JUDGMENT (Sanjay Kumar, J) A custody battle between the paternal grandparents and the mother for the person and properties of the children, Karuturi Hema Bindu, aged 16 years, and Karuturi Venkata Satya Sai Durga Vamsi Kiran, aged nearly 12 years. By order dated 03.03.2010, the District Judge, East Godavari, Rajahmundry, allowed GOP No.258 of 2008 filed by the mother holding that she was entitled to the custody of the children and their properties being their natural guardian and directing the paternal grandparents to render a true and proper account of the income and expenditure in respect of the children’s properties from May, 2003. Hence, the present appeal under Section 47 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 (for brevity, ‘the Act of 1890’) by the paternal grandparents. Late Karuturi Venkata Srinivasa Rao, the son of the appellants, married the respondent herein, Krishna Veni Durga Kumari, on 11.03.1993. At the time of the marriage the respondent was studying First Year LL.B. Course at Eluru, West Godavari District. She claimed to have discontinued the same upon the advice of her husband and in-laws and shifted her residence to her marital home at Pasivedala Village, Kovvur Mandal, West Godavari District. A daughter, Hema Bindu, was born to the couple on 06.08.1994 and a son, Vamsi Kiran, on 30.12.1998. While so, Karuturi Venkata Srinivasa Rao met with an untimely death on 06.05.2003 due to a snakebite. His widow, the respondent, however continued to be under the protection of her in-laws, the appellants herein. She stated that she was very much upset owing to the sudden death of her husband and was steeped in deep grief and shock. She further stated that she was subjected to the ancient tradition of disfiguring of a widow, against her will. On account of these circumstances, she said that she was depressed and did not come out of the house for a long period. It is her case that her father-in-law, the first appellant, assumed management of the properties that belonged to her and her late husband. She claimed that the first appellant obtained her signatures on blank papers stating that they were necessary for various purposes including filing of a case against the Government Doctor at Kovvur for his alleged negligence in treating her late husband, which contributed to his death. She claimed that the first appellant obtained her signatures on blank papers stating that they were necessary for various purposes including filing of a case against the Government Doctor at Kovvur for his alleged negligence in treating her late husband, which contributed to his death. She further stated that sometime thereafter, with a view to provide proper education to her children, she shifted residence to Rajahmundry from Pasivedala Village. The children were thereupon admitted in Jassver English Medium School at Rajahmundry. It is her further case that in September, 2005 the first appellant took her to the Lok Adalat at Rajahmundry and asked her to sign on certain papers stating that they related to the compromise of the damages suit filed against the Government Doctor for negligence. She claimed that she was not permitted to read those papers prior to affixing her signatures thereon. She further claimed that she blindly signed upon them without knowing the contents as she believed the first appellant and had implicit faith in him. It is her case that upon the lapse of two years after the death of her husband she decided to remarry for protection of her person and property and also of her children as she had lost her husband at a very young age. Marriage negotiations are said to have commenced in June, 2005 and she married one Kolli Raja Sekhar, a widower from Hyderabad in December, 2005. According to her, after the summer vacation of 2006 the appellants took the children to Pasivedala Village when she went to her husband’s house at Hyderabad and thereafter refused to send them to her and did not permit her to visit them. The first appellant is stated to have claimed that he had obtained a decree from the Lok Adalat at Rajahmundry regarding the custody of the children and their properties and that there was no need to send them to her. The first appellant is stated to have claimed that he had obtained a decree from the Lok Adalat at Rajahmundry regarding the custody of the children and their properties and that there was no need to send them to her. The respondent claimed that she applied for a certified copy of the decree at this stage in June, 2006 and came to know about the fabrication of a family settlement and a compromise memo with false recitals with regard to the custody and properties of the minor children to the effect that she had given up her rights and that Award dated 24.09.2005 in PLC No.500 of 2005 on the file of the District Legal Services Authority, Rajahmundry, had been passed by the Lok Adalat at Rajahmundry. She denied having entered into the said compromise in 2005 or the family settlement on 30.05.2003 and alleged that the same were brought into existence in September, 2005 using her signed blank papers. She further assailed the validity of the Award dated 24.09.2005 passed by the Lok Adalat, Rajahmundry, and asserted that it was not in the interest and welfare of the children to remain in the custody of the appellants. Stating that the Lok Adalat’s Award had no legal sanctity and was not binding on her or on the children, she filed GOP No.258 of 2008 under Section 10 of the Act of 1890. She sought custody of the children and also their properties in the capacity of their natural guardian. She further sought a direction to the paternal grandparents, the appellants herein, to render a true and proper account of the income and expenditure in respect of the children’s properties from May, 2003 till the date of restoration of the custody of the children and their properties to her. The first appellant filed a counter denying the allegations made by the respondent. He stated that the respondent had continued her Law Course studies after the death of her husband and that it was not true to state that she suffered deep grief and shock incapacitating her for a long period. He alleged that she went to Hyderabad in the month of October, 2003 stating that she wished to get employment. He admitted that he looked after his deceased son’s properties and also his liabilities after his sudden death. He denied having obtained any signatures from the widow on blank papers. He alleged that she went to Hyderabad in the month of October, 2003 stating that she wished to get employment. He admitted that he looked after his deceased son’s properties and also his liabilities after his sudden death. He denied having obtained any signatures from the widow on blank papers. He stated that when the respondent chose to shift her residence from Pasivedala village to Rajahmundry for the children’s education purposes, he took a house on rent at Rajahmundry. He further denied the allegations made by the respondent with regard to the passing of the Award by the Lok Adalat, Rajahmundry. He asserted that the respondent being a Law Graduate was well aware of the contents of the documents filed before the Lok Adalat and what went on before the Lok Adalat. He stated that the respondent read the contents of the petitions filed before the Lok Adalat and that she attended the Lok Adalat and only thereafter signed on the terms of the compromise. He therefore asserted that the Award was binding on her. He said that the mediator, Bose, and he along with his wife were present at that time. He alleged that the respondent had negotiated a second marriage in the month of October, 2003 itself but suppressed the said fact. He stated that immediately after the death of her husband, the respondent had an idea to marry another person and hence she wanted to get rid of the children and the properties. He stated that the second husband