Kuldip Singh , Judge 1. The plaintiff has come in second appeal against the judgment, decree dated 18.7.2000 passed by learned District Judge, Chamba in Civil Appeal No. 58 of 1999 reversing judgment, decree dated 29.7.1999 passed by the learned Sub Judge 1st Class, Dalhousie in Civil Suit No. 69 of 1994. 2. The facts, in brief, are that the appellant had filed a suit for declaration that sale deed dated 19.6.1993 executed by respondent No.2 in favour of respondent No.1 is illegal, void, without jurisdiction and inoperative on the rights of the appellant with consequential relief of possession and permanent prohibitory injunction. The respondent No.1 was defendant No.2 and respondent No.2 was defendant No.1 in the suit. 3. The further case of the appellant is that he constituted a co-parcenary and joint Hindu family with respondent No. 2 and they are coparceners. The pedigree table relied by the appellant in the plaint is as follows: 4. It is the case of the appellant that Sajjad Villa more particularly described in the plaint was recorded in the ownership of Baba Surinder Singh Karta of family and common ancestor of appellant and respondent No.2. Baba Surinder Singh died on 19.1.1988 and after his death the suit property was inherited by joint Hindu family of appellant and respondent No.2 and came in the hands of respondent No.2 being Karta of the joint Hindu family of the appellant and respondent No.2. They are coparceners and the suit property is coparcenary property of appellant and respondent No.2. 5. The respondent No.2 had wasteful nature. The respondent No.2 sold the suit property on 19.6.1993 without any legal necessity of the family at throw-away price. The sale consideration was wasted and was not spent on the joint Hindu family. The transfer of the suit property was a great loss to the Hindu Undivided Family. The appellant requested the respondents not to waste the property by transfer or sale but they refused to accede to the request of the appellant. On 2.8.1993 the appellant requested respondent No.1 to return the possession and cancel the transfer deed but without any positive result hence the suit was filed for declaration, possession and injunction as noticed above. 6. The suit was contested by respondent No.2 by filing written statement. He admitted the pedigree table, description of the property. He denied that suit property was sold without legal necessity. 6. The suit was contested by respondent No.2 by filing written statement. He admitted the pedigree table, description of the property. He denied that suit property was sold without legal necessity. He has also denied that sale consideration was not spent on the joint Hindu family. He prayed for dismissal of the suit. 7. The respondent No.1 also contested the suit by filing written statement and took preliminary objections of maintainability, jurisdiction of the Court to try the suit, appellant all the time had been assisting his father for selling the property to respondent No.1, he was even present alongwith his mother at the time of registration of the sale deed before Sub Registrar and, therefore, on account of his conduct he is debarred from assailing the sale, the suit has been filed by appellant in collusion with respondent No.2. On merits, it has been denied that appellant and respondent No.2 constitute co-parcenary and they are members of the joint Hindu Family. The respondent No.2 was the sole owner of Sajjad Villa after the death of late Baba Surinder Singh. The property was inherited by respondent No.2 not as Karta of the Hindu Undivided Family. It has been denied that the property was not sold for legal necessity or sale consideration was not utilized for the benefit of the family. 8. The respondent No.2 entered into an agreement with respondent No.1 for sale of the property on 19.6.1991, thereafter respondent No.1 obtained permission from Government of Himachal Pradesh to purchase the building and after receiving the permission the sale deed was executed by respondent No.2 in favour of respondent No.1 through his wife who was having special power of attorney to execute the sale deed. The appellant accompanied her mother at the time of registration of the sale deed. The suit is collusive with respondent No.2 The respondent No.1 prayed for dismissal of the suit. 9. On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed:- 1. Whether the sale deed dated 19.6.1993 executed by defendant No.1 in favour of defendant No.2 is illegal, void and without jurisdiction? .. OPP. 2. Whether the suit property is a co-parcenary property as alleged? ..OPP. 3. Whether the alienation made by defendant No.1 in favour of defendant No.2 is without legal necessity as alleged? …OPP. 4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the injunction as prayed? .. OPP 5. .. OPP. 2. Whether the suit property is a co-parcenary property as alleged? ..OPP. 3. Whether the alienation made by defendant No.1 in favour of defendant No.2 is without legal necessity as alleged? …OPP. 4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the injunction as prayed? .. OPP 5. Whether the suit is not maintainable ? OPD-2. 6. Whether this Court has no jurisdiction ? OPD-2. 7. Whether the plaintiff is estopped by his act and conduct? …OPD-2. 