JUDGMENT Since the controversy involved in both these writ petitions is similar and as they have arisen from the judgment and decree dated 13.6.1990 and subsequent orders passed by the Board of Revenue, Allahabad, therefore, for the sake of convenience, both the writ petitions are being decided by this common order. 2. In Writ Petition No. 4964 of 2001, the petitioners have sought the following relief :- (a) to issue a writ of certiorari or order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned orders dated 13th June, 1990 and the order dated 25th October, 1990 (Annexure III and IV to the writ petition). (b) to issue a writ of mandamus or order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding and directing the opposite parties not to interfere in the possession of the petitioners No. 1 to 3. (c) to issue any other writ, order or direction, which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case. (d) to award costs of this petition to the petitioners. 3. By the order dated 13.6.1990, the Board of Revenue has allowed all the five second appeals, set aside the judgment and decree passed by the Additional Commissioner as well as the judgment and decree passed by the trial court and decreed the suit of the plaintiff-appellants as mentioned in the order dated 13.6.1990. By the order dated 25.10.1990, the restoration applications filed by Balkar Singh and others were rejected by the Board of Revenue. 4. In Writ Petition No. 4965 of 2001, the petitioners have sought the following relief :- (a) to issue a writ of certiorari or order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned orders dated 7.3.1995 (Annexure VI), dated 3.12.1992 (Annexure V) and the order dated 13.6.90 (Annexure III) to the writ petition. (b) to issue a writ of mandamus or order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding and directing the respondents not to interfere with the possession of the petitioners over the land in dispute. (c) to issue any other writ, order or direction which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case. (d) to award costs of this petition to the petitioners. 5. By the order dated 13.6.1990, the Board of Revenue has decreed the suits of the plaintiff-appellants, who are respondent nos. (c) to issue any other writ, order or direction which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case. (d) to award costs of this petition to the petitioners. 5. By the order dated 13.6.1990, the Board of Revenue has decreed the suits of the plaintiff-appellants, who are respondent nos. 4 to 8 herein and set aside the judgment and decree passed by the Additional Commissioner in appeal and the judgment and decree passed by the trial court. By the order dated 3.12.1992, the Board of Revenue has rejected the review application of the petitioners. By the order dated 7.3.1995, the Board of Revenue has rejected the restoration application dated 26.12.1992 thereby praying for rehearing of review application. 6. Brief facts, giving rise to the present writ petitions, are that the plaintiff-respondents nos. 2 to 6 instituted as many as five revenue suits in the year 1979 bearing Suit Nos. 22/34 of 1978-79, Ravi Prakash and two others Vs. Pyara Singh and others, Suit No. 22/28 of 1978-79, Vijay Kumar Vs. Pyara Singh and others, Suit No. 22/29 Sudhir Kumar Vs. Pyara Singh and others, Suit No. 22/30 Naresh Kumar Vs. Pyara Singh and others and Suit No. 22/33 Subhash Mittal Vs. Pyara Singh and others under Sections 209/229-B of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (for short the Act) in the court of Assistant Collector, 1st Class, Kashipur. Pyara Singh and eight others including the Gaon Sabha Kharmasi and the State were arrayed as defendants. Plaintiffs have alleged that they are recorded Bhumidhars and tenants of Class I of the land in suit, which is detailed at the foot of the plaint in each suit. It is further alleged that the plaintiffs had been in continuous cultivatory possession over the suit land till 14.5.1978. The local police made a report to the Sub Divisional Magistrate Kashipur in April 1978 to the effect that there existed an apprehension of breach of peace over the possession of the land in dispute between two parties. Consequently, proceedings under Sections 145/146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were initiated and the Sub Divisional Magistrate passed a preliminary order on 2.5.1978 thereby the land in question was attached and given in the Supurdgi of receiver. As such the land became custodia legis. Consequently, proceedings under Sections 145/146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were initiated and the Sub Divisional Magistrate passed a preliminary order on 2.5.1978 thereby the land in question was attached and given in the Supurdgi of receiver. As such the land became custodia legis. Plaintiffs also alleged that Lekhpal in collusion with other revenue officials conspired with the defendants, who got their names entered in the revenue records by preparing P.A.-24 against the law and the Rules. It has also been alleged that the defendants were neither Bhumidhar nor in possession of the land in dispute. 7. The suits were resisted by the defendant-petitioners by filing their written statements. They admitted the plaintiffs to be recorded Bhumidhars of Class I of the suit land. It was asserted that the Manager and Mukhtare-Aam of the plaintiffs Sri K.K. Bhatia executed an agreement to sell in respect of the disputed land in favour of the defendants on 12.1.1977 and he also accepted a sum of Rs. 3,50,000/- as an advance against the sale consideration. The defendants were put into cultivatory possession over the land in suit and since then the defendants have been in continuous possession and are doing agriculture therein. The plaintiffs have never been in possession over the suit land on the spot. It is also asserted that a sum of Rs. 30,000/- was paid to one Dhola Party, who parted with the possession of the disputed land in favour of the defendants. The defendants denied that the land in custodia legis rather on the contrary, they claimed possession of the land in dispute with the consent of the plaintiffs through their Mukhtare-Aam Sri K.K. Bhatia, who allegedly executed an agreement of sale in their favour in respect of the land in suits. 8. The learned trial court framed four issues in the suit, recorded the evidence led by the parties and after hearing the parties came to the conclusion that the defendants have been in lawful possession of the land in dispute and they cannot be evicted from the said land. Ultimately, the suits filed by the plaintiffs have been dismissed by judgment and decree dated 9.9.1981. Aggrieved, the plaintiffs preferred separate appeals before the Additional Commissioner, Kumaun Division, Nainital, but the appellate court did not find favour with the plaintiff-appellants and dismissed the appeals by a common judgment and decree dated 29.6.1985. 9. Ultimately, the suits filed by the plaintiffs have been dismissed by judgment and decree dated 9.9.1981. Aggrieved, the plaintiffs preferred separate appeals before the Additional Commissioner, Kumaun Division, Nainital, but the appellate court did not find favour with the plaintiff-appellants and dismissed the appeals by a common judgment and decree dated 29.6.1985. 9. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Additional Commissioner, the plaintiff-appellants filed second appeals namely Second Appeal Nos. 79 to 83 of 1984-85 before the Board of Revenue, U.P. at Allahabad. The Board of Revenue after hearing both the parties at length, by a detailed judgment and order dated 13.6.1990 allowed all the five appeals, set aside the judgment and decree passed by the two courts below and ultimately decreed the suits filed by the plaintiffs. 10. Aggrieved by the said judgment and order, Balkar Singh and others filed restoration application nos. 98 to 102 of 89-90 before the Board of Revenue, which too were rejected by order dated 25.10.1990. Aggrieved, the petitioners filed Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 32490 of 1990 before the Allahabad High Court which was received by transfer to this Court and has been registered as W.P.M.S. No. 4964 of 2001. 