was involved in a criminal case pertaining to the suspicious death of his first wife. He further stated that the respondent had informed Bose about the second marriage proposal only on 06.08.2005 and not earlier. He denied that they had ever refused to send the children to her or prevented her from visiting them. He further denied the allegation that the family settlement had been fabricated. He said that the respondent knowing fully well about the consequences of the family arrangement and the compromise recorded by the Lok Adalat had agreed to the same, but at the instance of her second husband, she filed the present case. He contended that the District Court at Rajahmundry had no jurisdiction to entertain a challenge against the Award passed by the Lok Adalat, Rajahmundry, as the same was final, binding and unassailable. He contended that the District Court at Rajahmundry had no jurisdiction to entertain a challenge against the Award passed by the Lok Adalat, Rajahmundry, as the same was final, binding and unassailable. He accordingly sought dismissal of the O.P. The second appellant adopted the counter filed by her husband, the first appellant. The respondent examined herself as P.W.1 and marked seven documents in evidence. The first appellant examined himself as R.W.1 and six other witnesses, R.Ws.2 to 7. Exs.B.1 to B.34 were marked in evidence. The respondent speaking as P.W.1 reiterated the contents of her petition in her chief-examination. She marked the following documents in evidence: Exs.A.1 and A.2 are the birth certificates of the children. Ex.A.3 is a copy of the Award in PLC No.500 of 2005 along with a copy of the complaint. Ex.A.4 is a copy of a sale deed. Exs.A.5 and A.6 are the copies of the health insurance cards in the names of the children. Ex.A.7 are copies of the letters dated 20.05.2009 written by the first appellant and the daughter, Hema Bindu. In her cross-examination, the respondent stated that it was three years after her husband’s death that she completed her Law Degree. She conceded that her father-in-law, the first appellant, paid the school tuition fees for the children while they were studying at Rajahmundry. She also admitted that her parents-in-law, the appellants herein, extended their co-operation for the education and welfare of her children and in her efforts to secure a job. She stated that in January, 2005 she expressed her intention to marry again to her in-laws for the first time and that they gave their consent without objection. She further stated that the first appellant also made enquiries about the second husband after the proposal was made. She stated that within one month after her husband’s death, the first appellant obtained her signatures on blank papers for filing a case against the Doctor for negligence. She stated that till her second marriage she had confidence in the first appellant. She further stated that after she remarried, her daughter had visited her at Hyderabad on four occasions and her son on two occasions. She admitted that even in April, 2008 the children were taken by her to Hyderabad and the first appellant himself handed them over to her at Kovvur Bus Station. By that time, admittedly, the O.P. had already been filed. She admitted that even in April, 2008 the children were taken by her to Hyderabad and the first appellant himself handed them over to her at Kovvur Bus Station. By that time, admittedly, the O.P. had already been filed. She also admitted her signatures in Ex.A.3, the Lok Adalat Award. She detailed as to how the children would be better off with her at Hyderabad both in respect of their education as well as in the context of her attentions and affection. She denied the suggestion that the first appellant had requested her to reconsider her decision to marry Raja Sekhar as he was convicted in Sessions Case No.292 of 2002 pertaining to his first wife’s death which was confirmed in appeal. She also admitted that disputes had arisen between herself and the appellants only after her second marriage and that there were no disputes prior thereto. She denied having consented to give the custody of the children and their properties to the appellants at the time of her second marriage. She also denied knowledge of what she had signed before the Lok Adalat. She denied the suggestion that she had filed the subject petition at the behest of the second husband with a view to grab the properties of the children. The first appellant speaking as R.W.1 affirmed the contents of his counter in his chief-examination. He marked in evidence 34 documents. Exs.B.1 to 17 are the school fee receipts of the children; Exs.B.18 to 21 are the documents relating to the properties and accounts; Exs.B.22 and 23 are the documents relating to the criminal case pertaining to the second husband, Raja Sekhar; Ex.B.24 is a photograph; Ex.B.25 is a copy of the Award in PLC No.500 of 2005; Exs.B.26 to 28 are the study-cum-conduct certificates of the children issued by the Jassver English Medium School, Rajahmundry; Exs.B.29 to 32 are the notices exchanged by the parties; Ex.B.33 is a copy of the decree dated 17.04.2009 in CMA No.1437 of 2008 and Ex.B.34 is a copy of the legal notice issued by the first appellant. In his cross-examination, the first appellant admitted that a partition had taken place amongst his three sons and himself and that the deceased son was possessed of his own properties at the time of his death. In his cross-examination, the first appellant admitted that a partition had taken place amongst his three sons and himself and that the deceased son was possessed of his own properties at the time of his death. He also admitted that there were no disputes with the respondent when she was staying at Rajahmundry with the children. He specifically stated that they did not get any disputes settled regarding the family and did not execute any document in that regard. He further stated that except before the Lok Adalat, the appellants and the respondent did not jointly execute any documents either before or after the Lok Adalat Award proceedings. He admitted that he had not raised any objection for the second marriage of the respondent and that he did not warn her not to marry Raja Sekhar. He further stated that he came to know of the criminal cases pending against Raja Sekhar only after the present O.P. and upon enquiries. He further admitted that he attended the marriage of the respondent with Raja Sekhar. He admitted that after the filing of the O.P. and the developments thereafter, the daughter, Hema Bindu was not in their custody from 20.05.2009. He admitted his signature in the letter dated 20.05.2009 (Ex.A.7) in this regard. He stated that the son, Vamsi Kiran was still continuing to study in Jassver English Medium School, Rajahmundry, and was admitted in the hostel. He said that he had an objection to the respondent meeting her son and communicating with him over the telephone as he was not being allowed to speak to the daughter by the respondent. R.W.2 is a friend of Late Karuturi Srinivasa Rao and spoke of the discharge of his loan by the first appellant, after his death. R.W.3, a Taxi Driver, spoke of the respondent’s second marriage and the fact that the first appellant attended the same. R.W.4 is a neighbour of the appellants at Pasivedala village and spoke of the fact that the first appellant used to send the children to Hyderabad to their mother even after her second marriage. He further stated that the other sons of the appellants were also extending their support for the welfare and education of the children and that the children would not have such benefits at Hyderabad as their mother had remarried after the death of their father. He further stated that the other sons of the appellants were also extending their support for the welfare and education of the children and that the children would not have such benefits at Hyderabad