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2010 DIGILAW 866 (KAR)

Byrappa v. State of Karnataka

2010-08-05

MOHAN M.SHANTANAGOUDAR

body2010
ORDER Mohan Shantanagoudar, J.— Petitioners are the land losers in the acquisition by the Government of Karnataka under the provisions of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act (for short hereinafter referred to as the ‘KIAD Act’). The acquisition of lands is for the purpose of third respondent-Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board (for short hereinafter referred to as the ‘Board’) for formation of Bidadi Industrial Layout. The Government of Karnataka issued notifications under Sections 3(1), 1(3) and 28(1) of the KIAD Act on 15.4.1997 and 31.1.1998 proposing to acquire certain lands as shown in the notifications, situated at Thalaguppe, Baleveeranahalli, Bananduru, Shanumangala and Abbanakuppe Villages. Notices were issued under Section 28(2) of the KIAD Act to the petitioners. The petitioners have filed their objections before the Special Land Acquisition Officer. After hearing the petitioners, the Special Land Acquisition Officer, overruled the objections filed by the petitioners under Section 28(3) of KIAD Act. Thereafter final notifications came to be issued under Section 28(4) of the KIAD Act on 18.10.2007 and 20.11.2007. According to the petitioners, they are still in possession of the properties in question; whereas according to the respondents, possession of the properties has been taken over by the State Government and is handed over to respondent No. 3- Board for formation of industrial layout. The preliminary as well as final notifications are called in question in these writ petitions. 2. The preliminary as well as final notifications are called in question in these writ petitions. 2. Sri Ravivarma Kumar, learned senior advocate appearing on behalf of certain of the petitioners submits that out of total extent of 767 acres 14 guntas, situated at Shanumangala Village, which were sought to be acquired under the impugned notifications, an area of 76 acres 36 guntas has been deleted pursuant to the notification at Annexure-G filed in W.P. No. 7044/2008 and such deleted lands are not contiguous with each other; thereby the industrial area cannot be formed uniformly in one area; that the lands of the petitioners are similar to the lands which are deleted from the acquisition and therefore their lands also ought to have been deleted from acquisition; that the lands of only powerful persons are deleted and whereas the lands of poor persons like the petitioners are acquired; that the action of the respondents in not deleting the lands from acquisition is discriminatory, mala fide and arbitrary; that though the objections are filed by the petitioners, no enquiry was held into the matter; that the statement of objections filed by the respondents does not reveal that the Board has taken preliminary steps such as proper planning, survey, etc. before going ahead with the acquisition process. On these among other grounds it is contended that the entire acquisition proceedings are vitiated. 3. Sri H.C. Shivaramu, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners in W.P. No. 13369/2008, has argued that the petitioners’ family has lost 17 acres 26 guntas of lands in acquisition by respondent No. 3-Board at an earlier point of time; that Sy. Nos. On these among other grounds it is contended that the entire acquisition proceedings are vitiated. 3. Sri H.C. Shivaramu, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners in W.P. No. 13369/2008, has argued that the petitioners’ family has lost 17 acres 26 guntas of lands in acquisition by respondent No. 3-Board at an earlier point of time; that Sy. Nos. 155 and 156 totally measuring 2 acres 12 guntas are the only properties which have remained with the petitioners and that those properties are also sought to be acquired by the respondents; that the objections filed by the petitioners for preliminary notification have been over ruled by the Special Land Acquisition Officer without application of mind; that the lands belonging to powerful and rich persons are deleted from acquisition at the intervention of the then Minister for Industries and Commerce, he relies upon at Annexures-M and N in W.P. No. 13369/2008 in support of the said contention; that non-deletion of petitioners’ lands from acquisition is colourable exercise of power and the same is arbitrary on the part of the respondents; that the Circular dated 3.3.2007 issued by the State Government is not followed by the State Government; that the said Circular prohibits the State Government to acquire irrigated lands, garden lands, etc. and though the lands of the petitioners are irrigated lands, capable of growing two crops and some of the lands are garden lands, same are illegally acquired contrary to the aforementioned Circular; that the consent of the Pollution Control Board is not obtained prior to the commencement of acquisition procedure; that the consent of Pollution Control Board is necessary before going ahead with the acquisition proceedings in view of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board Vs. Sri. C. Kenchappa and Others, AIR 2006 SC 2038 . On these grounds, Sri H.C. Shivaramu, argued for quashing the acquisition notifications. 4. Sri. C. Kenchappa and Others, AIR 2006 SC 2038 . On these grounds, Sri H.C. Shivaramu, argued for quashing the acquisition notifications. 