11. The petitioners of writ petition (M/S) No. 4965 of 2001 being aggrieved by the order dated 13.6.1990 filed review application nos. 122 to 126 of 89-90 before the Board of Revenue which were rejected by order dated 3.12.1992. They again moved applications for rehearing of review applications, which too have been rejected by order dated 7.3.1995, which gave rise to the Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 15150 of 1995, which was received by transfer to this Court from the Allahabad High Court and has been registered as WPMS No. 4965 of 2001. 12. Both the writ petitions have been filed mainly on the ground that the judgment and orders passed by the Board of Revenue is based on conjectures and surmises and the Board of Revenue has not considered the judgments of the courts below and the material and evidence on record. It has also been contended that the unregistered agreement for sale ought to have been considered by the respondent no. 1 as secondary evidence while passing the impugned order. It has also been contended that the unregistered agreement for sale ought to have been considered by the respondent no. 1 as secondary evidence while passing the impugned order. It has also been contended that the land in dispute is in possession of the petitioner and has never been attached and therefore the land in dispute cannot be said to be custodia legis property. 13. Counter affidavit and rejoinder affidavit have been filed in these writ petitions and a number of documents have been annexed along with counter and rejoinder affidavits beside supplementary affidavit and supplementary counter affidavits having been brought on record from both the sides. 14. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the entire material placed before this Court including original record of proceeding under Section 145 of the Code and the Revenue Suit, which were already summoned by the High Court. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioners has vehemently contended that the suits under Section 229-B/209 of the Act filed by the plaintiff-respondents were not maintainable for the simple reason that the petitioner-defendants were in the continuous possession of the land in dispute prior to the date of institution of the suit. Learned counsel for the petitioners have further contended that even otherwise the plaintiff-respondents were not entitled to any relief because it is established on record that the plaintiffs were not in possession of the land in dispute, as has been held by the civil court in the suit filed for grant of permanent injunction as well as the High Court in second appeal. The present suits are also barred by the principle of res judicata in view of the fact that the suit for permanent injunctions were dismissed by the civil court as well as the two appellate courts including the High Court. Learned counsel for the petitioners have further contended that the petitioners were handed over possession of the disputed land after an agreement to sell was executed by the Manager and general power of attorney holder of the plaintiffs on 12.1.1977 and a part of sale consideration i.e. Rs. 3,50,000/- having been passed by the defendant-petitioners on that day itself. It has also been contended that the Board of Revenue has committed a manifest error of law in not relying the said agreement for sale, which was fully proved. 16. 3,50,000/- having been passed by the defendant-petitioners on that day itself. It has also been contended that the Board of Revenue has committed a manifest error of law in not relying the said agreement for sale, which was fully proved. 16. At the outset it may be mentioned that the scope of writ jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is limited. This Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction cannot sit like a court of appeal and cannot re-appreciate or reevaluate the evidence so as to arrive at a different conclusion. Only perversity in the impugned order can be seen to find out whether there is a case of mis-reading of evidence by the courts concerned. 17. The Apex Court in the case of Surya Dev Rai Vs. Ram Chander Rai and others [(2003) 6 Supreme Court Cases, 675 has held that “On the other hand, supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a subordinate court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.” 18. In the case “Ranjeet Singh Vs. Ravi Prakash” [(2004) 3 S.C.C. page 682], the Apex Court has observed inter alia in paragraph 4 of the judgment that “An error which needs to be established by lengthy and complicated arguments or by indulging in a long-drawn process of reasoning, cannot possibly be an error available for correction by writ of certiorari. If it is reasonably possible to form two opinions on the same material, the finding arrived at one way or the other, cannot be called a patent error. As to the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution also, it has been held in Surya Dev Rai that the jurisdiction was not available to be exercised for indulging in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correcting the errors in drawing inferences like a court of appeal.” 19. As to the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution also, it has been held in Surya Dev Rai that the jurisdiction was not available to be exercised for indulging in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correcting the errors in drawing inferences like a court of appeal.” 19. In these writ petitions, the following points need to be answered :- (1) Whether the agreement for sale allegedly executed by Mr. K.K. Bhatia on behalf of the plaintiff-respondents on 12.1.1977 in favour of the petitioners has been wrongly ignored by the Board of Revenue? (2) Whether the suits under Section 229-B/209 of the Act filed by the plaintiff-respondents are maintainable and whether the land in question is custodia legis on the date of institution of suits? (3) Whether the proceedings of the suits are barred by the principle of res judicata in view of the fact that the suits for injunction filed by the plaintiff-respondents were dismissed by the civil court as well as the appellate Courts? (4) Whether the findings recorded by the Board of Revenue in its judgment and order dated 13.6.1990 are perverse and not based on evidence on record? 20. The facts of the case, which emerges out from the record, are that one K.K. Bhatia made an application to the District Magistrate Nainital, who in turn by his order dated 19.3.1978 directed the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Kashipur to pass suitable orders to Station Officer Kashipur and Tahsildar Kashipur to make spot inspection and to do the needful. Subsequently, on the application made by one Naresh Kumar Jain, the Sub Divisional Magistrate Kashipur by his order dated 2.5.1978 passed a preliminary order under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the basis of report of Station Officer Kashipur that there is apprehension of breach of peace between the parties and directed them to appear on 11.5.1978. The details of the disputed land were given at the foot of the order showing that the disputed land pertain to Khata No. 14, Plot No. 104/2 M. area 2.61 acres, plot no. 141/2 area 0.67 acre, plot no. 142/2 area 3.30 acres and plot no. 144 M. area 15.79 acres situated in village Kharmasi, P.S. Kashipur, District Nainital, total area 21.92 acres. 141/2 area 0.67 acre, plot no. 142/2 area 3.30 acres and plot no. 144 M. area 15.79 acres situated in village Kharmasi, P.S. Kashipur, District Nainital, total area 21.92 acres. The Sub Divisional Magistrate/Executive Magistrate Kashipur by his order dated 12.5.1978 passed an under Section 146 of the Code and directed the Station Officer to attach the said property and to appoint a receiver to take possession and look-after the said property subject to the approval and control of the Magistrate concerned. In compliance of the order, the Station Officer Kashipur attached the property in question and the land in question was given in Supurdgi of Surendra Chandra Son of Sri Dharmendra Chandra Arora in presence of witnesses mentioned in the memo of attachment and Supurdgi prepared on 15.5.1978. It appears that second party Pyara Singh and others preferred Criminal Revision No. 48 of 1978 before the I Additional Sessions Judge, Nainital and by order dated 18.5.1978, the operation of part of order directing the Station Officer to appoint receiver was stayed. It also appears that the revisions were allowed by the Sessions Judge Nainital by his order dated 6.6.1978 and the order passed by the Executive Magistrate was set aside. 