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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2010 DIGILAW 882 (MP)

Yograj Infrastructure Ltd. v. Ssangyong Engineering And Construction Co. Ltd.

2010-08-31

U.C.MAHESHWARI

body2010
Judgment (1) ON behalf of the applicant this revision is directed under section 115 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 being aggrieved by the order dated 23/7/2010 passed by learned District Judge Narsinghpur in Misc. Civil Appeal No. 2/10 whereby, allowing the preliminary objection of the respondent, applicant's appeal filed under section 37(2)(b) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (In short 'the Act') has been dismissed. (2) THE facts giving rise to this revision in short are that the National Highways Authority of India New Delhi (in short 'NHAI') awarded a contract for the National Highways section II Project, Package-ADB-II/C-8 Four laning of Jhansi-Lakhnadon section KM 297 to KM 351 of NH 26 in the State of Madhya Pradesh (in short 'the Project') to respondent-Ssangyong (in short 'SSY') vide it's letter of acceptance No. NHAI/PH/II/NHDP/ADB/GM-II/NS- I/746 dated December 30, 2005 and by way of formal contract executed between NHAI/Employer and respondent-SSY dated April 12, 2006 (in short the 'main agreement'). As the applicant herein (in short YIPL) by showing it's desire requested the respondent-SSY to award the work under the Project on the premises that the applicant YIPL shall incur all the expenses on the said work order and shall be solely responsible for the profit and loss pertaining to the said work order to which respondent-SSY has agreed on the terms and conditions. THE respondent-SSY after satisfying that the applicant possess necessary expertise, resources and experience to successfully complete the work under the work order as envisaged in the bid documents and can perform/execute the Project as per the specifications, quality, stands and time period prescribed by the employer-NHAI and as agreed to by the respondent-SSY under the main agreement along with the Bill of Quantities, rate on the basis of which the works was to be performed, the respondent SSY entered in an agreement with the applicant-YIPL on dated 13-8-2006 to carry out the allotted work on the terms settled in this agreement. THE same is placed as Annexure-A/5 with this revision. In such agreement besides the clauses of other terms and conditions, the clauses of arbitration and of governing law were included in the following manner. "27. Arbitration All disputes, differences arising out of or in connection with this Agreement shall be referred to arbitration. THE same is placed as Annexure-A/5 with this revision. In such agreement besides the clauses of other terms and conditions, the clauses of arbitration and of governing law were included in the following manner. "27. Arbitration All disputes, differences arising out of or in connection with this Agreement shall be referred to arbitration. THE arbitration proceedings shall be conducted in English in Singapore in accordance with the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC) Rules as in force at the time of signing of this Agreement. THE arbitration shall be final and binding. THE arbitration shall take place in Singapore and be conducted in English language. None of the party shall be entitled to suspend the performance of the Agreement merely by reason of a dispute and/or a dispute referred to arbitration. 28. Governing law. This agreement shall be subject to the laws of India. During the period of arbitration, the performance of this Agreement shall be carried on without interruption and in accordance with its terms and provision. Subsequent to execution of the abovementioned agreement and during subsisting and performing the same on arising some dispute between the parties the same was referred to the sole arbitrator namely Graham Eston under the aforesaid clause of arbitration to hold the proceedings in accordance with Singapore International Arbitration Centre Rules (in short 'SIAC Rules'). In pendency of the arbitration proceedings before the sole arbitrator, the respondent-SSY filed an application for interim measures and furnishing of security before the sole arbitrator, seeking an order to the present applicant-YIPL to release all plants, machineries and equipments owned by it, to restrain the respondent from removing all and whatsoever plants, machineries, equipments, material, aggregates etc. owned by it from the work site and/or camp site. The respondent SSY further sought an order permitting it to use the PMEs and material, aggregates etc. for carrying out the work in accordance with the NHAI and Agreement between the parties dated 13-8-2006. The respondent also requested for an order restraining the applicant from creating any third party interest otherwise sell, lease, charge the plant, machineries, equipments, materials at the work site and/or camp site and/or any other movable/immovable asset owned by it without the permission of the Tribunal and further direction to the applicant to furnish security to the tune of Rs.221 Crores of any sum as it may deem fit and proper in satisfaction of the award. (3) THE applicant herein also filed an application before the arbitrator under section 17 of the Act of 1996 seeking to restrain respondent-SSY