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2010 DIGILAW 895 (GAU)

Dewin Gabil Momin v. Gonoth Manda Sangma

2010-11-29

BIPLAB KUMAR SHARMA

body2010
JUDGMENT B.K. Sharma, J. 1. The challenge made in this writ petition are the Annexures- F, G and H orders dated 18.02.85, 09.02.99 and 30.08.04 respectively passed by the Executive Member, In-charge Revenue, Garo Hills District Council and the Chief Executive Member, Garo Hills Autonomous Council, Tura respectively determining the Nokmaship of the particular clan, namely Sasatgiri Akhing. While by the first impugned order dated 18.02.85, it has been held the respondent No. 1 and 2 are entitled to get appointment as Nokma of Sasatgiri Akhing and the appointment as such of the petitioner is liable to be cancelled on the purported forfeiture of her right to continue as such, by the second order dated 09.02.99 affirmed on review by order dated 30.08.04, it has been held that the petitioner is entitled to continue as Nokma of the Akhing during her life time only. It has also been held and ordered that the respondent No. 1 be appointed as Nokma of the Akhing to the exclusion of the respondent No. 2. whose name shall be recorded only after the death of the petitioner subject to the condition indicated in the order. 2. Sasatgiri Akhing, according to the petitioner belongs to Momin clan. As per Annexure-A Genealogical chart (certified one), Khilpang Sangma was the first registered Nokma of the Akhing. In the said certified copy the names of the other Nokmas stand recorded in the ascending order, the last one being that of Dewin Gabil Momin, i.e. the petitioner. For a ready reference, the said chart is reproduced below: Khilpang Sangma (Thegite) Dangje Momin Mechik (Gabil) Watre Momin Mechik Thoram Sangma Rengje Momin Mechik Ramdon Sangma Daje Momin Mechik Baron Sangma Mechali Momin Mechik Chengkae Sangma Janna Momin Mechik Sanon Sangma Nadik Momin Mechik Jaram Sangma (Mankhin) Thache Momin Mechik Khimrang Sangma (Manda) Dewin Momin Khijing Sangma (Manda) 3. The working of the Akhing and running of its affairs including the appointment of Nokma is governed by Garo Customary Law. There is no dispute that the petitioner became the Nokma of the Akhing and to that effect an order was passed by the Deputy Commissioner on 04.08.47. The order so passed was upon hearing the parties including the respondents or their predecessors. For a ready reference the order dated 04.08.47 alongwith with order dated 19.07.47 are reproduced below: 19.07.47: Read and considered the Mauzadar's report. Heard the parties as well. The order so passed was upon hearing the parties including the respondents or their predecessors. For a ready reference the order dated 04.08.47 alongwith with order dated 19.07.47 are reproduced below: 19.07.47: Read and considered the Mauzadar's report. Heard the parties as well. There is a tug of war between the connection of the deceased Nokma. Dewin's party has attained where Jeng's party has not. Ask the Midar to appear with all adult Maharis of the parties on 04.08.47. Sd/- A. Ahuned. 04.08.47: The Mauzadar Laskar and parties have appeared. I have heard their views. In view of the circumstances Dewin Momin Mechik is appointed a Nokma in place of Tnasi Mechik. Should Dewin deserts from the Household or has no female issue Jeng Momin will succeed her. Sd/- A. Ahuned. 04.08.47 4. The aforesaid order has attained its finality there being no challenge to the same either from the respondents or from any other party who could claim to be interested in the matter. 5. As could be noticed from the above quoted chart, Tache Momin was the Nokma of the clan before appointment of the petitioner as such. Her husband was Khimrang Sangma. After his death the petitioner accepted Khijing Sangma as her substituted husband as per Garo customary law. Be it stated here that the earlier wife of Khijing, namely Smt. Jeng was alive at that point of time. Accordingly as per the customary law, the petitioner became the Nokma of the clan alongwith her said substituted husband. Be it stated here that Jeng Momin is the mother-in-law of the respondent No. 1. 6. The case of the petitioner can be projected by the following diagram. 