Judgment :- Aravind Kumar, J: In this writ petition order dated 3-8-2007 passed in O.S.No.2268/1996 by the 27th Additional City Civil Judge, Bangalore (Annexure-J) by answering issue No.4 holding that suit is not barred by limitation, is impugned herein. 2. The brief facts leading to filing of the writ petition are as under.: Respondent No.2 herein was allotted an industrial site by the first respondent-Karnataka Industrial Area Development Board (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Board’ for brevity) and was put in actual possession of the industrial site by issuing possession certificate in the year 1988. Thereafter the Board is said to have allotted the same industrial site to the petitioner herein in 1990 and it is said to have executed lease-cum-sale agreement in favour of the petitioner in 1994. Respondent No.2 has filed a suit O.S.No.2268/1996 before the City Civil Court initially for the relief of permanent injunction and later on an application was filed to incorporate the prayer to declare that second respondent is the confirmed allottee of the industrial site and as such entitled to possession of the suit schedule land, which order was questioned by the petitioner herein before this Court in CRP No.2203/1999 which came to be dismissed on 7-3-2000 and also confirmed in SLP (Civil) No.11682/2000 dated 21-8-2000. The Trial Court framed issues and later on it was recasted. The petitioner filed an application for considering issue No.4 and issue No.6 regarding limitation and valuation respectively as preliminary issues and after considering the agreements advanced by the parties Trial Court directed the parties to lead evidence on all issues. Aggrieved by the same, petitioner has filed revision petition in CRP 711/2001 against the order of the Trial Court dated 29-1-2001 against the order of the Trial Court dated 29-1-2001 directing to adduce evidence on all issues. This Court by order dated 13-1-2001 has directed the parties to lead evidence on issue Nos.4 and 6 and directed the Trial Court to decide issue Nos.4 and 6 and thereafter proceed to consider other issues. Insofar as issue No.6 regarding valuation, the plaintiff i.e., second respondent herein who was directed to pay additional Court fee unsuccessfully challenged the order of the Trial Court before this Court in W.P.No.5035/2005 and on dismissal of the writ petition on 21-10-2006 it is stated that additional Court fee has been paid. 3. Insofar as issue No.6 regarding valuation, the plaintiff i.e., second respondent herein who was directed to pay additional Court fee unsuccessfully challenged the order of the Trial Court before this Court in W.P.No.5035/2005 and on dismissal of the writ petition on 21-10-2006 it is stated that additional Court fee has been paid. 3. The Trial Court on issue No.4 i.e., regarding limitation had framed an issues as “Whether the suit is barred by limitation period? 4. After considering rival contentions Trial Court held that the suit filed is within the period of limitation by order dated 3-8-2007. It is this order which is impugned in the present writ petition. 5. Having Sri S.S. Naganand, learned Senior Counsel appearing for petitioner and Sri. Padubidri Raghavendra Rao, learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondent. 6. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties, following points arise for my consideration: 1) Whether the Trial Court was correct in holding that the suit is not barred by limitation by answering issue No.4 in the negative, by its order dated 03.08.2007? 2) What Order? RE: POINT NO: 1 7. The fact leading to the filing of this writ petition are not in dispute. However, in order to appreciate the rival contentions raised by the parties the following facts are enumerated herein. 8. The first respondent-Board allotted a Industrial Plot bearing No.29A, II Stage, Peenya Industrial Area, Yeshwanthpur, Bangalore by allotment letter dated 23/28-3-1987 and on 6/20-6-1988 possession certificate was issued in favour of the second respondent by first respondent and possession of the said site was delivered to the second respondent. Thereafterwards on 11.05.1990 respondent No.1 is said to have allotted the same industrial Plot to the petitioner and petitioner claimed that on 06.06.1990 possession of the suit schedule property was delivered by respondent No.1 by issuance of possession certificate and thereafterwards lease-cum-sale agreement is executed in Its favour on 28.12.1994. Second respondent filed a suit O.S.No.2268/1996 on 29.03.1996 on the file of the City Civil Court, Bangalore against the Board and the petitioner herein for the relief of perpetual injunction. Thereafterwards an application was filed seeking amendment to incorporate the prayer for declaration on 12.06.1996 i.e., within two months from the date of filing of the written statement by the petitioner herein in O.S.No.2268/1996. Thereafterwards an application was filed seeking amendment to incorporate the prayer for declaration on 12.06.1996 i.e., within two months from the date of filing of the written statement by the petitioner herein in O.S.No.2268/1996. The said application came to be numbered as I.A.No.3 and same was resisted by the petitioner herein and on consideration of arguments, Trial Court by its order dated 14.06.1999 allowed the application I.A.No.3 for amendment. The said order came to be questioned by the petitioner herein in CRP.No.2203/1999 which after contest came to be dismissed by order dated 07.03.2000 (Annexure R8). Aggrieved by the same petitioner herein preferred a Special Leave Petition to the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP (Civil) No.11682/2000 which also came to be dismissed by following order: “The petitioner is given liberty to raise this ground at an appropriate stage after disposal of the main suit. Reserving the liberty as aforesaid the Special Leave Petition is dismissed.” (Emphasis supplied by me) Thus, the order of amendment allowed by Trial Court had become final. 