8. Whether the suit has collusively been filed as alleged? …OPD-2. 9. Relief. The issues No. 1 to 4 were answered in affirmative and issues No. 5 to 8 in negative and the suit was decreed by learned Sub Judge on 29.7.1999 and a decree for declaration was passed in favour of the appellant declaring sale deed dated 19.6.1993 null and void and respondents were restrained from alienating the suit property to anybody. The decision dated 29.7.1999 was assailed in appeal by respondent No.1 and learned District Judge on 18.7.2000 allowed the appeal and set-aside judgment, decree dated 29.7.1999 passed by learned Sub Judge. In these circumstances, the plaintiff has come in second appeal which has been admitted on the following substantial questions of law: 1. Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the property in dispute has devolved upon the heirs of Baba Surinder Singh Bedi under proviso to Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act. 2. Whether in view of the proviso of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act the succession of property of Baba Surinder Singh Bedi on his heirs under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act will change the nature and nomenclature of property from ancestral/coparcenary property to that of self acquired property. 10. I have heard Mr. Ajay Kumar, Advocate, learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. K.D.Sood, Advocate, learned counsel for respondent No.1 and Mr. M.A.Khan, Advocate, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No.2 and have also gone through the record. The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the suit property has been proved to be coparcenary property which was at one point of time owned by Baba Surinder Singh who died on 19.1.1988. Late Baba Surinder Singh was the common ancestor of respondent No.2 and appellant who are father and son. The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the suit property has been proved to be coparcenary property which was at one point of time owned by Baba Surinder Singh who died on 19.1.1988. Late Baba Surinder Singh was the common ancestor of respondent No.2 and appellant who are father and son. The suit property in the hands of respondent No.2 on 19.6.1993 at the time of sale was ancestral /coparcenary property with appellant a member of coparcenary headed by respondent No.2. The sale being without legal necessity, therefore, appellant has every right to assail the sale dated 19.6.1993. He has submitted that learned Sub Judge had rightly decreed the suit of the appellant but learned District Judge has mis-construed, misinterpreted Sections 6, 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (for short ‘Act’). The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that respondents have failed to prove legal necessity. He has submitted for acceptance of the appeal, setting-aside of impugned judgment, decree and restoration of the judgment and decree passed by learned Sub Judge. 11. The learned counsel for respondent No.1 has submitted that the suit property in the hands of respondent No.2 on 19.6.1993 was not ancestral / coparcenary property. The sale deed executed by respondent No.2 in favour of respondent No.1 on 19.6.1993 is legal. He has submitted that appellant actively participated in the execution of the sale deed and, therefore, appellant is debarred from questioning the sale deed. He has supported the impugned judgment, decree. The learned counsel for respondent No.2 has supported the impugned judgment, decree. 12. The above substantial questions of law No.1 and 2 are interconnected, therefore, both of them can be conveniently considered and disposed of collectively. Ex.P-1 is the copy of sale deed dated 19.6.1993 vide which respondent No.2 through his attorney has sold Sajjad Villa to respondent No.1 for a consideration of Rs. 10,00,000/- which was registered on 19.6.1993 before Sub Registrar, Dalhousie. As per sale deed Ex.P-1 Sajjad Villa is situate on khasra Nos. 2127, 2128, 2129, 2130, 2132 and 2133. Ex.P-2 is the Missal Haquiat in which Surinder Singh S/o Gurbax Singh is shown owner in possession of the suit property. 10,00,000/- which was registered on 19.6.1993 before Sub Registrar, Dalhousie. As per sale deed Ex.P-1 Sajjad Villa is situate on khasra Nos. 2127, 2128, 2129, 2130, 2132 and 2133. Ex.P-2 is the Missal Haquiat in which Surinder Singh S/o Gurbax Singh is shown owner in possession of the suit property. In remarks column of Ex.P-2 it has been stated that vide mutation No. 48 of partition dated 20.9.1991 as per order of A.C. IInd Grade khasra No. 2127 to 2131 and Khasra No. 2133, Kittas 6, total measuring 0-54-46 hectares was attested in favour of Manmohan Singh S/o Surinder Singh. Ex.P-3 is the copy of Jamabandi for the year 199293 indicating suit property is owned and possessed by Surinder Singh S/o Gurbax Singh. In remarks column of Ex.P-3 reference of mutation No. 48 of partition has been given. In remarks column, it has further been stated that vide mutation No. 125 suit property has been sold by Manmohan Singh in favour of Guru Nanak Dev University for Rs. 10,00,000/- and the mutation was attested on 30.9.1994. Ex.DW-1/B is the application under Section 14 of the Indian Arbitration Act for making award dated 27.6.1988 as rule of the Court. The award dated 27.6.1988 was made rule of the court on 7.10.1988 by the learned Sub Judge, Jalandhar in arbitration case No. 125 of 1988. There is no denial of the fact that the suit property at one point of time was owned by Baba Surinder Singh father of respondent No.2 and grand-father of appellant, who died on 19.1.1988. The suit property alongwith other properties were partitioned by way of award dated 27.6.1988 which was made rule of the Court on 7.10.1988. The suit property fell to the share of respondent No.2. 