7. According to the petitioner, said Smt. Jeng, mother-in-law of the respondent No. 1, time and again tried to dislodge the petitioner from her Nokmaship and made all out efforts to incorporate her name as Nokma. Such an effort was made even in 1947 when said Smt. Jeng objected to the appointment of the petitioner as Nokma. It appears that there was further claim on her part for being appointed as Nokma and the same was negatived by the competent authority by its order dated 20.10.52. The order is reproduced below: ORDER SHEET REV. case No. 13 A.C. of 1952-53 Appointment of Nokam of Sasatgiri -III 32(13) 20/10/52:- Seen Mauzadar's report. It appears that there was further claim on her part for being appointed as Nokma and the same was negatived by the competent authority by its order dated 20.10.52. The order is reproduced below: ORDER SHEET REV. case No. 13 A.C. of 1952-53 Appointment of Nokam of Sasatgiri -III 32(13) 20/10/52:- Seen Mauzadar's report. Phanna Marak, Laskar present with 20 Maharis all of whom agree that in place of Khimrang Nokma deceased his Nokkrom Khijing should be appointed as Nokma Exter his name in the G.T. accordingly (with Dewin Momin) Khijing's wife Jeng Momin cannot be appointed Nokma as long as Dewin Momin is alive. 8. The aforesaid order dated 20.10.52 has also attained its finality there being no challenge to the same either by Smt. Jeng Momin or by any one who could be said to be aggrieved by the said order which includes the respondent Nos. 1 and 2. 9. According to the petitioner, she was all along discharging her duties and functions as Nokma of the Akhing as the wife of Khijing. In due course the respondent No. 1 got married to Jeng Momin's daughter, i.e. the respondent No. 2 and he joined the clan as the son-in-law. Khijing Sangma died in 1984, consequently it was incumbent on the part of the respondent No. 1 to take the petitioner as the wife under Garo customary practice, but instead, he started meddling with the affairs of the Akhing. It is the categorical stand of the petitioner that the conduct of the respondent No. 1 was doubtful and depicted lack of integrity. The Chras and Chachis did not arrange for the respondent No. 1 and the petitioner to live as husband and wife. Further plea of the petitioner is that the respondent No. 1 used to stay separately alongwith the respondent No. 2 and his mother-in-law, Smt. Jeng Momin leading a separate establishment. 10. As noted above, it is the stand of the petitioner that on the death of the Khijing Sangma in year 1984, the respondent No. 1 and 2 alongwith Jeng Momin started harassing the petitioner in discharging her duties as Nokma. According to her, the respondent No. 1 even started using physical assault on her and at times even criminally intimidated her with gun etc. According to her, the respondent No. 1 even started using physical assault on her and at times even criminally intimidated her with gun etc. According to the petitioner, such conduct on the part of the respondent No. 1 was with a view to oust the petitioner as Nokma of the Akhing so that he alongwith his wife, i.e. the respondent No. 2 could become the Nokma of the Akhing. 11. The petitioner has referred to the judgment and order dated 21.12.91 (Annexure-D) passed by the Judicial Officer and Magistrate, 1st Class, Garo Hills District Council, Tura in Misc. Case No. 1/84 by which it has been held that the respondent No. 1 was guilty of ill treatment and assault on the petitioner. By the said order a fine of Rs.500/- was imposed with further direction to the respondent No. 1 to vacate the premises which he forcibly occupied and took possession from the petitioner. For a ready reference, the operative part of the order dated 21.12.91 is quoted below: On perusal of the entire case record including the depositions given by the parties examined and the submissions of the learned Counsels for the parties, I am satisfied that the complaint made by Dewin Momin Mechik against the accd. Gonoth Sangma are all true. It has also appeared to me that the complainant Dewin Momin Mochik is the Nokma of Sasatgiri Village but has been disowned by the illtreatment given by the accd. Gonoth Sangma. In the premises I hold that Shri Gonoth Sangma guilty of illtreatment and assault to the complainant Smti Dewin Momin and make the accd. Gonoth Sangma liable to pay a fine of Rs.500/- to the complainant for the illtreatment and simple injuries caused to the person of the complainant. The accd. Gonoth Sangma is also directed to vacate the homestead land of the complainant at the village Sasatgiri to enable her to set up dwelling house at the village. 12. When the matter rested thus, a petition was moved before the Executive Member, In-charge, Revenue, Garo Hills District Council, Tura seeking appointment of the Nokma of the Akhing. Although the application was filed by one Shri Biden G. Momin seeking appointment of suitable person as Nokma for the Akhing, but he did not name any person. However, the respondent Nos. When the matter rested thus, a petition was moved before the Executive Member, In-charge, Revenue, Garo Hills District Council, Tura seeking appointment of the Nokma of the Akhing. Although the application was filed by one Shri Biden G. Momin seeking appointment of suitable person as Nokma for the Akhing, but he did not name any person. However, the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 by their application dated 06.11.84 submitted to the said authority prayed for appointment of the respondent No. 2 as the Nokma alongwith her husband, i.e. the respondent No. 1. It appears that the proceeding before the Executive Member, In-charge Revenue, Garo Hills District Council, Tura was registered and numbered as GDCREV. No. 88/1984-85. 