JUDGMENT : This application is filed under Rule 18 of Order XX, read with Section 151 C.P.C., by the three petitioners, who are said to be assignees of defendant No.206 in C.S.NO.14 of 1958, in respect of 116 acres of land. They pray for a final decree in their favour in respect of the said land, which is part of item No. 37 of Schedule IV, annexed to the preliminary decree. 2. The averments in the affidavit filed in support of the application in brief, are that, the suit was filed by one, Dildarunnisa Begum, for partition of Mathruka properties of Nawab Khurshid Jah, in the City Civil Court, Hyderabad, and later, it was withdrawn to this Court. The Jagir Administrator and State of Andhra Pradesh, that figured as defendant Nos.43 and 53 respectively, opposed the suit and ultimately, a preliminary decree was passed on 28-6-1963, determining the entitlement of the shares. According to them, 80% of the shareholders, including the plaintiff and several defendants sold away their undivided share, as per the preliminary decree through a registered document in favour of H.E.H. the Nizam, and his brother-in-law – Nawab Khasimnavaz Jung in the year 1965, and on an application made by the purchasers, they came to be impleaded as defendant Nos.151 and 157 on 20-8-1964. H.E.H. the Nizam, is said to have sold his rights under the document, and share in favour of M/s. F.E. Dilshaw Limited, a Company, through a sale deed dated 23-2-1967, and thereafter the Company was impleaded as defendant No.206, vide order dated 10-3-1969. The Company later on was reconstituted as M/s. Cyrus Investments Limited and the change was recognized by this court vide order dated 9-3-1979. The petitioners state that the Receiver/Commissioner appointed by this Court divided the suit schedule properly between various sharers and the shares that have jointly fallen to defendant Nos.156 and 206 were also divided into two equal shares, which included the lands in Hafeezpet and Hayathnagar Villages. The land in Sy.No.80 of Hafeezpet, viz., item No.37 of Schedule IV of the decree, is one such item, allotted to defendant Nos.156, 157 and 206. The land in Sy.No.80 of Hafeezpet, viz., item No.37 of Schedule IV of the decree, is one such item, allotted to defendant Nos.156, 157 and 206. After referring to certain other developments, it is stated that the Receiver/Commissioner has further divided the land between defendants 157 and 206, and the latter is said to have assigned its interest, right and title in favour of M/s. Goldstone Engineering Limited, on 29-11-1995, which in turn, was impleaded as defendant No.320, and it is from the said Company, that the petitioners claim rights. 3. Counter-affidavits are filed by respondent Nos.16, 19, 30 and 832. The respondent No.30, who incidentally, is defendant No.23 in the suit, stated that, ignoring the interests of the original parties to the suit, several third parties are claiming interest in the property on the basis of agreements of sale, assignment deeds, etc., leading to several complications. According to him, the land in Sy.No.80 of Hafeezpet, to an extent of Ac. 5.87 guntas was allotted to his father, who figured as respondent No.23. He stated that the so-called adjustment between the petitioners and any parties or others to the suit, is not binding on him. 4. Other respondents, who filed counter-affidavits, submit that the various steps, that have taken place at different stages of the suit are untenable in law. Reference is made to a direction issued by this Court on 30-1-1996, wherein the matter has been forwarded to the Collector, under Section 54 C.P.C., and it is urged that any steps, subsequent thereto, are untenable. 5. The Government of Andhra Pradesh has also opposed the application by raising several contentions, touching on the validity of the decree itself. 6. Reference is made to a direction issued by this Court on 30-1-1996, wherein the matter has been forwarded to the Collector, under Section 54 C.P.C., and it is urged that any steps, subsequent thereto, are untenable. 5. The Government of Andhra Pradesh has also opposed the application by raising several contentions, touching on the validity of the decree itself. 6. On a perusal of the pleadings of the parties and after hearing the learned counsel for the parties, at length, this Court felt that the following issues become relevant: (1) Whether the preliminary decree, dated 28-6-1963, passed by this Court, suffered from any infirmity, particularly in the context of the vesting of the property under the Jagir Abolition Regulations; (2) What are the parameters for this Court to pass final decrees, even at the instance of persons, who are not parties to the preliminary decree; and (3) Whether there existed any mechanism or device in the instant case itself to ascertain as to the exact extent of property covered by preliminary decree, and the one, as regards which, final decrees can be passed from time to time. 7. Since the land involved is vast in extent and stakes are heavy, this Court requested Sri Challa Sitaramaiah, learned Senior Counsel, to assist the Court, purely on legal aspects. The learned Senior Counsel, in all fairness, stated that, long ago, he appeared in one of the proceedings, but not for or against the parties to the present applications, and he did not take any sides on the aspects, referred to above. When asked by this Court, the learned counsel for the parties to the proceedings stated that they do not have any objection for the assistance that may be rendered by Sri Challa Sitaramaiah. 8. Sri Vedula Venkata Ramana, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners submits that the preliminary decree passed in the suit has become final and the assignments/transfers of the undivided shares among the respective parties, in accordance with their shares were recognized by this Court from time to time. He contends that in certain cases, not only the assignments were recognized, but also directions were issued for effecting mutation in the revenue records and possession of the properties was also delivered to the concerned parties. He contends that in certain cases, not only the assignments were recognized, but also directions were issued for effecting mutation in the revenue records and possession of the properties was also delivered to the concerned parties. Learned Senior Counsel submits that the petitioners have derived right and title from defendant No.206, and the property claimed under the applications has already been allotted by the Receiver/Commissioner. He made elaborate submissions, referable to the very inception of the suit. He has drawn the attention of the Court to the pleadings in the suit, issues framed therein, and the findings recorded thereon. He bestowed his specific attention on the legal character of the lands in items 37 to 40 of Schedule-IV and certain items in Schedule-IV-A, which are vacant lands, thousands of acres, in extent (for short ‘the suit lands’). The gist of his argument in this regard is that the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) (Abolition of Jagirs) Regulation, 1953 (for short ‘the Jagirs Regulation’) did not have any impact upon the availability of the said lands, for partition. 9. Learned Senior Counsel submits that the preliminary decree passed by this Court has become final and it is too late in the day, to re-examine any aspects of it, particularly when the preliminary decree became the subject-matter of internal appeals before this Court, SLPs before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, and when valuable rights accrued in favour of vast number of persons and agencies over the years. Learned counsel has also advanced arguments on the three aspects, referred to above, and offered specific answers. He has relied upon several judgments in support of his contention. 