4. Sri Shivaprakash, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of certain of the petitioners supporting the arguments of Sri Ravivarma Kumar, submits that area in question is a green belt area and therefore no industry can be set up over the acquired lands; that the acquisition is made by the State Government without application of mind, inasmuch as the beneficiaries under the acquisition earlier made, such as Himalaya Drug Company which was allotted about 183 acres of land situated in the area in question has returned the properties in favour of the Board on the ground that the said company is not in position to go ahead with the industrial activities. He further argued that Sy. Nos. 56 and 58 which are the subject matter of W.P. No. 9351/2006 totally measure 2 acres 10 guntas situated at Shanumangala Village; that the said properties are sought to be acquired for the purpose of Toyota Kirloskar; that already an area of about more than 700 acres was allotted in favour of the said company way back in the year 1998 and the company has merely utilised 70 acres out of total extent of 700 acres of land allotted to it and the remaining extent of land is vacant. In spite of the same, the said company wants to get these 2 acres 10 guntas also in addition to the land which is already allotted to it in the year 1998. He further submits that Toyota Kirloskar wants the properties in question for satisfying "vastu shastra" and therefore he prays for quashing the acquisition. 5. It is further argued on behalf of the petitioners that the State Government itself should consider the objections and hear the land owners and thereafter pass appropriate orders under Section 28(3) of the KIAD Act; since, in the matters on hand, the Special Land Acquisition Officer (cadre of Assistant commissioner) has considered the objections and heard the petitioners, the acquisition proceedings vitiate in view of the dictum laid down in the judgment passed by this Court in the case of A. Janardhan Shetty, S/o. Late Sankappa Shetty and Others rep. by GPA holder H.T. Raju Vs. The State of Karnataka rep. by its Secretary Govt. by GPA holder H.T. Raju Vs. The State of Karnataka rep. by its Secretary Govt. Commerce and Industries Department, The Special Land Acquisition Officer, Karnataka Industrial Area Development Board, The Karnataka Industrial Area Development Board rep. by its Executive Director and ABB Limited represented by its Company Secretary Sri. B. Gururaj, ILR (2009) KAR 2159 . The writ petitions are opposed by the State Government, Board as well as the allottees of the industrial sites. 6. Sri Vijay Shankar learned senior advocate appearing on behalf of respondent No. 3-Board submitted that since there is no challenge to the notification, by which certain of the lands are deleted from acquisition, it is not open for the petitioners to comment on the said notification; that merely because certain of the lands are deleted and even assuming such deletion was uncalled for, the illegality cannot be allowed to be perpetuated; that for the deletion of the lands, there should be absolute parity with regard to the lands already deleted and the lands sought to be deleted; that only bald averments are made with regard to similarity of lands; that the deleted portions of the lands are at the periphery of the layout and that therefore such deletions will not come in the way of forming industrial layout in orderly manner, 7. Sri Basavaraj Sabarad, learned advocate appearing on behalf of respondent-Board supporting the arguments of Sri Vijaya Shankar submitted that opportunity of being heard was given to land losers and thereafter the objections are overruled by the concerned; that certain of the land losers have already received compensation and that therefore such petitioners should not be allowed to question the acquisition proceedings; that the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches, inasmuch as the writ petitions are filed after lapse of one year of issuance of final notification. He further submits that the question as to whether the area in question is a green belt area or not, need not be gone into at the time of the acquisition. 8. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the beneficiary-M/s. Toyota Kirloskar in W.P. No. 9351/2006, by relying on Annexures-R1 to R4 submits that what is exactly allotted to the said company earlier is about 432 acres. 8. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the beneficiary-M/s. Toyota Kirloskar in W.P. No. 9351/2006, by relying on Annexures-R1 to R4 submits that what is exactly allotted to the said company earlier is about 432 acres. According to him, the beneficiary-M/s. Toyota Kirloskar is a growing concern and same needs entire area including the one which is acquired presently for industrial purpose. 9. Sri Shashikiran Shetty, learned Counsel appearing for impleading applicant in W.P. Nos. 11822-11830/2009, submits that the land-loser, petitioner-Veerabhadraiah in the said writ petitions, is allotted three acres of land by the 3rd respondent-Board for establishing his industry; that since the petitioner in the said writ petition himself has taken possession of the allotted site from the 3rd respondent-Board for establishing the industry, it is clear that the petitioner has agreed for acquisition. He draws the attention of the Court to condition No. 15 of allotment letter issued by the 3rd respondent-Board in favour of the allottees and contends that the Board has imposed a condition on each of the allottees that one person from the land losers’ family should be given a job in the industry to be established. On these among other grounds, the respondents prayed for dismissal of the writ petitions. 10, Petitioners herein were issued with notices by the concerned Land Acquisition Officer. They have filed their statement of objections. Thereafter the petitioners were given an opportunity of being heard. On hearing, the causes shown by the petitioners for dropping the acquisition proceedings are not accepted and consequently acquisition proceedings continued by issuing final notification. The records maintained by Board clearly reveal that the petitioners were orally heard in the matter before passing the order under Section 28(3) of the KIAD Act. Thus, the contention of the petitioners that no enquiry was conducted by the Board under Section 28(3) of the KIAD Act cannot be accepted. Certain of the petitioners, i.e., the land owners of Sy. No. 108 measuring 7 acres 60 guntas in their objections and at the time of hearing before Land Acquisition Officer, have prayed for compensation of Rs. 20,00,000/ - per acre, in the alternative, if the acquisition proceedings are not dropped in respect of their lands. 