H. Baruah, J. - The judgment and award delivered on 25.03.2009 by the Commissioner Work­men's Compensation, West Tripura, Agartala in Case No. TS (WC) No. 22 of 2007 is under challenge in this appeal preferred under Sections 30,30(a)(a) read with Section 4(1) (d) and sub-section 2 of Section 4 of Work­men's Compensation Act, 1923 (for short the Act), primarily on two substantial question of law namely: (1) Whether learned Commissioner committed grave error of law in assessing the compensation treating the disability of the claimant-respondent as permanent in nature relying the law laid down under Section 4 (Ic) (ii) of the Workmen's Com­pensation Act, 1923 contrary to the va­lidity period of disability certificate issued by the medical board for a period of five years, which indicates that the nature of disability suffered by the claimant respond­ent is temporary in nature. (2) Whether the learned Commissioner committed error and illegality in awarding interest to be paid by the insurer of the offending vehicle in violation of sub-section 3 A of Section 4 A of the Act. 2. Sri Binoy Bhusan Roy, the respondent No. 1 in the appeal has also challenged the impugned judgment and award by filing cross objection on the ground that the award so assessed by the learned Commissioner is in the lower side and compensation has not been assessed by the learned Commissioner taking into consideration the admitted monthly wage and the appropriate factor as indicated in Schedule IV of the Act with reference to the age of the injured (claimant/respondent No. 1). 3. For the purpose of answering the sub­stantial questions as raised by the appellant and the question of enhancement of the award, in the opinion of this Court, the brief facts are required to be placed at this stage, which are as follows: 4. The respondent No. 1 herein was a helper/khalashi of the truck bearing registra­tion No. AS-25B-7582 owned by respond­ent No. 2, Sri Bidhan Mazumdar and was under his employment. On 26.11.2006 while the aforesaid vehicle was awaiting for escort party near R. K. Cherra Rubber Garden on Assam-Agartala Road the respondent No. 1 was doing some maintenance work under the vehicle. The respondent No. 1 herein was a helper/khalashi of the truck bearing registra­tion No. AS-25B-7582 owned by respond­ent No. 2, Sri Bidhan Mazumdar and was under his employment. On 26.11.2006 while the aforesaid vehicle was awaiting for escort party near R. K. Cherra Rubber Garden on Assam-Agartala Road the respondent No. 1 was doing some maintenance work under the vehicle. All on a sudden the escort party ar­rived and on being signaled the respondent No. 2 who is also driver of the said vehicle without taking any notice or care moved the vehicle and as a result, the respondent No. 1 received grievous injuries in his left leg and right eye besides other injuries on his body. Injured respondent No. 1 was immediately shifted to Manu Hospital and thereafter to G. B. Hospital, Agartala, wherein he was treated as indoor patient till 16.12.2006. After his release he had to attend G. B. Hospital for a continuous period of three days. An FIR be­ing lodged, Manu P. S. Case No. 39 of 2006 was registered under Sections 279/338 IPC. Respondent No. 1 partial disablement had been assessed at 20% for fracture of his left leg and 30% of vision of his right eye. A no­tice under Section 10 of the Act though served having had no response, respondent No. 1 filed a claim petition before the Commissioner, Workmen's Compensation claiming compen­sation to the tune of Rs. 6,00,000/-. It would be appropriate to state that the truck bearing Registration No. AS-25B-7582 during the relevant point of time was insured with the Oriental Insurance Company Ltd., Agartala, the appellant herein, the respondent No. 2 in cross objection indicated above filed by the respondent No. 1, Sri Binoy Bhusan Roy. Respondent No. 2 being the owner-cum-driver of the aforesaid vehicle through his written objection admitted the, accident and the registration of a police case as well. In his written objection he only contended that the offending vehicle was duly insured with the insurance company, the appellant herein which is liable to indemnify the injured. The appel­lant herein was arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in the claim petition and contested the claim by filing written objection and denied that the accident occurred in course of employment of the respondent No. 2. It also denied its liability. The appel­lant herein was arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in the claim petition and contested the claim by filing written objection and denied that the accident occurred in course of employment of the respondent No. 2. It also denied its liability. On