9. One another factor to be noticed by this Court is plaintiff had filed an application for grant of temporary injunction in the suit at the time of filing the suit and said application came to be dismissed by order dated 12.09.1997 and it was confirmed by order of this Court passed in MFA.No.3394/1997 on 10.07.1999. The said order has reached finality. 10. As observed herein above on 19.08.2000 the Trial Court had framed issues and relevant issue for consideration of rival contentions in this writ petition is issue No.4 which reads as under: ‘4) Whether the suit is barred by limitation period?” 11. An interlocutory application came to be filed by the petitioner herein requesting the Court to dispose of issues No.4 and 6 as preliminary issue. The said application though came to be resisted by the plaintiff i.e., first respondent herein, Trial Court on consideration of rival contentions allowed the application by order dated 02.11.2000 and ordered that issues No.4 and 6 is to be heard as preliminary issues. Thereafter Trial Court passed another order on 29.01.2001 directing the parties to adduce their evidence on all issues. Thereafter Trial Court passed another order on 29.01.2001 directing the parties to adduce their evidence on all issues. Aggrieved by this order of 29.01.2001 petitioner herein had filed CRP.No.711/2001 before this Court and after considering the contentions of both the parties, this Court by order dated 13.03.2001 disposed of the revision petition by directing the Trial Court to decide issues No.4 and 6 at first instance and thereafter to proceed to consider other issues. 12. Accordingly issue No.6 was taken up and Trial Court directed the respondent herein to pay Court fee on the market value of the suit schedule property and accordingly first respondent (plaintiff) is said to have remitted an additional Court fee of Rs.1,69,520/- in addition to the earlier Court fees paid, in all amounting to Rs.1,78,125/-. Though said order was challenged by the second respondent herein in WP.No.5085/2004, it did not yield any positive result in favour of the second respondent and when the writ petition came to be dismissed on 21.10.2006 the second respondent has remitted the Court fee as aforesaid. 13. However, Trial Court while considering issue No.4 held the same in the negative i.e., in favour of the Plaintiff and answered the same by holding that suit filed by the plaintiff was within the period of limitation. It is this order which is impugned in the writ petition. 14. Application for amendment of the plaint seeking relief of declaration was filed on 12.06.1996 and same came to be allowed on 14.06.1999. This order came to be confirmed in CRP.No.2203/1999 on 07.03.2000 and Special Leave Petition filed against this order came to be dismissed on 21.08.2000 is not in dispute. It is the contention of the learned Senior Counsel Sri.Naganand that when amendment is allowed it relates to the date on which it was allowed and not the date of filing of the application. In support of this proposition he has relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Tarlok Singh Vs. Vijay Kumar Sabgarwal reported in 1996(8) SCC 367 , wherein it has been held as follows: “The question is: as to when the limitation began to run? In view of the admitted position that the contract was to be performed within 15 days after the injunction was vacated, the limitation began to run on 06.04.1986. Vijay Kumar Sabgarwal reported in 1996(8) SCC 367 , wherein it has been held as follows: “The question is: as to when the limitation began to run? In view of the admitted position that the contract was to be performed within 15 days after the injunction was vacated, the limitation began to run on 06.04.1986. In view of the position that the suit for perpetual injunction was converted into one for specific performance by order dated 25.08.1989, the suit must be deemed to have been instituted on 25.08.1989 and the suit was clearly barred by limitation.” 15. On the basis of principles enunciated in the above decision It is contended by Sri.Naganand that when same is applied to the facts of the case he would contend that admittedly amendment was allowed on 14.06.1999 and as on the date of allowing the amendment suit was barred under Article 58 of Limitation Act, 1963 since lease-cum-sale deed had been executed by the first respondent in favour of the petitioner on 28.12.1994. Thus, reckoning the period of limitation of 3 years from the date of execution of lease-cum-sale agreement the suit had become time barred and as such he would submit that issues framed regarding limitation ought to have been held in the affirmative and suit ought to have been dismissed. 16. At this juncture it would be necessary to extract the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court relied upon by the learned Counsel for the second respondent, which are as under: 1. 