13. The question is what was the character of suit property in the hands of respondent No.2 when it fell to his share by way of award dated 27.6.1988. The learned counsel for the appellant has contended that character of suit property in the hands of respondent No.2 after award remained ancestral qua appellant. He has every right to question the sale dated 19.6.1993 made by respondent No.2 in favour of respondent No.1 as the sale was without the consent of appellant and without legal necessity. The learned counsel for the appellant has contended that character of suit property in the hands of respondent No.2 after award remained ancestral qua appellant. He has every right to question the sale dated 19.6.1993 made by respondent No.2 in favour of respondent No.1 as the sale was without the consent of appellant and without legal necessity. Per contra, the learned counsel for respondent No.1 has submitted that property after the death of common ancestor Baba Surinder Singh on 19.1.1988 and partition award dated 27.6.1988 in the hands of respondent No.2 had lost the character of ancestral/coparcenary property and, therefore, respondent No.2 had every right to sell the suit property to respondent No.1 for consideration. 14. Intestate succession of Hindu is provided in Chapter II of the Act. Section 6 of the Act at the relevant time was as follows:- “Devolution of interest in coparcenary property.- When a male Hindu dies after the commencement of this Act, having at the time of his death an interest in a Mitakshara coparcenary property, his interest in the property shall devolve by survivorship upon the surviving members of the coparcenary and not in accordance with this Act: Provided that , if the deceased had left him surviving a female relative specified in class 1 of the Schedule or a male relative specified in that class who claims through such female relative, the interest of the deceased in the Mitakshara coparcenary property shall devolve by testamentary or intestate succession, as the case may be, under this Act and not by survivorship. Explanation 1. – For the purposes of this section, the interest of a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to be the share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of the property had taken place immediately before his death, irrespective of whether he was entitled to claim partition or not. Explanation 2. – Nothing contained in the proviso to this section shall be construed as enabling a person who has separated himself from the coparcenary before the death of the deceased or any of his heirs to claim on intestacy a share in the interest referred to therein.” The Section 8 of the Act is as follows:- “General rules of succession in the case of males. – The property of a male Hindu dying intestate shall devolve according to the provisions of this Chapter – (a) firstly, upon the heirs, being the relatives specified in class I of the Schedule ; (b) secondly, if there is no heir of class I, then upon the heirs, being the relatives specified in class II of the Schedule; (c) thirdly, if there is no heir of any of the two classes, then upon the agnates of the deceased ; and (d) lastly, if there is no agnate, then upon the cognates of the deceased.” 15. The appellant in para 2 of the plaint has pleaded that Baba Surinder Singh had died on 19.1.1988. Thus, the succession regarding the estate of Baba Surinder Singh common ancestor of appellant and respondent No.2 had opened on 19.1.1988. There is nothing on record how Baba Surinder Singh had acquired the property including the property in dispute, but it is not of much significance inasmuch as it is nobody’s case that the property of late Baba Surinder Singh was to devolve on his successors by some mode other than succession provided under the Act. 16. The question of interpretation of Sections 4, 6 and 8 of the Act has come up for decision in several cases in the past. In Shrivallabhdas Modani Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, M.P.