the basis of the pleadings the learned Commissioner framed three issues, namely: (1) Whether the petitioner sustained in-juries in an accident occurred on 26.11.2006 at about 11.30 a.m. in course of his employment under the Opposite Party No. 1, Shri Bidhan Mazumdar ? (2) Whether the petitioner is entitled to get any compensation? If so, what will be the amount of compensation and who is liable to pay the same ? (3) What other relief/reliefs the petitioner is entitled to ? On these issues witnesses were examined and documents proved. After scrutiny of the facts and evidence on record both oral and documentary the learned Commissioner awarded a compensation amounting to Rs. 1,46,763/- with 12% interest per annum from the date it fell due i.e. on and from date of serving of notice under Section 10 of the Act. The appellant herein, the insurer of the offending vehicle as indicated above was di­rected to pay the amount of compensation with 12% interest per annum on and from 2.4.2007, the date of serving of notice under Section 10 of the Act. Being aggrieved thereby the appellant herein has preferred this instant appeal mainly on the two substantial questions of law as indicated herein above. 5. The aforesaid judgment and award is also under challenge in cross objection filed by the respondent No. 1 of the appeal namely, Sri Binoy Bhusan Roy, the claimant. In the cross objection it was contended that the learned Commissioner failed to consider the admitted monthly wage of the Cross Objec­tion at Rs. 3,600/-. The assessment of monthly wage at Rs. 3,000/- by the Commissioner is contra to the admitted monthly wage. There­fore, computation of the award taking monthly wage at Rs. 3,000/- is erroneous and illegal. It is also contended by the crass objector that the Commissioner committed manifest error in law in fixing the factor at 163.07 while the admitted age of the cross objector at the rel­evant point of time was 45 years of age. Thus, the factor ought to have been calculated at 169.44. 3,000/- is erroneous and illegal. It is also contended by the crass objector that the Commissioner committed manifest error in law in fixing the factor at 163.07 while the admitted age of the cross objector at the rel­evant point of time was 45 years of age. Thus, the factor ought to have been calculated at 169.44. If the both aspects are taken together the award would have been at a higher rate than the award computed by the learned Commissioner. The Cross Objector, there­fore, prays this Court to enhance the award by taking into consideration the admitted monthly wages 3,600/- and the factor at 169.44. 6. We have heard Mr. P. Goutam, learned counsel for the Oriental Insurance Co., the insurer as well as Mr. S. Deb, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. S. C. Das, learned counsel appearing for and on behalf of Sri Binoy Bhusan Roy, the claimant. 7. Section 4 of the Act deals with the sub­ject "amount of compensation" on account of death, permanent total disablement, per­manent partial disablement and temporary disablement whether total or partial results from the injury. In this instant case we are concerned with Section 4(1)(b) and Section 4 (1)(c) of the Act in the context of computa­tion of the award. From the records as well as from the judgment impugned herein it ap­pears that Ext. 5 and Ext. 6 are the disability certificate issued by the medical board showing the extent of disability of the left leg and the right eye. Ext. 5 indicates that the claimant suffers partial disablement of permanent nature of his left leg to the extent of 20% while Ext. 6 indicates that the claim­ant suffers disability to the extent of 30% of his right eye. The above two disability certifi­cate issued by the medical board give an in­dication that the nature of disability suffered by the claimant is temporary in nature and it would be for five years. Mr. Goutam appear­ing for and on behalf of the appellant as well as the opposite party No. 2 of the Cross Objection submitted that the learned Com­missioner ought to have determined the com­pensation in terms of Section 4(1)(d) and sub­section 2 of Section 4 of the Act for a period of 5 years and in that event the compensation would have been much lower. The learned Commissioner committed error treating the disability of the claimant-respondent No. 1 as permanent in nature ignoring the disability certificate issued by the medical board and computed the compensation by resorting to the provision of Section 4 (1)(c)(II) of the Act. Learned Commissioner in view of the disability certificate Ext. 6 taking recourse to SI. No. 26A of Schedule I of the Act took percentage of loss of earning capacity at 10% and thus calculated the disability in total at 30% following the