10. Learned Government Pleader for Revenue submits that the preliminary decree, in so far as it related to the lands covered by the Jagirs Regulation is void ab initio, and unenforceable in law. He contends that the suit lands are part of Jagir, and once Jagirs stood abolished by operation of law, they were not available by operation of law, they were not available for partition. He submits that, while deciding the suit, this Court acted in the capacity of an ordinary Civil Court, and in a suit for partition, the validity, import or the effect of the Jagirs Regulation could not have been adverted to, much less decided. He submits that, while deciding the suit, this Court acted in the capacity of an ordinary Civil Court, and in a suit for partition, the validity, import or the effect of the Jagirs Regulation could not have been adverted to, much less decided. He further submits that the observations made by this Court in the preliminary decree, that the property was available for partition is contrary to the Jagirs Regulation and the fact that the Khurshid Jah Paigah, is covered by the Regulation, is not disputed by any one. Learned counsel submits that the so-called compromise between some of the parties does not affect the rights of the Government, since it did not join the same, and public law cannot be altered by compromise between the private parties. 11. Another contention of the learned Government Pleader is that, even if a preliminary decree is taken as valid, the various steps said to have been taken by the Receiver, in the form of allotment of shares; is untenable, since the matter was referred to the Collector, under Section 54 of the C.P.C. He contends that it is only in a final decree, that the properties, representing the respective shares of the parties in a partition suit, can be allotted by a Court, and allotment of specific item of property in favour of one or two parties out of several hundreds, in the present suit, is untenable, and cannot be recognized in law. He submits that the various transfers, adjustments or assignments, said to have been made by some of the parties, are equally opposed to law. He further submits that the so-called compromise between the parties is contrary to Order XXIII C.P.C., and since the suit is still pending, this Court is competent to set aside such compromises, in so far as it concerns the properties, that vested in the Government by operation of the Jagirs Regulation. 12. Learned Counsel for the contesting respondents have, to a large extent, supported the preliminary decree, and their objection is, as to the transfers and assignments of undivided shares by some of the parties to the suit. They contend that the procedure prescribed under the C.P.C. was completely by-passed and indiscriminate allotments were made, in respect of definite items of property in favour of a selected few, ignoring the interests of rest of the parties. 13. They contend that the procedure prescribed under the C.P.C. was completely by-passed and indiscriminate allotments were made, in respect of definite items of property in favour of a selected few, ignoring the interests of rest of the parties. 13. Sri Challa Sitarmaiah, learned Senior Counsel, as Amicus Curiae, submits that the Paigah estate, which figures in certain items of Schedule IV and IV-A stood abolished with the pronouncement of Jagirs Regulation and the properties ceased to be the Mathruka of the original Jagirdar. He contends that even under the Firman, a Jagir or Paigah was never treated as the personal property of the Jagirdar or Paigah, and their right was limited, to the extent of collecting revenue from the enjoyers of the land. He submits that the preliminary decree, in so far as it related to those properties, suffered from a serious legal infirmity, and such a decree cannot be recognized in law, He has drawn the attention of this Court, to the various aspects of the grants, made by the Rulers, and the characteristics of such grants. 14. Learned Senior Counsel further submits that, much before the preliminary decree came to be passed, the Hon’ble Supreme Court not only upheld the Jagir Regulation, but also explained the purport in clear terms, viz., that, with the abolition of Jagirs, the land stood vest in the Government, and the Jagirdar is entitled only to be paid the commutation and the record in the instant case discloses that the commutation amount has also been paid to the legal heirs of Nawab Khurshid Jah. Learned counsel contends that, when the decree is void ab initio, it does not give any rights in favour of the parties, and in plethora of decisions, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that, such questions can be decided even by an Executing Court. Learned counsel further submits that, since the suit is still pending, the basic infirmity, if any, in a preliminary decree, can certainly be examined in an application filed for a final decree. 15. The suit was originally filed by only on plaintiff, viz., Dildarunnisa Begum, against 43 defendants, in the Court of Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. It was numbered as O.S.No.41/1/55. The High Court of Andhra Pradesh was formed with effect from 1-11-1956. The original jurisdiction of the High Court is confined to limited matters, such as, Election Petitions, Company Applications Admiralty Suits. It was numbered as O.S.No.41/1/55. The High Court of Andhra Pradesh was formed with effect from 1-11-1956. The original jurisdiction of the High Court is confined to limited matters, such as, Election Petitions, Company Applications Admiralty Suits. It is not vested with the jurisdiction to entertain civil suits, like the Madras. Bombay and Calcutta High Courts. The circumstances, under which O.S.No.41/1/55 was withdrawn from the Court of Chief Judge, City Civil Court, to this Court, are not immediately known. Be that as it may, the suit was tried by this Court, as though it is a Civil Court, to adjudicate such matter. 16. The relief claimed in the suit is the one, for partition and separate possession and delivery of 29/2944th share to the plaintiff. The items of property included, landed property, bungalows, house plots, cash etc. Prominent among the various items of Schedule IV are, items 37,38,39 and 40, comprising of about 6,000 acres of land in four revenue villages, around Hyderabad, and certain items in Schedule-IV-A to the extent of thousands of acres of land, in similar Villages. 17. All the said lands are part of Khurshaid Jah Paigah. Here itself, it is necessary to give a brief introduction of the Paigah. 18. Asaf Jah, the founder of the Nizam’s dynarsty was said to be a highly paid officer in the Moghul Empire, In-charge of this part of the Empire. At a time, when the Moghul Empire was becoming weak, he is said to have asserted his supremacy, and while establishing his Kingdom brought along with him, certain trusted Lieutenants. One such person was Abdul Khair Khan from Oudh, a meritorious warrior and Commander of 6,000 horsemen. Through a Firman, then erstwhile Ruler, granted him Jagir, as remuneration for his service. Khair Khan died in 1751. His son, Abdul Feteh Khan was issued fresh firman. The term ‘Paigah’ came to be used, when a fresh firman was issued in favour of his son, Faqruddin Khan. He died in 1863, and was succeeded by Rafiuddin Khan. The last of the firmans came to be issued in favour of the legal descendants of Rafiuddin Khan, Asman Jah, Khurshid Jah and Vikar-ul-Umra. The plaintiff and most of the original defendants are said to be the lineal descendants of Khurshid Jah. He died in 1863, and was succeeded by Rafiuddin Khan. The last of the firmans came to be issued in favour of the legal descendants of Rafiuddin Khan, Asman Jah, Khurshid Jah and Vikar-ul-Umra. The plaintiff and most of the original defendants are said to be the lineal descendants of Khurshid Jah. Without exception, the firman issued from time to time prohibited partition of the properties and only succession to the right to receive revenue was permissible. 