-1, 138 ITR 673 the question No.2 referred to the High Court for decision was as follows:- “Whether the property which devolved on Shri Shrivallabhdas on the death of his father, Gokalchand, also constituted the HUF property consisting of his own branch including his sons.” The High Court after noticing Sections 4, 8 of the Act has held as follows:- “Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act lays down the scheme of succession to the property of a Hindu dying intestate. The schedule classifies the heirs on whom such property shall devolve. Those specified in class I take simultaneously to the exclusion of all other heirs. A son’s son is not mentioned as an heir under class I of the Schedule and, therefore, he cannot get any right in the property of his grandfather under this provision. The schedule classifies the heirs on whom such property shall devolve. Those specified in class I take simultaneously to the exclusion of all other heirs. A son’s son is not mentioned as an heir under class I of the Schedule and, therefore, he cannot get any right in the property of his grandfather under this provision. The right of a son’s son in his grand father’s property during the lifetime of his father which existed under the Hindu law as in force before the Act, is not saved expressly by the Act and, therefore, the earlier interpretation of Hindu law giving a right by birth in such property “ceased to have effect”. The High Court ultimately held as follows :- “We, therefore, answer question No.2 as follows: The property which devolved on the assessee, Shrivallabhdas on the death of his father, Gokalchand, did not constitute the HUF property consisting of his own branch including his sons. The answer is in the negative and against the assessee.” 17. The question before the Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Commissioner of Wealth Tax, A.P.-II Vs. Mukundgirji, 144 ITR 18 was as follows:- “Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the properties devolved on the assessee on his father’s death are assessable in the status of ‘Individual’ or in the status of ‘Hindu undivided family’?” The High Court after noticing several provisions of the Act held as follows: “Accordingly, we are of the opinion that the properties which devolve upon a heir mentioned in class I of the Schedule under S. 8 constitute his absolute properties, and that his sons have no right by birth in such properties and cannot, therefore, claim any share or sue for partition of such properties.” The High Court ultimately answered the question as follows:- “For the above reasons, we answer the question referred to us in the following words: The properties which devolved upon the assessee on his father’s death are assessable in the status of “individual’ and not in the status of ‘Hindu undivided family” comprising of the assessee and his son or sons, as the case may be. The answer shall be in favour of the Department and against the assessee. There shall be no order as to costs.” 18. The answer shall be in favour of the Department and against the assessee. There shall be no order as to costs.” 18. The remarks column of Ex.P-3 jamabandi for the year 1992-93 indicates that mutation of succession No.47 on the death of Baba Surinder Singh was attested on 31.7.1991. The estate of Baba Surinder Singh was mutated in favour of Sardool Singh, Manmohan Singh, Anup Singh, Harinder Singh, Gurdeep Singh sons of Surinder Singh S/o Gurbax Singh equal share five shares, Gajinder Singh, son and Smt. Raj widow of Abhininder Singh son of Surinder Singh equal share one share. It is thus clear on the death of Surinder Singh, Gajinder Singh, son and Smt. Raj, widow of Abhininder Singh son of Surinder Singh also succeeded to the estate of Surinder Singh. 19. In Gurupad Khandappa Magdum Vs. Hirabai Khandappa Magdum and others, AIR 1978 S.C. 1239, Section 6 of the Act was considered and the Court has held as follows:- ”The Hindu Succession Act came into force on June 17, 1956. Khandappa having died after the commencement of that Act, to wit in 1960, and since he had at the time of his death an interest in mitakshara coparcenary property, the pre-conditions of S. 6 are satisfied and that section is squarely attracted. By the application of the normal rule prescribed by that section, Khandappa’s interest in the coparcenary property would devolve by survivorship upon the surviving members of the coparcenary and not in accordance with the provisions of the Act. But, since the widow and daughter are amongst the female relatives specified in Class I of the Schedule to the Act and Khandappa died leaving behind a widow and daughters, the proviso to S. 6 comes into play and the normal rule is excluded. Khandappa’s interest in the coparcenary property would therefore devolve, according to the proviso, by intestate succession under the Act and not by survivorship. Testamentary succession is out of question as the deceased had not made a testamentary disposition though, under the explanation to S. 30 of the Act, the interest of a male Hindu in mitakshara coparcenary property is capable of being disposed of by a will or other testamentary disposition.” 