as their mother had remarried after the death of their father. R.W.5 is also a resident of Pasivedala village and spoke of the fact that after the second marriage of the respondent, misunderstandings arose between her and the first appellant. He spoke of the capacity of the first appellant to provide good facilities to the children and look after their welfare. He opined that their welfare lay in remaining in the custody of the appellants. In his cross-examination, he clarified that his opinion was based on the fact that the respondent had remarried. R.W.6 is the nephew of the first appellant, being his sister’s son. He is a resident of Rajahmundry. The daughter, Hema Bindu, stayed with him while she was writing her X Class public examinations. He was of the opinion that it would be better and safer for the children to remain in the custody of the appellants. He spoke of the fact that disputes and misunderstandings arose between the appellants and the respondent after she remarried. He further spoke of the fact that the daughter, Hema Bindu, was inclined to shun her mother and her mother’s family as she was happy staying with her paternal grandparents. In his cross-examination, he however admitted that prior to the second marriage of the respondent she and the children had mutual love and affection. He further stated that he did not know the reasons for the disputes between the respondent and the first appellant. The disputes, according to him, started after the second marriage. The last witness for the appellants, R.W.7, was Potluri Subash Chandra Bose, the mediator whose name finds mention in the family settlement and the compromise memo which formed part of the record before the Lok Adalat, Rajahmundry. He is no other than the father-in-law of the third son of the appellants. He stated that on 07.08.2005 when he had gone for the birthday celebrations of the daughter, Hema Bindu, the respondent told him that she had decided to marry again and requested him to inform the same to her parents-in-law, the appellants. He stated that thereupon he brought the same to the knowledge of his son-in-law who informed his parents. He stated that on 07.08.2005 when he had gone for the birthday celebrations of the daughter, Hema Bindu, the respondent told him that she had decided to marry again and requested him to inform the same to her parents-in-law, the appellants. He stated that thereupon he brought the same to the knowledge of his son-in-law who informed his parents. He further stated that the appellants in turn informed him that they had no objection if it was the wish and decision of the respondent to remarry. He claimed to have informed the same to the respondent over the telephone. He further claimed that during the discussions held with the respondent in the presence of her uncle and father it was decided that the custody of the children should be with the appellants and that the respondent accepted the same. He stated that on this basis the PLC case was filed before the Lok Adalat, Rajahmundry, and that he was present on the day the Lok Adalat Award was passed. He asserted that the respondent had read the contents of the PLC case, the terms therein and the affidavits filed before the Lok Adalat and signed the same in his presence and in the presence of the Lok Adalat Judge and other witnesses. He therefore imputed full knowledge of the contents of the PLC case to the respondent. In his cross-examination, he admitted that even as on 06.08.2005 the relationship between the respondent and her in-laws was cordial. He further submitted that within 15 to 20 days of the meeting held to discuss the issue of the respondent’s second marriage, the Lok Adalat proceedings took place. The second witness in the said proceedings was stated to be his son-in-law, the third son of the appellants. Pertinent to note, he admitted that the parents of the respondent were not present at that time. The trial Court framed the following points to be answered: 1. Whether this court has got jurisdiction to entertain the matter in view of passing of the award by the Lok Adalat and without setting aside the award by a competent authority. 2. Whether the petitioner had voluntarily entered into the compromise before the Lok Adalat accepting the corresponding terms and executing relevant papers and accordingly the award was passed and is binding on her? 3. 2. Whether the petitioner had voluntarily entered into the compromise before the Lok Adalat accepting the corresponding terms and executing relevant papers and accordingly the award was passed and is binding on her? 3. Whether the petitioner has placed sufficient evidence to uphold the claim that the 1st respondent obtained her signatures on some papers playing fraud upon her? 4. Whether the interest of the minor children would be best served if they stay with the petitioner or with the respondents? 5. Whether the petitioner is entitled to the relief prayed for? Being of the opinion that it could entertain the matter as the Lok Adalat did not have the jurisdiction to go into the question of custody of the minors, the trial Court held against the appellants on point 1. On points 2 and 3, observing that it was hard to believe that the Lok Adalat would have passed the Award without making an effort to read over the contents of the settlement and ascertaining the view of both parties, the trial Court held against the respondent. The trial Court was of the view that the respondent, perhaps being compelled to agree for the settlement, gave up her claim of guardianship over the children. With regard to points 4 and 5 the trial Court, having taken into account the views of the children, decided that their interest would be best served if they stayed with the respondent and her second husband. Holding so, the trial Court allowed the O.P. The correctness of these findings is in issue before us in this appeal. The first and foremost issue to be considered is the effect of the Award dated 24.09.2005 passed by the Lok Adalat, Rajahmundry, in PLC No.500 of 2005 on these proceedings. It is the case of the appellants that the said Award is legally binding on the parties and the respondent, having agreed therein to give the custody of the children and their properties to the appellants, could not be permitted to retract there from or challenge the same. It is their contention that the said Award was passed with the full knowledge and consent of the respondent in the presence of witnesses and the Lok Adalat; and being unappealable the respondent could not attack the validity of the said Award indirectly by way of these proceedings instituted under the Act of 1890. It is their contention that the said Award was passed with the full knowledge and consent of the respondent in the presence of witnesses and the Lok Adalat; and being unappealable the respondent could not attack the validity of the said Award indirectly by way of these proceedings instituted under the Act of 1890. They placed reliance on the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in SANJAY KUMAR V/s. SECRETARY, CITY CIVIL COURT LEGAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, HYDERABAD 2010 (3) ALT 289 (DB). Refuting these contentions, the respondent asserted that the Lok Adalat, Rajahmundry, did not have the jurisdiction to decide the issue of guardianship which as per the Act of 1890 vests in the District Court. She further alleged that the so-called family settlement dated 30.05.2003 was fraudulently fabricated using blank signed papers obtained from her by the first appellant immediately after the death of her husband. She pointed out that the family settlement was allegedly executed on 30.05.2003, mere days after the death of her husband, and that the terms therein were so unreasonable that no prudent person would believe or have agreed to the same. She stated that she was in a state of shock and grief at that