19. That the emphasis in the suit was for division of lands forming art of Khurshid Jah Paigah, is evident from the opening paragraph of the plaint itself. The descendancy up to Khurshid Jah Paigah was traced; and the conditions of the latest firman, i.e., the one, dated 17-1-1929, issued by the H.E.H. the Nizam, were extracted. In paragraph 12 of the plaint, it was mentioned that the firman prohibited distribution of the properties by way of partition, and that they cannot be treated as mathruka properties. In paragraph 13, reference was made to the abolition of Jagirs. The interpretation placed on this, by the plaintiff, was that on the abolition of Jagirs, the restriction placed upon the partition of the paigah properties stood revoked and that she became entitled for share in the mathruka estate of Nawab Khurshid Jah, to the extent of 29/2944th share. The cause of action for filing of the suit was mentioned as the Promulgation of Jagirs Regulation. The Jagir Administrator was impleaded as defendant No.43, alleging that the possession of the landed properties in certain items of Schedule IV and IV-A was taken over by him. 20. The 1st defendant in the suit i.e., Himayat Nawaz Jung, filed a detailed written-statement. He pleased that the entire property stood vested in the Government and the suit is not maintainable. Several other contentions were also raised. It is in this context, that the plaintiff got amended the plaint, by adding paragraph 17-A etc., referring those contentions, and impleaded the Government of Andhra Pradesh as defendant No.53. Paragraph 17-B of the plaint reads as under: “That the plaintiff has come to know through the written-statement of defendant No.1 that the properties mentioned in item Nos.37 to 40 of the Schedule 4, and Nos.13 to 15 of Schedule 4-A of the plaint schedule are in the possession of the State of Andhra Pradesh. Paragraph 17-B of the plaint reads as under: “That the plaintiff has come to know through the written-statement of defendant No.1 that the properties mentioned in item Nos.37 to 40 of the Schedule 4, and Nos.13 to 15 of Schedule 4-A of the plaint schedule are in the possession of the State of Andhra Pradesh. As these form the suit properties, the State of Andhra Pradesh is a proper and necessary party to the suit.” Similarly, the State of Mysore was impleaded, since some of the properties are said to have vested it it. 21. The State of Andhra Pradesh filed a written-statement, which is brief in content. 22. This Court framed as many as 50 issues. Important among them are, issue Nos.7 (a), 14(a) and (b) and they read as under: “7(a): Is the suit property detailed in schedules 4, 4(a) and 4(b) the Mathruka property of Late Nawab Khurshid Jah? 14(a) Are the properties mentioned in items 7 to 40 of schedule 4 the Makthas and Inam properties and, if so, whether the civil court has no jurisdiction is relation to the same? (b) Whether properties items 1 to 13 and 14 of Schedule of 4-A, Makthas, were amalgamated under the jagir abolition regulation, and property item No.5 was kept under the supervision of tahasil? What is its effect?” After the trial of the suit progressed to certain extent, the plaintiff and 58 defendants filed application No.264 of 1961, under Order XXIII Rule 3 C.P.C., with a prayer to pass a decree in terms of compromise, arrived at among them. The Jagir Administrator, State of Andhra Pradesh and 39 others were added as respondents to this application. 23. A judgment was rendered in the suit as well as the application, on 28-6-1963. It is important to note that the decree partakes the characteristics of a compromise decree, and at the same time, pronouncement of contentious issues. The Jagir Administrator, State of Andhra Pradesh and 39 others were added as respondents to this application. 23. A judgment was rendered in the suit as well as the application, on 28-6-1963. It is important to note that the decree partakes the characteristics of a compromise decree, and at the same time, pronouncement of contentious issues. The compromise memo was referred to, at the threshold, and after discussion, running into about 290 pages, on various issues, the result is indicated as under: “The result of the above discussion is that the suit of the plaintiff in relation to the defendants other than the parties to the compromise shall be decreed in the following terms: (1) xxx (2) that the properties items 37 and 40 is Schedule IV will also be available for partition only in case they happen to be released by the Government.” (It is not necessary to refer to other part of the decree, in the present context). This was treated as a preliminary decree. Shortly after the decree was passed, all the parties to the suit have virtually become inactive or unconcerned. It is stated that 80% of the parties to the suit have transferred their undivided share in the landed property, in favour of H.E.H. the Nizam, and his brother-in-law, Nawab Khasimnavaz Jung. They, in turn, came to be added as defendant Nos.151 and 157, and from them, the assignment/transfer is said to have taken place, in favour of M/s. Cyrus and Company and the flow of assignments continued for decades. 24. Normally, when a decree is passed in a partition suit on the basis of the compromise, the further steps are left to be undertaken by the parties themselves. The necessity to pass final decree in such cases is a rarity (See Bhusan v. Chabimoni (1) AIR 1948 Calcutta 363). Further, even where a preliminary decree is passed, the necessity to appoint a Commissioner would arise at the stage of final decree proceedings. In the instant case, in the decree dated 28-6-1963 itself, this Court appointed an Advocate, as Commissioner, directing him to partition the properties. 25. The Commissioner did undertake certain exercise. However, he reported that there is lack of unanimity among the parties. In the instant case, in the decree dated 28-6-1963 itself, this Court appointed an Advocate, as Commissioner, directing him to partition the properties. 25. The Commissioner did undertake certain exercise. However, he reported that there is lack of unanimity among the parties. Taking that into account, an order was passed in 1972, referring the matter to the Collector under Section 54 of the C.P.C., as provided for under Rule 18(1) of Order XX C.P.C. The record is not clear as to when, an in what form, the matter was taken away from the purview of the Collector. It is apt to refer to the principle enunciated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shub Karan Bubna v. Sita Saran Bubna (2) 2009 (8) SCJ 281 = (2009) 9 SCC 689 . It was held: 18.1. In regard to estates assessed to payment of revenue to the Government (agricultural land), the court is required to pass only one decree declaring the rights of several parties interested in the suit property with a direction to the Collector (or his subordinate) to effect actual partition or separation in accordance with the declaration made by the court in regard to the shares of various parties and deliver the respective portions to them, in accordance with Section 54 of the Code. Such entrustment to the Collector under law was for two reasons. First is that the Revenue Authorities are more conversant with matters relating to agricultural lands. Second is to safeguard the interests of the Government in regard to revenue. (The second reason, which was very important in the 19th century and early 20th century when the Code was made, has now virtually lost its relevance, as revenue from agricultural land is negligible.) Where the Collector acts in terms of the decree, the matter does not come back to the court at all. The court will not interfere with the partitions by the Collector, except to the extent of any complaint of a third party affected thereby. 18.2. The court will not interfere with the partitions by the Collector, except to the extent of any complaint of a third party affected thereby. 18.2. In regard to immovable properties (other than agricultural lands paying land revenue), that is, buildings, plots, etc., or movable properties: (i) where the court can conveniently and without further enquiry make the division without the assistance of any Commissioner, or where parties agree upon the manner of division, the court will pass a single decree comprising the preliminary decree declaring the rights of several parities and also a final decree dividing the suit properties by metes and bounds. (ii) where the division by metes and bounds cannot be made without further inquiry, the court will pass a preliminary decree declaring the rights of the parties interested in the property and give further directions as may be required to effect the division. In such cases, normally a Commissioner is appointed (usually an engineer, draughtsman, architect, or lawyer) to physically examine the property to be divided and suggest the manner of division. The court then hears the parties on the report, and passes a final decree for division by metes and bounds. The function of making a partition or separation according to the rights declared by the preliminary decree (in regard to non-agricultural immovable properties and movables) is entrusted to a Commissioner, as it involves inspection of the property and examination of various alternatives with reference to practical utility and site conditions. When the commissioner gives his report as to the manner of division, the proposals contained in the report are considered by the court; and after hearing objections to the report, if any, the court passes a final decree whereby the relief sought in the suit is granted by separating the property by metes and bounds. It is also possible that if the property is incapable of proper division, the court may direct sale thereof and distribution of the proceeds as per the shares declared. 