21. Aggrieved, the first party Naresh Kumar Jain preferred Criminal Revisions before the Allahabad High Court. The Allahabad High Court by order dated 23.2.1979 allowed all the three revisions, set aside the order passed by the Sessions Judge dated 6.6.1978 and restored the order of attachment passed by the Magistrate. It was observed that the Magistrate concerned should himself appoint a suitable person as a receiver during the continuance of the proceeding under Section 145 of the Code. Subsequently, the learned Magistrate in compliance of the direction of the Allahabad High Court directed the parties to give list of persons of confidence to appointed as a receiver by his order dated 23.7.1979. This order was challenged in Criminal Revision No. 85 of 1979 by Sri Pyara Singh before the Additional Sessions Judge, Nainital, who did not find favour with the revisionist and dismissed the revision by his order dated 3.11.1979. Pyara Singh made an application dated 30.7.1978 to make inspection of the property before a receiver could be appointed. He alleged that he was in peaceful possession of the disputed land. Pyara Singh made an application dated 30.7.1978 to make inspection of the property before a receiver could be appointed. He alleged that he was in peaceful possession of the disputed land. Pyara Singh also challenged the order dated 30.7.79 in Criminal Revision No. 85 of 1979 before the Sessions Judge, which was dismissed. Ultimately, the Sub Divisional Magistrate by his order dated 9.9.1981 passed in the cases pertaining to Section 145 of the Code held that Pyara Singh and others were in peaceful possession over the land in dispute on the day the preliminary order was passed and two months before it. Aggrieved, the first party Ravi Prakash and others preferred revision before the 1st Additional Sessions Judge Nainital, who by his order dated 25.3.1982 quashed the order of the Magistrate dated 9.9.1981 and remanded the case for trial to the Magistrate. 22. Aggrieved by this order, the second party Pyara Singh and six others filed Criminal Revision before the High Court. Ultimately, the High Court by a common order dated 18.8.1982 passed in Criminal Revision No. 606 of 1982, 607 of 1982 and 608 of 1982 Pyara Singh and others Vs. State of U.P. and others dismissed the same with the direction to the Magistrate for decision as directed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge. Subsequently, the learned Sub Divisional Magistrate by his order dated 8.8.1983 has held that the second party Pyara Singh and others were in possession of the disputed land. Consequently, the order of attachment dated 12.5.1978 was withdrawn and the proceedings under Section 145 of the Code were dropped. 23. Aggrieved by the order dated 8.8.1983, the first party Sudhir Kumar and others preferred three separate criminal revisions before the II Additional Sessions Judge, Nainital. The revisions were ultimately allowed vide order dated 22.9.1984 and the cases were remanded to the learned Magistrate in the light of the directions made in the body of the judgment and in accordance with law. 24. Pyara Singh and other preferred Criminal Revision No. 2136 of 1984 before the Allahabad High Court, which was ultimately decided by order dated 27.3.1987 with the following observations :- “In Ram Sumer Puri Vs. 24. Pyara Singh and other preferred Criminal Revision No. 2136 of 1984 before the Allahabad High Court, which was ultimately decided by order dated 27.3.1987 with the following observations :- “In Ram Sumer Puri Vs. State of U.P. (A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 472) it has been held that if a civil suit on regular litigation is pending between the parties where the question of possession is involved, a parallel criminal proceeding under Section 145 of the Code would not be justified. In view of the dictum laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the proceedings under section 145/146 of the Code are dropped. The parties are directed to get their remedy from the revenue court in the second appeal. It is open to the opposite party and the applicant to make an application for appointment of receiver or for an injunction with a prayer to maintain status quo or whatever the prayer may be convenient to the parties. The present revision is accordingly disposed of. The record of the case would be sent back immediately.” 25. It appears that the plaintiff-respondents had also filed separate civil suits in the court of Munsif Kashipur for a decree of permanent injunction. A perusal of the record reveals that plaintiff Sudhir Kumar had instituted Civil Suit No. 52 of 1978 with the allegation that he is recorded tenure holder (bhumidhar) of plot No. 144 M. measuring 9.90 acres, situated in village Kharmasi, Tahsil Kashipur, district Nainital (now part of district Udham Singh Nagar) and that the plaintiff is in possession of the land through his manager – K.K. Bhatia, who is cultivating the land. It was also pleaded that the defendants-respondents (petitioners herein) forcibly want to take possession of the said land and they made an attempt to that effect on 22.3.1978. Similarly, plaintiff Vijay Kumar instituted Civil Suit No. 50 of 1978 with the allegation that he is recorded tenure holder of plot No. 144 M. measuring 0.25 acre, plot No. 145 M. measuring 0.45 acre, plot no. 146 M. measuring 0.38 acre and plot no. 155 M. measuring 1.05 acre of land situated in the same village Kharmasi. He also took other pleas as that of the plaintiff of Civil Suit No. 52 of 1978. 26. Plaintiff Subhash Mittal claiming himself to be bhumidhar of plot No. 155M. 146 M. measuring 0.38 acre and plot no. 155 M. measuring 1.05 acre of land situated in the same village Kharmasi. He also took other pleas as that of the plaintiff of Civil Suit No. 52 of 1978. 26. Plaintiff Subhash Mittal claiming himself to be bhumidhar of plot No. 155M. measuring 15 acres instituted Civil Suit No. 49 of 1978 and another plaintiff Naresh Kumar who claimed himself to be bhumidhar of plot No. 141/2M. measuring 0.16 acre, plot no. 142/2 M. measuring 3.30 acres and plot no. 144 M. measuring 15.79 acres, instituted Civil Suit No. 51 of 1978 with similar pleas against the defendants for a decree of permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering in their possession. The defendants (petitioners herein) are common in all the suits. Separate written statements with common pleas were filed in all the four suits. It was admitted that the plaintiffs are the bhumidhars of the suit land but pleaded that plaintiffs’ manager and power of attorney holder Shri K.K. Bhatia executed an agreement of sale in their favour and accepted a consideration of Rs. 3,50,000/- and in pursuance of the agreement, the defendants were handed over possession of the suit land on 12.01.1977 and since then they are in cultivatory possession of the land. It was also pleaded that they have sown and harvested crop of wheat in the year 1978 when the suit was filed. They also pleaded that since 1977 huts and houses of the defendants are standing over the suit land. 27. The trial court framed the issue on the point of possession of the plaintiff over the suit land and after recording the evidence and hearing the parties, the trial court has held that the plaintiffs failed to establish their possession over the suit land and dismissed the suits by separate judgment and decree dated 12.11.1984. 28. 27. The trial court framed the issue on the point of possession of the plaintiff over the suit land and after recording the evidence and hearing the parties, the trial court has held that the plaintiffs failed to establish their possession over the suit land and dismissed the suits by separate judgment and decree dated 12.11.1984. 