from removing, shifting, alienating, transferring in any manner, the plants, machineries, equipments, vehicle and material and maintain the status-quo in that regard till passing the final arbitral award. THE applicant also prayed for direction against the respondent to release the sum of Rs. 144,42,25,884/- along with interest till realization or in the alternative direct the respondent-SSY to furnish a bank guarantee of a nationalized bank of India for the aforesaid amount and keep it alive till passing of the final award. THE prayer for restraining the respondent- SSY from encashing the bank guarantee in question is also made. (4) THE sole arbitrator Mr. Graham Eston after hearing the parties on their abovementioned applications for interim measure had given interim ruling in case ARB No. 37/10 vide interim order dated 29-6-2010, whereby, the application of the applicant filed for interim measures restraining the respondent from alienating, selling, transferring, shifting the plants and machineries, equipments etc. till final adjudication has been dismissed. THE arbitrator also refused to hear other applications of the applicant filed for interim measures saying that the matter is pending in the appeal before the Hon'ble High Court, however, by allowing the application of the respondent-SSY filed for interim measures passed the orders on them in the shape of final relief without taking the note of the fact that the appeal in respect of such dispute is pending before the High Court. A copy of such ruling of the arbitrator is annexed as Annexure-A/2 with this revision. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid ruling/order of the sole arbitrator, the applicant-YIPL filed the impugned Miscellaneous Civil Appeal under section 37 (2) (b) of the Act 1996 in the Court of District Judge, Narsinghpur. The memo of such appeal is annexed as Annexure-A/3 with this revision. On filing such appeal initially vide order dated 13-7-2010, the parties were directed to maintain the status-quo and the matter was fixed for reply on 20-7-2010. On behalf of respondent by filing the reply on dated 19-7-2010 the preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the applicant's appeal, stating that the Act, 1996 would not apply and only Rules of Singapore would apply was taken. Copy of such reply is also enclosed with the revision memo as Annexure-A/4. On behalf of respondent by filing the reply on dated 19-7-2010 the preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the applicant's appeal, stating that the Act, 1996 would not apply and only Rules of Singapore would apply was taken. Copy of such reply is also enclosed with the revision memo as Annexure-A/4. After hearing the parties on the question of maintainability of the appeal, the Court of District Judge on consideration by allowing such objection of the respondent, holding that in view of agreement of the parties and the concerning rules of the arbitration, the appeal of the applicant is not entertainable and dismissed the same. On which, the applicant has come forward to this Court with this revision. (5) SHRI R.K. Pancholi, learned appearing counsel of the applicant after taking me through contents of the revision memo and the papers placed on the record along with the impugned order said that the approach of the appellate Court holding that such Court did not have jurisdiction over the matter is not sustainable. In continuation, he said that the alleged dispute was referred to the sole arbitrator for holding the arbitration clause in accordance with the Clause 27.1 of the abovementioned agreement Annexure-A/5 pursuant to that such arbitration is being conducted by the sole arbitrator at Singapore in accordance with SIAC Rules. In this connection he argued that mere on conducting the arbitration proceedings at Singapore i.e. out of the India did not oust the jurisdiction of Indian Court. According to him, by virtue of Clause 28 of the abovementioned agreement such arbitration proceedings is being carried out at Singapore subject to laws of India. While subsisting the arbitration proceedings on arising the occasion for challenging any interim ruling of the arbitrator then, the Court of Narsinghpur, the Indian Court has jurisdiction to entertain the appeal filed by the applicant under section 37 (2) (b) of the Act 1996. According to him, if in terms of the agreement the arbitration proceedings is being conducted out of India, even then, part-I of the Act 1996 is applicable to the case and in pursuant of it, the jurisdiction of the Indian Court for entertaining the proceedings could not be deemed to be ousted. According to him, if in terms of the agreement the arbitration proceedings is being conducted out of India, even then, part-I of the Act 1996 is applicable to the case and in pursuant of it, the jurisdiction of the Indian Court for entertaining the proceedings could not be deemed to be ousted. By referring the definition of section 2.2 of the Act, he said that under this provision the jurisdiction of the Indian Court with respect of the arbitration held outside of India has not been specifically ousted. Thus, impliedly, it could not be deemed that the Indian Court did not have jurisdiction over such arbitration held outside of the country. So in such premises, the District Court, Narsinghpur was having the jurisdiction