time and it is unthinkable that a newly bereaved widow like herself would have been contemplating remarriage within such a short span of her loss. The recital that she gave up the custody of the person and properties of her children to her own exclusion is also equally unbelievable. The further recital that she had also given up her own property rights indicated the sham nature of the document. She therefore reiterated that the said Award had no legal sanctity and could be ignored. Relevant to note, the trial Court held against the respondent in so far as her allegations against the passing of this Award are concerned. In her pleadings before this Court in the present appeal, the respondent once again sought to assail these findings. It is no doubt true that under Order 41, Rule 22, CPC, being the respondent in the appeal, it is open to her to not only support the decree of the trial Court but also assail the findings against her in respect of any issue which ought to have been in her favour. It is no doubt true that under Order 41, Rule 22, CPC, being the respondent in the appeal, it is open to her to not only support the decree of the trial Court but also assail the findings against her in respect of any issue which ought to have been in her favour. However, we may not be required to resolve this issue though there any number of suspicious circumstances surrounding the Award, not the least being the absence of the respondent’s family members at that time. The Award of the Lok Adalat, Rajahmundry, presided over by the IV Additional Junior Civil Judge, Rajahmundry, in our opinion, is flawed by a more fundamental legal defect and we deem it unnecessary to go into the aspect as to whether it was obtained by fraud and misrepresentation as alleged by the respondent. Admittedly, there was no case pending between the parties as on the date of institution of the complaint before the Legal Services Authority. It was therefore a pre-litigation case. It may be noticed that in the said complaint the children were purported to be represented by their paternal grandparents, the appellants herein. Further, the recitals in the said complaint are to the effect that it was filed by the appellants and the children seeking settlement of their disputes with the respondent as per the family arrangement dated 30.05.2003 and to record the same and pass necessary Award. As per Section 6 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 (for brevity, ‘the Act of 1956’), the natural guardians of a Hindu minor are the father and after him, the mother. Therefore, in the normal scheme of things, after the death of their father, the respondent was the natural guardian of the children. Without being specifically appointed to that status in accordance with law, the appellants had no right to represent the interest of the minors before the Lok Adalat. Therefore, in the normal scheme of things, after the death of their father, the respondent was the natural guardian of the children. Without being specifically appointed to that status in accordance with law, the appellants had no right to represent the interest of the minors before the Lok Adalat. On the other hand, they not only sought to represent the minors before the Lok Adalat, but such representation was against none other than their natural guardian It is no doubt true that as per Section 21 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 (for brevity, ‘the Act of 1987’), a lawfully valid Award passed by the Lok Adalat would be deemed to be a decree of a Civil Court and would be final and binding on the parties to the dispute [P.T.THOMAS V/s. THOMAS JOB (2005) 6 SCC 478 ]. No appeal would lie against such an Award. However, the jurisdiction of the Lok Adalat to determine and to arrive at a compromise or settlement between the parties to a dispute is delineated by Section 19(5) of the Act of 1987 and unless the Lok Adalat concerned had such jurisdiction, its Award would not qualify under Section 21 to be treated on par with a decree and would not attain the finality or binding nature conferred on it by the said provision. Section 19 of the Act of 1987 as it originally stood read as under: “19. Organisation of Lok Adalats. –– (1) The State or District Authorities may organise Lok Adalats at such intervals and places and for exercising such jurisdiction and for such areas, as they think fit. (2) Every Lok Adalat organised for an area shall consist of such judicial officers of the area as may be specified by the State or District Authorities organising the Lok Adalat and such other members possessing such qualifications and experience as may be prescribed by the State Government. (3) A Lok Adalat shall have jurisdiction to determine and arrive at a compromise or settlement between the parties to a dispute in respect of any matter falling within the jurisdiction of any civil, criminal or revenue court or any tribunal constituted under any law for the time being in force in the area for which the Lok Adalat is organised.” Section 19 was amended under Act No.59 of 1994 with effect from 29.10.1994 and presently reads as under: “19. Organisation of Lok Adalats: –– (1) Every State Authority or District Authority or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee or every High Court Legal Services Committee or, as the case may be, Taluk Legal Services Committee may organise Lok Adalats at such intervals and places and for exercising such jurisdiction and for such areas as it thinks fit. (2) Every Lok Adalat organised for an area shall consist of such number of–– (a) serving or retired judicial officers; and (b) other persons, of the area as may be specified by the State Authority or the District Authority or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee or the High Court Legal Services Committee, or as the case may be, the Taluk Legal Services Committee, organising such Lok Adalat. (3) The experience and qualifications of other persons referred to in Clause (b) of subsection (2) for Lok Adalats organized by the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee shall be such as may be prescribed by the Central Government in consultation with the Chief Justice of India. (4) the experience and qualifications of other persons referred to in Clause (b) of subsection (2) for Lok Adalats other than referred to in sub-section (3) shall be such as may be prescribed by the State Government in consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court. (5) A Lok Adalat shall have jurisdiction to determine and to arrive at a compromise or settlement between the parties to a dispute in respect of–– (i) any case pending before; or (ii) any matter which is falling within the jurisdiction of and is not brought before, any Court for which the Lok Adalat is organised: Provided that the Lok Adalat shall have no jurisdiction in respect of any case or matter relating to an offence not compoundable under any law.” Section 19(5)(ii) requires that a pre-litigation case should be heard by a Lok Adalat organized for the Court which had jurisdiction to hear the matter had it been instituted. The provision speaks of ‘jurisdiction’ generally and it cannot therefore be construed in the narrow sense to mean ‘territorial jurisdiction’ only. As per Section 9 of the Act of 1890, an application for guardianship of the person and property of a minor has to be made before the District Court having jurisdiction over the place where the minor ordinarily resides or where he/she has property. As per Section 9 of the Act of 1890, an application for guardianship of the person and property of a minor has to be made before the District Court having jurisdiction over the place where the minor ordinarily resides or where he/she has property. Under Section 9 (2), in case the minor has property situated elsewhere, the application for guardianship over such property can be moved either before the