13. Responding to the aforesaid proceeding and the claim of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2, the petitioner submitted her written objection reiterating her stand as narrated above and prayed for dismissal of the petition and to allow her to continue as the Nokma with the right of appointing her younger daughter Nongjak Momin as Nokma in due course. The aforesaid proceeding was decided by the impugned Annexure-F judgment and order dated 18.02.85 in favour of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2. Being aggrieved, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Chief Executive Member, GHDC and the same was registered and numbered as GDC-REV/Appl. No. 2 (MS)/1985. The appeal was disposed of by the impugned order dated 09.02.99 (Annexure-G) inter alia holding that the petitioner would continue as Mechik Nokma of the Akhing during her life time and after her death the respondent No. 2, i.e. the wife of the respondent No. 1 shall be recorded as Mechik Nokma. It has also been held that the name of the respondent No. 1 shall also be entered in the record as Nokma alongwith the petitioner. Being aggrieved by the limited Nokmaship to the petitioner by the said order, the petitioner preferred a review petition and the same having been dismissed by the impugned order dated 30.08.2004, she has invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court by filing the instant writ petition. 14. The respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have resisted the claim of the petitioner by filing their affidavit in opposition. They have justified the impugned orders. According to the respondents, the Gobil Ganjet is a sub-clan of Marak clan and the members of the Akhing belong to the said sub-clan. 14. The respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have resisted the claim of the petitioner by filing their affidavit in opposition. They have justified the impugned orders. According to the respondents, the Gobil Ganjet is a sub-clan of Marak clan and the members of the Akhing belong to the said sub-clan. According to the respondents, Smt. Jeng Marak is the daughter of Thache Momin and the respondent No. 2 is her daughter. It is the further stand of the respondents that by the aforesaid order dated 20.11.52, the petitioner was given the limited right during her life time and the entry of her name in the Genealogical chart is only for a life time interest. According to the said two respondents, after the death of Khijing in the year 1984, the writ petitioner deserted the house of Khimrang and Khijing and even left the Akhing land and started living in another village. The plea of torturing the petitioner has been denied. 15. As regards the aforesaid judgment dated 21.12.99 passed in Misc. Case No. 1/1984, it has been contended that an appeal was preferred before this Court and the same was allowed by setting aside the said judgment. Although in paragraph-15 of the counter affidavit such a plea has been taken with the leave of the Court to produce the copy of the said judgment on appeal, but during the course of hearing learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 and 2 on being asked, could not produce any copy of the said purported judgment on appeal. 16. It is the stand of the respondents that Jeng Marak being the daughter of Thache Momin and wife of Khimrang, she had a right to become Nokma of the Akhing and thereafter the Nokmaship is to pass on her daughter, i.e. the respondent No. 2, who in turn to run the Akhing alongwith her husband, i.e. the respondent No. 1. 17. In the affidavit in reply filed by the petitioner, the stand of the respondents in their counter affidavit has been denied. It has been denied that the petitioner deserted the Akhing and started living separately in another village. Her stand is that she was meted out with physical assault and torture by the respondent No. 1 making her life miserable. In the affidavit in reply filed by the petitioner, the stand of the respondents in their counter affidavit has been denied. It has been denied that the petitioner deserted the Akhing and started living separately in another village. Her stand is that she was meted out with physical assault and torture by the respondent No. 1 making her life miserable. It is her stand that although Smt. Jeng earlier failed in her design to grab Nokmaship, but kept on trying to dislodge the petitioner from Nokmaship and in the process also utilized the services of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2. As regards the plea of the respondents that her two daughters have married outside the clan, it has been stated that such stand of the respondents is not true and that she being the Nokma, her daughters are to inherit the Nokmaship as per the Garo custom. 