28. Aggrieved, the plaintiff-appellants preferred separate appeals bearing Civil Appeal No. 121 of 1984 arising out of Civil Suit No. 52 of 1978, Civil Appeal No. 119 of 1984, arising out of Civil Suit No. 50 of 1978, Civil Appeal No. 120 of 1984 arising out of Civil Suit No. 49 of 1978 and Civil Appeal No. 122 of 1984 arising out of Civil Suit No. 51 of 1978 before the appellate court, which were ultimately heard by the Additional Civil Judge Nainital and ultimately, all the four civil appeals were dismissed on merits by separate judgment and decree dated 27.10.1976. The plaintiffs (plaintiff-respondents herein) preferred separate Second Appeals before the Allahabad High Court, which were received in the High Court and were registered as Second Appeal No. 587 of 2001, S.A. No. 588 of 2001, S.A. No. 589 of 2001 and S.A. No. 590 of 2001. All these appeals also culminated in dismissal. However, it is pertinent to mention here that the second appellate Court (High Court) has made the following observations in paragraph no. 14 of the judgment rendered on 31.3.2008 as under :- “14. Attention of this Court is drawn on behalf of plaintiffs/appellants to the copy of judgment and order dated 13.06.1990, passed by Board of Revenue, Allahabad in Second Appeals No. 79-83 of 1984-85 between the parties, directing that the possession of the plaintiffs should be restored over the land in suits. Learned counsel for the respondents pointed out that this judgment is subjudice before this Court in another writ petition filed by the defendants, (meaning thereby the present writ petitions) having gone through the judgment and order dated 13.06.1990, passed by the Board of Revenue, it is clear from said order that on the date of institution of suit, the plaintiffs were not in possession and as such in the opinion of this Court, the plaintiffs were not entitled to the decree of prohibitory injunction. As to the relief of possession they have rightly approached the revenue court, as is apparent from order dated 13.06.1990, passed by Board of Revenue.” 29. Now coming to the facts giving rise to the present writ petitions, it is pertinent to mention that after passing the preliminary order dated 2.5.1978 and after passing the order of attachment and Supurdgi of the disputed land by the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Kashipur, in the proceedings under Sections 145/146 of the Code the plaintiff-respondents herein namely, Sudhir Kumar, Naresh Kumar Jain, Subhash Mittal, Vijai Kumar Jainand Ravi Prakash Jain instituted revenue suits under Section 229-B/209 of the Act against Pyara Singh, Ram Singh, Ajayab Singh, Balkar Singh, Rajendra Singh, Kuldeep Singh and Ranjeet Singh. The plaintiffs have pleaded that the disputed land had been attached on 15.5.1978 under the orders of the Sub Divisional Magistrate passed in a proceeding under Section 145 of the Code and since then the land in dispute is custodia legis. 30. The main controversy to be resolved in these writ petitions is whether on the basis of the alleged agreement dated 12.1.1977 by which the manager of the plaintiffs Mr. K.K. Bhatia had executed an agreement to sell the land in dispute in favour of the defendants as Mukhtare-Aam of the plaintiffs the defendants have acquired right and title over the said land and whether this document alone is sufficient to defeat the suit of the plaintiffs in the facts and circumstances of the case. 31. Learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the petitioners were handed over possession of the disputed land by Mr. K.K. Bhatia, the manager and general power of attorney holder of the plaintiffs on 12.1.1977 after passing part of sale consideration, i.e. amount of Rs. 3,50,000/-. Therefore, the possession of the petitioners over the disputed land is established and the rights of the plaintiffs stood extinguished after transfer of property on the basis of agreement to sell. 32. K.K. Bhatia, the manager and general power of attorney holder of the plaintiffs on 12.1.1977 after passing part of sale consideration, i.e. amount of Rs. 3,50,000/-. Therefore, the possession of the petitioners over the disputed land is established and the rights of the plaintiffs stood extinguished after transfer of property on the basis of agreement to sell. 32. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondents has contended that the alleged agreement for sale is not a genuine and reliable document for the reasons that the original agreement was not produced; that the document is not a registered document, which required compulsory registration w.e.f. 1.1.1977 as envisaged by Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, that the total land as mentioned in the schedule is 67-85 acres of land, therefore, price of total land shown would come to Rs. 3,39,250/- only, hence a prudent person could not have passed on more than the total amount i.e. Rs. 3,50,000/- as an advance of sale consideration to the seller. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondents also contended that the photocopy of the alleged agreement does not bear the signatures of the parties to the agreement at the foot of the first page, therefore, even the first page of the alleged photocopy cannot be a part of the other two pages and the photocopy cannot be admissible in evidence unless otherwise corroborated by reliable evidence. 33. Undisputedly, the agreement to sell allegedly executed by Mr. K.K. Bhatia, Manager of the plaintiffs is an unregistered document, which was allegedly executed on 12.1.1977. Admittedly, the petitioners have not produced certified copy or the original of the alleged agreement for sale executed on behalf of the recorded tenure holders in favour of the defendants on the basis of which land worth 89 acres or at least 67-85 acres had been allegedly transferred in their favour after having received a handsome amount of Rs. 3,50,000/- towards part payment of sale consideration. It is settled law that the document, which is relied upon by a party must be proved in accordance with law before the court concerned or the same should have been admissible in evidence without requiring formal proof by way of oral evidence. 34. The Board of Revenue while deciding the Second Appeals has dealt with on this point in paragraph no. 34. The Board of Revenue while deciding the Second Appeals has dealt with on this point in paragraph no. 6 of the judgment whether there has been any agreement for sale between the parties to the contest and whether the alleged document said to be the agreement for sale is a genuine and valid document and has actually been executed on behalf of the recorded tenure holder under the valid authority. The following observations were made by the Board of Revenue at page 11 of its judgment on the point :- “It is an admitted fact that the original copy of the so called agreement for sale has not been produced in evidence and the reasons given for not producing the original document is that the original document was burnt in a fire accident took place in the hut of the respondents-defendants and a First Information Report to this effect was lodged with the Police. This appears to be absolutely fabricated story of defence which is proved from the statement of Sri Pyara Singh D.W.1 who is the main contesting and leading defendant-respondent in the case. According to his statement the fire accident took place in his but in which the relevant papers were burnt of and a F.I.R. was lodged about the accident. A photo copy of an application appears to have been addressed to the Incharge of the Police Chauki Kureshwari tehsil Kashipur district Nainital has been placed on the record as a piece of evidence and no copy of F.I.R. lodged has actually been filed. Firstly, the photostat copy of the application moved is not admissible in evidence unless it is proved by the official of the police chauki concerned stating that such an application was actually given informing the Police about the fire accident. D.W.8 Sachchidanand Head Moharrir who has been examined to prove the photo copy has actually not proved it because no original application was brought by him to prove the photo copy nor he could disclose as to whether the F.I.R. was actually lodged or not. Thus unless the original is placed before the witness the Photostat copy cannot be proved. D.W.8 