District Court having jurisdiction over the place where the minor resides or the District Court having jurisdiction over the place where the property is situated. In any event, the issue of guardianship over the person and properties of the children in the present case fell squarely within the jurisdiction of the District Court alone. No doubt, Section 20(2) of the Act of 1987 postulates that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, the Committee organizing the Lok Adalat may on receipt of an application from any one of the parties to any matter referred to in Section 19(5)(ii) stating that such matter needs to be determined by a Lok Adalat, shall refer the matter to the Lok Adalat for determination. However, such reference would necessarily have to be in accordance with Section 19(5)(ii) of the Act of 1987 which posits that the reference of a case which is yet to be brought before the Court can only be to a Lok Adalat which is organized for such Court. Therefore, once jurisdiction with regard to deciding issues of guardianship stood vested in the District court, the pre-litigation case pertaining thereto could only be referred to a Lok Adalat organized for a District Court. The emphasis in the statute is upon the jurisdiction of the Lok Adalat with reference to the Court for which it was organized and which, in turn, had jurisdiction to hear the matter. However, in practice, it appears that the Legal Services Authorities are referring cases to Lok Adalats on the basis of geographical area only without reference to the Court which had jurisdiction to hear such cases. This is obviously because of the wording of Section 19(2) and (3) of the Act of 1987 as they originally stood. Relevant to note, though Section 19(3) was substituted by bringing in Section 19(5), Section 19(2) remained almost unaltered and speaks even now of organization of the Lok Adalat for an area. This is obviously because of the wording of Section 19(2) and (3) of the Act of 1987 as they originally stood. Relevant to note, though Section 19(3) was substituted by bringing in Section 19(5), Section 19(2) remained almost unaltered and speaks even now of organization of the Lok Adalat for an area. Section 19(3) as it stood earlier also spoke to the same effect as it dealt with jurisdiction of a Lok Adalat with reference to the geographical area alone. However, after the amendment of the provision, Section 19(5) now speaks of the jurisdiction of the Lok Adalat with reference to the Court for which it is organized and which had jurisdiction to hear the matter. Thus, in the light of the statutory environment of Section 19 of the Act of 1987 as it stands presently, though the Legal Services Authority can organize a Lok Adalat for an area, the jurisdiction of such Lok Adalat for determining particular cases by way of compromise or settlement would be with reference to the jurisdiction of that Court for which the Lok Adalat is organized. It is no doubt true that such Lok Adalat can be presided over by serving or retired Judicial Officers irrespective of rank but such Lok Adalat must be referred cases with regard being had to the Court for which it was organized which, in turn, had jurisdiction to decide the matter. The record pertaining to the Lok Adalat organized on 24.09.2005 indicates that two benches were constituted for settlement of cases. One bench presided over by a District Judge heard MVOP cases while the second bench presided over by a Junior Civil Judge heard civil, criminal and the subject pre-litigation case. Relevant to note, MVOPs would normally be heard by a Claims Tribunal consisting of Judicial Officers not lower than the rank of a District Judge. Consequently, MVOP cases referred to the Lok Adalat were rightly heard by the bench presided over by a District Judge. The same course should have been adopted for the subject pre-litigation case dealing with appointment of a guardian, which also fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of a District Judge. However, it was not so done. Consequently, MVOP cases referred to the Lok Adalat were rightly heard by the bench presided over by a District Judge. The same course should have been adopted for the subject pre-litigation case dealing with appointment of a guardian, which also fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of a District Judge. However, it was not so done. Though the Lok Adalat plays only a conciliatory role and not a judicial one, it must be remembered that under Section 21 of the Act of 1987, its Award is deemed to be a decree of a Court. Partaking of such legal flavour, proceedings before the Lok Adalat must necessarily conform to basic legal principles and statutory requirements. It is for this reason that Judicial Officers, serving or retired, are required to preside over such Lok Adalats under Section 19(2) of the Act of 1987. This is also perhaps the reason why Section 19(5) makes it necessary that the cases must be placed before the Lok Adalat with reference to the Court for which such Lok Adalat is organized. The present practice of the Legal Services Authorities in State in referring cases to a Lok Adalat losing sight of this requirement and only going by the geographical area therefore needs to be corrected. The observations of the Supreme Court in B.P. MOIDEEN SEVAMANDIR V/s. A.M.KUTTY HASSAN JT 2009 (2) SC 320 = (2009) 2 SCC 198 in this regard are apposite: “11. Such strange orders by the Lok Adalats are the result of lack of appropriate rules or guidelines. Thousands of Lok Adalats are held all over the country every year. Many members of the Lok Adalats are not judicially trained. There is no fixed procedure for the Lok Adalats and each Adalat adopts its own procedure. Different formats are used by different Lok Adalats when they settle the matters and make awards. We have come across Lok Adalats passing “orders”, issuing “directions” and even granting declaratory relief, which are purely in the realm of courts or specified tribunals, that too when there is no settlement.” In the present case also, the subject matter of the complaint before the Lok Adalat was with regard to the declaration of a guardian for the children. We have come across Lok Adalats passing “orders”, issuing “directions” and even granting declaratory relief, which are purely in the realm of courts or specified tribunals, that too when there is no settlement.” In the present case also, the subject matter of the complaint before the Lok Adalat was with regard to the declaration of a guardian for the children. Such a declaratory relief did not fall within the realm of the Lok Adalat and at that, upon a petition filed by the paternal grandparents portraying themselves as the guardians of the children against their natural guardian! This aspect was completely overlooked by the Lok Adalat. Even if entertained, the case ought to have been referred to the Lok Adalat constituted for a District Court. Though such a Lok Adalat was constituted and heard MVOPs the present case was referred to the other bench which was not organized for a District Court. Ergo, the Lok Adalat presided over by the IV Additional Junior Civil Judge, Rajahmundry, had no jurisdiction as per Section 19(5)(ii) of the Act of 1987 and the Award passed by the said Lok Adalat is non est in the eye of law. It is null and void for want of jurisdiction. In such circumstances, the reliance placed by the appellants upon SANJAY KUMAR is misplaced. The said case dealt with a lawful and valid Award passed by the Lok Adalat which was sought to be assailed thereafter by one of the parties thereto. In such circumstances, a Division Bench of this Court held that an Award of the Lok Adalat is an administrative act of incorporating the terms of compromise or settlement agreed by the parties in its presence and it did not sit in adjudication of such dispute. Once the Award is passed in terms of the settlement