18. I have heard Ms. A. Paul, learned Counsel for the petitioner as well as Mr. S. Dey, learned Standing counsel, Garo Hills Autonomous Council. I have also heard Mr. R. Kar, learned Counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 and 2. Learned Counsel for the parties have referred to the provisions of Garo customary laws as indicated in the Garo Hills Autonomous District (Social Customs and Usages) Validating Act, 1958. While Ms. A. Paul, learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the unreported Division Bench judgment dated 15.05.78 delivered in the writ petition being CR No. 282/77 (Gongsin Sangma and Anr. v. Chief Executive Member, Garo Hills District Council), Mr. Kar, learned Counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 and 2, has placed reliance on the judgment reported in (1988) 2 GLR 120 (Smt. Dore Sangma and Ors. v. Chief Executive Member, Garo Hills District Council) and AIR 1969 G&N 22 (Mt. Singma Sangma Mechik v. Mt. Khilji Sangma Mechik and Anr.) . I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties and the entire materials available on records. 19. It is the stand of the petitioner that her Nokmaship having attained its finality pursuant to the above quoted order dated 04.08.47 followed by order dated 20.10.52, same very issue could not have been reopened and that too, at the instance of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2. 19. It is the stand of the petitioner that her Nokmaship having attained its finality pursuant to the above quoted order dated 04.08.47 followed by order dated 20.10.52, same very issue could not have been reopened and that too, at the instance of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2. The order dated 04.08.47 was passed by the competent authority in the proceeding registered and numbered as REV. No. 48 A.C. 1946-47. The said proceeding was relating to Sasatgiri Akhing and on perusal of the orders passed therein what is seen is that all interested parties including the predecessor of the respondents had participated in the proceeding and it was on the basis of the Mauzadar's report etc., the petitioner was appointed as the Nokma in place of Thache Momin. However, a condition was imposed that if the petitioner deserts the household or has no female issue, Smt. Jeng Momin would succeed her. Admittedly, the petitioner has two daughters to inherit the Nokmaship. It is also an admitted position that the said order dated 04.08.47 has attained its finality there being no appeal or any other proceeding against the said order. 20. The aforesaid order was followed by order dated 20.10.52 in which the competent authority upon hearing all interested parties and on perusal of the Mauzadar's report appointed Khijing to whom the petitioner was the substituted wife as Nokma. It was once again held that Khijing's wife Smt. Jeng Momin was not to be appointed as Nokma as long as the petitioner was alive. It is this part of the order which the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have harped upon so as to claim that the Chief Executive Member has rightly passed the impugned orders proving Nokmaship to the petitioner only during her life time with no right of inheritance by her daughters. 21. The aforesaid order dated 20.10.52 will have to be read in the context in which the same was passed and as preceded by earlier order passed on 04.08.47. 21. The aforesaid order dated 20.10.52 will have to be read in the context in which the same was passed and as preceded by earlier order passed on 04.08.47. While in the first proceeding answered by order dated 04.08.47, it was held that the petitioner would be the Nokma of the Akhing, in the second order dated 20.10.52 when the question of appointing Nokma arose, it was ordered that Khijing should be appointed as Nokma alongwith the petitioner and that Smt. Jeng Momin was not to be appointed as such as long as the petitioner was alive. This part of the order cannot mean that the petitioner has only limited right of Nokmaship confining the same to her life time. There is no dispute that she has two daughters and it being matriarchal society and as per the Garo customary law, the daughters, more particularly the younger one, as claimed by the petitioner would inherit the Nokmaship. 