guidelines given an explanation 1 of Section 4(1)(c) of the Act. 8. Contrary to the submission advanced by Mr. P. Goutam, Mr. S. Deb, learned Senior Counsel appearing for and on behalf of the respondent No. 1 (cross objector) sub­mitted that though the disability certificate Ext. 6 in respect of the right eye of the claimant-injured indicates, the disability of temporary in nature for a period of five years, such dis­ability is referred to by the medical board is required to be assessed on the basis of the evidence available on record. From the scrutiny of the records of T.S. (WC) No. 22 of 2007 it is noticed that the claimant respondent No. 1 (cross objector) in support of his claim for proof of disability in respect of his right eye and left leg brought the doctors concerned to the witness box who were duly cross examined by the appellant herein. Both the medical officers were members of the medical board and were examined as PW-1 and PW-2. PW-1 is Dr. Pranabendu Barman. His evidence is that on 14.2.2007 he along with two other members of District Disability Board examined one Binoy Bhusan Roy of Teliamura to ascertain his disability. On his examination it was discovered that said Binoy Bhusan Roy was suffering from temporary disability for a period of five years in respect of his right eye and the said temporary disability was to the extent of 30%. This witness also went on to depose that Binoy Bhusan Roy was suffering Corneal Opacity of his right eye. He also stated as per certificate issued by them there is no chance of recovery from the permanent partial disability and with such type of disability person can work as assistant of a vehicle but would be unable to drive. This witness also went on to depose that Binoy Bhusan Roy was suffering Corneal Opacity of his right eye. He also stated as per certificate issued by them there is no chance of recovery from the permanent partial disability and with such type of disability person can work as assistant of a vehicle but would be unable to drive. He also deposed that with such percentage of disability one person can work as a day labour, worker, sales man etc. PW-3, is Dr. Subal Debnath, he in his evidence deposed that on 21.3.2007 he along with two other doctors of the board examined one Binoy Bhusan Roy of Teliamura to ascertain his disability. During examination they found a fracture in the left hip joint of the Binoy Bhusan Roy, as a result of which Binoy Bhusan Roy became temporarily disabled for a period of five years and his disability was 20% and after examination they issued a disability certificate, Ext. 5. This witness also stated that said temporary partial disablement can decrease or increase after a period of five years and said Binoy Bhusan Roy is to continue his treatment for recovery. He further stated in his evidence that with such type of partial disability Binoy Bhusan Roy would not be able to walk properly but would be limping. He also stated further that with such percentage of disability Binoy Bhusan Roy would be able to work as a helper. The learned Commissioner while assessing the compensation did not disturb the percentage of disability of the left leg of the claimant respondent No. 1, however, the percentage of disability suffered on the right eye by the respondent No. 1 had been reduced to 10% on account of loss of partial vision of one eye as incorporated in Part II of Schedule I of the Act in SI. No. 26 (A). Mr. S. Deb, learned Senior Counsel while arguing in the context of disability of the claimant-respondent No. 1 very strenuously argued that the learned Commissioner committed error and illegality in assessing the disability at 10% of the right eye of the respondent No. 1, taking resort to SI. No. 26(A) of Part II of the Schedule I of the Act in view of evidence of PW-2, Dr. Pranabendu Barman. No. 26(A) of Part II of the Schedule I of the Act in view of evidence of PW-2, Dr. Pranabendu Barman. PW-2 in his evidence stated that Binoy Bhusan Roy, respondent No. 1 herein suffered from Corneal Opacity of his right eye and there was no chance of recovery from that permanent partial disability and in view of such evidence on record the learned Commissioner ought not to have reduced the percentage from 30% to 10%. In SI. No. 26 of Schedule I percentage of loss of earning capacity has been assessed at 30% when there is loss of vision of one eye without complications or disfigurement of eyeball the other being normal and in SI. No. 26A percentage of loss of earning capacity is assessed at 10% if there is loss of partial vision of one eye. The dictionary meaning of "Cornea" is the transparent layer which covers and protects the outer part of the eye. The meaning of "eyeball" is whole of the eye, including the part inside