ORDER S.K. Gangele, J. 1. Shri K.N. Gupta, Sr. Advocate, with Shri Anmol Khedkar, Advocate, for applicants. Shri U.K. Jain, Advocate, for Respondents No. 1 & 3. Shri D.P. Singh, Advocate, for Respondent No. 2. Heard. Applicants have filed this application under Order 39, Rule 2-A, Code of Civil Procedure for awarding a proper punishment against Respondents on account of disobedience of the order dated 18-5-2006 passed by this Court in First Appeal No. 270/2003. 2. Applicants filed a suit in the Court of First Additional District Judge, Vidisha for declaration and permanent injunction in regard to an agricultural land. The Plaintiffs - applicants claimed that they have 1/4th share in the suit land. The trial Court decreed the suit vide judgment and decree dated 18-8-2003. Against the aforesaid judgment and decree Sanman Singh, Respondent No. 1 filed an appeal before this Court, which was registered as First Appeal No. 270/2003. 3. The first appeal came up for hearing before this Court on 18-5-2006 and learned Single Judge of this Court passed the following order under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 Code of Civil Procedure: 18-5-2006 Shri U.K. Jain, learned Counsel for the Petitioner Shri Praveen Newaskar, learned Counsel for the Respondents No. 1 and 2. Shri D.D. Bansal, learned Counsel for Respondents No. 4 and 5. Shri Bhagwan Pandey, learned Counsel for Respondent No. 7. Heard on I.A. No. 8276/06 which is an application for vacating the stay order and I. A. No. 8277/06 which is an application under Order XXXIX, Rule 1 and 2 Code of Civil Procedure. Wherein prayer is made that Appellant and Respondents No. 3, 4, 5, 7 to 12 be restrained from alienating the suit property and also not to raise any construction over the suit property. Counsel for Appellant prays for time to file reply of the application. Reply be filed within four weeks. Till then Appellant and Respondents No. 3 to 5 and 7 to 12 are restrained from selling any specific part of the property. C.c. as per rules. 4. Subsequently, the case was listed on 14-8-2006 before the Court. On the aforesaid date the learned Single judge ordered that the order dated 18-5-2006 shall remain in operation till final disposal of this appeal. C.c. as per rules. 4. Subsequently, the case was listed on 14-8-2006 before the Court. On the aforesaid date the learned Single judge ordered that the order dated 18-5-2006 shall remain in operation till final disposal of this appeal. After the order of this Court, the Respondent No. 1 by a registered sale-deed dated 30-3-2007 sold a part of the property of Survey No. 291/5 to Respondent No. 2. Another sale-deed was also executed on 5-6-2006 and a sale-deed dated 12-5-2000 was executed by Respondent No. 1 in favour of Dhanwantibai and another sale-deed 1-4-2004 in favour of Kishorilal Jatav. As per the applicants the Respondent No. 1 has sold the suit property in disobedience of the order passed by this Court on 18-5-2006. 5. Respondent No. 1 in his reply has admitted the fact that he has sold the property after passing the order of this Court. The relevant averments raised by Respondent No. 1 to this effect is as under: 4. That, the answering non-applicant is a patient of Harniya and remains ill and is a retired government servant who is retired in the year 1993, and generally remains ill and twice operated for Harniya and Gallbladder. Due to medical treatment and meet the family expenses of non-applicant No. 1 he has to sale part of the land which is much less to his share. The area of the total land was 2.497 Hectare which is approximately 13 Bighas and the share of answering non-applicant was 1/4 which comes to 3.5 Bighas of the land, while the total land sold by answering non-applicant was less than 1 Bigha and no specific share was sold by him. Hence, the answering non-applicant has not committed breach of injunction. The land sold to Narayan Singh was 20' x 10' on 1-4-2000, Kishori Lal area 20' x 10' on 1-5-2000, Dhanwanti 25' x 25' on 12-5-2000, Geeta Bai 15' x 16' on 17-5-2005, Sushila Bai area 235 sq. ft. on 15-6-2006 and Narayan Singh 261/2434 = 0.206 Hectare of 30-3-2007. These all lands are liable to be adjusted in the share on non applicant No. 2, which is even more left after adjusting the total area sold by non applicant No. 1. ft. on 15-6-2006 and Narayan Singh 261/2434 = 0.206 Hectare of 30-3-2007. These all lands are liable to be adjusted in the share on non applicant No. 2, which is even more left after adjusting the total area sold by non applicant No. 1. The filing of the application by the applicant and passing on the order on 18-5-2006 was not within the knowledge of the non applicant No. 1 on that day, but it came to his notice when it was intimated by his counsel and filed the reply of the application for vacating stay in June, 2006. The date of sale-deed in favour of Dhanvanti Bai is mentioned wrong, it is 1-4-2000. It is also denied that Respondent No. 3 has purchased the property of having knowledge of the order dated 18-5-2006 and 14-8-2006. 