22. It is in the above context, Ms. A. Paul, learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the unreported judgment in Gongsin Sangma (supra). In paragraph -7 of the said judgment, it has been observed thus: 7. The only other submission of learned Counsel that deserves our serious consideration is whether a nokma can be removed by the clans men under the Garo Customary law. The learned Executive Magistrate has held, and in our opinion correctly, that under the Garo customary law inheritance of the Akhing passes from daughter to daughter of the Nokma not only for a limited period but from generation to generation. In case no Nokma's daughter is available, it will pass to the nearest daughter of Nokma's family circle. "Nokmas family is just like a royal family and appointment of a Nokma is just like a coronation of a king. When a Nokma and her husband are once installed under the Garo Customary law they cannot be removed from that status. A woman can be appointed a Nokma without a husband if she is entitled to the Nokmaship, but a man without wife cannot b e appointed Nokma and it means that real owner of the Akhing and other properties is a woman. A woman can be appointed a Nokma without a husband if she is entitled to the Nokmaship, but a man without wife cannot b e appointed Nokma and it means that real owner of the Akhing and other properties is a woman. A man by virtue of his marriage with a woman Nokma can be a Nokma and so long he is a husband of a woman Nokma, he can be a head of the clan people or a custodian of the Akhing on behalf of his wife and Nokma's clan-people. (Emphasis supplied) 23. The proceeding in GDC/REF. 88/1984-85 was initiated on the basis of the petition filed by one Shri Biden G. Momin. In the said petition, the prayer made was for appointment of Nokma from amongst suitable persons belonging to Sasatgiri Akhing. In the petition no name for such appointment was indicated. However, the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 entered appearance in the said proceeding claiming Nokmaship to which the petitioner objected to narrating all the aforesaid facts. The Executive Member, G.D.C. by his order dated 18.02.85 appointed the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 as Nokma to the replacement of the petitioner brushing aside the objection raised by the petitioner that it was not the case of deserting the Akhing, but she was driven out by the said two respondents. In the process, the Executive Member also did not address himself to the aforesaid orders dated 04.08.47 and 20.10.52 which as noted above, have attained its finality. The Executive Member ought to have decided as to whether the matter could have been reopened on the basis of the said petition. By the said impugned order, the Executive Member while appointing the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 as Nokma of the Akhing has gone to the extent of saying that registration of the name of the petitioner was due to misconception of customs and that such registration was accidental. Thus, by recording such finding the Executive Member sat on appeal over the aforesaid two orders of 1947 and 1952. 24. Another finding recorded by the Executive Member is that the petitioner was a deserter and accordingly her name was required to be deleted so as to substitute with insertion of names of the respondent No. 1 and 2. Thus, by recording such finding the Executive Member sat on appeal over the aforesaid two orders of 1947 and 1952. 24. Another finding recorded by the Executive Member is that the petitioner was a deserter and accordingly her name was required to be deleted so as to substitute with insertion of names of the respondent No. 1 and 2. Branding of the petitioner as deserter was without dealing with the specific plea of the petitioner that she was mercilessly beaten up by the respondent No. 1. According to the Executive Member, such stand on the part of the petitioner is contradictory in view of her deposition that there was attempt to beat her. However, nothing has been discussed in detail more particularly in respect of the moot question as to why the petitioner would desert the Akhing so as to be followed by her claim for Nokmaship. 25. The perversity in the finding of the Executive Member can very well be seen in which the Executive Member even sat on appeal over the above quoted orders dated 1947 and 1952 without there being any challenge to the same. The following paragraphs in the impugned order passed by the Executive Member will depict the perversity: In custom in a very peculiar circumstances rarely the 2nd wife is appointed as Nokma while there is a daughter of the real nokma in case of minority of imbecility etc. If the 2nd wife is a substitute wife from the same line of 1st wife in absence of express condition by chras and close mahari people she cannot dispossess/disinherit the daughter of the 1st wife. The question does not arises at all if 