duly signed by the parties, it becomes binding on them and is executable as if it is a decree of the Civil Court. No appeal would lie against such Award and the only permissible challenge on very limited grounds would be under Articles 226 or 227 of the Constitution. This principle was in fact only a reiteration of what was laid down by the Supreme Court in STATE OF PUNJAB V/s. JALOUR SINGH (2008) 2 SCC 660 . No appeal would lie against such Award and the only permissible challenge on very limited grounds would be under Articles 226 or 227 of the Constitution. This principle was in fact only a reiteration of what was laid down by the Supreme Court in STATE OF PUNJAB V/s. JALOUR SINGH (2008) 2 SCC 660 . Therein, the Supreme Court observed that it is evident from the provisions of the Act of 1987 that Lok Adalats had no adjudicatory or judicial functions and their functions relate purely to conciliation. The Supreme Court held that the Award of the Lok Adalat does not mean any independent verdict or opinion arrived at by any decision-making process and is merely an administrative act of incorporating the terms of settlement or compromise agreed by the parties in the presence of the Lok Adalat in the form of an executable order. The Supreme Court further observed that if any party wants to challenge such an Award it can be done only by filing a petition under Article 226 and/or Article 227 of the Constitution, that too on very limited grounds. It is on the basis of these decisions that the appellants contend that the indirect challenge by the respondent to the Award of the Lok Adalat, Rajahmundry, in PLC No.500 of 2005 cannot be permitted as she had not chosen to assail it by way of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. However, in view of our finding that the said Award is a nullity and is non est in the eye of law for want of jurisdiction, this argument does not hold water. In AJUDH RAJ V/s. MOTI (1991) 3 SCC 136 , the Supreme Court held that if an order is passed without jurisdiction, it can be ignored as a nullity, that is, non-existent in the eye of law and that it would not be necessary to set it aside. The same principle was followed thereafter in STATE OF MAHARASHTRA V/s. PRAVIN JETHALAL KAMDAR (2000) 3 SCC 460 wherein the Supreme Court affirmed the finding of the High Court that the plea of a document being null and void could be raised in any proceeding and no separate declaration need be sought. The same principle was followed thereafter in STATE OF MAHARASHTRA V/s. PRAVIN JETHALAL KAMDAR (2000) 3 SCC 460 wherein the Supreme Court affirmed the finding of the High Court that the plea of a document being null and void could be raised in any proceeding and no separate declaration need be sought. That being so, it is not necessary for the respondent in the present case to independently challenge the null and void Award passed by the Lok Adalat, Rajahmundry, by way of a writ petition or seek a declaration to that effect even in the present proceedings. The legal status, or rather the lack of it, of the Lok Adalat Award can be taken note of by this Court and the consequences thereof inevitably follow. The Award of the Lok Adalat, Rajahmundry, therefore does not bar and could not have the effect of barring the respondent from invoking the provisions of the Act of 1890 for seeking a declaration as to her guardianship over her children. The matter may be viewed from yet another angle. The doctrine of ‘parens patriae’ (literally, ‘parent of the country’) has been evolved in common law and applies where Courts take decisions for the protection of the interests of persons who are unable to take care of themselves. Traditionally this doctrine is applied in cases involving the rights of minors and mentally incapacitated persons. Courts have developed two distinct standards while exercising parens patriae jurisdiction – ‘best interests test’ and ‘substituted judgment test’ [SUCHITA SRIVASTAVAV/s. CHANDIGARH ADMINISTRATION (2009) 9 SCC 1 ]. The doctrine of parens patriae finds reflection in Clause 17 of the 1865 Charter of the Letters Patent applicable to this Court. Clause 17 reads as under: “17. Courts have developed two distinct standards while exercising parens patriae jurisdiction – ‘best interests test’ and ‘substituted judgment test’ [SUCHITA SRIVASTAVAV/s. CHANDIGARH ADMINISTRATION (2009) 9 SCC 1 ]. The doctrine of parens patriae finds reflection in Clause 17 of the 1865 Charter of the Letters Patent applicable to this Court. Clause 17 reads as under: “17. Jurisdiction as to infants and lunatics:- And we do further ordain that the said High Court of Judicature at Madras shall have the like power and authority with respect to the persons and estates of infants, idiots and lunatics within the presidency of Madras, as that which is now vested in the said High Court immediately before the publication of these presents.” Clause 16 of the Letters Patent of 1862 which was revoked by the Charter of 1865 reads as under: “And we do further ordain that the said High Court of Judicature at Madras shall have the like power and authority with respect to the persons and estates of infants, idiots and lunatics, whether within or without the Presidency of Madras as that which is now vested in the said Supreme Court at Madras.” The power that was vested in the Supreme Court at Madras under Clause 32 of the Madras Charter of 1800 is to this effect: “And we do hereby authorize the said Supreme Court of Judicature at Madras to appoint guardians and keepers for infants, and their estates, according to the order and course observed in that part of Great Britain called England.” In the context of Clause 17 of the Letters Patent, it must be understood that the term ‘infants’ does not have a literal meaning and is not limited in its application to babies or very small children. It must be taken in the generic sense to mean and include minor children who require protection of their interest through a guardian. This interpretation also finds reflection in RAJAH OF VIZIANAGARAM V/s. SECY. OF STATE AIR 1937 MADRAS 51, wherein the children involved were of the ages of 14, 12, 10 and 9 years. The RAJAH, their father, invoked the powers of the High Court under Clause 17 of the Letters Patent when the Court of Wards sought to send them abroad against his will. The Madras High Court exercised jurisdiction thereunder. OF STATE AIR 1937 MADRAS 51, wherein the children involved were of the ages of 14, 12, 10 and 9 years. The RAJAH, their father, invoked the powers of the High Court under Clause 17 of the Letters Patent when the Court of Wards sought to send them abroad against his will. The Madras High Court exercised jurisdiction thereunder. Thus, the parens patriae jurisdiction of this Court under Clause 17 of the Letters Patent is unhindered by age, so long as the children continue to be minors warranting protection of their interest. Section 3 of the Act of 1890 also recognizes the plenary power of this Court to appoint a guardian for a minor and states that nothing in the said Act shall be construed to affect or in any way derogate from such power. Thus, notwithstanding the Award of the Lok Adalat, Rajahmundry, the jurisdiction of this Court under Clause 17 of the Letters Patent and Section 3 of the Act of 1890 to deal with the issue of guardianship of the person and properties of the children cannot be curtailed. All the more so, when their best interests were not even considered, as is evident from the Lok Adalat Award. Under Section 7 of the Act of 1890, the District Court is empowered to make an order appointing a guardian for the person and/or properties of a minor or for declaring a person to be such a guardian. Under Section 8 the persons entitled to apply for such an order are detailed and include, under clause (a), a person desirous of being, or claiming to be, the guardian of the minor. Therefore, the