the head that cannot be seen. The dictionary meaning of "Opaque" is not clear enough to see through or allow light through, therefore, the meaning of "Corneal Opacity" would be not loss of the complete vision of the eye. In that sense on account of disability in the right eye of the respondent No. 1 cannot be said as loss of vision. If there is loss of vision of one eye without complications than and than percentage of loss of earning capacity can be assessed at 30% but in our case from the evidence of PW-2 with the aid of dictionary meaning of "Cornea" and "Opaque" it cannot be said that respondent No. 1 did loss his complete vision of his right eye as a result of injury sustained and in the vehicular accident. Therefore, it can be said that respondent No. 1 is suffering from loss of partial vision of one eye in regard to which percentage of loss of earning capacity can be assessed at 10%. Argument advanced by Mr. S. Deb, learned Senior Counsel that percentage of loss of earning capacity of right eye of the respond­ent No. 1 ought not to have been disturbed cannot be accepted. Argument advanced by Mr. S. Deb, learned Senior Counsel that percentage of loss of earning capacity of right eye of the respond­ent No. 1 ought not to have been disturbed cannot be accepted. The learned Commis­sioner in my considered view has rightly as­sessed the percentage of loss of earning ca­pacity at 10% in respect of disability of the right eye of the respondent No. 1. The learned Commissioner assessed the total percentage of the disability at 30% and accordingly as­sessed the compensation in favour of the claimant respondent No. 1. Mr. P. Goutam while advancing his argument submitted that the learned Commissioner in the context of assessing the loss of earning capacity of the respondent No. 1 for disability in his right eye as well as left leg has not committed any er­ror or illegality and therefore, percentage of loss of earning capacity as assessed by the learned Commissioner is required to set at rest without any disturbance. Such assess­ment was made by the learned Commissioner taking into consideration of the evidence of PW-2 and PW-3 and also the description of the injuries described in Schedule I, Part II of the Act. Thus, the claim of the respondent No. 1 that the percentage of loss of earning capacity was required to be assessed to be 50% in all would not be sustainable. 9. In regard to the monthly income of the respondent No. 1 it was submitted by Mr. S. Deb, learned Senior Counsel that the learned Commissioner committed error in assessing the monthly income of the respondent No. 1 at 3,000/- despite availability of evidence on record to show his monthly income at Rs. 3,600/- and Rs. 50/- per day as footing charge, thus, contributing Rs. 3,500/- per month for the expenses of his family consist­ing of four members. The claim of respond­ent No. 1 in the context of income is sup­ported by the respondent No. 2, the owner-cum-driver of the offending vehicle. In his written statement Sri Bidhan Mazumdar, the owner-cum-driver of the offending vehicle admitted that claimant respondent No. 1 was paid monthly salary of Rs. 3,600/- at the rate of Rs. 120/- per day and in addition he was also paid fooding charge at the rate of Rs.50/- per day thus, his monthly total income was Rs.5,100/-. The appellant was arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in Case No. TS (WC) 22 of 2007. 3,600/- at the rate of Rs. 120/- per day and in addition he was also paid fooding charge at the rate of Rs.50/- per day thus, his monthly total income was Rs.5,100/-. The appellant was arrayed as opposite party No. 2 in Case No. TS (WC) 22 of 2007. By filing written statement de­nied the claim of the respondent No. 1 in re­spect of monthly income. Appellant brought Sri Bidhan Mazumdar, the owner-cum-driver of the offending vehicle to the witness box as D W-1. This witness in his evidence stated that at the time of accident claimant was 45 years of age and he used to earn Rs.3,600/- per month as the salary and in addition there to he was also provided Rs.50/- per day as fooding charge, in all he was getting Rs.5,100/- per month form him. It was argued that in view of the evidence of DW-1, the monthly income of the respondent No. 1 ought not to have assessed at Rs. 3,000/- per month rather it ought to have been assessed at Rs.3,500/-per month. It was also argued by Mr. S. Deb that the finding of the learned Commissioner that there is no evidence in respect of the income is erroneous in view of the evidence of DW-1. I have meticulously, in the context of income, gone through the averments made in the claim petition, the written statement of the owner-cum-driver of the offending vehicle, the written statement submitted by the