2nd wife is not a substitute one nor she belongs to the same macheng or line whatever may be the circumstances in case 2nd wife is a registered nokma she got only a life estate. Again being married to real nephew of late Kejing sangma i.e. of Manda clan the line of real nokma (original) perpetuates without any stigma of custom. Now claim of Smti Dewin to allow her to bring nokram for her daughter Nongjak as nokma does not arise because in custom these cannot be two nokma in the same house. Further, court cannot select anybody to become nokma or nokrom it is the act of the party only nor court can direct anybody to marry some particulars body. Now claim of Smti Dewin to allow her to bring nokram for her daughter Nongjak as nokma does not arise because in custom these cannot be two nokma in the same house. Further, court cannot select anybody to become nokma or nokrom it is the act of the party only nor court can direct anybody to marry some particulars body. In custom, law, equity and justice I feel the birth right of Smti. Jeng Marak and thereafter her daughter Smti Ganjek Marak cannot evaporate because of accidental retistration of Smti Dewin Momin name as nokma and it must be admitted that registration of Smti Dewin's name was due to misconception of custom and it was wrong registration and it should not be allowed to stand. (Emphasis supplied) 26. The aforesaid order was followed by the impugned order on appeal dated 09.02.99 and the review order dated 30.08.04. In view of the fact that the appellate authority has allowed the petitioner to continue as Nokma of the Akhing will go to show that the plea of her being a deserter and thereby loosing her right to remain as Nokma stood rejected. However, the appellate authority has held that the petitioner would remain as Nokma of the Akhing only during her life time alongwith the respondent No. 1. After her death and subject to the condition imposed in the appellate order, it is the respondent No. 2 who will substitute her and thus, the appellate authority has recognized only a limited estate and/or right to the petitioner which she can enjoy during her life time only. The question arises is, as to whether such finding recorded by the appellate authority is perverse and opposed to the aforesaid orders passed in 1947 and 1952. In the impugned review order dated 30.08.04, the appellate authority has affirmed the appellate order. 27. In the aforementioned judgment and order dated 15.05.78 passed in the case of Gongsin Sangma, the Division Bench of this Court held in categorical terms in reference to Garo customary law that inheritance of the Akhing passes from daughter to daughter of the Nokma not only for a limited period, but from generation to generation. An woman can be appointed as Nokma without her husband, but a man without a wife cannot be appointed a Nokma, meaning thereby that the real owner of the Akhing and other properties is the woman. An woman can be appointed as Nokma without her husband, but a man without a wife cannot be appointed a Nokma, meaning thereby that the real owner of the Akhing and other properties is the woman. It has been held in the said judgment that a man by virtue by his marriage with a woman Nokma can be a Nokma and so long as he is a husband of a woman Nokma, he can be a head of the clan people or a custodian of the Akhing on behalf of his wife and Nokma's clan-people. 28. In order to give legal force to the various social customs and usages which are not derogatory to morality and public policy THE GARO HILLS AUTONOMOUS DISTRICT (SOCIAL CUSTOMS & USAGES) ACT, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1958) was enacted. Under Section 4(8) of the Act, "Nokma" means the head of a clan or machong who holds any land as a custodian on behalf of a clan or a machong. Section 6 provides that all acts done before the commencement of this Act shall be deemed to be valid if such act is consistent with the provisions of the Act and for that purpose, the Act shall be deemed to have been in force since the commencement of the Constitution. 29. Section 7 of the Act provides that the succession of Nokmaship to any Akhing shall be recognized in accordance with such social custom or customary practice as was followed/prevalent in that behalf before the commencement of the Constitution, except that the powers which were exercised by the Deputy Commissioner before the commencement of the Constitution shall be exercised by the Revenue member of the District Council. According to Section 8 (1) Whenever a vacancy occurs in the office of a Nokma of any AKhing or there arises any dispute in the matter of succession to Nokmaship of any Akhing or any dispute with regard to any other matter relating to or connected with, any Akhing and the boundaries thereof, the matter shall be referred to, in the first instance, to the Revenue member for disposal in accordance with the customary practice and the usages of the Garos. Any persons aggrieved at the order of the Revenue Member under sub-section (1) above may prefer an appeal to the Chief Executive Member within 60 days from the date of the order. 