to entertain and decide the appeal of the applicant. He also argued that in the absence of any specific terms between the parties ousting the jurisdiction of the Indian Court, they are governed by "governing law" stated in Clause 28 of the agreement. According to which, the agreement had taken place between the parties subject to law of India. He also argued the case on distinguishable feature of the curial law and the governing law. According to him, the arbitration proceedings is to be conducted under Clause 27 of the Agreement under the SIAC Rules, the same could be termed to be curial law, while the governing law of the parties is the Indian Laws as enumerated under Clause 28 of the agreement. In such premises, interim ruling was rightly challenged by the applicant under the Act of 1996 but contrary to Clause 28 of agreement and the settled proposition of law in this regard by allowing the preliminary objection of the respondent, his appeal has been dismissed. The applicant's counsel by referring the Rule 1.1 of the SIAC Rules (Annexure-A/7) said that according to it, if any mandatory provision of the applicable law of the arbitration from which the parties cannot derogate then the provision shall prevail. Under such premises, the appeal was rightly filed on behalf of the applicant under the Act of 1996 and the same was tenable. Under such premises, the appeal was rightly filed on behalf of the applicant under the Act of 1996 and the same was tenable. He also argued that the work order of the contract was to be executed by the applicant in the territorial jurisdiction to the Court of District Judge Narsinghpur, then in any case, as per provision of Civil Procedure Code, on the basis of the cause of action such Court was having the jurisdiction over the matter and in such premises his appeal ought to have been entertained and decide the same on merits by such Court. He also argued that the earlier applications for interim measures, although before referring the matter to arbitrator, were filed and entertained by the Court of District Judge, Narsinghpur so by virtue of section 42 of the Act 1996 his appeal was entertainable. He also placed reliance on some decisions of the Apex Court, the same shall be considered at the appropriate stage of this order and prayed for setting aside the impugned order and remitting back the matter to the Appellate Court with a direction to decide the appeal on merits. (6) ON the other hand, responding the aforesaid argument Shri R. S. Jaiswal, learned Senior Advocate argued that the approach of the appellate Court dismissing the appeal of the respondent on his objection regarding maintainability is in accordance with the terms of the agreement and SIAC rules in which, the arbitration proceedings is being conducted by the sole arbitrator. The same does not require any interference at this stage. In continuation, by referring the Clause 27.1 and 28 of the agreement, he said that as per Clause 27.1 once the parties have agreed to resolve their dispute through arbitration under SIAC rules at Singapore then, during subsisting arbitration proceedings before the arbitrator, the parties are bound by the SIAC Rules. According to Rule 32 of such SIAC rules, the applicant has a remedy to challenge the interim ruling/order of the arbitrator under the provision of International Arbitration Act (Cap. 143A,2002 Ed, Statutes of the Republic of Singapore) as such rules were enacted under such Act and not under any enactment of Indian Law. According to him, the Clause 28 of agreement while subsisting the arbitration proceedings did not give any right to the parties to challenge any interim ruling or award passed under the SIAC rules. 143A,2002 Ed, Statutes of the Republic of Singapore) as such rules were enacted under such Act and not under any enactment of Indian Law. According to him, the Clause 28 of agreement while subsisting the arbitration proceedings did not give any right to the parties to challenge any interim ruling or award passed under the SIAC rules. He also argued that the case laws cited on behalf of the applicant being distinguishable on facts with the present matter are not helping to the applicant. With these submissions by placing reliance on some decisions of the Apex Court prayed for dismissal of this revision. Having heard the parties at length, I have carefully gone through the contents of the revision memo, preliminary objections filed on behalf of the respondent in the appellate Court, the papers placed by the parties on record and also perused the impugned order of the Appellate Court. (7) ACCORDING to Clause 27.1 of the aforesaid agreement all the disputes, differences arising out of or in connection with the agreement between the parties was referable to Arbitration and as per further provision of such clause, the arbitration proceedings was to be conducted in English language in Singapore in accordance with Singapore International Arbitration Center (SIAC) Rule as in force at the time of signing of the Agreement. So, in such premises, the parties were agreed to resolve their disputes through arbitration under the abovementioned rules. Once the parties have agreed to get resolve their dispute under the aforesaid specific rules then, the parties are bound by such rules till the final award is passed by the arbitrator. In such