Sachchidanand Head Moharrir who has been examined to prove the photo copy has actually not proved it because no original application was brought by him to prove the photo copy nor he could disclose as to whether the F.I.R. was actually lodged or not. Thus unless the original is placed before the witness the Photostat copy cannot be proved. But even if assuming that it was a genuine piece of evidence it does not show that actually any F.I.R. was lodged with the Police because generally there is no provision for recording F.I.R’s in the Police Chaukis and the records concerned are maintained by the Police stations where the F.I.R’s are lodged and copies are issued. This application appears to be a piece of evidence to create evidence as no details relating to the boundaries of the hut burnt or of the articles destroyed has been given in the application and the Head Moharrir himself denied that this application was presented by Sri Pyara Singh in support of the allegations about the fire accident allegedly took place resulting in the burning of the original agreement to sell. Thus this piece of evidence is a waste paper and cannot be considered to be a F.I.R. Moreover, Sri Pyara Singh D.W.1 in his cross examination has clearly admitted that most of the original documents were being kept by him in his house in village Gobra where he had a puckcka house of permanent residence and also that most of the relevant original documents were kept by his counsel and only photocopies were kept with the witness himself. Thus it cannot be believed that only the original agreement for sale was kept in the hut existing on the land in dispute as a temporary shed for shelter allegedly for supervision and cultivation of the land and only to burn that document the fire accident took place. The witness himself admitted that he lodged the F.I.R. only about the destruction of the papers and not relating to the destruction of the other house hold articles in the fire accident. The witness has disclosed that the fire accident took place about 9 months ago while the date of his statement is 8.2.80 and the F.I.R. was lodged on 14.8.79 and the period comes to about 6 months only. The witness has disclosed that the fire accident took place about 9 months ago while the date of his statement is 8.2.80 and the F.I.R. was lodged on 14.8.79 and the period comes to about 6 months only. The photo copy produced has been proved by the notary who had attested it from the original but when and who was the person to get the photocopies prepared from the original is not known to the witness himself and got the photo copies prepared. He has expressed complete ignorance to tell about the person to whom he had given for getting the photocopies done. Thus the story of fire accident burning of original agreement for sale is absolutely false and cannot be believed and the reasons for not producing the original document appears to be only for not allowing the original document from coming before the court just to conceal the fact that it was not a genuine document and if the same is produced before the court in original it shall be challenged and the signatures and thumb impressions with writing on it can be put to test and examination by the experts which may result in proving the document totally false. Thus the safe course was adopted to produce the photo copy by concocting the story of fire accident. Moreover, even if this document would have been produced in original the document would have not been of any help to the defence case of the respondents simply because it has not been executed by the appellants plaintiffs, who are the recorded tenure holders of the land having transferable rights themselves. It is said on behalf of the defendants that Sri K.K. Bhatia had executed this document as a Mukhtare-Aam for the plaintiffs-appellants. This fabricated case can also not be believed nor it has got any evidence to prove the validity of document simply because there is nothing on record to show that any Mukhtar nama has ever been executed by the plaintiffs-appellants in favour of Sri K.K. Bhatia nor any such Mukhtarnama has been produced in evidence.” 35. During the course of arguments, the learned counsel for the petitioners was directed to file the photostat copy of the alleged agreement for sale which bears the signatures of the parties to the agreement to sell on the first page. During the course of arguments, the learned counsel for the petitioners was directed to file the photostat copy of the alleged agreement for sale which bears the signatures of the parties to the agreement to sell on the first page. Learned counsel for the petitioners has stated at the Bar that the photostat copy available with the petitioners do not bear signatures of the parties to the agreement at the foot of the first page. In such circumstances the first page of the alleged agreement cannot be taken as part of the second and third pages. Moreover, Mr. K.K. Bhatia has mentioned that the land is his bhumidhari land which is not correct. It is admitted case of the parties that the plaintiff-respondents are recorded tenure holder (bhumidhar) of the disputed land. The Board of Revenue has dealt with on this point and has elaborately discussed the evidence on record from page 6 to page 17 of the judgment. In such facts and circumstances of the case, the first page of the document is nothing but a waste paper in the eye of law and the learned Board of Revenue has rightly ignored the alleged agreement for sale, which was relied upon by the trial court and the lower appellate court in its judgments. 36. Since the alleged agreement for sale of land, even if from a very remote consideration it is taken for the sake of argument that the document is reliable and genuine, is considered for the purposes of the present case, this document cannot be admissible in evidence under Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908. I have perused the judgment and decree passed by the trial court as well as the first appellate court. The trial court has based its findings mainly on the execution of the alleged agreement for sale and on non production of Mr. K.K. Bhatia before the trial court in evidence. It is not disputed that the defendant-petitioners are claiming their rights and title in the five suits on the basis of execution of agreement of sale by Mr. K.K. Bhatia. It is the stand of defendants-petitioners and not the plaintiff-respondents that the said document was executed by Mr. K.K. Bhatia as general power of attorney of the plaintiffs. Moreover, in this agreement, Mr. K.K. Bhatia has mentioned himself as bhumidhar of the disputed land. K.K. Bhatia. It is the stand of defendants-petitioners and not the plaintiff-respondents that the said document was executed by Mr. K.K. Bhatia as general power of attorney of the plaintiffs. Moreover, in this agreement, Mr. K.K. Bhatia has mentioned himself as bhumidhar of the disputed land. The aid of such pleadings had been taken by the petitioner-defendants, therefore, it was incumbent upon the petitioner-defendants to have produced Mr. K.K. Bhatia in support of their plea and to substantiate the contention that the agreement was in fact executed by him (K.K. Bhatia) as general power of attorney holder of the plaintiff-respondents. The burden to produce Mr. K.K. Bhatia, if any, was upon the petitioners and not upon the plaintiff-respondents in the witness box. The trial court appears to have lost sight of the pleadings raised by the plaintiffs and defendants in the plaint and written statement, while at page 2 of the trial court judgment, it is mentioned that the defendants raised a plea that the agreement for sale was executed in their favour on 12.1.1977 and a sum of Rs. 3,50,000/- was received from them and possession was given to the defendants of the disputed land. It is also mentioned by the defendants that the agreement dated 12.1.1977 shall be produced separately. It is settled law that the burden of proof is always upon the party which raises a particular plea in its pleadings, hence, the non-production of K.K. Bhatia in the witness box cannot be detrimental to the case of the plaintiffs, as held by the trial court. 