6. From the aforesaid fact, it is clear that the Respondent No. 1 sold some of the portion of land on 30-3-2007. Another sale-deed was executed on 5-6-2006, however, this Court passed the order on 18-5-2006. It is clear from the order passed by this Court on 18-5-2006 that Respondent No. 1 was restrained from selling any specific part of the property. From the aforesaid act of Respondent No. 1, it is clear that Respondent No. 1 has wilfully disobeyed the order of this Court and made out a charge for breach of injunction. 7. Respondents No. 2 and 3 could not be held liable for breach of injunction because they are purchasers and as per their pleadings they had no knowledge about the order passed by this Court. 8. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Patel Rajnikant Dhulabhai and Ors. v. Patel Chandrakant Dhulabhai and Ors. reported in AIR 2008 SC 3016 has held as under in regard to proper punishment in the event of breach of the order of the Court: 59. From the above decisions, it is clear that punishing a person for Contempt of Court is indeed a drastic step and normally such action should not be taken. At the same time, however; it is not only the power but the duty of the Court to uphold and maintain the dignity of Courts and majesty of law which may call for such extreme step. At the same time, however; it is not only the power but the duty of the Court to uphold and maintain the dignity of Courts and majesty of law which may call for such extreme step. If for proper administration of justice and to ensure due compliance with the orders passed by a Court, it is required to take strict view under the Act, it should not hesitate in wielding the potent weapon of contempt. 60. Now, in the instant case, both the orders passed by this Court on April 26, 2004 and January 10, 2005, were explicitly clear. The first order totally prohibited/restrained the Respondents/contemners from creating any interest whatsoever in the suit property. As held by us, in spite of the said order, interest had been created by the contemners in the suit property. But even otherwise there is intentional disobedience and wilful breach of the subsequent order dated January 10, 2005 inasmuch as transactions had been entered into without issuing notice to the Petitioners. We have already held that they could not have been entered into by the Respondents before issuance of notice to the Petitioners. The Respondents were clearly aware of the order. In fact, the action was sought, to be defended and justified on the ground that the Court had not directed 'prior' notice, and as such, non-issuance of notice before entering into sale transactions would not amount to disobedience of the order of the Court. We are unable to uphold the contention. In the circumstances it must be held that the disobedience of the order by the contemners was wilful, intentional and deliberate. 61. The question then is whether the case calls for imposition of punishment on the contemners. The learned Counsel for the contemners submitted that in the affidavit-in-reply, the Respondents have stated that if this Court comes to the conclusion that they had committed contempt of Court, the Court may accept unconditional and unqualified apology and may discharge notice. The counsel submitted that the statutory provision itself enacts that no apology shall be rejected merely on the ground that it is qualified or conditional [Explanation to Section 12(1)]. 62. We must frankly admit our inability to agree with the learned Counsel. In the light of what is stated above, we are convinced that the contemners have intentionally and deliberately violated the orders of the Court. 62. We must frankly admit our inability to agree with the learned Counsel. In the light of what is stated above, we are convinced that the contemners have intentionally and deliberately violated the orders of the Court. We are also convinced that the orders were clear, unambiguous and unequivocal having one and only one meaning. Wilful and deliberate disobedience of the orders passed by the Apex Court of the country can never be said to be bona fide, honest or in good faith. If it is so, the action calls for serious view to ensure, proper administration of justice. 