premises, the Clause 28 of the agreement stating under the head of "governing law" that this agreement shall be subject to the laws of India does not appear to be inconsistent with the Clause 27.1 of the Agreement. Such Clause 28 further provides that during period of arbitration the performance of this Agreement shall be carried out without interruption and in accordance with its terms and provision. So, according to it also, during subsisting the arbitration proceedings, the parties are bound to comply with the terms and the provisions enumerated under the aforesaid Clause 27.1 of the agreement. So, the aforesaid both the provisions; Arbitration clause 27.1 defined the "Arbitration" and Clause 28 defined the "Governing law" are neither inconsistent nor conflicting to each other. So, according to it also, during subsisting the arbitration proceedings, the parties are bound to comply with the terms and the provisions enumerated under the aforesaid Clause 27.1 of the agreement. So, the aforesaid both the provisions; Arbitration clause 27.1 defined the "Arbitration" and Clause 28 defined the "Governing law" are neither inconsistent nor conflicting to each other. In the available circumstances, in view of the agreed terms of the arbitration mentioned in Clause 27.1 of this agreement after referring the matter to the arbitrator under such Clause the parties had bound themselves to comply with SIAC Rules during subsisting the arbitration proceedings before the sole arbitrator and till final award is passed by the arbitrator. (8) MY aforesaid view is neither in the conflict of the agreed terms of the parties enumerated in the agreement nor against any applicable law to the parties and also not against any SIAC rules specifically adopted by the parties. At this juncture, I would like to reproduce the concern SIAC rules as referred by the parties. The same are read as under :- (a) Rule 1 and 1-1 is read as under : Rule 1 scope of application and interpretation "1.1 Where parties have agreed to refer their dispute to the SIAC for arbitration, the parties shall be deemed to have agreed that the arbitration shall be conducted and administered in accordance with these Rules. If any of these Rules is in conflict with a mandatory provision of the applicable law of the arbitration from which the parties cannot derogate, that provision shall prevail." (b) The relevant part of Rule 24 regarding interim measures is read as under :- "Rule 24: Additional Powers of the Tribunal a.......... If any of these Rules is in conflict with a mandatory provision of the applicable law of the arbitration from which the parties cannot derogate, that provision shall prevail." (b) The relevant part of Rule 24 regarding interim measures is read as under :- "Rule 24: Additional Powers of the Tribunal a.......... j. order an interim injunction or any other interim measure; m. order any party to provide security for legal or other costs in any manner the Tribunal thinks fit;" (9) THE Rule 32 is read as under : "Rule 32 : Law of the Arbitration Where the seat of arbitration is Singapore, the law of the arbitration under these Rules shall be the International Arbitration Act (Chapter 143A,2002 Ed, Statutes of the Republic of Singapore) or its modification or re-enactment thereof." (10) KEEPING in view of the aforesaid Rule 1-1 on examination of the case at hand, I have found that by alleged agreement the parties had agreed to refer their dispute to the SIAC for arbitration and under such premises it shall be deemed that parties have agreed that their arbitration should be conducted and administered in accordance with such rules. On further examination, I have not found any circumstances in the rules of SIAC which is in conflict with a mandatory provision of the applicable law of the arbitration from which the parties cannot derogate, in such a situation during subsisting the arbitration proceedings the parties are bound to comply the abovementioned adopted rules. According to Rule 24 j and m, the arbitrator has authority to pass order on interim injunction or any other interim measure and order any party to provide security for legal or other costs in any manner the Tribunal thinks fit. And according to aforesaid Rule 32, during subsiding the arbitration proceedings under such SIAC rules, the law of the arbitration shall be the International Arbitration Act 'Chapter 143A,2002 Ed, Statutes of the Republic of Singapore', thus in view of such rules, which have been accepted by the parties, if any of the party is aggrieved by any interim ruling or order of the arbitrator then, such party may resort the remedy for assailing the same under the provisions of International Arbitration Act in which the abovementioned rules are framed. In such premises, any order or ruling given by the arbitrator or Tribunal under the abovementioned rules during subsisting the arbitration proceedings cannot be challenged under the Act of 1996 or any other enactment except the abovementioned International Arbitration Act. In such premises, it could be said that at this juncture the proceedings against the interim ruling or order of arbitrator on the basis of the Clause 28 of their agreement could not be entertained under section 37(2)(b) of the Act 1996. In other words contrary to the specific terms of the agreement, the abovementioned rules which are