18.3. As the declaration of rights or shares is only the fist stage in a suit for partition, a preliminary decree does not have the effect of disposing of the suit. The suit continues to be pending until partition, that is, division by metes and bounds takes place by passing a final decree. 18.3. As the declaration of rights or shares is only the fist stage in a suit for partition, a preliminary decree does not have the effect of disposing of the suit. The suit continues to be pending until partition, that is, division by metes and bounds takes place by passing a final decree. An application requesting the court to take necessary steps to draw up a final decree effecting a division in terms of the preliminary decree, is neither an application for execution (falling under Article 136 of the Limitation Act) nor an application seeking a fresh relief (falling under Article 137 of the Limitation Act). It is only a remainder to the court to do its duty to appoint a Commissioner, get a repot, and draw a final decree in the pending suit so that the suit is taken to its logical conclusion.” 26. Over the past few decades, scores of applications were filed in this suit, and most of them by persons, who are not parties to the suit. The applications were to the effect that the defendant Nos.156 and 157 or their transferees have assigned certain extents of land in favour of such petitioners and reliefs, in the form of (a) recognition of assignment, (b) adding them as defendants to the suit, (c) direction the revenue authorities to effect mutations, and (d) to direct delivery of possession of the property, were prayed. Quite large number of applications were ordered, almost uncontested. In certain applications, which were contested, the matter went up to the Supreme Court and exception was taken to the nature of disposal. 27. At one stage, a Division Bench of this Court suspected the bona fides of persons who filed such applications, and when it was insisted that every applicant must appear, and prove their bona fides and identity, more than 90% of them did not turn up. It is in this background, that the applications filed by the petitioners herein, who are not parties to the suit, need to be examined. 28. The modus operandi till now is that an application for recognition of assignment for hundreds, if not thousands of acres is filed on the basis of a private negotiation between one of the recognized assignees, and it is passed as a matter of course, since there is no opposition. 28. The modus operandi till now is that an application for recognition of assignment for hundreds, if not thousands of acres is filed on the basis of a private negotiation between one of the recognized assignees, and it is passed as a matter of course, since there is no opposition. The record in this suit has grown to such a volume, that several almirahs are filled with it, and no one in the Court or outside, has an idea as to the extent of the land, that has changed hands on the basis of the orders passed from time to time. The result is that the property worth thousands of crores gets transferred without there being. (a) any declaration of title; (b) execution of sale deed, that warrants payment of stamp duty and registration fee; (c) verification as to the impact of Land Ceiling Laws, (d) consent of all the parties to the suit; and all this in respect of land, which is undisputedly covered by the Jagirs Regulation. 29. At a time, when it is difficult for a person to purchase few hundred square yards, from a person, holding clear title, because of the operation of several laws, the transactions of the volume, referred to above, are taking place without hindrance, and once an order is passed, it is cited and used as a shield before the authorities of various departments. It is in this context that an effort is being made to address certain basic questions, lest, the High Court is accused of, paving the way for transactions, which are otherwise untenable. This Court is conscious of the fact that quit large number of orders came to be passed, and some of the matters have landed before the Hon’ble Supreme Court also. However, the present examination and consideration is strictly with reference to the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, and the relevant provisions of law. 30. As to the first question, it has already been mentioned that the Jagirs Regulation has abolished the Jagirs and similar prerogatives conferred by the erstwhile Governors. The word ‘Jagir’ is defined under Section 2(f) of the Regulation, and if includes paigah also. 30. As to the first question, it has already been mentioned that the Jagirs Regulation has abolished the Jagirs and similar prerogatives conferred by the erstwhile Governors. The word ‘Jagir’ is defined under Section 2(f) of the Regulation, and if includes paigah also. The plaintiff was conscious of the fact that the landed property, included the suit schedule, is part of paigah, and she has also stated with all honesty, that the possession of the lands was taken over by the Jagir Administrator, defendant No.43. Apart from re-affirming that fact, the 1st defendant in the suit said that the properties stood vested in the Government and thereby, the Government of Andhra Pradesh came to be impleaded as a defendant. 31. The fact the Khurshaid Jah Paigah is covered by the Jagir Regulation, is evident from Schedule, attached to the Commutation Regulations. It occurs at item No.2 in the list of 23 “Jamiath Jagirs”. This expression is used to connote a special treatment being extended to those Jagirs or paigahs, in the context of calculation of basic annual revenue. While in the case of other jagirs, 60% of the gross basic sum on annual revenue was to be deducted, in case Jamiath jagirs, the deduction was to be 20% only. It is also not out of place to mention here that the Jagirs Regulation was included in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution. Therefore, it needs to be seen, as to whether it is competent for this Court to pass a preliminary decree, in respect of properties, that are covered by Jagirs Regulation. 32. This Court is aware of the fact that appeals preferred by the Government, against preliminary decree stage, was dismissed and SLP filed against it, was rejected by the Supreme Court. In this regard, it is felt that a challenge made to a preliminary decree, by way of appeal, stands on a footing, different from a consideration of the same, by the very Court, which passed the decree, with reference to certain basic questions. 33. In Sabitri Dei and others v. Sarat Chandra Rout and others (3) (1996) 3 SCC 301 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has dealt with a question as to whether the validity of a decree can be canvassed at the stage of execution or in collateral proceedings. 33. In Sabitri Dei and others v. Sarat Chandra Rout and others (3) (1996) 3 SCC 301 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has dealt with a question as to whether the validity of a decree can be canvassed at the stage of execution or in collateral proceedings. The facts of that case are broadly akin to those, in the present case, except that the vesting took place under a different enactment. A suit was filed for recovery of a piece of land in the Court of Munsif, Cuttack, and the suit was decreed. The decree became final with the dismissal of the revision by the Orissa High Court, on 15-10-1976. However, the land stood vested in the Government in 1963, by virtue of a notification under Section 3 (1) of the Orissa Estates Abolition Act, Execution Petition was filed in the year 1981. The judgment-debtor raised an objection under Section 47 of that Act, as to the executability of the decree. The objection was sustained by the Executing Court. The High Court, however, took the view that, once the decree has become final, the validity of the same cannot be examined in the execution proceedings. Reversing the same, the Supreme Court held; “Para 6. Coming to the first question, it is apparent that on issuance of notification under section 3(1) of the Act, the estate vests free from all encumbrances in the State Government. The