20. The devolution of coparcenary property under Section 6 was again considered by the Apex Court in Smt. Raj Rani Vs. The devolution of coparcenary property under Section 6 was again considered by the Apex Court in Smt. Raj Rani Vs. The Chief Settlement Commissioner, Delhi and others, AIR 1984 S.C. 1234 and in para 17 of the report the Court has held as follows:- “There is no dispute that Nanak Chand died leaving behind his widow, three sons and three daughters. Dewan Chand fraudulently obtained an order alleging that Nanak Chand died leaving behind only three sons. If Nanak Chand died after the enforcement of the Hindu Succession Act, as found earlier, obviously his wodow, three sons and three daughters would succeed to his interest in equal shares, which would work out to 1/7th. Now, the question arises what was the interest of Nanak Chand at the time of his death. As the property in question was Mitakshara coparcenary property, his interest would be determined in accordance with the provisions of Explanation I of S.6 of the Hindi Succession Act. It would be appropriate at this stage to read Sec. 6 insofar as it is material for the purposes of this case: “6. When a male Hindu dies after the commencement of this Act, having at the time of his death an interest in a Mitakshara coparcenary property, his interest in the property shall devolve by survivorship upon the surviving members of the coparcenary and not in accordance with this Act: Provided that, if the deceased had left his surviving a female relative specified in Class I of the Schedule or a male relative, specified in that class who claims, through such female relative, the interest of the deceased in the Mitakshara coparcenary property shall devolve by testamentary or intestate succession, as the case may be, under this Act and not by survivorship. Explanation I. – For the purposes of this section, the interest of a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to be the share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of the property had taken place immediately before his death, irrespective of whether he was entitled to claim partition or not.” The interest of Nanak Chand shall be deemed to be the share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of the property had taken place immediately before his death irrespective of whether he was entitled to claim partition or not. In view of Explanation I of Sec. 6, Nanak Chand would have got 1/5th interest on partition between him and his wife and three sons. If once the interest of Nanak Chand is determined to be 1/5th before his death, his interest would devolve upon his widow, three sons and three daughters equally and thus the share of each one of them would be 1/5 x 1/7, that is, 1/35th each. The claim of these heirs cannot be denied merely because some of them have not advanced the claim. When the question of determination of share among the heirs crops up before the Court, the Court has to see that every heir gets his due. Shri Itorora appearing for the respondents could not successfully meet the point raised on behalf of the appellant.” 21. The Supreme Court in Commissioner of Wealth-tax, Kanpur vs. Chander Sen AIR 1986 SC 1753 in para 17 of the report has noticed the following views of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in 144 ITR 18 as follows :- “Accordingly, we are of the opinion that the properties which devolve upon a heir mentioned in class I of the Schedule under S. 8 constitute his absolute properties, and that his sons have no right by birth in such properties and cannot, therefore, claim any share or sue for partition of such properties.” The Supreme Court has further observed that aforesaid reasoning of the High Court appearing at Pages 23 to 26 of Justice Reddy’s view in 144 ITR 18 appears to be convincing. The Supreme Court in para 20 of the report has held as follows: “In view of the Preamble to the Act i.e. that to modify where necessary and to codify the law, in our opinion it is not possible when Schedule indicates heirs in Class I and only includes son and does not include son’s son but does include son of a predeceased son, to say that when son inherits the property in the situation contemplated by S. 8 he takes it as karta of his own undivided family. The Gujarat High Court’s view noted above, if accepted, would mean that though the son of a predeceased son and not the son of a son who is intended to be excluded under S. 8 to inherit, the latter would by applying the old Hindu law get a right by birth of the said property contrary to the scheme outlined in S. 8. Furthermore as noted by the Andhra Pradesh High Court the Act makes it clear by S. 4 that one should look to the Act in case of doubt and not to the pre-existing Hindu law. It would be difficult to hold today the property which devolved on a Hindu under S.8 of the Hindu Succession Act would be HUF property in his hand vis-à-vis his own son; that would amount to creating two classes among the heirs mentioned in Class I, the male heirs in whose hands it will be joint Hindu family property and vis-à-vis son and female heirs with respect to whom no such concept could be applied or contemplated. It may be mentioned that heirs in Class I of Schedule under S. 8 of the Act included widow, mother, daughter of predeceased son etc.” The Supreme Court in Commissioner of Wealth-tax (supra) has considered 138 ITR 673, 144 ITR 18 and approved the views expressed by Madhya Pradesh High Court and Andhra Pradesh High Court. 