appellant and the evidence on record of both the sides. From its scrutiny it can never be said that the claimant respondent No. 1 was not paid Rs. 3,600/- as monthly wage at the rate of Rs. 120/- per day in addition thereto Rs. 50/- per day as fooding charge by the respondent No. 2 herein. When the respondent No. 2 herein while on oath de­posed before the learned Commissioner that respondent No. 1 had been paid in the scale as indicated above, the learned Commissioner ought not to have opined that there is no evidence on record to show that respondent No. 1 had the income at Rs. 3,600/- per month. Assessment in respect of monthly income of Rs. 3,000/- is erroneous and illegal. I find force in the argument advanced by Mr. Deb that monthly income of the respondent No. 1 can be assessed at Rs. 3,500/-. 10. 3,600/- per month. Assessment in respect of monthly income of Rs. 3,000/- is erroneous and illegal. I find force in the argument advanced by Mr. Deb that monthly income of the respondent No. 1 can be assessed at Rs. 3,500/-. 10. In respect of age of the respondent No. 1 at the time of accident DW-1, the owner-cum-driver of the offending vehicle de­posed on oath that respondent No. 1 was running 45 years of age at the time of acci­dent. Learned Commissioner took the relevant factor 163.07 while calculating the compen­sation. The judgment and award is silent why such a relevant factor has been taken into consideration. Schedule IV of the Act deals with the subject "Factors for working out lump sum equivalent of compensation amount in case of permanent disablement and death". In the schedule in Column-1 completed years of age on the last birthday of the workmen immediately preceding the date of which the compensation fell due indicated. If the age of the insured or the deceased does not exceed 45 years of age at the time of accident, the relevant factor would be per schedule 169.44 while factor 163.07 can be calculated when the age of the deceased or the injured does not exceed 47 years of age. There is no evi­dence on record to show that the at the time of accident the claimant respondent No. 1 was running 47 years of age. DW-1 in his evidence without any ambiguity stated that age of the claimant-respondent at the time of ac­cident was 45 years. In that view of the evi­dence on record assessment of compensa­tion by taking factor 163.07 by the learned Commissioner is erroneous and illegal, the factor ought to have been taken at 169.44 in view of the evidence on record. Thus, the argument advanced by Mr. S. Deb, learned Senior Counsel in my considered view has substance in it. 11. The learned Commissioner also granted 12% interest on the amount of com­pensation due from the date of service of notice under Section 10 of the Act i.e. on and from 2nd April, 2004. Mr. P. Goutam, learned counsel appearing for the appellant submits that interest and penalty as provided under sub-section 3 A of Section 4A is a liability of the employer and not the insurer of the offending vehicle. Mr. P. Goutam, learned counsel appearing for the appellant submits that interest and penalty as provided under sub-section 3 A of Section 4A is a liability of the employer and not the insurer of the offending vehicle. Referring to sub­section 3 of Section 4 A it was submitted by P. Goutam that where an employer is in default in paying the compensation due under the Act within one month from the date it fell due, due Commissioner would be within his jurisdiction to direct the employer in addition to the amount of arrear, pay simple interest thereon @ 12% per annum or such higher rate not exceeding the maximum of the lending rates of any nationalized bank as specified by the Central Government by notification in the official gazette and also if in the opinion of the Commissioner there was no justification for delay shall direct the employer in addition to the amount to the arrear and interest thereon to pay a further sum not exceeding 50% of such amount by way of penalty. The working out of interest at the rate of 12% by the learned Commissioner, is, therefore, according to Mr. Goutam is erroneous. Mr. Goutam in support of his contension in the context of grant of interest relied on the decision in the case be­tween New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Harshadbhai Amrutbhai Modhiya &Anr., reported in 2006 (2) TAG 321 (SC). In the case (supra) the Apex Court in paragraphs-13,18 and 20 held as under : "13. By reason of the provisions of the Act, an employer is not statutorily liable to enter into a contract of insurance. Where, however, a con­tract of insurance is entered into by and be­tween the employer and the insurer, the insurer shall be liable to indemnify the employer. The insurer, however, unlike under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act does not have a statu­tory liability. Section 17 of the Act does not provide for any restriction in the matter of con­tracting out by the employer vis-a-vis the in­surer. 