37. The first appellate court appears to have gone one step further in observing that since Mr. K.K. Bhatia moved an application before the Sub Divisional Magistrate Kashipur on 1.3.78 in a proceeding under Section 145 of the Code mentioning himself as power of attorney holder of the plaintiffs, therefore, on this ground the burden to proof shifted upon the plaintiffs. This finding is not tenable in the eye of law particularly when neither any certified copy or the original of the power of attorney executed in favour of Mr. K.K. Bhatia was brought on record of the proceeding under Section 145/146 of the Code nor there is any such finding of the criminal court that Mr. K.K. Bhatia was the power of attorney holder of the plaintiffs. K.K. Bhatia was brought on record of the proceeding under Section 145/146 of the Code nor there is any such finding of the criminal court that Mr. K.K. Bhatia was the power of attorney holder of the plaintiffs. It is settled law that the findings of criminal court are not even binding upon the civil court. Moreover, if it is taken that Mr. K.K. Bhatia had actually made an application before the Executive Magistrate against the petitioners alleging that they are threatening to disturb his possession in the land in dispute as general power of attorney holder of the plaintiffs-respondents as has been accepted by the first appellate court, then the execution of alleged agreement of sale by Mr. K.K. Bhatia himself on 12.1.1977 in favour of the petitioners becomes suspicious. A prudent person, if he had legally executed a document in favour of any party after having received a handsome amount and had passed the possession of the land to that party about one year earlier, would not dare initiate criminal proceedings against the other party i.e. petitioners on his own accord. Be that as it may, as the claim of the defendant-petitioners entirely rests upon the execution of alleged agreement for sale, therefore, the burden lay upon the petitioners (defendants) to have proved the alleged agreement for sale within the four corners of the law on the point, which they have utterly failed to discharge before the two courts below, i.e. the trial court and the first appellate court. It would suffice to mention that this Court is concerned with the perversity in the judgment and order of the Board of Revenue. 38. Even otherwise, at the most a document which is required by law to be registered, if unregistered, is inadmissible as evidence of a transaction affecting immovable property, but it may be admitted as evidence of collateral facts or for any collateral purpose, that is for any purpose other than that of creating, declaring, assigning, limiting or extinguishing a right to immovable property, as has been held by the Apex Court in the case of Rana Vidya Bhushan Singh Vs. Ratiram [(1969) 1 UJ 86 (Supreme Court)]. The Apex Court in the case of K.B. Saha and Sons Private Limited Vs. Development Consultant Limited [(2008) 8 Supreme Court Cases, 564], wherein in paragraph 34 the Apex Court has held as under :- “34. Ratiram [(1969) 1 UJ 86 (Supreme Court)]. The Apex Court in the case of K.B. Saha and Sons Private Limited Vs. Development Consultant Limited [(2008) 8 Supreme Court Cases, 564], wherein in paragraph 34 the Apex Court has held as under :- “34. From the principles laid down in the various decisions of this Court and the High Courts, as referred to hereinabove, it is evident that : 1. A document required to be registered, if unregistered is not admissible into evidence under Section 49 of the Registration Act. 2. Such unregistered document can however be used as an evidence of collateral purpose as provident in the proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act. 3. A collateral transaction must be independent of, or divisible from the transaction to effect which the law required registration. 4. A collateral transaction must be a transaction not itself required to be effected by a registered document, that is, a transaction creating, etc. any right, title or interest in immovable property of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards. 5. If a document is inadmissible in evidence for want of registration, none of its terms can be admitted in evidence and that to use a document for the purpose of proving an important clause would not be using it as a collateral purpose.” 39. It is thus crystal clear that the trial court as well as the first appellate court have committed a manifest error of law in relying upon the alleged agreement of sale for the purposes of transfer of right, title or interest, for which it was executed, particularly when the same is inadmissible in evidence under Section 49 of the Registration Act. The alleged agreement for sale even did not contain signatures of either party to the agreement at the foot of the first page which covered most important clause nos. 1 to 6 of the agreement. The registration of the document was made compulsory by the legislature w.e.f. 1.1.1977 as provided under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. 40. Learned counsel for the petitioners has vehemently argued that the defendant-petitioners were in possession of the land in dispute in view of agreement to sale and they had passed on part of sale consideration in part performance of contract, hence they are not liable to ejectment in a suit under Section 209 of the Act. 40. Learned counsel for the petitioners has vehemently argued that the defendant-petitioners were in possession of the land in dispute in view of agreement to sale and they had passed on part of sale consideration in part performance of contract, hence they are not liable to ejectment in a suit under Section 209 of the Act. In support of his contention, the learned counsel has placed reliance upon the case of Banjara Singh Vs. Board of Revenue U.P. and others [1992, R.D., 268 (Allahabad High Court)] wherein in paragraph no. 9, the following observations were made :- “9. In the instant case the possession was transferred, handsome amount was received and balance was to be paid at the time of actual sale. The transfer of possession indicates that some right of vendor i.e. possessory title, was transferred. In any way what is decisive is not the nature of transaction in the present case, but as to whether the possession of the defendant was otherwise than in accordance with law so as to make him liable for ejectment. As the defendant was in possession by virtue of his amount advanced, hence his possession could not be said to be otherwise than in accordance with law.” 41. This case-law is of no avail to the petitioners as the facts of the case at hand are distinguishable. In the cited case, the agreement for sales was not denied by the plaintiff along with payment of advance by the defendant. As already discussed above, the sole basis of defence, i.e. the agreement for sale allegedly executed by Mr. K.K. Bhatia, the manager of the plaintiff-respondents is neither an authenticated document in the eye of law, nor properly proved, nor the same is registered, nor the same is admissible in evidence. Moreover, the petitioners have utterly failed to prove that the plaintiff-respondents had ever executed power of attorney to sell their land. Therefore, the story of payment of handsome amount towards sale-consideration on the strength of the said document has been rightly ignored by the Board of Revenue. 42. Learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the petitioner-defendants cannot be evicted from the disputed land in view of the provisions of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act as they have already passed huge amount as part of sale consideration as part performance of the contract under the agreement for sale. 43. 42. Learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the petitioner-defendants cannot be evicted from the disputed land in view of the provisions of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act as they have already passed huge amount as part of sale consideration as part performance of the contract under the agreement for sale. 43. In reply, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondents has submitted that the provisions of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act do not apply to the facts of the present case for the simple reason because there is no lawful agreement to sell the disputed land between the parties and no such plea has been raised by the petitioner-defendants in their written statement. 