pre-existing rights shall cease to exist and new rights have been created under the Act. By virtue of Section 6, the Homesteads of Intermediaries and buildings together with lands on which buildings stand in the possession of Intermediaries and used as goals, factories or mills to be retained by them on payment of rent. But the preconditions in a deemed settlement for fixation of rent as contemplated under section 6 must be satisfied namely the land must be in possession of the Intermediary and the same must be in use as golas, factories or mills. Under subsection (3) of Section 8-A if no claim is filed within the specified period then the right to possess the land or building or structure, as the case may be, stands vested in the State Government by operation of the Act and thereupon the right to make any such claim by the Intermediary stands extinguished. Under subsection (3) of Section 8-A if no claim is filed within the specified period then the right to possess the land or building or structure, as the case may be, stands vested in the State Government by operation of the Act and thereupon the right to make any such claim by the Intermediary stands extinguished. It is admitted by the parties that the Intermediary had not filed any claim within the stipulated period and in fact no settlement of rent had been made with the Intermediary under Section 6. Such a settlement could not have been made as admittedly the defendants judgment-debtor is in possession of the land. This being the position, on and from the date of issuance of notification under Section 3(1) of the Act that is 27-4-1963, the civil court loses jurisdiction in respect of the disputed property by operation of Section 39 of the Act and consequently the decree passed on 30-3-1965 must be held to be a nullity. Once a decree is held to be a nullity, the principle of constructive res judicata will have no application and its invalidity can be set up whenever it is sought to be enforced or is acted upon as a foundation for a right even at the stage of execution or in any collateral proceeding. 34. Reference was made to its own judgment in Sushil Kumar Mehta v. Gobind Ram Bohra (4) (1990) 1 SCC 193 . The discussion on this aspect was summed up, as under: “…..In our considered opinion the estate in question having been vested by virtue of notification under Section 3(1) of the Act and no claim having been made by the Intermediary for getting deemed settlement of fixation of rent, by operation of subsection (3) of Section 8-A, the right of the Intermediary stands extinguished and therefore under such circumstances the civil court had no jurisdiction to pass the decree in the year 1965. Consequently the decree in question is a nullity and the executing court can refuse to execute the decree. The High Court was in obvious error in directing execution of the decree.” 35. In the opinion of this Court, the instant case stands on a better footing. Consequently the decree in question is a nullity and the executing court can refuse to execute the decree. The High Court was in obvious error in directing execution of the decree.” 35. In the opinion of this Court, the instant case stands on a better footing. The reason is that, a suit for partition would be pending, till a final decree is passed, and there is sufficient authority for the proposition that a preliminary decree cab be varied, and if necessary modified by the same trial Court, till the final decree is not passed. Further, when vesting of the property by operation of a statute, subsequent to the decree, has the effect of nullifying it, such a vestiture, much prior to the very institution of the suit, that too, acknowledged by the plaintiff and other parties to that suit, would not result, in a lesser impact. 36. Coming to the purport of the Jagirs Regulation, slight elaboration needs to be made, as to the circumstances under which, it came to be issued. Though India became independent on 15th August, 1947, the State of Hyderabad did not become part of it. It was only on 18-9-1948, the H.E.H. the Nizam agreed to annex that State with Union of India. As a measure of transition, he delegated all his powers to the Military Governor, appointed by the Government of India. It is, in exercise of the powers so conferred, that the Military Governor issued the Jagirs Regulation, abolishing the Jagirs. The validity of these Regulations was challenged before the Hyderabad High Court, in Sarwarlal and others v. State of Hyderabad (5) AIR 1954 Hyderabad 227. 37. A Division bench of this Court observed that the Jagirdars in the State of Andhra Pradesh are only life tenures, and each successor has a fresh estate, and they did not possess any heritable estates. The relevant portion reads: “Para-4…. 37. A Division bench of this Court observed that the Jagirdars in the State of Andhra Pradesh are only life tenures, and each successor has a fresh estate, and they did not possess any heritable estates. The relevant portion reads: “Para-4…. Therefore, it is clear that the jagirdars of this State, whatever be the words used in their original Sanads, did not have heritable estates and each had a life-tenure, which was inalienable during his life without proper sanction….” Their Lordships further held, Para-5: We will now refer to two cases of the then Judicial Committee in support of our view that jagirdars in this State had only life-tenures, each successor of the estate got a fresh estate, and the powers of the grantor were absolute in matter of granting these estates on the deaths of the jagidars. In-‘Sultan-ul-mulk v. Badsha Begum’, 35 Deccan LR 887 (B), it was held that jagir tenures were inalienable, non-heritable, reverted to the grantor on the death of the grantees and on being granted to the heirs the order operated as a fresh grant. Again in – ‘Munawar Begum v. Najib Mirga’, 35 Deccan LR 236 (C), the provisions of the several Firmans were considered and it was held that the grantees of these tenures had no right to burden the estate, and the rights conferred on them were not hereditable. It is obvious that the claim of the applicants, in view of the aforesaid citations, about being the owners of their respective tenures cannot be upheld, and the powers of the Ruler of this State regarding such estates were absolute and uncontrolled by any legal limitation.” 38. The matter was carried to the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sarwarlal v. State of Hyderabad (6) AIR 1960 SC 862 . The challenge was on the grounds of lack of competence of the Military Governor, and of the “the naked confiscation of the property”. Repelling the contentions, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and upheld the Regulation. The brief history of the transition of powers from H.E.H. the Nizam, to a democratically elected Government, between September, 1948 to December 1949, was referred to. 39. It is apt to extract paragraph 15 of the said judgment. It reads: “Para-15: The plea that the fundamental rights of the appellant under the Constitution were infringed by the two Regulations does not require any detailed examination. 39. It is apt to extract paragraph 15 of the said judgment. It reads: “Para-15: The plea that the fundamental rights of the appellant under the Constitution were infringed by the two Regulations does not require any detailed examination. By virtue of the Abolition Regulation, the rights of the appellant as a jagirdar in his jagir were extinguished and by the Commutation Regulation, the quantum of compensation payable to him was determined by a pre-Constitution legislation. The Regulations were competently promulgated in exercise of legislative authority in that behalf and the Constitution does not operate retrospectively to revive the rights which had been, before it was enacted, extinguished. The Constitution has, except as otherwise expressly provided, no retrospective operation: Keshavan Madhava menon v. State of Bombay: (1951) SCR 228: ( AIR 1951 SC 128 ); and rights which were by legislation extinguished, before it was enacted, are not revived thereby. At the commencement of the Constitution, the appellant had, therefore, no rights in the jagirs and he, obviously, could not claim a writ of mandamus directing delivery of possession of the jagir, or a writ directing commutation otherwise than under the provisions of the Commutation Regulation. It may also be observed that the Parliament has, by the Constitution (1stAmendment) Act included the Abolition and the Commutation Regulations in then ninth schedule, and by virtue of Article 31-B, the two Regulations are exempt from challenge on the ground that they are inconsistent with or take away or abridge any of the fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution”. 