30. Any persons aggrieved at the order of the Revenue Member under sub-section (1) above may prefer an appeal to the Chief Executive Member within 60 days from the date of the order. 30. The Garos are one of the matrilineal tribes of the North Eastern Region inhaviting in the state of Meghalaya. The Society consist of certain clans known as the "Chatchis" which are again sub-divided into sub-clans known as "Machongs". As per prevailing custom the right of inheritance passes from the mother to the youngest daughter known as the "Nokna" and her husband as "Nokrom". The inhabited area under a particular machongs as its ownership is known as the "Akhing'. The husband of the inherited daughter who act as the custodian or supervisor is known as the "Nokma". The machjong on the wife linage provides the inheritance line whereas the husband is to provide custodial management of the properties. 31. The Garos being a matrilineal society, the decent is traced through the mother only. All property is held by the woman and is passes from the mother to the daughter. Under the Garo customary practices, no man can directly possess property. No man can inherit property and in any case any property comes to him through gift etc. he must immediately pass the same to the female. A Garo man cannot make will or bequeath property to any one. 32. In view of the above position under Garo customs, a man cannot inherit property. The courts below could not have placed reliance on the power of attorney allegedly executed in favour of the respondent No. 1 by Khijing. Even if any such power of attorney was executed, same is nonest in the eye of law. 33. The petitioner was brought as substituted wife of Khimrang on the death of Thache Momin as she was the grand daughter of Thache. She was accepted as Nokma and she was registered as such by the aforesaid orders passed in 1947 and 1952. The petitioner has categorically denied that Smt. Jeng Momin was daughter of Thache. After the death of Khimrang who had became the husband of the petitioner after death of Thache, the petitioner married Khijing who was the nephew of Khimrang. Out of such wedlock, the petitioner has two daughters and two sons. The petitioner has categorically denied that Smt. Jeng Momin was daughter of Thache. After the death of Khimrang who had became the husband of the petitioner after death of Thache, the petitioner married Khijing who was the nephew of Khimrang. Out of such wedlock, the petitioner has two daughters and two sons. The petitioner in her objection filed in the proceeding before the Executive Member claimed appointment of her younger daughter after her. The fact that the petitioner has two daughters through Khijing has been admitted by the respondents in their counter affidavit (refer paragraph 22). In the same very paragraph while stating that the petitioner after death of Khijing had deserted the Akhing, it has been stated that there was no question of the respondent No. 1 marrying the writ petitioner. For a ready reference the said paragraph is quoted below: 21. That in response to the statement made in para-22 of the petition, I beg to say that admittedly the petitioner has two daughters from Khijing, but none of them is married to any of the nephews of Khijing. Both the daughters of the writ petitioner married outside the Sangma clan and as such they are not entitled to be the Nokma and inherit the Akhing land. After the death of Khijing, the writ petitioner deserted the Akhing land and thus there was no question of respondent No. 1 marrying the writ petitioner. 34. Although Mr. Kar, learned Counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 upon reference to the paragraph-13 of the same affidavit, submits that after death of Khijing, the respondent No. 1 was taken as substituted husband of the writ petitioner on 12.01.83 according to Garo customs but the writ petitioner did not like to stay with him and that she deserted the family and the Akhing land, but in the same paragraph it has been admitted that Khijing Sangma died in 1984. If that be so, there is no question of taking the respondent No. 1 as the substituted husband of the writ petitioner on 12.01.83 and consequently the respondent No. 1 cannot be named as Nokma alongwith the petitioner. 35. The aforesaid stand in paragraph-13 of the counter affidavit with inherent contradiction will have to be understood in the context of the categorical stand of the same very respondents in paragraph- 21 referred to above. 