22. In Yudhishter Vs. Ashok Kumar AIR 1987 S.C. 558, the Supreme Court considered the question whether respondent was a licensee of his father or a co-owner of the property namely ancestor house. The Supreme Court in para 10 of the report has held as follows:- “This question has been considered by this Court in Commr. Of Wealth Tax, Kanpur v. Chander Sen, (1986) 3 SCC 567 : (AIR 1986 SC 1753), where one of us (Sabyasachi Mukharji, J.) observed that under the Hindu Law, the moment a son is born, he gets a share in father’s property and becomes part of the coparcenary. His right accrues to him not on the death of the father or inheritance from the father but with the very fact of his birth. His right accrues to him not on the death of the father or inheritance from the father but with the very fact of his birth. Normally therefore, whenever the father gets a property from whatever source from the grandfather or from any other source, be it separate property or not, his son should have a share in that and it will become part of the joint Hindu family of his son and grandson and other members who form joint Hindu family with him. This Court observed that this position has been affected by Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act 1956 and, therefore, after the Act, when the son inherited the property in the situation contemplated by Section 8, he does not take it as Kar of his own undivided family but takes it in his individual capacity. At pages 577 to 578 (of SCC) (at p.1760 of AIR) of the report this Court dealt with the effect of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act 1956 and the commentary made by Mulla, 15th Edn. Pages 924-926 as well as Mayne’s on Hindu Law 12th Edition pages 918-919. Shri Banerji relied on the said observations of Mayne on ‘Hindu Law’, 12th Edn. At pages 918919. This Court observed in the aforesaid decision that the views expressed by the Allahabad High Court the Madras High Court, the Madhya Pradesh High Court and the Andhra Pradesh High Court appeared to be correct and was unable to accept the views of the Gujarat High Court. To the similar effect is the observation of learned author of Mayne’s Hindu Law, 12th Edn. Page 919. In that view of the matter it would be difficult to hold that property which devolved on a Hindu under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 would be HUF in his hand vis-à-vis his own sons. If that be the position then the property which devolved upon the father of the respondent in the instant case on the demise of his grandfather could not be said to be HUF property. If that is so, then the appellate authority was right in holding that the respondent was a licensee of his father in respect of the ancestral house.” 23. The learned counsel for the appellant has relied Ruli Ram (deceased) through L.R. and others Vs. If that is so, then the appellate authority was right in holding that the respondent was a licensee of his father in respect of the ancestral house.” 23. The learned counsel for the appellant has relied Ruli Ram (deceased) through L.R. and others Vs. Amar Singh AIR 1994 H.P. 102 and has submitted that character of the property after partition in the hands of respondent No.2 shall remain ancestral. He has relied para 23 of the report wherein the learned Single Judge has observed that there is no doubt with the legal proposition that the share which a co-parcener obtains on partition in an ancestral property is, in fact, ancestral property as regards his male issues, they take an interest in it by birth. The learned Single Judge in para 24 of the report has observed:- “This position now stands affected after the Succession Act became operative in 1956. The Succession Act has brought about some fundamental and radical changes in law of succession, which applied to Hindus by virtue of any text rule or interpretation of Hindu Law or any custom or usage having the force of law prior to 1956, which ceased to have any effect with respect to all matters expressly dealt with in the Succession Act. In Chander Sen’s case (supra) and in the subsequent decision in Yudhister Vs. Ashok Kumar, AIR 1987 SC 558, the Supreme Court dealt with the overriding effect of the express provisions of the Succession Act. In Chander Sen’s case the apex court approved the view expressed by the Allahabad High Court in Commissioner of Income Tax U.P. Vs. Ram Rakshpal Ashok Kumar (1968) 67 ITR 164 (All) and Khudi Ram Laba v. Commissioner of Income Tax, U.P. (1968) 67, ITR 364 (All) that the income from the assets inherited by son from his father from whom he has separated by partition can be assessed as income of the son individually since under S.8 of the Succession Act, the property of the father, who dies intestate devolve on his son in his individual capacity and not as Karta of his own family.” 24. The para 23 of Ruli Ram supra is of no help to appellant inasmuch as in para 24 of the judgment, the learned Single Judge has held that position now stands affected after the Succession Act became operative in 1956. The para 23 of Ruli Ram supra is of no help to appellant inasmuch as in para 24 of the judgment, the learned Single Judge has held that position now stands affected after the Succession Act became operative in 1956. The learned Single Judge in Ruli Ram supra in para 25 of the report has held as follows:- “In the instant case, the ratio of the aforementioned judgment of Chander Sen’s case will not apply, since what is claimed by the learned counsel for the tenant herein is that prior to the coming into force of the Succession Act, in the final decree passed in the year 1951, Ruli Ram got a share