18. As indicated hereinbefore, a contract of insurance is governed by the provisions of the Insurance Act. Unless the said contract is gov­erned by the provisions of a statute, the parties are free to enter into a contract as for their own volition. The Act does not contain a provision like Section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act. 18. As indicated hereinbefore, a contract of insurance is governed by the provisions of the Insurance Act. Unless the said contract is gov­erned by the provisions of a statute, the parties are free to enter into a contract as for their own volition. The Act does not contain a provision like Section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Where a statute does not provide for a compul­sory insurance or the extent thereof, it will bear repetition to state, the parties are free to choose their own terms of contract. In that view of the matter, contracting out, so far as reimbursement of amount of interest is concerned, in our opin­ion, is not prohibited by a statute. 20. For the reasons aforementioned, the im­pugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. The appellant is not liable for the interest. However, we make it clear that the employer shall be liable to pay the amount of interest to the claimant. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs." 12. The Apex Court while deciding the case (supra) also took assistance of the judg­ment rendered in P. J. Narayan Vs. Union of India & Ors., reported in 2004 AC7 452 wherein the Apex Court observed as follows: "There is no statutory liability on the Insur­ance Company. The statutory liability under the Workmen's Compensation Act is on the em­ployer. An insurance is a matter of contract be­tween the Insurance Company and the insured. It is always open to the Insurance Company to refuse to insure. Similarly they are entitled to provide by contract that they will not take on liability for interest. In the absence of any stat­ute to that effect, Insurance Company cannot be forced by Courts to take on liabilities which they do not want to take on. The writ petition is dismissed. No order as to costs." Mr. Gautam in support of his contention in the context of award of interest also relied in the judgment dated 30.04.2008 passed by this Court in MFA (WC) No. 02 of 2008 : Branch Manager, Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. (I) Subodh Sarkar, (2) Sri Dilip Deb reported in 2008 (3) GLT557 wherein this Court also held that there was no statutory liability on the insurer to pay interest when the insurance policy is silent. Ltd. Vs. (I) Subodh Sarkar, (2) Sri Dilip Deb reported in 2008 (3) GLT557 wherein this Court also held that there was no statutory liability on the insurer to pay interest when the insurance policy is silent. Such interest and penalty is payable by the employer only under the provision of Section 4A of the Act. A similar view was taken by this Court while deciding W. P. (C) No. 440 of 2005 National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Kanai Dasgupta & Ors. Decided on 7.6.2006 reported in 2006(4) GLT287 that insurer of the vehicle is not statutorily liable to pay interest and in MFA (WC) No. 13 of 2002 decided on 25.7.2007, Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Shri Himangshu Ch. Deb & Am. reported in 2010 (3) GLT 712 by Division Bench of this Court. 13. The Insurance policy of the offending vehicle when scrutinized, we find no such li­ability clause in respect of payment of inter­est that entered by and between the appel­lant herein and respondent No. 2, Sri Bidhan Mazumdar, the owner of the truck bearing Registration No. AS-25B-7582. In view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court and this High Court the learned Commissioner, Workmen's Compensation appears to have committed error and illegality in awarding in­terest at the rate of 12% on the amount of compensation payable by the appellant. Therefore, I am of the considered view that the interest so directed to be paid at the rate of 12% per annum from the date it fell due cannot sustain and accordingly it is interfered with. The compensation so to be computed by this Court on the basis of the discussions hereinbefore made would be liable to be paid by the insurer to the claimant. The compen­sation is thus calculated as under: Rs. 3500 X relevant factor 169.44 x 30 100 = Rs. 1,77,912/- (Rupees One lakh seventy seven thou­sands nine hundred twelve). 