40. Hardly any doubt is left that with the promulgation of the Regulation, the rights in a Jagir or paigah stood extinguished and the only relief they are entitled to is the one for payment of the commutation. 41. Similar view was expressed by the Supreme Court in Raja Ram Chandra Reddy v. Rani Shankaramma (7) 1956 SCJ 459. 42. The effect of the M.P. Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1950, and the consequences that have flown from it fell for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Haji S.K. Subhan v. Madhorao (8) AIR 1962 SC 1230 . As in the case of Jagir Regulation, under the said enactment also, the rights in the estates, covered by it, stood abolished, and vested in the State, free from all encumbrances. As in the case of Jagir Regulation, under the said enactment also, the rights in the estates, covered by it, stood abolished, and vested in the State, free from all encumbrances. Dispute arose in the context of the recovery of possession of a piece of land, covered by the enactment, but purchased subsequently. The suit was decreed, being unaware of the vestiture of the land in the Government, by operation of the Act, and the decree became final. At the stage of execution, an objection was raised on the basis of the provisions of the enactment. The matter ultimately reached the Supreme Court. If was held; “Para-39: The contention that the Executing Court cannot question the decree and has to execute it as it stands, is correct, but this principle has no operation in the facts of the present case. The objection of the appellant is not with respect to the invalidity of the decree or with respect to the decree being wrong. His objection is based on the effect of the provisions of the Act, which has deprived the respondent of his proprietary rights, including the right to recover possession over the land in suit and under whose provisions the respondent has obtained the right to remain in possession of it. In these circumstances, we are of opinion that the executing Court can refuse to execute the decree holding that it has become in-executable on account of the change in law and its effect”. 43. A Division Bench of this Court in Bandari Ramachander v. Special Court under A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, Hyderabad (9) 2003 (3) ALT 292 (DB) took into account the scope of the Jagir Regulation, in the context of that case. It was held that the Jagirs stood abolished with the promulgation of the Regulation, and even otherwise, no one can hold any personal property or title in a Jagir Village. Authorities can be multiplied on this aspect. 44. It is true that in the judgment that led to the passing of preliminary decree, this Court expressed its view on the purport of the Jagirs Regulation, vis-a-vis the land, while answering issue N0s.7 and 14. 45. It has already been mentioned that the decree was mostly on the basis of a compromise memo, and all the same, discussion was undertaken on merits. 45. It has already been mentioned that the decree was mostly on the basis of a compromise memo, and all the same, discussion was undertaken on merits. The relief was mostly confined to the parties to the compromise memo, that too, in terms thereof. The question, as to whether private parties, through their understanding, consent or compromise, can affect the operation of public law; does not need much elaboration. Such arrangements, howsoever well-framed they may be; cannot defeat the operation of public law or the property, that is vested in the State. In State of Punjab v. Amar Singh (10) AIR 1974 SC 994 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court had an occasion to deal with this aspect. It was held that a compromise, which is otherwise untenable, cannot be acted upon, even if it is brought into existence, with the participation of the authorities under a statute or of the Government. In the words of the Supreme Court; “Para-37:…. The order was a nullity, denuded of evidence and absent judicial satisfaction. Strictly speaking, collusive razis cannot affect the State which has the right to utilize surplus lands for re-settling tenants. Certain proceedings, e.g., election petitions and actions under Section 92, Civil Procedure Code, one set in motion, transcend private interests and public authorities cannot pass orders on collusive representations without regards to public interest or independent satisfaction. Annexure ‘A’ ex facie was a nullity. It is unfortunate that the Assistant Collector has, with insipient insouciance, lent his authority to a compromise, where care and conscientiousness would have averted the error. We are satisfied that Annexure ‘A’ is unavailing against the State and its officers in accommodating ejected tenants on the lands in question. The public policy of Section 10-A cannot be outwitted by consent orders calculated to defeat the provision and without the statutory authority charged with the enquiry being satisfied about the bona fides of and eligibility for the purchase. So viewed, the respondents in these appeals cannot on the strength of the purchase orders exclude those lands from the operation of Section 10-A (a) of the Act”. The following passage from C.P.C., by Mulla, was quoted with approval. “If a decree is passed under this rule on a compromise which is not lawful, the Court should not enforce the decree in execution proceedings. Thus, a sale of an office attached to a temple is against public policy. The following passage from C.P.C., by Mulla, was quoted with approval. “If a decree is passed under this rule on a compromise which is not lawful, the Court should not enforce the decree in execution proceedings. Thus, a sale of an office attached to a temple is against public policy. Hence, if in a suit against the holder of such an office a compromise is arrived at whereby the holder of the office consents to the office being sold in satisfaction of the debt due to the plaintiff, and a decree is passed on the compromise, the Court should notwithstanding the consent decree refuse to sell the office in execution. It is clear that if the matter had rested in contract only, the Court could not have enforced the sale in a suit brought for that purpose. The mere fact that the contract is embodied in a decree does not alter the incidents of the contract.” 46. Recently, in Reliance Natural Resources Ltd. v. Reliance Industries Ltd. (11) (2010) 2 Law ISC 56, the Hon’ble Supreme Court quoted with approval, the maxim, authored by Justinian, which reads: “Jus publicum privatorum pactis mutari non potest.” Public law cannot be changed by private pacts.” 47. Chitty, in his Treatise on ‘Contracts’, has this to say, about the contracts, which are made in contravention of statutes. “Express voidness by statute. Unfortunately statues all too infrequently expressly state that contracts of certain sorts are to be unenforceable at the suit of either or both parties. The express voidness for illegality of certain contracts of gaming and wagering is considered elsewhere in this work. A contract may, by statute, be void without being illegal, the only penalty being that a contract made in contravention of the statue is entirely ineffective to create rights, as in the case of a contract made in contravention of the Gaming Acts 1845 and 1892; or again a contract may be unenforceable without being either illegal or void, in which case it is effective to alter the rights of the parties, although the altered rights are not enforceable by them.” (See Chitty on Contracts Volume -1 24th Edition – page 1014) 48. In Snell v. Unity Finance Ltd. (12) (1963) 3 All.E.R.50, a Court of Appeal took the view that no Court can enforce a contract, which runs contrary to the provisions of a statute. In Snell v. Unity Finance Ltd. (12) (1963) 3 All.E.R.50, a Court of Appeal took the view that no Court can enforce a contract, which runs contrary to the provisions of a statute. The following passage from Scott v. Brown, Doering, McNab and Co. (13) (1892) 2 Q.B.728 was extracted: “No court ought to enforce an illegal contract or allow itself to be made the instrument of enforcing obligations alleged to arise out of a contract or