11. There cannot be any dispute that 76 acres 36 guntas of lands are deleted from acquisition as is clear from Annexure-G produced along with W.P. No. 7044/2008. 20,00,000/ - per acre, in the alternative, if the acquisition proceedings are not dropped in respect of their lands. 11. There cannot be any dispute that 76 acres 36 guntas of lands are deleted from acquisition as is clear from Annexure-G produced along with W.P. No. 7044/2008. According to the petitioners, such deleted lands are not contiguous, but are scattered within the proposed layout and therefore the industrial layout cannot be formed in an uniform manner, According to the petitioners, the lands of the rich and powerful persons are deleted from acquisition process and the lands in question which are similar to those lands, are not deleted from acquisition. It is also contended that the deletion is made at the intervention of the then Minister. 12. The order relating to deleting the lands from acquisition vide Annexure-G produced along with W.P. No. 7044/2008 is not challenged by anybody. To verify the question as to whether the lands are deleted based on the order of the Minister, the records maintained by the Board are secured. The records reveal that certain of the land owners Chikkamaraiah, S/o. Koli Maraiah, Eramaraiah and Puttarevaiah, etc. of Shanumangala Village have requested by writing a letter dated 25.5.2005 to the then Minister for Industry and Commerce for dropping the acquisition proceedings in respect of their lands, as found in the said letter. The then Minister has made a note on the said letter to the effect "kindly examine this request and send a report". The Minister has not directed anybody to drop the acquisition proceedings. However, as aforementioned, he has merely requested the Chief Executive Officer of the Board to examine the lands of such land owners, who wrote the letter, and sought for a report. Thereafter concerned officials have visited the spot. Ultimately, the decision is taken in the year 1997 for deleting the lands from acquisition on the basis of the. report. The records nowhere reveal that the lands are deleted based on the request or order made by the Minister. It seems, the lands are deleted from acquisition based on the fact situation not with ulterior motive. In this view of the matter, this Court is unable to agree with the contentions of the petitioners that the lands of the rich and powerful persons are deleted from acquisition with the intervention of the Minister. It seems, the lands are deleted from acquisition based on the fact situation not with ulterior motive. In this view of the matter, this Court is unable to agree with the contentions of the petitioners that the lands of the rich and powerful persons are deleted from acquisition with the intervention of the Minister. Even assuming that such deletion of certain lands from acquisition is improper, the same will not be interfered with by this Court as the notification/order relating to deletion of lands is not under challenge. It is now by well settled that if the order in favour of the other person is found to be contrary to law or not warranted in the facts and circumstances of the case, such illegal or unwarranted order cannot be made the basis for issuing a writ compelling the respondent-Board to repeat the illegality or to pass another unwarranted order. The extra-ordinary and discretionary power of the High Court cannot be exercised for such a purpose. Merely because the respondent-authority has passed an illegal/unwarranted order, the same does not entitle the High Court to compel the authority to repeat that illegality over again and again. By refusing to direct the respondent-Board to repeat the illegality, the Court is not condoning the earlier illegal act/order nor can such illegal order constitute the basis for a legitimate complaint of discrimination. In the matter on hand, as aforementioned, the authorities of the Board have examined the request of aforementioned land owners for deletion, for long length of two years of time, and only after getting themselves satisfied, the order of deletion came to be passed. 13. As has been held by the Apex Court in the case of Chandigarh Administration and another Vs. Jagjit Singh and another, AIR 1995 SC 705 , in the case of Gursharan Singh and others etc. Vs. New Delhi Municipal Committee and others, (1996) 2 AD SC 48 , and in the case of State of Haryana and Others Vs. Ram Kumar Mann, JT (1997) 3 SC 450 , the doctrine of discrimination is found upon existence of an enforceable right and that Article 14 of the Constitution of India would apply only when invidious discrimination is meted out to equals and similarly circumstanced without any rational basis or relationship in that behalf. Ram Kumar Mann, JT (1997) 3 SC 450 , the doctrine of discrimination is found upon existence of an enforceable right and that Article 14 of the Constitution of India would apply only when invidious discrimination is meted out to equals and similarly circumstanced without any rational basis or relationship in that behalf. The guarantee of equality before law is a positive concept and it cannot be enforced by a citizen or Court in a negative manner. To put it in other words, if an illegality or irregularity has been committed in favour of any individual or a group of individuals, the others cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court to contend that the same irregularity or illegality be committed by the State or an authority which can be held to be