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2010 DIGILAW 882 (AP)

E. Jangaiah died v. S. Prathp Reddy

2010-09-14

R.KANTHA RAO

body2010
Judgment 1. This appeal is directed against the order dated 04.10.2000 passed by the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Tribunal-cum-III Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad in O.P.No.219 of 1996. 2. Originally E.Jangaiah (first petitioner) filed claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act for compensation of Rs.1,00,000/-on account of the injuries sustained in the motor accident said to have been occurred at about 1600 hours on 13.02.1996 due to involvement of lorry bearing No. APR 990. The first respondent is the owner of the offending vehicle and the second respondent is the insurance company with which the vehicle was insured at material time. 3. However, E. Jangaiah, the first petitioner died three years after filing the claim petition and thereafter, the appellants (petitioners 2 and 3) i.e. his wife and minor son were brought on record as his legal representatives as per the orders of the Tribunal below in I.A.No.1735 of 1999, dated 13.12.1999. 4. The learned Tribunal below made an enquiry into the claim petition during the course of which PWs.1 and 2 were examined and Exs.A.1 to A.10 were marked on behalf of the appellants and no oral or documentary evidence was let in by the respondents. 5. I have heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellants and the learned standing counsel appearing for the respondent. 6. By its order dated 04.10.2000, the learned Tribunal dismissed the claim in toto holding that in the absence of any evidence showing that the death was caused due to injuries sustained by the first petitioner in the accident and also in view of the provisions of Section 166 of the M.V.Act, this being compensation claimed relating to personal injuries sustained by the first petitioner, the appellants/petitioners 2 and 3, who are the legal representatives of the deceased-1st petitioner, are not entitled to claim any compensation and holding as such, the learned Tribunal dismissed the claim petition. 7. In this appeal, it has been contended by the learned counsel appearing for the appellants, who are legal representatives of the injured claimant that on the death of the injured claimant, the cause of action survives and the Tribunal is not justified in dismissing the claim petition against the appellants. 8. 7. In this appeal, it has been contended by the learned counsel appearing for the appellants, who are legal representatives of the injured claimant that on the death of the injured claimant, the cause of action survives and the Tribunal is not justified in dismissing the claim petition against the appellants. 8. On the other hand the learned counsel appearing for the second respondent-insurance company would submit that as per the provisions of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act when the injured claimant after making an application for compensation in respect of the injuries sustained by him in a motor vehicle accident dies, the cause of action will not survive and his legal representatives are not entitled to claim any compensation and the Tribunal is wholly justified in dismissing the claim petition. 9. The point therefore, arises for consideration in the present appeal is whether after the death of E.Jangaiah, injured claimant, who filed the claim petition seeking compensation in respect of the personal injuries sustained by him in a motor vehicle accident, the appellants, who are his wife and minor son can continue the proceedings as his legal representatives and whether they can claim compensation? 10. In the first place, it would be necessary to refer the provisions of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act which lay down as to who can make an application for compensation in respect of death or injuries arising under motor vehicle accident. The sub-section (1) of Section 166 reads as follows: 166. Application for compensation:-(1)An application for compensation arising out of an accident of the nature specified in Sub-section (1) of Section 165 may be made,- (a) by the person who has sustained the injury; or (b) by the owner of the property; or (c) where death has resulted from the accident, by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased; or (d) by any agent duly authorized by the person injured or all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased, as the case may be: 11. From the bare perusal of Sub-section (1) of Section 166 of the M.V. Act, it seems that an injured person can make an application for compensation in respect of the injuries sustained by him or the legal representatives can make an application for compensation only where the death has resulted from the accident. From the bare perusal of Sub-section (1) of Section 166 of the M.V. Act, it seems that an injured person can make an application for compensation in respect of the injuries sustained by him or the legal representatives can make an application for compensation only where the death has resulted from the accident. Even in personal injury cases, the application for compensation can be made by any agent duly authorized by the injured person. Therefore, it is explicit from the language of Section 166 of the Act that in personal injury cases either the injured or an agent duly authorized by him can make an application for compensation, but it shall be during the time when the injured is alive. Claiming compensation by the legal representatives only arises in cases of death of a person in a motor vehicle accident. 12. However, the learned counsel appearing for the appellants relied upon decisions in JOTI RAM AND OTHERS V. CHAMAN LAL AND OTHERS 1984 ACJ 645 , SAMPATI LAL v HARI SINGH AND OTHERS1985 ACJ 539, NURANI JAMAL AND OTHERS v NARAM SRINIVASA RAO AND OTHERS 1994 ACJ 22 AND KHAIRULLAH AND ANOTHER v ANITA AND OTHERS 1994 ACJ 1017. for the preposition that the doctrine of ‘actio personalis moritur cum persona’ has no application to the case where the injured claimant died during the pendency of his claim petition filed under Motor Vehicles Act and his legal representatives can be brought on record to continue the proceedings to the extent of the claim on account of the loss to the estate. 13. The learned counsel would submit that basing on the above judgments the appellants are entitled for compensation which is equivalent to the amount spent by the deceased-first petitioner for the treatment of the injuries sustained by him towards the medical expenses. 14. The decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants, in my view are not applicable to the facts of the present case. Even if it is considered that the appellants are entitled for compensation towards loss caused to the estate, the appellants have to establish that some amount has been spent for the treatment of the injuries sustained by the deceased-first petitioner. The appellants except marking Exs.A.7 (23 medical bills), did not adduce any evidence to prove the medical bills. Even if it is considered that the appellants are entitled for compensation towards loss caused to the estate, the appellants have to establish that some amount has been spent for the treatment of the injuries sustained by the deceased-first petitioner. The appellants except marking Exs.A.7 (23 medical bills), did not adduce any evidence to prove the medical bills. In the absence of any evidence substantiating the medical bills, it is not possible for this Court to arrive at a finding that certain amount was spent for the treatment of the injuries of the deceased. Furthermore, from the language employed in Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, unless the injuries sustained by the first petitioner in the motor vehicle accident are proved to be the cause of his death, the appellants, who are his legal heirs, according to me, has no cause of action to claim any compensation. In the instant case, the accident took place on 13.02.1996 and the first petitioner-injured died on 01.09.1999 i.e. after three years. No material is placed by the appellants to show that the first petitioner died in consequence of the injuries sustained by him in the accident. 15. For the reasons aforementioned, the appellants are not entitled for any compensation as the legal representatives of the deceased-first petitioner. The learned Tribunal below rightly dismissed the claim petition and there are no valid grounds to interfere with the order passed by the learned Tribunal. 16. The appeal, therefore fails and accordingly, dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.