transaction which is illegal, if the illegality is duly brought to the notice of the court, and if the person invoking the aid of the court is himself implicated in the illegality. It matters not whether the defendant has pleaded the illegality or whether he has not. It the evidence adduced by the plaintiff proves the illegality the court ought not to assist him. If authority is wanted for this proposition, it will be found in the well-known judgment of Lord Mansfield in Holman v. Johnson [(1775) 1 Cowp.341]. Willmer, L.J., summed up the discussion, and observed; “In my judgment counsel for the defendants was right when he submitted in the course of his reply that what we have to do in the present case is to resolve a conflict between two well-established and basic principles. The first principle on which he reliefs is the principle that the court will not lend its assistance for the purpose of enforcing in illegal contract, once the illegality has come to light and the court is satisfies of the illegality. The principle invoked on the other side is that with which I have been concerned in the last few moments, viz., that appeals from country courts are limited by the rule laid down by the House of Lords in Smith v. Baker and Sons [(1891) A.C.325], and limited in such a way as would, it is said, preclude the present appeal. This is not the first time that the court has been asked to resolve a conflict between two well-established principles. Faced with that conflict, I have no doubt as to which is the principle that must prevail. I am satisfied that the principle to which we must give effect is the principle that the Court will not lend any assistance to enforce an illegal contract where that illegality has plainly appeared in the evidence. Faced with that conflict, I have no doubt as to which is the principle that must prevail. I am satisfied that the principle to which we must give effect is the principle that the Court will not lend any assistance to enforce an illegal contract where that illegality has plainly appeared in the evidence. It seems to me that this is just such an exceptional case as was refereed to by Lord Moultion in North –Western Salt Co., Ltd. v. Electrolytic Alkali Co., Ltd. [(1914-15)] All E.R. Rep. at. P.759] in the passage to which I have already referred, in relation to which he said: “In such a case the court would act upon it”, i.e., the illegality to which he had referred. It appears to me in those circumstances that, the illegality having been brought to our attention, it is our duty to give effect to it. The result of that is that in my judgment, first, we should allow the defendants to amend the notice of appeal in accordance with the draft which has been submitted to us; and, secondly, on the merits we should allow the appeal and direct that the plaintiff’s action should be dismissed.” 49. Almost similar situation obtains, in the instant case. 50. Now a glance at the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners. In Venkata Reddy and others v. Pethi Reddy (14) AIR 1963 SC 992 , the effect of Section 28-A of the Provincial Insolvency Act, as amended in the year 1948, upon a preliminary decree that was passed earlier thereto in a partition suit, was considered. It was held that a provision of law, which has come into operation after the preliminary decree came to be passed, does not affect such decree. In the instant case, the situation is totally different. The Jagirs Abolition Regulations were not only in operation by the time the suit was filed, but also the Hon’ble Supreme Court upheld and explained its purport. 51. In Hope Plantations Limited v. Taluk Land Board, Peermade and another (15) (1999) 5 SCC 590 , the question that arose before the Hon’ble Supreme Court was, as to whether it was competent to the Taluk Land Board constituted under the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 to review its own decision, which became final, on being upheld by the Hon’be Supreme Court. The review was based upon a judgment rendered by the Supreme Court on a different point subsequently. Explaining the purport of Order 47 C.P.C., the Supreme Court held that the subsequent judgment rendered by a Court cannot be the basis for an authority to review its decision. Hardly there exists any similarity between the situation covered by the instant case and the one that fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in that case. 52. Dhurandhar Prasad Singh v. Jai Prakash University (16) (2001) 6 SCC 534 , in a way, weakness the plea of the petitioners. After referring to the treatises on administrative law and the precedents, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that it is competent for a Civil Court, under Section 47 C.P.C. to decide all the questions relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed. It was also indicated that the power under that provision is narrow than the one of appeal, revision or review. A note of caution was sounded as to the manner in which the power under that provision can be exercised. Same view was reiterated in Rafique Bibi v. Syed Waliuddin and others (17) (2004) 1 SCC 287 = 2003 (6) ALT 13.3 (DN SC). 53. It is necessary to take note of the fact that in the two judgments referred to above, the subject matter was not a preliminary decree and the proceedings arose after the suits or other proceedings are disposed of finally. 54. The parameters of powers of a Court to recall its own judgment are explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres (India) Pvt. Ltd (18) (1996) 5 SCC 550 . The plea, on which the judgment rendered by the National Commission under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 was to be reviewed, was that the respondents therein played fraud on the Commission in securing the judgment. The Supreme Court observed as under: “The judiciary in India also possesses inherent power, specially under Section 151 C.P.C. to recall its judgment or order if it is obtained by fraud on Court. In the case of fraud on a party to the suit or proceedings, the Court may direct the affected party to file a separate suit for setting aside the decree obtained by fraud. In the case of fraud on a party to the suit or proceedings, the Court may direct the affected party to file a separate suit for setting aside the decree obtained by fraud. Inherent powers are powers which are resident in all Courts, especially of superior jurisdiction. These powers spring not from legislation but from the nature and the construction of the Tribunals or Courts themselves so as to enable them to maintain their dignity, secure obedience to its process and rules, protect its officers from indignity and wrong and to punish unseemly behaviour. This power is necessary for the orderly administration of the Court’s business.” The purpose of citing the judgment appears to be that it was only when fraud is played, that a request can be made by the parties to the proceedings to recall the earlier judgment and since no such grounds are urged, the occasion may not arise. Similarly in A.V. Papayya Sastry and others v. Government of A.P and others (19) 2007 ALT (Rev.) 49 (SC)=2007 (5) ALT 14.3 (DN SC) = 2007 (3) SCJ 871= (2007) 4 SCC 221 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that fraud vitiates everything and if proved, it can constitute the basis for recalling the order or judgment rendered by an authority or the Court. It was observed that in case the order or the judgment are upheld by the superior Courts, the doctrine of merger gets attracted and it would not be possible for the authority or the Court to review or recall or reconsider the same. It was however, held that in case fraud is pleaded and proved, the doctrine of merger would not apply. 55. Firstly, there is no application for review filed by any of the parties and secondly, the grounds of fraud are not urged. The whole discussion is as to the enforceability of the preliminary decree in the light of the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court interpreting the purport of the Jagirs Abolition Regulations. 56. The result of the discussion undertaken above is that, a preliminary decree was passed in respect of the lands covered by the Jagirs Abolition Regulations, though all the parties to the suit agreed that the lands stood vested in the Government. 