2002 (4) KCCR 2839, Sampath Kumar Vs. Ayyakannu and Another wherein it has been held as follows: “An amendment once incorporated relates back to the date of the suit. At this juncture it would be necessary to extract the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court relied upon by the learned Counsel for the second respondent, which are as under: 1. 2002 (4) KCCR 2839, Sampath Kumar Vs. Ayyakannu and Another wherein it has been held as follows: “An amendment once incorporated relates back to the date of the suit. However, the doctrine of relation back in the context of amendment to pleadings is not one of universal application and in appropriate cases the Court is competent while permitting an amendment to direct that the amendment permitted by it shall not relate back to the date of the suit and to the extent permitted by it shall be deemed to have been brought before the Court on the date of which the application seeking the amendment was filed.” 2) AIR 2001 SC 2896 , Siddalingamma and Another vs. Mamtha Shenoy “On the doctrine of relation back, which generally governs amendment of pleadings unless for reasons the Court excludes the applicability of the doctrine in a given case the petition for eviction as amended would be deemed to have been filed originally as such and the evidence shall have to be appreciated in the light of the averments made in the amended petition. The High Court though set aside the order of the Trial Court but it is writ larger from the framing of the order of the High Court, especially the portions which we have extracted from the order of the High Court and reproduced in earlier part of this judgment, that the learned Single Judge of the High Court also was not seriously doubting the genuiness of the landlady’s requirement on the material available on record but was not feeling happy with the contends of the eviction petition as originally filed an over-zealous attempt on the part of the landlady in projecting her sister’s sons and grandchildren as her own.” 17. In the background of the principles enunciated by their Lordships in the above judgments i.e., Sampath Kumar and Siddalingamma it would be necessary to extract the order dated 14.06.1999 passed in the present case i.e., O.S.No.2268/1996 allowing I.A.No.3 i.e., application filed by the plaintiff under Order 6 Rule 17 of Code of Civil Procedure whereunder plaintiff had sought for amendment of incorporating the prayer for declaration and possession, which reads as under: ORDER I.A.No.3 filed under Order 6, Rule 17 of Code of Civil Procedure by the plaintiff is allowed. The plaintiff is hereby permitted to carry out the amendment in terms of I.A.No.3. 18. A bare reading of the above order would reveal that application has been allowed without any conditions imposing on the plaintiff and it is an order in simpliciter allowing the application. There is no specific direction restricting the prayer to be incorporated from a particular date. The order allowing I.A. does not specify that it shall come into effect from the date of presenting the plaint or it would be effective only from a particular date. As held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Siddalingamma’s case once amendment is allowed to be incorporated it relates back to the date of the suit and the doctrine of relation back does not get excluded in the instant case since there is no such restrictive order passed by Trial Court while allowing the application. Keeping this principle in mind when the facts are examined it is noticed that present suit has been filed on 29.03.1996 and written statement was filed on 20.04.1996. Application for amendment was filed on 12.06.1996 which came to be allowed on 14.06.1999. As contended by the learned Senior Counsel Sri.S.S.Naganand if the limitation is to be considered to have commenced on 28.12.1994 i.e., date of execution of lease-cum-sale agreement in favour of the petitioner and if Article 58 is applied as contended and examined as to whether suit would be barred, it has to be held in negative for the reason that amendment application filed on 12.06.1996 was within the period of limitation i.e., claim for declaration has been sought for within 3 years from the date of denial by defendants and said application for amendment having been allowed on 14.06.1999 it relates back to date of filing the application. Further there being no fetters placed in the order allowing application for amendment it relates back to the date of filing of the suit. 19. At this juncture it would be necessary to extract the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s Revajeetu Builders and Developers Vs. M/s Narayanaswamy and Sons & Ors. Reported in 2009 AIR SCW 6644 i.e., Paragraph 67 which reads as under: “67. On critically analyzing both the English and Indian cases, some basic principles emerge which ought to be taken into consideration while allowing or rejecting the application for amendment. (1) Whether the amendment sought is imperative for proper and effective adjudication of the case? (2) Whether the application for amendment is bona fide or mala fide? (3) The amendment should not cause such prejudice to the other side which cannot be compensated adequately in terms of money; (4) Refusing amendment would in fact lead to injustice or lead to multiple litigation; (5) Whether the proposed amendment constitutionally or fundamentally changes the nature and character of the case? And (6) As a general rule, the Court should decline amendments if a fresh suit on the amendment claims would be barred by Limitation on the date of application.’ (Emphasis supplied by me) 20. In the above judgment the Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down that Courts should decline the amendment if a fresh suit on the amendment claims would be barred by limitation on the date of the application the application for amendment should not be entertained. When this test is applied to the facts of the case on hand and examined it emerges that suit has been filed on 29.03.1996 and application for amendment was filed on 12.06.1996 and as on the date of filing of the application, even if the argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is to be accepted that Article 58 is attracted to the facts of the case, the claim made in the amendment application had not become time barred and it was well-within the time prescribed under Article 58 as on date of filing of the application for amendment. Hence, the contention raised by the learned Counsel for petitioner that the suit was barred by time cannot be acceded to and it is hereby rejected. 21. Hence, the contention raised by the learned Counsel for petitioner that the suit was barred by time cannot be acceded to and it is hereby rejected. 21. Insofar as the judgment of Tarlok Singh’s case referred to supra relied upon by the learned Counsel for petitioner has to be held as inapplicable to the facts of the present case for the following reasons: a) In the said case respondent had instituted sui for perpetual injunction on 23.12.1987 and application for amendment to convert it into specific performance was filed on 17.07.1989 which came to be allowed on 25.08.1989 and on facts it was found that in the said case the contract had to be performed within 15 days after injunction was vacated and the limitation had begun to run from 06.04.1986 and thus, it was found that when application had been allowed it was deemed to have been instituted on 25.08.1989 by which date the claim of plaintiff had become time barred. However, the said facts are conspicuously absent in the instant case. b) Even otherwise applying the “Doctrine of relation back” as held in the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sampath Kumar’s case and Siddalingamma’s case to the facts of the case to arrive at a conclusion that the said doctrine is squarely applicable to the facts of the case since Trial Court has not specifically ordered that amendment permitted would not relate back to the date of the suit. In view of there being no embargo placed by Trial Court, I am of the considered view that these two judgments are squarely applicable to the facts of the present case. c) As held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Revajeetu’s case, if on the date of filing of the application for amendment the claim had not become time barred, it has been held that amendment requires to be allowed otherwise which would result in entertaining or examining a stale claim. 22. In the instant case application for amendment has been filed within 3 months from the date of instituting the suit and hence, it cannot be held that the claim made in the application for amendment had become time barred. 22. In the instant case application for amendment has been filed within 3 months from the date of instituting the suit and hence, it cannot be held that the claim made in the application for amendment had become time barred. In view of the above, the contention of the learned Counsel for petitioner that date of allowing the amendment is to be construed for the purposes of reckoning the limitation cannot be accepted and it is hereby rejected. 23. The other contention raised by the learned Counsel for petitioner that Section 65 of the Limitation Act cannot have application and it is Article 58 which governs the present suit in question also cannot be accepted. When the application for amendment was allowed by Trial Court on 14.06.1999 it came to be challenged by the petitioner herein in CRP.No.2203/1999 before this Court wherein it has been held to the following effect: “Para 9: Normally the title……………..thereof. However, prima facie, the case is in favour of the plaintiff that he must be deemed to be in possession of the property by virtue of the possession certificate as well as the order of allotment.” In order to appreciate the contention of the learned Counsel for petitioner it would be necessary to extract Article 65 of the Limitation Act which reads as under: Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run 65. For possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on title Twelve years When the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff Explanation-For the purpose of this article (a) Where the suit is by a remainderman, a reversioner (other than a landlord) or a devisee, the possession of the defendant shall be deemed to become adverse only when the estate of the remainderman, reversioner or devisee, as the case may be falls into possession; (b) Where the suit is by a Hindu or Muslim entitled to the possession of immovable property on the death of a Hindu or Muslim female, the possession of the defendant shall be deemed to become adverse only when the female dies; (c) Where the suit is by a purchaser at a sale in execution of a decree when the judgment-debtor was out of possession at the date of the sale, the purchaser shall be deemed to be a representative of the judgment-debtor who was out of possession. 24. 