a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. In the recent judgment of Apex Court in the case of Bondu Ramaswamy v. Bangalore Development Authority and Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 4097/2010, along with other matters - popularly known as Arkavathi Layout Case) the Court has taken into consideration the similar aspect of the matter and has observed thus: We are conscious of the fact that when a person subjected to blatant discrimination, approaches a court seeking equal treatment, he expects relief similar to what others have been granted. All that he is interested is getting relief for himself, as others. He is not interested in getting the relief illegally granted to others, quashed. Nor is he interested in knowing whether others were granted relief legally or about the distinction between positive equality and negative equality. In fact he will be reluctant to approach courts for quashing the relief granted to others on the ground that it is illegal, as he does not want to incur the wrath of those who have benefited from the wrong action. As a result, in most cases those who benefit by the illegal grants/actions by authorities, get away with the benefit, while others who are not fortunate to have ‘connections’ or ‘money power’ suffer. But these are not the grounds for courts to enforce negative equality and perpetuate the illegality. The fact that an Authority has extended favours illegally in the case of several persons cannot be a ground for courts to issue a mandamus directing repetition thereof, by applying the principle of equality. But these are not the grounds for courts to enforce negative equality and perpetuate the illegality. The fact that an Authority has extended favours illegally in the case of several persons cannot be a ground for courts to issue a mandamus directing repetition thereof, by applying the principle of equality. Article 14 guarantees equality before law and not equality in subverting law nor equality in securing illegal benefits. But courts cannot be silent bystanders if acquisition process is used by officers of the Authority with ulterior or malafide motives. For example, let us take a case where 2000 acres are required for a project as per the Development Scheme, but the preliminary notification is issued in respect of 3000 acres; and when the land owners ‘apply’ or ‘approach’ the Authority, 1000 acres of lands are released, Or take a case where a project required 1000 acres of contiguous land for a development project, and preliminary notice is accordingly issued for acquisition of a compact contiguous extent of 1000 acres; but thereafter without any logical explanation or perceivable reason, several large areas in the midst of the proposed layout, are denotified or deleted making it virtually impossible to execute the development scheme, as proposed. In the absence of satisfactory explanations in such a case, it may be necessary to presume that there was misuse or abuse of the acquisition process. Be that as it may. In the very matter, the Apex Court has illustrated the principle relating to positive and negative equality in respect of notional acquisition cases. After examining the principle relating to positive and negative equalities with reference to four notional acquisition cases, the Apex Court has concluded thus: Therefore, a land owner is not entitled to seek deletion of his land from acquisition, merely on the ground that lands of some others have been deleted. He should make out a justifiable cause for deleting his land from acquisition. If the Rules/Scheme/Policy provides for deletion of certain categories of land and if the petitioner falls under those categories, he will be entitled to relief. He should make out a justifiable cause for deleting his land from acquisition. If the Rules/Scheme/Policy provides for deletion of certain categories of land and if the petitioner falls under those categories, he will be entitled to relief. But if under the Rules or Scheme or policy for deletion, his land is not eligible for deletion, his land cannot be deleted merely on the ground that some other land similarly situated had been deleted (even though that land also did not fall under any category eligible to be deleted), as that would amount to enforcing negative equality. But where large extents of land of others are indiscriminately and arbitrarily deleted, then the court may grant relief, if on account of such deletions, the development scheme for that area has become inexecutable or has resulted in abandonment of the scheme. Alternatively, if a common factor can be identified in respect of other lands which were deleted, and if the petitioner’s land also has that common factor, relief can be granted on the ground that the Authority had adopted the common factor as the criterion in the case of others and therefore adopting the same yardstick, the land of petitioners also should be deleted. These principles may be kept in view while implementing direction in para 105D(i)(f) of the Judgment of the division Bench of the High Court. From the above, it is clear that the petitioners should make out a justifiable cause for deleting their lands from acquisition. If under the Rules or Scheme or Policy relating to deletion, the petitioners’ lands are not eligible for deletion, their lands cannot be deleted merely on the ground that some other lands similarly situated had been deleted, inasmuch as that would amount to enforcing negative equality. But, where large extents of lands of others are indiscriminately and arbitrarily deleted, then the Court may grant relief, if on account of such deletions, the development scheme for that area has become inexecutable or has resulted in abandonment of the scheme. But in the matter on hand, there is nothing on record to show that on account of deletion of 76 acres 36 guntas of land, the development scheme for that area has become