14. hi the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Mubasir Ahmed &Anr., reported in 2007 AIR SCW1265 in paragraph-9 of the judgment rendered by it held as under: "9. Interest is payable under Section 4A (3) if there is default in paying the compensation due under this Act within one month from the date it fell due. The question of liability under Section 4A was dealt with by this Court in Maghar Singh Vs. Jashwant Singh (1998 990 SCC 134). Interest is payable under Section 4A (3) if there is default in paying the compensation due under this Act within one month from the date it fell due. The question of liability under Section 4A was dealt with by this Court in Maghar Singh Vs. Jashwant Singh (1998 990 SCC 134). By Amending Act, 14 of 1995, Section 4A of the Act was amended, inter alia, fixing the minimum rate of interest to be simple interest @ 12%. In the instant case, the accident took place after the amendment and, therefore, the rate of 12% as fixed by the High Court cannot be faulted. But the period as fixed by it is wrong. The starting point is on completion of one month from the date on which it fell due. Obviously it cannot be the date of accident. Since no indication is there as when it becomes due, it has to be taken to be the date of adjudication of the claim. This appears to be so because Section 4-A (1) prescribes that compensation under Section 4 shall be paid as soon as it falls due. The compensation becomes due on the basis of adjudication of the claim made. The adjudication under Section 4 in some cases involves the assessment of loss of earning capacity by a qualified medical practitioner. Unless adjudication is done, question of compensation becoming due does not arise. The position becomes clearer on a reading of sub-section (2) of Section 4A. It provides that provisional payment to the ex­tent of admitted liability has to be made when employer does not accept the liability for com­pensation to the extent claimed. The crucial ex­pression is "falls due". Significantly, legislature has not used the expression "from the date of accident". Unless there is adjudication, the question of an amount falling due does not arise." In the impugned judgment the learned Commissioner in paragraph 12 held that in­terest fell due on and from 2.4.2007 i.e. the date of service of notice under Section 10 of the Act. In the case (supra) the Apex Court held that where there is no indication of date as to when it becomes due it has to be taken to be the date of adjudication of the claim. Section 4Aof the Act deals with the subject "compensation to be paid when due and pen­alty for default". In the case (supra) the Apex Court held that where there is no indication of date as to when it becomes due it has to be taken to be the date of adjudication of the claim. Section 4Aof the Act deals with the subject "compensation to be paid when due and pen­alty for default". In sub-section 3 it says that where any employer is in default in paying the compensation due under this Act within one month from the date it fell due, the Commis­sioner shall direct the employer in addition to the amount of arrears to pay simple interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum and also penalty not exceeding 50%. The im­pugned judgment was delivered on 25.3.2009 and, therefore, the amount of com­pensation would be payable by the employer under Section 4A of the Act within one month from the date of judgment and if the employer fails to pay the compensation within the time frame as indicated in sub-section 3 of Sec­tion 4A of the Act the Commissioner of the Workmen's Compensation would then be within his jurisdiction to direct payment of sim­ple interest at the rate of 12% per annum. Since the offending vehicle is insured with the appellant company by the insured, the claim­ant respondent No. 1 herein, liability of pay­ment of compensation would be with the in­surance company. Therefore, the insurance company is directed to pay the compensa­tion as computed herein before within a pe­riod of one month. If the insurance company fails to make payment of the compensation within the time frame as indicated above interest @ 12% per annum would be payable on the amount of compensation by the em­ployer, the respondent No. 2 herein, which shall be paid by the appellant company, liable to be realised from the respondent-opposite party No. 2 in accordance with law. 15. In the result, the appeal is partly al­lowed. Order of payment of interest @ 12% per annum by the appellant is set aside and quashed. The Cross Objection filed by claim­ant-respondent No. 1 stands allowed to the extent as indicated above. Both the appeal and the cross objection are disposed of by this common judgment inasmuch as both cropped up from the same judgment. 16. No cost. Send back the LCR forth­with.