63. In Hiren Bose, Re, AIR 1969 Cal 1 : 72 Cal WN 82, the High Court of Calcutta stated: It is also not a matter of course that a Judge can be expected to accept any apology. Apology cannot be a weapon, of defence forged always to purge the guilty. It is intended to be evidence of real contrition, the manly consciousness of a wrong done, of an injury inflicted and the earnest desire to make such reparation as lies in the wrongdoer's power. Only then is it of any avail in a Court of justice. But before it can have that effect, it should be tendered at the earliest possible stage, not the latest. Even if wisdom dawns only at a later stage, the apology should be tendered unreservedly and unconditionally, before the judge has indicated the trend of his mind. Unless that is done, not only is the tendered apology robbed of all grace but it ceases to be an apology. It ceases to be the full, frank and manly confession of a wrong done, which it is intended to be. 64. It is well-settled that an apology is neither a weapon of defence to purge the guilty of their offence; nor is it intended to operate as a universal panacea, it is intended to be evidence of real contriteness [Vide M.Y. Shareaf v. Hon'ble Judges of the High Court of Nagpur (1955) 1 SCR 757 ; M.B. Sanghi v. High Court of Punjab and Haryana (1991) 3 SCR 312 : AIR 1955 SC 19 : AIR 1991 SCW 2011 . 65. In T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad through the Amicus Curiae v. Ashok Khot and Anr. 65. In T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad through the Amicus Curiae v. Ashok Khot and Anr. 2006 (5) SCC 1 , a three-judge Bench of this Court had an occasion to consider the question in the light of an 'apology' as a weapon defence by the contemner with a prayer to drop the proceedings. The Court took note of the following observations of this Court in L.D. Jaikwal v. State of U. P. (1984) 3 SCC 405 : AIR 2006 SCW 2475 : AIR 1984 SC 1374 . We are sorry to say we cannot subscribe to the 'slap - say sorry -and forget' school of thought in administration of contempt jurisprudence. Saying 'sorry' does not make the slipper taken the slap smart less upon the said hypocritical word being uttered. Apology shall not be paper apology and expression of sorrow should come from the heart and not from the pen. For it is one thing to 'say' sorry - it is another to 'feel' sorry." Para 32 of AIR SCW 66. The Court, therefore, rejected the prayer and stated: Apology is an act of contrition. Unless apology is offered at the earliest opportunity and in good grace, the apology is shorn of penitence and hence it is liable to be rejected. If the apology is offered at the time when the contemer finds that the Court is going to impose punishment it ceases to be an apology and becomes an act of a cringing coward." Para 31 of AIR SCW 67. Similar view was taken in other cases also by this Court 68. We are also satisfied that the so-called apology is not an act of penitence, contrition or regret. It has been tendered as a 'tactful move' when the contemners are in the tight corner and with a view to ward off the Court. Acceptance of such apology in the case on hand would be allowing the contemners to go away with impunity after committing gross contempt of Court. In our considered opinion, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, imposition of fine in lieu of imprisonment will not meet the ends of justice. 69. Acceptance of such apology in the case on hand would be allowing the contemners to go away with impunity after committing gross contempt of Court. In our considered opinion, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, imposition of fine in lieu of imprisonment will not meet the ends of justice. 69. Considering the facts and circumstances in their entirety, in our opinion, ends of justice would be served if we hold the Respondents/contemners guilty under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, read with Section 94(c) and Rule 2-A of Order XXXIX of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 as amended by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 and Article 129 of the Constitution and order the Respondents-contemners to undergo simple imprisonment for a term of two weeks i.e. fourteen days. 9. The Respondent No. 1 submitted an unconditional apology, however, looking to the act of Respondent No. 1, in my opinion, the unconditional apology submitted by Respondent No. 1 could not be accepted. Hence, in my opinion, ends of justice would be satisfied if the Respondent No. 1 be awarded a proper punishment. 10. Consequently, I hold the Respondent No. 1, Sanman Singh s/o Shri Khushilal, guilty under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act read with Section 94(c) and Order 39, Rule 2-A, Code of Civil Procedure and I order that Respondent No. 1 shall pay a fine of Rs. 25,000/- (Rupees Twenty Five Thousand only) and in the event if Respondent No. 1 fails to pay the fine to the applicants, he shall undergo simple imprisonment for a term of two weeks i.e. 14 days. Respondents No. 2 and 3 are discharged.