44. As has been observed above, the alleged agreement for sale is not a genuine document, therefore, the provisions of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act are not attracted to the case at hand. The argument is of no avail to the petitioners. 45. I am also of the considered view that the Board of Revenue has rightly held that an unregistered agreement to sell is simply a waste paper and is absolutely inadmissible in evidence and it cannot be held to be a valid document to confer any kind of rights on the party concerned. 46. Learned counsel for the petitioners has vehemently contended that the petitioners-defendants were in actual and cultivatory possession of the land in dispute and the land in question is not custodia legis and has argued that the suits under Section 229-B of the Act filed against them by the plaintiff-respondents are not maintainable. 47. In reply, learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondents has urged that it is established on record that the proceedings under Section 145/146 of the Code were drawn on the application made by Naresh Kumar and others, the plaintiff-respondents, and land in dispute was undisputedly attached under orders of the Sub Divisional Magistrate Kashipur dated 12.5.1978. Learned counsel further submitted that the proceedings under Section 145/146 of the Code were dropped finally under the orders of the High Court of Allahabad dated 27.3.1987 and the parties were further directed to get their remedy from the revenue court in the second appeal. Learned counsel further submitted that the proceedings under Section 145/146 of the Code were dropped finally under the orders of the High Court of Allahabad dated 27.3.1987 and the parties were further directed to get their remedy from the revenue court in the second appeal. The second appellate Court by its elaborate judgment and order has dealt with the point of custodia legis and has also decreed the suit of the plaintiff-respondents and has already set aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial court as well as first appellate Court. 48. I have perused the judgment of the Board of Revenue on this aspect. In the order at page 22 of the judgment, the following observations were made :- “Thus it is clear that ultimately criminal proceedings about the disputed land have ended but the fact remains that the land in dispute is still under the supardgi of the court concerned even if the proceedings have been dropped. It is clear from the perusal of record that in compliance of the preliminary order passed for the attachment of property in dispute by the Magistrate concerned on 125.78 under section 146 Cr.P.C. the land in dispute was placed under attachment by the local police and was given in the custody of Sri Surendra Chandra son of Sri Dharamendra Chand Arora resident of Mohalla Rahimkhani tehsil and police station Kashpur district Nainital on 15.5.78 and the memo of attachment and custody prepared is fard kurdi and far supardginama by the Police dated 15.5.78 is on file. There is nothing on record to show that the property attached and given in the supardgi was ever taken from the supardgar under the orders of the court and was given in the possession of either of the parties and the supardgar was discharged from the liability and the custody of disputed property although the property was held to have been in the actual possession of second party the defendants-respondents by the Magistrate and then again the attachment order was withdrawn and the property was ordered to be released in favour of the defendants-respondents by the Magistrate on the basis of the revenue court decision and also lastly the Magistrate had withdrawn his attachment order, but all the orders were set aside by the Higher Judicial Authorities and there is nothing on record to show that the orders were actually executed by discharging the supardgar or the supardginama and the attachment were cancelled in the light of the orders dropping the proceedings. In view of these facts and circumstances, I am of the definite view that the property is still in the custody and supardgi on behalf of the Magistrate and the order of the Hon’ble High Court dropping the proceedings under section 145/146 Cr.P.C. has been passed during the pendency of second appeal in this court in which the stay order and the order relating to the status quo is continuing making no change in the position with regard to the possession and custody of the property in dispute on the spot.” 49. The above observations recorded by the Board of Revenue in its order goes to the root of the case on the point of custodia legis. The Board of Revenue has rightly observed that the learned Additional Commissioner has misunderstood the order of the High Court dated 23.2.1979 referred to above and has wrongly held that the order of attachment was declared to be void. The High Court of Allahabad had observed that the Executive Magistrate himself should appoint a receiver and this power cannot be delegated to the any other officer including the Station Officer of Police Kashipur. The High Court of Allahabad had observed that the Executive Magistrate himself should appoint a receiver and this power cannot be delegated to the any other officer including the Station Officer of Police Kashipur. I am of the considered view that even if a trespasser is found to be in possession of the disputed land on the date of preliminary order passed under Section 145 of the Code, then after custody of the property by court under Section 145/146 of the Code, the possession of the same would go to the lawful owner. A Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Aneg Singh and others Vs. Ram Nath and others [1973, R.D., page 290] wherein it is held that “if it is found that the trespasser was actually in possession on the date of the preliminary order, then the effect of the court’s possession thereafter is to effect an interruption in his possession. The trespasser cannot count the period of the possession of the court or the receiver as his own possession for the purpose of limitation for a suit for ejectment or possession.” Even otherwise in the instant case, the petitioners have claimed their possession over the disputed land only since 12.1.1977 when the alleged agreement for sale was executed by the manager and so-called power of attorney holder of the plaintiff-respondents. The suits were ultimately filed in the revenue court on or about 19.4.1979. In this view of the matter, there is no bar of limitation in filing the suits against the petitioners, as submitted by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondents. 50. The Apex Court in the case of Shanti Kumar Panda Vs. Shakuntala Devi reported in AIR 2004 Supreme Court, 115 has explained the words ‘competent Court’ occurring in sub-section (1) of Section 146 of the Code, in clause (1) of paragraph no. 23 of the judgment. The relevant extract is reproduced as under :- “23. For the purpose of legal proceedings initiated before a competent Court subsequent to the order of an Executive Magistrate under Ss. 145/146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the law as to the effect of the order of the Magistrate may be summarized as under :- (1) The words ‘competent Court’ as used in sub-section (1) of S. 146 of the Code do not necessarily mean a Civil Court only. 145/146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the law as to the effect of the order of the Magistrate may be summarized as under :- (1) The words ‘competent Court’ as used in sub-section (1) of S. 146 of the Code do not necessarily mean a Civil Court only. A competent Court is one which has the jurisdictional competence to determine the question of title or the rights of the parties with regard to the entitlement as to possession over the property forming subject-matter of proceedings before the Executive Magistrate. (2) A party unsuccessful in an order under S. 145(1) would initiate proceedings in a competent Court to establish its entitlement to possession over the disputed property against the successful party. Ordinarily, a relief of recovery of possession would be appropriate to be sought for. In legal proceedings initiated before a competent Court consequent upon attachment under S. 146(1) of the Code it is not necessary to seek relief of recovery of possession. As the property is held custodia legis by the Magistrate for and on behalf of the party who would ultimately succeed from the Court it would suffice if only determination of the rights with regard to the entitlement to the possession is sought for. Such a suit shall not be bad not asking for the relief of possession.” 