inexecutable or has resulted in abandonment of the scheme. But in the matter on hand, there is nothing on record to show that on account of deletion of 76 acres 36 guntas of land, the development scheme for that area has become inexecutable or has resulted in abandonment of the scheme. Except the vague averments made in the writ petitions that their lands are similarly situated, the petitioners have not produced anything to show that certain of the lands are indiscriminately deleted resulting in the development scheme becoming inexecutable. In the matter on hand, the respondent-Board has proposed to form industrial layout in the area of about more than 1800 acres. Accordingly the notifications under Sections 3(1) and 1(3) of the KIAD Act were issued. However, among 1800 acres, about 400 acres are belonging to the State Government. Thus, the remaining area of about 1400 acres of land belonging to private persons was sought to be acquired by issuing notification under Section 28(1) of the KIAD Act. These 1400 acres proposed to be acquired are situated at Talakuppe Village, Baleveeranahalli Village, Shanumangala Village and Abbanakuppe Village. Subsequently, one more preliminary notification was issued under Section 28(1) of the KIAD Act in respect of 305 acres, on 30.1.1998, apart from issuing notifications under Sections 3(1) and 1(3) of the KIAD Act. Thus, in all about 1700 acres and odd were sought to be acquired. After receipt of the statement of objections and after conducting the enquiry, as aforementioned, an area of 76 acres 36 guntas of land is deleted. Which means, a small portion of the lands, which were proposed for acquisition, is deleted. There is nothing on record to show that such lands were deleted indiscriminately. In view of the same, it cannot be said that on account of deletion of 76 acres 36 of land, the development scheme for that area has become inexecutable or has resulted in abandonment of the scheme. This Court also does not find any ground to accept the contention of the petitioners that non-deletion of the petitioners’ properties from acquisition amounts to discrimination, mala fide action or arbitrariness. 14. For deletion of lands, there should be absolute parity between the lands deleted and the lands proposed to be acquired. Whether the lands deleted are similarly situated to the lands proposed to be acquired, is a pure question of fact, which has to be decided by the concerned authority. 14. For deletion of lands, there should be absolute parity between the lands deleted and the lands proposed to be acquired. Whether the lands deleted are similarly situated to the lands proposed to be acquired, is a pure question of fact, which has to be decided by the concerned authority. This Court cannot sit as an appellate authority to decide the aspect of similarity of the lands. 15. The petitioners relied upon the documents produced along with the memo dated 23.6.2010 to contend that the persons whose land has been deleted has entered into an agreement of sale with Aiswarya Builders. The said document relied upon by the petitioners to contend that the acquiring authority by deleting the lands wanted to help the persons dealing with the real estate business. The said contention of the petitioners also cannot be accepted, inasmuch as the agreement of sale is entered into by the persons whose lands are deleted, with Aiswarya Builders after deletion of lands. Such an agreement of sale is not entered into prior to deletion of the lands. More over, it is open for the agriculturists to decide as to how best their property is to be utilised. Merely because the lands are deleted from acquisition, such land owners cannot be directed to keep the properties with them for all times to come. 16. It is argued on behalf of the petitioners that the lands in question are irrigated lands capable of growing two crops in a year and some of the lands are garden lands, etc. and therefore the acquisition of such lands is in violation of mandate found in the Circular dated 3.3.2007 issued by the State Government. 17. The said Circular dated 3.3.2007 reveals that the garden lands, fertile lands or the lands capable of growing two crops in a year should not be included in the acquisition in case if such non inclusion does not affect the scheme. The question as to whether the properties of the petitioners are garden lands, fertile lands or the lands capable of growing two crops in a year is again a question of fact. The very contentions are raised before the Land Acquisition Officer by filing the objections and at the time of oral hearing, before issuing the final notification. Such objections are overruled based on fact situation. The very contentions are raised before the Land Acquisition Officer by filing the objections and at the time of oral hearing, before issuing the final notification. Such objections are overruled based on fact situation. In view of the same, it cannot be said that the action of the respondents in acquiring the lands in question violates the principles found in the Circular. 