driver is the owner of the motor vehicle, in that case the owner could not himself be a recipient of compensation as the liability to pay the same is on him. This proposition is absolutely clear on a reading of Section 163-A of the MVA. Accordingly, the legal representatives of the deceased who have stepped into the shoes of the owner of the motor vehicle could not have claimed compensation under Sec.163-A of the MVA." 7. In view of the authoritative pronouncement by the Honble supreme Court, the order passed by the learned Motor Accident Claims tribunal deserves to be upheld, though for a different reason. In view of the authoritative pronouncement by the Honble supreme Court, the order passed by the learned Motor Accident Claims tribunal deserves to be upheld, though for a different reason. The liability of the Insurance Company was not to pay the compensation, which was to be paid by the appellant being owner in terms of Sec.163-A of the motor Vehicles Act. 8. Even otherwise this appeal is barred by limitation, as there is delay of 324 days in filing the present appeal. The only ground taken for condonation of delay is that the appellant was not aware, of the award passed and he came to know about it only on receipt of notice of execution. 9. This plea is not only vague and lacking material particulars but is also against facts as recorded by the learned Motor Accident Claims tribunal, wherein it has been categorically held that in spite of notice, the appellant has chosen not to appear. It cannot, therefore, be said that the award was not within the knowledge of the appellant. 10. No ground muchless sufficient ground for condoning the delay is made out. The appeal is dismissed on merit, as well as being time barred.