51. In the case at hand, it is not disputed that the revenue suits were filed by the plaintiff-respondents against the defendant-petitioners after the order of attachment and custody was passed by the Executive Magistrate, already detailed herein above at appropriate places. In view of the dictum of the Apex Court in the case of Shanti Kumar Panda (supra) coupled with the undisputed facts of the case, it is clear that the land in suits is custodia legis and the suits filed by the plaintiff-respondents in the revenue courts were fully maintainable. The ratio of the said case is fully applicable to the facts of the case at hand. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the petitioners were in actual possession of the disputed land throughout the proceedings under Sections 145/146 of the Code, therefore, it cannot be held as custodia legis and even otherwise that the plaintiffs could not have sought relief of possession of the disputed land being custodia legis is not tenable in the eye of law. I am in complete agreement with the findings recorded by the Board of Revenue that the disputed property is custodia legis does not call for any interence by this Court in writ jurisdiction. 52. Learned counsel for the petitioners further argued that the judgment of the High Court dated 31.3.2008 passed in second appeals arising out of the suits for permanent injunction filed by the plaintiff-respondents against the petitioners would operate as res judicata as the plaintiff-respondents have lost their claim for permanent injunction upto the stage of second appeals and the judgment of the second appellate Court has attained finality. 53. I have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioners and I am not inclined to accept the same for the following reasons :- Firstly, because the competent Court for the purposes of the entitlement of rights and title of the parties herein is revenue Court and not the civil court as has already been held by the Apex Court in the case of Shanti Kumar Panda (supra). Secondly, in the civil suits before the civil courts filed for a decree of permanent injunction, only the issue of possession of the party concerned was considered by the civil courts. The title of the parties were neither determined nor the same could be determined by the civil courts. Moreover, the civil suits were instituted before filing of revenue suits and that too after the disputed property has been attached and given in custody of supardgar in the proceedings under Section 145/146 of the Code. Thirdly, the contention of the petitioners falls to the ground in the light of the observations made by this Court in the last line of paragraph no. 14, already referred to above, wherein it has been held that as to the relief of possession, the plaintiff-respondents herein have rightly approached the revenue court. Fourthly, the principle of res judicata would apply only if the matter was in issue directly and substantially in a prior litigation and decided against a party. It is not such a case in the present writ petitions. I am fortified in my view by the dictum of Apex Court in the case of Sajjadanashin Sayed MD.,B.E. EDR. (D) by LRs. Vs. Musa Dadabhai Ummer and others [(2000) 3 S.C.C., 350]. 54. The Apex Court in the case of Gram Panchayat of Village Naulakha Vs. It is not such a case in the present writ petitions. I am fortified in my view by the dictum of Apex Court in the case of Sajjadanashin Sayed MD.,B.E. EDR. (D) by LRs. Vs. Musa Dadabhai Ummer and others [(2000) 3 S.C.C., 350]. 54. The Apex Court in the case of Gram Panchayat of Village Naulakha Vs. Ujagar Singh and others [(2000) 7, Supreme Court Cases, 543] has held in paragraph no. 10 as under :- “10. We may also add one other important reason which frequently arises under Section 11 CPC. The earlier suit by the respondent against the Panchayat was only a suit for injunction and not one on title. No question of title was gone into or decided. The said decision cannot, therefore, be binding on the question of title. See in this connection Sajjadanashin Sayed v. Musa Dadabhai Ummer where this Court, on a detailed consideration of law in India and elsewhere held, that even if, in an earlier suit for injunction, there is an incidental finding on title, the same will not be binding in a later suit or proceedings where title is directly in question, unless it is established that it was “necessary” in the earlier suit to decide the question of title for granting or refusing injunction and that the relief for injunction was founded or based on the finding on title. Even the mere framing of an issue on title may not be sufficient as point out in that case.” 55. A similar view has been taken by the Apex Court while considering the principle of res judicata, in the case of Williams vs. Lourdusamy and another [(2008) 5, S.C.C., Page 647] wherein the law laid down in the case of Sajjadanashin Sayed (supra) has been followed as well as “Haryana State Electricity Board Vs. Hanuman Rice Mills, Dhanauri and others” [(2010) 9 S.C.C., 145]. 56. Lastly, the suits were filed by the plaintiffs-respondents under Section 229B/209 of the Act. The revenue suits are not simplicitor suits under Section 209 of the Act. The plaintiff-respondents have specifically pleaded that the Lekhpal concerned in collusion with the defendants nos. 1 to 7 without any authority of law made an entry on P.A.-24 in the revenue records and prayed for delivery of possession to the plaintiff-respondents, if the defendants are found in possession of the suit land. 57. The plaintiff-respondents have specifically pleaded that the Lekhpal concerned in collusion with the defendants nos. 1 to 7 without any authority of law made an entry on P.A.-24 in the revenue records and prayed for delivery of possession to the plaintiff-respondents, if the defendants are found in possession of the suit land. 57. For the reasons and discussion above, it follows that the Board of Revenue has rightly held that the agreement for sale allegedly executed on 12.1.1977 by Mr. K.K. Bhatia, the manager and so-called power of attorney holder of the plaintiffs is not admissible in evidence, rather it is nothing but a waste paper in the eye of law. The Board of Revenue has also rightly held that the land in dispute is custodia legis and the suits filed by the plaintiffs were fully maintainable under Sections 229-B/209 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. It has also been rightly held that the suits were not barred by principle of res judicata or Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. Both the trial court as well as the first appellate court have committed a manifest error of law in dismissing the suit mainly on the basis of alleged agreement for sale, which was neither duly proved by the defendant-petitioners nor the same was admissible in evidence. The Board of Revenue has rightly ignored the alleged agreement, even for collateral purposes. The impugned orders including the judgment and decree dated 13.6.1990 passed by the Board of Revenue thereby decreeing the suits of the plaintiff-respondents do not suffer from any perversity or jurisdictional error. Consequently, both the writ petitions being devoid of merits are liable to be dismissed. 58. Both the writ petitions are accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs. 59. Interim order dated 18.12.1990 passed in W.P.M.S. No. 4964 of 2001 is vacated. 60. The original records of revenue suit and the criminal proceedings under Section 145/146 of the Code be transmitted to the courts concerned immediately.