18. The petitioners by relying upon the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of A. Janardhan Shetty, S/o. Late Sankappa Shetty and Others rep. by GPA holder H.T. Raju Vs. The State of Karnataka rep. by its Secretary Govt. Commerce and Industries Department, The Special Land Acquisition Officer, Karnataka Industrial Area Development Board, The Karnataka Industrial Area Development Board rep. by its Executive Director and ABB Limited represented by its Company Secretary Sri. B. Gururaj, ILR (2009) KAR 2159 , contended that the exercise of power by Special Land Acquisition Officer in considering and rejecting the statement of objections of the land owners to acquire the lands, is illegal, inasmuch as the State Government cannot delegate its quasi judicial power upon the Assistant Commissioner. According to the petitioners, the State Government itself has to serve notice on the land owners and consider the objections, if any, filed by the land owners and hear them; that such power as contemplated under Sections 28(2) and 28(3) of the KIAD Act cannot be delegated by the State Government to the Assistant Commissioner/Land Acquisition Officer. The said contention also cannot be accepted. The aforementioned judgment passed by the Division Bench of this Court, was questioned before the Apex Court in SLP. Nos. 25791-25794/2009. The said matters are dismissed by the order dated 3.11.2009 by the Apex Court. However, it is made clear in the very order by the Apex Court that the question of law raised by the Division Bench relating to delegation of power is kept open. The ratio of the judgment of the Division Bench is ordered to be confined to the facts of the said case. Which means that the question as decided by the Division Bench is kept open and not confirmed by the Apex Court. The ratio of the judgment of the Division Bench is ordered to be confined to the facts of the said case. Which means that the question as decided by the Division Bench is kept open and not confirmed by the Apex Court. More over, Section 31 of the KIAD Act makes it amply clear that the State Government may if it thinks fit delegate its power to be exercised in Chapter-VII to any of its Officers, by Rules made in that behalf. Rule 14 of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Rules framed under the KIAD Act, reveals that the powers of the State Government under Sub-sections (2), (3), (6), (7) and (8) of Section 28 of the KIAD Act and Sub-sections (1),(2) and (3) of Section 29 of the KIAD Act are delegated to the Assistant Commissioners incharge of Revenue sub-divisions within their respective jurisdiction, or to the Special Land Acquisition Officers or the Additional Special Land Acquisition Officers in the Board with such jurisdiction as the State Government may specify from time to time. From the aforementioned, it is clear that the State Government has delegated its powers relating to Section 28(3) of the KIAD Act to the concerned Land Acquisition Officers. Therefore, it is clear that the concerned Land Acquisition Officers are empowered to receive, decide and consider the statement of objections filed by the land owners. They can also pass orders under Section 28(3) of the KIAD Act. 19. One of the land-losers viz., Veerabhadraiah, petitioner in W.P. No. 11822-30/2009, is allotted 3 acres 9 guntas (plot No. 20, carved out of Sy. No. 154 of Shanumangala Village, Bidadi 2nd Phase, Sector-I) for setting up of Coir Curling Unit by the Board on 6.10.2009. Such allotment is made pursuant to his application dated 3.10.2007. After taking the allotment of site by the Board, he should not have approached this Court by filing the writ petition questioning the acquisition. This is clear case of abuse of process of law. 20. Certain of the allotment letters by the Board issued in favour of the entrepreneurs are on record. Condition No. 15 of allotment letters issued by the Board in favour of the beneficiaries makes it amply clear that the allottees of site shall provide employment to any one of the family of erstwhile land owners, depending upon their qualification and the suitability to the post. Condition No. 15 of allotment letters issued by the Board in favour of the beneficiaries makes it amply clear that the allottees of site shall provide employment to any one of the family of erstwhile land owners, depending upon their qualification and the suitability to the post. This is a welcome measure. The land-losers apart from getting compensation in accordance with law, will also get an employment, i.e., at least one person in each family will get employment. Out of the total extent of more than 1700 acres land acquired, the lands under challenge are about 202 acres 31 guntas. Which means, about 85% to 90% of the land-losers have accepted the acquisition and have not challenged the acquisition notifications. Even during the pendency of the writ petitions, some of the petitioners have filed memo for dismissing the writ petitions on the ground that they are no more aggrieved by the acquisition notifications. Such petitioners who have filed memo have already accepted the compensation. For example, the 5th petitioner-Sri Puttaiah in W.P. No. 7044/2008 has been paid compensation in respect of Sy. Nos. 111 111/3, 112, 15/2, 116, 130/1, 130/3, totally measuring 16 acres 34. Further, he has been paid compensation for 15 guntas in Sy. No. 60 out of 1 acre 17 guntas. Likewise Sri Kyathappa-petitioner No. 2 in W.P. No. 9820/2008 has been paid compensation in respect of Sy. No. 54/8, measuring 2 acres 6 guntas. Similarly compensation has been paid to Sri Puttaiah in respect of the land in Sy. No. 108, measuring 7 acres 11 guntas. Sri Chickahanumanthaiah-petitioner No. 1 in W.P. Nos. 14325 and 17603-17613/2008 has been paid compensation in respect of Sy. No. 40/7, measuring 15 guntas, Sri Thimmaiah-petitioner No. 2 in the said writ petitions is paid compensation in respect of Sy. Nos. 41/1 to the extent of 2 guntas, and Sy. No. 41/2, to the extent of 38 guntas, Sri Mutharayappa-petitioner No. 3 has been paid compensation in respect of Sy. No. 41/3 to the extent of 28 guntas, and Sy. No. 41/4 to the extent of 22 guntas, Sri Chickachenappa, Sri Sri Dinesh Kumar, Sri Rudrappa and Sri Dodiah, petitioners 4 to 7 are paid compensation in respect of the lands in Sy. No. 41/5 to the extent of 3 acres 7 guntas. No. 41/3 to the extent of 28 guntas, and Sy. No. 41/4 to the extent of 22 guntas, Sri Chickachenappa, Sri Sri Dinesh Kumar, Sri Rudrappa and Sri Dodiah, petitioners 4 to 7 are paid compensation in respect of the lands in Sy. No. 41/5 to the extent of 3 acres 7 guntas. Sri K. Lokesh and Sri K. Rarnesh, petitioners 11 and 12 are also paid compensation in respect of Sy. No. 54/7B to the extent of 13 acres. These facts would reveal that certain of the petitioners have already accepted the compensation. As aforementioned, it is argued on behalf of the petitioners in W.P. No. 13369/2008 that the family of the petitioners has lost 17 acres 26 guntas in earlier acquisition and except the properties involved in the writ petition, no lands are available to them. But strangely no averment is found in the said writ petition supporting the oral arguments made on behalf of the petitioners. Hence, the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioners in W.P. No. 13369/2008 that they have lost about 17 acres 26 guntas in earlier acquisition and that the lands which are proposed to be acquired in Sy. Nos. 155 and 156 are only properties available to them cannot be accepted. 