not in conflict of any existing governing laws by entertaining the appeal of the applicant under the Act of 1996, it could not be permited to come out from the provisions of arbitration rules which has been admitted and accepted by the parties in agreement whereby during subsisting the arbitration proceedings the jurisdiction of Indian Court is expressly or in any case impliedly ousted by them. (11) MY aforesaid view is fortified by the decision of the Apex Court in the matter of Shreejee Traco(I) (P) Ltd. vs. Paperline International Inc, (2003) 9 SCC 79 (Supreme Court) in which it was held as under : - "The law governing arbitration proceedings is the law chosen by the parties or, in the absence of agreement, the law of the country in which the arbitration is held. In the absence of express choice of the law governing the contract as a whole or the arbitration agreement as such having been exercised by the parties, a presumption may arise that the law of the country where the arbitration is agreed to be held is the proper law of the arbitration agreement. The presumption is rebuttable. The parties have the freedom to choose the law governing an international commercial arbitration agreement. The presumption is rebuttable. The parties have the freedom to choose the law governing an international commercial arbitration agreement. There is nothing in the contract or correspondence between the parties to rebut the ordinary presumption and spell out an intention of the parties that they intended proper law of India to govern arbitration in spite of the place of arbitration having been agreed to be at New York." According to the aforesaid precedent if there is a specific contract/ provision between the parties stating that they will be governed by the law of some specific country then the law of such country shall be applicable to them, but where the parties have not chosen any specific enactment in that regard then law of such country where the arbitration proceedings is being conducted shall govern the parties. In the present matter, as discussed above the parties have agreed and given their consent to resolve their dispute by the sole arbitrator under SIAC Rules, enacted under the International Arbitration Act. Therefore, during subsisting of the arbitration proceedings, by virtue of aforesaid Rule 32 the parties may have resort their remedy under the International Arbitration Law under which the aforesaid SIAC Rules are enacted. (12) SUCH question was also answered by the larger bench of the Apex Court presided over by three Hon'ble Judges of Apex Court in the matter of Sumitomo Heavy Industries Ltd. vs. ONGC Ltd., (1998) 1 SCC 305 (Supreme Court) in which it was held as under :- "Where the law governing the conduct of the reference is different from the law governing the underlying arbitration agreement, the court looks to the arbitration agreement to see if the dispute is arbitrable, then to the curial law to see how the reference should be conducted, "and then returns to the first law in order to give effect to the resulting award". The curial law does not apply to the filing of an award in court. The curial law operates during the continuance of the proceedings before the arbitrator to govern the procedure and conduct thereof. The courts administering the curial law have the authority to entertain applications by parties to arbitrations being conducted within their jurisdiction for the purpose of ensuring that the procedure that is adopted in the proceedings before the arbitrator conforms to the requirements of the curial law and for reliefs incidental thereto. The courts administering the curial law have the authority to entertain applications by parties to arbitrations being conducted within their jurisdiction for the purpose of ensuring that the procedure that is adopted in the proceedings before the arbitrator conforms to the requirements of the curial law and for reliefs incidental thereto. SUCH authority of the courts administering the curial law ceases when the proceedings before the arbitrator are concluded." Keeping in view of the aforesaid decision of the Apex Court on examining the case at hand then, it is apparent that the dispute of the impugned case has been referred to the arbitrator under the agreement/contract of the parties under the Indian law, but after referring the matter to the arbitrator under SIAC Rules such rules being curial law, the arbitrator has to pass the award under such SIAC rules and in such premises, till passing the award by the arbitrator the proceedings is to be conducted in accordance with such curial law and if any party aggrieved by any order of the arbitrator then according to their terms of agreement may resort and exhaust the remedy by virtue of Rule 32 of such SIAC Rules under the International Arbitration Act, (under which such rules are enacted). So, in the aforesaid premises, the findings of the appellate Court for dismissal of the appeal on preliminary objections of the respondent do not appear to be perverse or contrary to law hence, the same could not be interfered under the revisional jurisdiction of this Court enumerated under section 115 of Civil Procedure Code. (13) SO far as the case laws cited on behalf of the applicant's are concerned, the same are being taken into consideration one by one. In the matter of Bhatia