24. In this regard the following decisions relied upon by the learned Counsel for second respondent is required to be extracted which are as under: 1) AIR 1991 Kar 273 , Seshumull M.Shah Vs. Sayed Abdul Rashid and others “7. The learned Counsel for the appellant urged before me two submissions: The first submission was that the suit filed by the plaintiff was barred by limitation. The suit was governed by Art.58 and not by Article 65 of the Limitation Act. Second submission urged before me was that in the facts and circumstances of the case, defendant No.1 was entitled to the protection of Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, he being bona fide purchaser for value without notice. So far as the first submission is concerned, it proceeds on the assumption that the suit was merely a suit for declaration of title and nothing else. It is not possible to accept this submission. In the plaint, the plaintiff has stated the manner in which she acquired title to the suit lands. She then stated the facts about the necessity to appoint her son-in-law defendant No.2 as her manager to look after her properties. She has then stated about the manner in which defendant No.2 dealt with her properties and ultimately her knowledge about the fact that defendant No.2 had got a patta made in him own name in respect of the suit lands and his selling the suit lands to defendant No.1. On such pleadings, the plaintiff claimed not merely a declaration that she was the owner of the property and that the sale deed executed by the 2nd defendant in favour of the first defendant was void, but also a relief for possession of the suit lands and damages amounting to Rs.1,500/- from defendant No.1, who, it was alleged, had cut a standing Tamarind tree on the land in question. To me it is obvious that such a suit where possession is claimed as a consequence of the declaration would be governed by Art.65 and not Art.58 of the Limitation Act. The first submission must therefore be rejected.” 2) AIR 1984 Gujarat 24, Niranjan Amrit Lal Vs. Manharlal Jivanlal Parikh “6. The fourth substantial question of law is whether the suit is barred by limitation. Both the Courts below have held that the suit is barred by limitation. The first submission must therefore be rejected.” 2) AIR 1984 Gujarat 24, Niranjan Amrit Lal Vs. Manharlal Jivanlal Parikh “6. The fourth substantial question of law is whether the suit is barred by limitation. Both the Courts below have held that the suit is barred by limitation. The lower appellate Court has held that although the suit for possession based on title could be governed by Art.65 of the Limitation Act, but as there are other ancillary reliefs also claimed, the limitation period would be governed not by Art 65. Here the lower appellate Court has obviously gone wrong. The limitation period in this case would undoubtedly be governed by Art.65 of the Limitation Act because the relief regarding possession of the suit schedule property is the main relief and it would not be affected by lesser period of limitation applicable to ancillary reliefs claimed together with the main relief. When there are several reliefs claimed in a suit, the limitation period would be that of the main relief the limitation for ancillary relief being ignored.” 25. The plaintiff has claimed for declaration that he is a confirmed allottee of the suit schedule land as per the confirmatory letter of allotment dated 23/28-3-1987 claiming this to be the title granted to him by the first respondent in his favour. When this prayer is examined with reference to Article 65 it has be held that it would squarely fall within this article. Thus, where possession is claimed in a suit resultant consequence of declaration it would be governed by Article 65 and not Article 58 of the Limitation Act. The judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Abdul Waheed Khan Vs. Bhawani and Others reported in AIR 1966 SC 1718 would be squarely applicable to the facts of the case. Though learned Counsel for respondent has relied upon various other decisions referred to above it would not be of necessity to examine them, in view of the fact that it is being held that Article 65 would be applicable to the case on hand and not Article 58 as contended by the learned Counsel for petitioner. Accordingly, Point No.1 is answered holding that Trial Court was correct in holding that suit was not barred by limitation. 26. Accordingly, Point No.1 is answered holding that Trial Court was correct in holding that suit was not barred by limitation. 26. It would be necessary to extract the judgment of this Court in CRP.No.2203/1999 RE: POINT NO: 2 wherein a direction has been issued by this Court to the Trial Court on 07.03.2000 to dispose of the suit within a period of 9 months and the said direction has remained a mirage. The suit is of the year 1996 and 14 years have lapsed and trial is yet to commence on other issues. The Hon’ble Supreme Court while disposing of SLP (Civil) No.11682/2000 on 21.8.2000 had in fact reserved liberty to petitioner herein to raise the grounds raised in CRP.No.2203/1999 at appropriate stage after disposal of suit so that all issues can be decided. As such it would be necessary to issue further direction to the Trial Court to dispose of the suit within 3 months from today and parties to the suit are also hereby directed to extend full co-operation in disposing of the suit as ordered herein above within a period of 3 months from today. Accordingly writ petition is dismissed. The order of Trial Court dated 03.08.2007 is hereby confirmed.