56. The result of the discussion undertaken above is that, a preliminary decree was passed in respect of the lands covered by the Jagirs Abolition Regulations, though all the parties to the suit agreed that the lands stood vested in the Government. The findings recorded by this Court on the purport of the Regulation run contrary to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sarvarlal’s case (6 supra), which, very much existed by the time the preliminary decree was passed on 28-06-1963. Therefore, the preliminary decree is, in a way, per incuriam being contrary to the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Sarwarlal’s case and suffered from a serious infirmity, since it has proposed to undo the legal consequences that have flown from the Jagirs Abolition Regulations. 57. The second question is as to the parameters for this Court to pass final decree at the instance of the persons who are not parties to the preliminary decree. It has already been mentioned that the suit was initially filed only against 53 defendants and the number increased in geometrical proportion after the preliminary decree came to be passed. For the past about four decades, the applications are being filed only by the assignees for passing of final decree. 58. It is settled principle of law that an assignee from a party to the suit steps into the shoes and can seek the relief which he as assignor could have sought. Therefore, no objection can be taken as to the filing of applications by the assignees of a decree. It is equally settled that in a suit for partition, more final decrees than one can be passed if the situation warrants. 59. It has already been mentioned that the preliminary decree so far as it related to the land assessed to the Revenue Department was forwarded to the District Collector under Order 20 Rule 18(1) read with Section 54 C.P.C. in the given set of facts, that was only the course available to the Court. Though the order referring the matter to the Collector was not challenged much less set aside, the applications have been entertained and orders were passed as prayed for. Assuming that no illegality has crept into such a process, the petitioners are required to cross an important hurdle. 60. Though the order referring the matter to the Collector was not challenged much less set aside, the applications have been entertained and orders were passed as prayed for. Assuming that no illegality has crept into such a process, the petitioners are required to cross an important hurdle. 60. A final decree, if passed, would dispose of a suit for partition and such decree must be in respect of all the items covered by the preliminary decree. There may be cases where it is not possible to pass final decree in respect of all the items and unanimity exists among the parties as regards certain items. In such cases, final decree can be passed in respect of some of the items covered by the preliminary decree. However, such decree must be with the participation of all the parties and all of them are allotted their respective shares in the items concerned. Take for instance, the case of a suit for partition between two plaintiffs and four defendants, in which a preliminary decree is passed allotting one-sixth share to each of the parties in respect of three items of properties admeasuring Acs.30.00, Acs. 20.00 and Acs. 10.00 respectively. If the partition is affected in its entirely, each party would get Acs.10.00 each. If for any reason, unanimity did not exist among them for division of items 2 and 3, they can be allotted Acs.5.00 each in item No.1 comprising of Acs.30.00. It would be a totally untenable exercise, if two of them are allotted the entire Acs.20.00 in item No.2 or, one of them is allotted entire Acs. 10.00 in item No.3, without allotting anything to the other three on the ground that there did not exist unanimity. Even a partial final decree must accommodate the shares of all, how-so-ever small the extent may be. Further, none of the parties to a partition suit or their assignees can claim a definite extent exclusively for themselves. 61. A Commissioner is required to divide available items of property and allot the part to all the parties, according to their respective shares. It is a different matter that some of them may agree to take a common lot together representing their shares. Invariably, a final decree, even in respect of some of the items of the suit schedule property must accommodate the interests of all. It is a different matter that some of them may agree to take a common lot together representing their shares. Invariably, a final decree, even in respect of some of the items of the suit schedule property must accommodate the interests of all. Unfortunately, no such exercise has undertaken so far in this case and each applicant submitted application claiming a definite extent of the property for himself. Therefore, the application submitted by the petitioners for passing a final decree in respect of Acs. 165.00 in their favour without indicating the corresponding shares of others, is not maintainable. 62. The third question, in a way has bearing upon the second one. Time and again, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had explained the purport of a preliminary decree and final decree. A preliminary decree would decide the shares of the parties and would identify the properties that are available for partition. In the final decree proceedings, the property is divided into parts and the parties are allotted their respective shares in it. In a suit filed in respect of immovable properties, the plaintiff is required to furnish the exact extent and other particulars of the property. However, in a suit for partition, there is bound to be some fluidity in this regard. 63. It is not uncommon that items of property get added or deleted not only at the stage of preliminary decree, but also in the course of final decree proceedings. However, by the time a final decree is passed, the parties as well as the Court must be sure as to the exact extent of the property that is available for partition. In the instant case, till today, neither the original parties nor their assignees have disclosed to this Court the exact extent of land that is liable to be partitioned. Ever before any final decree is passed, the parties went on assigning substantial extents of land in favour of others, as though they have fallen to their share. Even where an undivided share is allotted, it should be only with reference to the exact fraction or percentage of the share and it cannot be with reference to any particular item in its entirely. Even where an undivided share is allotted, it should be only with reference to the exact fraction or percentage of the share and it cannot be with reference to any particular item in its entirely. Therefore, even if the preliminary decree is otherwise valid, and the application filed for final decree is perfect, a serious handicap exists, namely absence of the particulars of the total properties available for partition, thereby disabling the Court from passing a final decree. 64. Therefore, the application is dismissed, holding that the preliminary decree, dated 28-6-1963, in so far as it related to the properties in Item Nos.37 to 40 of Schedule IV and item Nos.1 to 14 of Schedule IV-A, is unenforceable being contrary to the A.P. (Telangana Area) Abolition of Jagirs Regulation and the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sarwarlal’s case (6 supra). It is however, directed that in case the parties to the suit have derived any rights vis-a-vis the said properties independent of the preliminary decree, it shall be open to them to enforce and exercise the same. It is further held that a partial final decree cannot be passed in respect of some of the parties or their assignees in respect of a definite extent of land, unless an exercise to divide the same in accordance with the shares of all the parties is undertaken and that an application of this nature cannot be entertained in the absence of correct information as to the exact extent of the land that is available for partition. 65. The Registry is directed not to entertain any applications in this suit, for final decree in respect of the properties in the items referred to above. 66. There shall be no order as to costs. 67. This Court places on record, its appreciation, for the effective and dispassionate assistance rendered by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, learned Amicus Curie, learned Government Pleader for Revenue and the learned Counsel, who represented the other parties.