International vs. Bulk Trading S. A. and another, reported in (2002) 4 SCC 105 in which it was held as under :- "32 To conclude, we hold that the provisions of Part I would apply to all arbitrations and to all proceedings relating thereto. Where such arbitration is held in India the provisions of Part I would compulsorily apply and parties are free to deviate only to the extent permitted by the derogable provisions of Part I. In cases of international commercial arbitrations held out of India provisions of Part I would apply unless the parties by agreement, express or implied, exclude all or any of its provisions. In that case the laws or rules chosen by the parties would prevail. Any provision, in Part I, which is contrary to or excluded by that law or rules will not apply." According to the ratio of aforesaid case in case of international commercial arbitrations held out of India provisions of Part I of the Act 1996 would apply unless the parties by agreement, express or implied, exclude all or any of its provisions. In that case the laws or rules chosen by the parties would prevail. Any provision, in Part I, which is contrary to or excluded by that law or rules will not apply. (14) IN the case, at hand under the agreement by virtue of Clause 27.1, the parties have agreed to resolve their dispute under the provision of SISA rules and it's provision and thereby expressly or in any case impliedly also adopted Rule 32 of such rules which categorically speaks that the law of arbitration under these rules shall be the INternational Arbitration Act (chapter 143 A, 2002 ED, statutes of the republic of Singapore). So in such premises, in view of express agreement of parties ousting the jurisdiction of the INdian Court during subsisting the arbitration proceedings, this case is not helping to the applicant's here. The case of Sumitomo Heavy Industries (supra) was also cited by the applicant's counsel, but in view of the principle laid down in such case as stated above, the same is not helping to the applicant. (15) SO far the case of Venture Global Engineering vs. Satyam Computer Services Ltd. and anr., reported in 2008(3) MPLJ (SC) 329 = AIR 2008 SC 1061 is concerned, such case was decided taking into consideration the principle laid down by the Apex Court in the Bhatia International (supra) the same has been discussed in former paras. Apart this the same was decided after passing the final award by the arbitrator and not during subsisting the arbitration proceedings. SO in the available circumstances, the same is not helping to the applicant. Apart this the same was decided after passing the final award by the arbitrator and not during subsisting the arbitration proceedings. SO in the available circumstances, the same is not helping to the applicant. (16) SO far the arguments of the applicant's counsel saying that on the basis of territorial jurisdiction of the Court under the Civil Procedure Code, the Narsinghpur Court had to entertain the appeal as the contractual work under the work order has been/was to be carried out in the territorial jurisdiction of such District Court is concerned, it is suffice to say that the present proceedings of the arbitration is being carried out by the arbitrator according to the terms of the agreement of the parties and also in accordance with the Rules of SISA Rules adopted by the parties in such agreement. In such premises, by borrowing the provision of Civil Procedure Code, when the arbitration proceedings is being carried out, it could not be held that on the basis of territorial jurisdiction over the area where the contracted work was to be carried out, the jurisdiction of the Court is available to the applicant for filing the appeal under section 37 (2) (b) of the Act 1996. SO in such premises, the case laws in the matter of A.B.C. Laminart Pvt. Ltd. and another vs. A. P. Agencies Salem, reported in AIR 1989 SC 1239 and Laxman Prasad vs. Prodigy Electronics Ltd. and another, reported in (2008) 1 SCC 618 are not helping to the applicant in the present matter. So far the arguments regarding section 42 of the Act of 1996 is concerned, in view of the aforesaid discussion if any proceedings were initiated by either of the parties before referring the matter to the arbitrator in the Court of District Judge Narsinghpur and the same were decided taking into consideration such circumstances then after referring the dispute to arbitrator by entertaining the impugned appeal the parties could not be permitted to come out from their express terms of the agreement specially when the parties are bound by the SIAC rules. Therefore, section 42 of the Act is also not helping to the applicant. Besides this, such provision does not appear to be applicable to appeal as the same is enacted for the purpose of application. Therefore, section 42 of the Act is also not helping to the applicant. Besides this, such provision does not appear to be applicable to appeal as the same is enacted for the purpose of application. (17) IN view of the aforesaid discussions, I have not found any infirmity, perversity or illegality or anything contrary to the propriety of law in the impugned order of the appellate Court, hence by affirming the impugned order this revision being devoids of any merits, is hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to the costs. Appeal dismissed.