respondent in the present case being the mother of the children and being their natural guardian under Section 6(a) of the Act of 1956 was entitled to maintain the subject application for a declaration that she was the lawful guardian of their person and properties. Needless to state, while deciding such an issue what is of paramount importance and consideration is the ‘best interest’ and welfare of the children. Needless to state, while deciding such an issue what is of paramount importance and consideration is the ‘best interest’ and welfare of the children. In this regard, reference may be made to the judgment of the Madras High Court in SAMUEL STEPHEN RICHARD V/s. STELLA RICHARD AIR 1955 MADRAS 451, wherein the Court observed: “In deciding the question of custody, the welfare of the minor is the paramount consideration and the fact that the father is the natural guardian would not ‘ipso facto’ entitle him to custody. The principal considerations or tests which have been laid down under Section 17, in order to secure this welfare, are equally applicable in considering the welfare of the minor under Section 25. The application of these tests casts an ‘arduous’ duty on the court. Amongst the many and multifarious duties that a Judge in Chambers performs by far the most onerous duties are those cast upon him by the Guardians and Wards Act. He should place himself in the position of a wise father and be not tired of the worries which may be occasioned to him in selecting a guardian best fitted to assure the welfare of a minor and thereafter guide and control the guardian to ensure the welfare of the ward—a no mean task but the highest fulfilment of the dharmasastra of his own country. It is only an extreme case where a mother may not have the interest of her child most dear to her. Since it is the mother who would have the interest of the minor most at heart, the tender years of a child needing the care, protection and guidance of the most interested person, the mother has come to be preferred to others.” This paragraph was quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in LEKHA V/s. P.ANIL KUMAR (2006) 13 SCC 555. The Supreme Court observed therein that the natural guardian of a minor child according to Hindu law being the father, in the next place, the guardian of the child is the mother. The Court opined that the very principle of guardianship is that there is a presumption that parents will be able to exercise good care in the welfare of their children if they do not happen to be unsuitable as guardians. The Court opined that the very principle of guardianship is that there is a presumption that parents will be able to exercise good care in the welfare of their children if they do not happen to be unsuitable as guardians. In this regard, reference may be made to Section 6 proviso of the Act of 1956 which states to the effect that no person shall be entitled to act as a natural guardian of a minor if he ceased to be a Hindu or if he has completely and finally renounced the world becoming a hermit or an ascetic. Pertinent to note, there is no disqualification of the natural guardian on the ground of remarriage. This aspect was also dealt with by the Supreme Court in LEKHA. The Supreme Court observed: “19. The law permits a person to have the custody of his minor child. The father ought to be the guardian of the person and property of the minor under ordinary circumstances. The fact that the mother has married again after the divorce of her first husband is no ground for depriving the mother of her parental right of custody. In cases like the present one, the mother may have shortcomings but that does not imply that she is not deserving of the solace and custody of her child. If the court forms the impression that the mother is a normal and independent young woman and shows no indication of imbalance of mind in her, then in the end the custody of the minor child should not be refused to her or else we would be really assenting to the proposition that a second marriage involving a mother per se will operate adversely to a claim of a mother for the custody of her minor child. …” Therefore, the mere fact that the respondent entered into matrimony again after the death of her first husband would not, by itself, be sufficient to disentitle her to seek the custody of her children through the first marriage. Further, as pointed out by the Supreme Court in NIL RATAN KUNDU V/s. ABHIJIT KUNDU (2008) 9 SCC 413 , a Court while dealing with custody cases, is neither bound by statutes nor by strict rules of evidence or procedure nor by precedents. In selecting the proper guardian for a minor, the paramount consideration should be the welfare and well-being of the child. In selecting the proper guardian for a minor, the paramount consideration should be the welfare and well-being of the child. Pursuant to the order of this Court dated 06.09.2010, the child-Karuturi Venkata Satya Sai Durga Vamsi Kiran has been produced before this Court by the Station House Officer concerned at the direction of the Superintendent of Police, West Godavari District. The police authorities shall accordingly stand discharged. After discussing in camera with the children-Karuturi Venkata Satya Sai Durga Vamsi Kiran and Karuturi Hema Bindu, both the children expressed the desire that they wish to stay with their mother. They stated so in the presence of their paternal grandfather-Sri Karuturi Satyanarayana. It is however not the case that the children have any grievance about how their grandparents have looked after them. But, they desire to stay together and in the custody of the mother. This Court is therefore of the opinion that the custody of the children should be with the mother in their best interest. The daughter, Hema Bindu, is of a discerning age being 16 years old and has already made a choice as to where her best interests lie. She chose to be under the protection of her mother and stepfather. The first appellant himself handed over her custody, evidenced in writing, to the maternal grandfather and maternal uncle at her request, embodied in a separate letter, on 20.05.2009 (Ex.A.7). The first appellant is also not insistent upon retaining the custody of the daughter. The bone of contention, to put it bluntly, is the son, Vamsi Kiran, who is now nearly 12 years of age. The facts brought on record however establish that the relations between the parties were not snapped completely even after institution of these proceedings. Admittedly, the children were permitted to visit the mother after the second marriage which was, in fact, attended by the first appellant. It appears that after the said marriage the relations have soured gradually between the parties over a period of time and have now reached a chasmic divide. The discussions that we had with the parties also fortify our opinion that the first appellant holds it against the respondent for marrying again. It appears that after the said marriage the relations have soured gradually between the parties over a period of time and have now reached a chasmic divide. The discussions that we had with the parties also fortify our opinion that the first appellant holds it against the respondent for marrying again. Though such feelings are perhaps understandable in the bereaved parents, the young widow cannot be bound over or tied down for ever by their sentiments or be made to choose between her second husband and her children through the first one. To ascertain the views of the children and more particularly, the young boy, we interviewed them at length and again talked to them in the presence of the mother and the paternal grandfather. They both expressed a firm desire to stay together and with their mother. Though the boy did not voice any ill-feeling or unhappiness with his paternal grandparents, his natural choice was to stay with his mother and sister. He, in fact, expressed