21. It is further argued that the consent of the Pollution Control Board is to be obtained before commencement of the industry as has been held by the Apex Court in the case of Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board Vs. Sri. C. Kenchappa and Others, AIR 2006 SC 2038 . The allotment letters clearly reveal that the Board has directed the allottees of industrial plots to get consent from the Pollution Control Board before commencement of the industry. Such a condition will have to be necessarily fulfilled by the entrepreneurs before establishment of the industry. 22. It is argued that an area in question is a green belt and no industry can be set up in the green belt and consequently the acquisition notifications are bad in the eye of law. Such a contention also cannot be accepted in view of series of judgments rendered by the Apex Court as well as by this Court including the judgments in the case of Bhagat Singh Vs. State of U.P. and Ors., AIR 1999 SC 436 , in the case of N. Somashekar and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Ors. Such a contention also cannot be accepted in view of series of judgments rendered by the Apex Court as well as by this Court including the judgments in the case of Bhagat Singh Vs. State of U.P. and Ors., AIR 1999 SC 436 , in the case of N. Somashekar and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Ors. reported in 1997 (7) KarLJ 410 , in the case of S.S. Darshan v. State of Karnataka and Ors. reported in 1995 (6) KarLJ 327 . From the aforecited judgments, it is clear that there is no need that the land proposed to be acquired by the Government for a particular public purpose should be reserved for the same purpose or use mentioned in the Master Plan or Zonal Plan for the said area. Nor will the acquisition be invalid merely because the land proposed to be acquired is for a purpose other than the one permitted by the Master Plan or Zonal Plan applicable to that locality, Acquisition will be valid if it is for a public purpose even if it is not for the type of user permitted by the Master Plan or Zonal Plan in force at the time the acquisition is made. It will be for the beneficiary of the acquisition to move the competent authority under the Development Act and obtain the sanction of the said authority for suitable modification of the Master Plan so as to permit the use of the land for the public purpose for which the land is acquired. In fact, it may be difficult for the beneficiary of the acquisition to move the competent authority under the Development Act seeking permission to change of land use even before the land is acquired or before possession is given to the beneficiary. From the principle stated in the case of Aflatoon and Others Vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi and Others, AIR 1974 SC 2077 , it is clear that acquisition for a public purpose and obtaining permission from the competent authority under the Development Act concerned for change of land use are different from one another and the former is not dependent upon the latter. 23. The preliminary notifications in these matters are issued in the year 1997 and 1998 and the final notifications are issued from time to time till about 6 to 7 years. 23. The preliminary notifications in these matters are issued in the year 1997 and 1998 and the final notifications are issued from time to time till about 6 to 7 years. In some of the matters, the final notification is issued after 8 to 9 years. In this context, it is contended by the petitioners that there is lot of time gap between the preliminary notification and the final notifications and hence, the acquisition proceedings vitiate. No time limit is stipulated for issuing final notifications in the KIAD Act and the Rules framed thereunder. Therefore, it cannot be said that the final notifications ought to have been issued within one year or two years, Therefore, the action of the respondents in issuing final notification belatedly cannot be said to be illegal. However, the propriety requires that final notifications should be issued in a reasonable period even under the KIAD Act, so that the land-losers will know where they stand. After issuance of preliminary notification, the land owner cannot develop the land, inasmuch as the sword will be hanging on his head always thereafter. He will not get compensation also, until the award is made. Though the land owners will be in possession of such lands after preliminary notification till possession is taken, they cannot invest money for getting more profit in agriculture or horticulture. They cannot even get the lands converted in accordance with law. Under such circumstances, though the KIAD Act does not stipulate particular time limit for issuance of final notifications, it is expected that the propriety requires the acquiring authority to issue the final notifications within the reasonable period after preliminary notification. Inclusion of the land of a person in an acquisition notification is a traumatic experience for the landowner, particularly if he was eking out his livelihood from that land, If certain areas are notified in the preliminary