in the coparcenary property, which in his hand as Karta of the Joint Hindu Family property was ancestral qua his sons, who got a right in coparceners, possession of the residential portions were obtained by Ramesh Chand and Suresh Kumar and not by the tenant Ruli Ram. This submission made by the learned counsel for the tenant deserves acceptance in view of the fact that the share which Ruli Ram got, prior to coming into force of the Succession Act, in partition of the ancestral property in the year 1951 was ancestral property as regards his male issues. In the year 1980, during the life time of Ruli Ram, possession was sought by one of his male issues as coparcener, which was made a ground seeking eviction of the tenant Ruli Ram. There is no evidence that he himself got vacant possession of a residence.” In Ruli Ram the rights were crystallized in the year 1951 before the commencement of the Act whereas in the present case the appellant is claiming his right in the property of his grand father after the death of grand father which took place after the commencement of the Act. The succession to the estate of Baba Surinder Singh common ancestor opened on 19.1.1988 when he died, the mutation of his estate was attested on 31.7.1991. The partition mutation was attested on 20.9.1991. The partition did not take place during the life time of Baba Surinder Singh. In these circumstances, Ruli Ram supra does not support the plea of appellant that property in dispute after the death of his grand father in the hands of father of appellant will be ancestral / coparcenary property qua appellant. 25. In Hari Singh Vs. The partition did not take place during the life time of Baba Surinder Singh. In these circumstances, Ruli Ram supra does not support the plea of appellant that property in dispute after the death of his grand father in the hands of father of appellant will be ancestral / coparcenary property qua appellant. 25. In Hari Singh Vs. Kishan Singh, 2001 (2) S.L.C. 56, the learned Single Judge after noticing several judgments of the High Courts and Supreme Court in para 32 of the report has held that the suit property though ancestral but having come to the defendant under the provisions of Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, would be individual and separate property of the defendant and not joint with his son Kulbir Singh. 26. The Section 4 of the Act gives over-riding effect over any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu law or any custom or usage having force of law immediately before the commencement of the Act. The Section 6 of the Act as existed on 19.1.1988 when succession to the estate of late Baba Surinder Singh opened provided that when a male Hindu dies after the commencement of this Act, having at the time of his death an interest in a Mitakshara coparcenary property, his interest in the property shall devolve by survivorship upon the surviving members of the coparcenary and not in accordance with this Act. But the proviso to Section 6 further provides that if the deceased had left him surviving a female relative specified in class 1 of the Schedule or a male relative specified in that class who claims through such female relative, the interest of the deceased in the Mitakshara coparcenary property shall devolve by testamentary or intestate succession, as the case may be, under this Act and not by survivorship. 27. The estate of Baba Surinder Singh was mutated in favour of several persons including respondent No.2 and Smt. Raj vide mutation No. 47 dated 31.7.1991. The mutation No. 47 has not been assailed by the appellant. The bare perusal of Section 6 of the Act makes it clear that in this situation the estate of Baba Surinder Singh would devolve under Section 8 and not under Section 6 of the Act. The mutation No. 47 has not been assailed by the appellant. The bare perusal of Section 6 of the Act makes it clear that in this situation the estate of Baba Surinder Singh would devolve under Section 8 and not under Section 6 of the Act. In view of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgments, respondent No.2 would inherit his share in the estate of late Baba Surinder Singh in his individual capacity and not alongwith his son appellant. Once this is the position then the appellant has no right to assail the sale dated 19.6.1993 made by respondent No.2 in favour of respondent No.1. 28. DW-1 Baljeet Singh, Director Youth Welfare Service of Guru Nanak Dev University, Amritsar has stated that at the time of registration of sale deed, Registrar of Guru Nanak Dev University, he, wife of Colonel Manmohan Singh were present. Capt. Amninder and his wife were also present. Nobody objected at that time. This evidence has not been rebutted by the appellant. This indicates that the appellant even otherwise accepted the sale deed dated 19.6.1993 made by respondent No.2 in favour of respondent No.1. The learned District Judge has rightly appreciated the material on record. There is no perversity in the impugned judgment, decree. The substantial questions of law No. 1 and 2 are decided against the appellants. 29. No other point was urged. 30. The result of the above discussion, the appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.