willingness to immediately join his mother, though the paternal grandmother had not come along with the grandfather for him to say his farewell. This clearly indicates his ready willingness and enthusiasm to join the company of his mother and sister. It may however be noted that when the matter came up earlier before this Court by way of an appeal, CMA No.1437 of 2008, filed against the interlocutory order dated 13.08.2008 passed in I.A.No.2010 of 2008 in O.P.No.258 of 2008, the children when examined by two learned Judges of this Court said that they were more comfortable with their paternal grandparents. Needless to state, in matters of this nature where the children are subjected to a tug-of-war, both physical and emotional, between their warring near relations they are bound to have ambivalent and confused feelings. However, given the passage of time and our strong impression during the discussions that we had with them, we are of the considered opinion that the children are both very much interested in staying together and with their mother. Though doubts are voiced by the appellants as to the propriety of the children being in the custody of their mother owing to the involvement of the second husband in a criminal case, the same has to be considered in proper perspective and context. Though doubts are voiced by the appellants as to the propriety of the children being in the custody of their mother owing to the involvement of the second husband in a criminal case, the same has to be considered in proper perspective and context. It appears that the second husband was implicated in the suicide of his first wife and was found guilty under Section 306 IPC of the offence of abetting her suicide. The said verdict was confirmed in Criminal Appeal No.76 of 2005 (Ex.B.23). However, this judgment has not attained finality as the matter is presently pending before this Court. In any event, neither the respondent nor the daughter who have been staying with him have made any complaint against him. It may therefore be premature at this stage to hold that the respondent ought not to have the custody of her children because of the involvement of the second husband in a criminal offence. The finding as to his guilt is yet to attain finality and the account given by both the children about their experiences with him during the pendency of these proceedings speaks well of him as they said that he looked after them well and with affection. In any event, we are of the opinion that it is not in the interest of the siblings to be apart at this stage of their young lives. It is however to be noticed that except for the attrition of the relationship owing to the second marriage of the respondent, the relations of the respondent with her late husband and her in-laws all through were amicable. In fact, the observation of the trial Court that the respondent’s relationship with the first husband was strained is without basis. It seems that the trial Court misinterpreted the testimony of the respondent, which was to the effect that she along with her husband lived together separately in a portion of the same house in which her in-laws resided, to mean that she and her husband lived separately. In fact, the evidence of R.W.4, a neighbour in Pasivedala Village, is that the respondent and her husband lived amicably without any disputes. It is not the case of the appellants also that there were any differences between their deceased son and the daughter-in-law. In fact, the evidence of R.W.4, a neighbour in Pasivedala Village, is that the respondent and her husband lived amicably without any disputes. It is not the case of the appellants also that there were any differences between their deceased son and the daughter-in-law. Be that as it may, the evidence on record demonstrates that the relations between the appellants and the respondent were also amicable all through and even after the death of the respondent’s first husband. As stated earlier, it appears that the second marriage was the turning point in their relationship. Whatever be their differences, the children can neither be denied their mother’s love and care nor the grandparents’ affection and benediction. As the children’s strong desire is to remain together and in the control and protection of their mother, we are of the opinion that their custody should be with her. This order shall however not preclude the grandparents from having the benefit of the company of their grandchildren during the vacations. It is made clear that the mother, K.Krishnaveni Durga Kumari, shall take steps to see that the grandparents have access to the children for a few days during the vacations for Dasara, Christmas/Pongal and Summer. This arrangement shall come into effect immediately and the children shall be sent to their grandparents during the Dasara Vacation, 2010. Legal wrangles sometimes leave indelible rancorous scars. All the more so, in familial disputes. Now that this Court has passed final orders in this C.M.A., we are hopeful that the parties hereto will bury the hatchet and work together to secure a peaceful and loving atmosphere for the children. As a word of caution, we hope and trust that the grandparents-Karuturi Satyanarayana and Karuturi Chilaka Pushparatnam shall not subject the children-Karuturi Venkata Satya Sai Durga Vamsi Kiran and Karuturi Hema Bindu to any type of coercion. It is stated that the boy is in the midst of 7th Class course and owing to this order directing his custody to be delivered to the mother forthwith, he will be forced to shift schools midterm. However, the respondent assured us that she would ensure the admission of the boy in a good school at Hyderabad immediately so that he would not be forced to miss an academic year. We hope and trust that the respondent will take all possible measures to do so. However, the respondent assured us that she would ensure the admission of the boy in a good school at Hyderabad immediately so that he would not be forced to miss an academic year. We hope and trust that the respondent will take all possible measures to do so. Contact numbers of the concerned officers of the High Court Legal Services Committee were made available to the daughter, Hema Bindu, so that she would be in a position to contact such officers in the event of her requiring the assistance of this Court for any reason. In so far as the properties are concerned, number of contentious issues are sought to be raised by the parties. There is a dispute as to when exactly a partition took place amongst the first appellant and his sons. However, be it on whatever date, the fact remains that the first appellant admits to such a partition and the fact that his deceased son, the respondent’s first husband, was possessed of such divided properties along with accretions owing to subsequent purchases. As the Award of the Lok Adalat in PLC No.500 of 2005 is found to be null and void, the recitals therein to the effect that the respondent waived her rights in the properties stand nullified. In so far as the properties of late Karuturi Venkata Srinivasa Rao are concerned they devolved upon his mother, widow and children jointly by way of intestate succession. The respondent would therefore be entitled to take control and possession of her share and that of her children in such properties. It is for her to institute necessary proceedings for partition and separate share of these properties in a competent Court of law. These properties were maintained by the first appellant till now. He is therefore under a legal duty to account for the income and expenditure in relation thereto to the extent of the shares of the respondent and the children till the date of handing over their shares in the said properties. The Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is disposed of with the above directions. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.