notification and if the final notification/notifications is/are not issued within a reasonable period, the same may breed corruption and nepotism among the officials. It also creates hostility, mutual distrust and disharmony among the land owners dividing them on the lines of ‘those who can influence and get their lands deleted’ and ‘those who cannot’. Touts and middlemen flaunting political connections flourish, extracting money for getting lands deleted. Thus, instead of subjecting large number of citizens to such traumatic experience, acquiring authority must issue final notification within reasonable period. Touts and middlemen flaunting political connections flourish, extracting money for getting lands deleted. Thus, instead of subjecting large number of citizens to such traumatic experience, acquiring authority must issue final notification within reasonable period. In view of the same, there is a need for the Law Commission and the Legislature to revisit the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966, which is about 45 years’ old, at least in this regard, Be that as it may, since the action of the acquiring authority is not illegal, this Court will not quash the final notifications on that ground, 24. The contention of the petitioners is that there is no proper planning on the part of the acquiring authority prior to the date of preliminary notification and that the preliminary notifications are issued mechanically without due application of mind. In that regard, the records maintained by the Board are perused. The Board in its 205th Meeting, dated 18.11.1997 has discussed in Subject No. 5 regarding granting of approval to form Bidadi Industrial Layout. Initially, the Board had planned to form Bidadi Industrial Layout in 1638 acres of land. It planned to spend Rs. 13,750 lakhs towards infrastructure facilities in the said layout. It is also decided to fix compensation on adhoc basis in respect of 190 acres at Rs. 35,00,000/ - per acre and for remaining extent of land at Rs. 40,00,000/ - per acre. Certain other matters such as levelling of land, providing water supply, power supply, and approach roads to the sites, etc. are also discussed in Subject No. 5. It was decided to provide water to the layout from Cauvery Water Supply raising main of BWSSB at Harohally. It was noted that the cost of the water supply alone works out to Rs. 1,800 lakhs. A provision is also made for drawing of HT/LT lines and establishment of 220/66/11KV sub-station at the industrial area. It was also discussed that cost of malkies, structures, establishment charges and interest on the compensation of the land works out to Rs. 15,141 lakhs, whereas, the cost of development including infrastructure facilities, levelling of car project land works out to Rs. 18,652.40 lakhs. Hence, the total estimated cost including the land acquisition and development with Board service charges works out to Rs. 37,172.74 lakhs. In the said meeting, the approval of layout map of Bidadi Industrial Layout and approval of sanction for incurring Rs. 18,652.40 lakhs. Hence, the total estimated cost including the land acquisition and development with Board service charges works out to Rs. 37,172.74 lakhs. In the said meeting, the approval of layout map of Bidadi Industrial Layout and approval of sanction for incurring Rs. 13,750 lakhs for developmental activities were accorded. 25. In 286th Board Meeting, the final price in respect of Bidadi Industrial Area was determined. It was decided that the final price in respect of lands of the allotments made at Bidadi Industrial Area at tentative rates is ranging from Rs. 25 lakhs per acre to Rs. 35 lakhs per acre. It increased the tentative rates by 50% in each case. Thus, it is clear that various meetings are held and decisions are taken from time to time in respect of the acquisition process, fixing of compensation, grant of compensation, etc. From the records maintained by the Board, it is clear that the Board had made plan to acquire definite extent of lands to an extent of 163S acres situated at Thalaguppe, Baleveeranahalii, Bananduru. 26. Shanumangala and Abbanakuppe Villages, for formation of Bidadi Industrial Layout. Thus, it cannot be said that the Board did not plan adequately before issuing preliminary notification. 27. W.P. No. 9351/2006 is filed after lapse of about six years from the date of final notification. According to the respondents, the sale deed dated 13.3.2002 vide Annexure-R6, is executed on 9.3.2001 vide Annexure-R4, in favour of the respondent-beneficiary and the possession is also handed over to the beneficiary on 20.4.2001 vide Annexure-R5. No proper explanation is forthcoming explaining the delay. Hence, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches also. 28. During the course of arguments, it was submitted on behalf of the petitioners that 2 acres and 10 guntas of land is acquired only for vastu purposes, inasmuch as M/s. Toyota Kirloskar feels that this extent of land is necessary to avoid evil forces. Thus, according to the petitioners, the land in question is not necessary to the beneficiary for formation of industry, but is necessary only for vastu purposes and consequently such an acquisition is bad in the eye of law. 29. Such a contention cannot be accepted, inasmuch as there is no pleading by the petitioners to that effect in the memorandum of writ petition. 29. Such a contention cannot be accepted, inasmuch as there is no pleading by the petitioners to that effect in the memorandum of writ petition. The aforementioned oral submission is made only at the time of final arguments without any basis. In view of the same, the said contention cannot be accepted. 30. Having regard to the totality of the facts and circumstances mentioned supra, this Court does not find any ground to interfere with the impugned acquisition notifications. Accordingly, all the writ petitions are dismissed.