35. The aforesaid stand in paragraph-13 of the counter affidavit with inherent contradiction will have to be understood in the context of the categorical stand of the same very respondents in paragraph- 21 referred to above. That being the position, it cannot be said that the petitioner had taken the respondent No. 1 as the substituted husband entitling him to act as Nokma alongwith the petitioner. 36. In the appellate order dated 09.02.99, the Chief Executive Member has recorded the finding that recording the petitioner's name as Nokma was with certain conditions vide orders dated 04.08.47 and 20.10.52 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Garo Hills. On a plain reading of the said two orders will make the position clear about which discussions have been made above. The order dated 04.08.47 was passed in a proceeding in which Smt. Jeng Momin through whom the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have stacked claim, was very much party. Only condition imposed towards debarment of the petitioner from continuation as Nokma was her desertion from the household. After the appellate order dated 09.08.99, the said plea of desertion as has been raised by the respondent Nos. 1 and 2, is not at all sustainable. The plea of desertion did not appeal to the appellate authority and accordingly, the appellate order has been passed holding that the petitioner would be entitled to continue as Nokma of the Akhing during her life time. 37. Significantly, the Deputy Commissioner in his order dated 04.08.47 categorically held that the Nokmaship would pass on to Jeng Momin only if there was no female issue to the petitioner. Thus there being female issue to her and having regard to the aforesaid finding recorded in the Division Bench unreported judgment, it is the petitioner's two daughters, may be the younger one who would inherit the Nokmaship from the petitioner. 38. Coming to the second order of 1950 in which the appellate authority has placed reliance, suffice it to say that the said order will have to be read in the context of the first order passed on 04.08.47. By the said order while ordering for entering the name of Khijing as Nokma, it was also observed that Khijing's wife, namely Jeng Momin cannot be appointed as Nokma as long as the petitioner was alive. By the said order while ordering for entering the name of Khijing as Nokma, it was also observed that Khijing's wife, namely Jeng Momin cannot be appointed as Nokma as long as the petitioner was alive. Such observation, in my considered opinion, cannot mean the limited right of the petitioner to remain Nokma of the Akhing during her life time only. The observation was made dealing with the claim of Jeng Momin that she was entitled to get Nokmaship. It was held that so long as the petitioner was there, there is no question of conferring Nokmaship to her. This aspect of the matter will be further governed by the fact that the petitioner has two daughters through Khijing. It being the matriarchal society and inheritance being through the daughters, Nokmaship of the Sasatgiri Akhing will devolve upon the daughters of the petitioner. 39. Jeng Momin's claim for Nokmaship having being rejected way back in 1947 and 1952, the finality attained in the matter could not have been reopened by the Executive Member by his impugned order. Likewise, the appellate authority also could not have held that the petitioner has only limited right of Nokmaship confining the same to her life time. On the face of it, such finding recorded by both the authorities are perverse and based on no materials. Both the authorities miserably failed to take note of the purport and meaning of the aforesaid two orders passed in 1947 and 1952. 40. The fact of the matter is that the petitioner was recognized and appointed Nokma of Sasatgiri Akhing. After the death of Khijing, she was not married to the respondent No. 1, a fact which has emerged from the own stand of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 in their counter affidavit, If that be so, coupled with the facts narrated above, it is the petitioner who will continue to remain as Nokma of the Sasatgiri Ahking and her such right is not limited right during her life time alone, but will devolve upon her daughters as per the Garo customary law. 41. The two decisions on which Mr. Kar, the learned Counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 has placed reliance are of no help to their case. In Mt. 41. The two decisions on which Mr. Kar, the learned Counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 has placed reliance are of no help to their case. In Mt. Singma Sanma (supra), it was held that the Limitation Act does not apply to disputes between members of Garo tribe who are included amongst Scheduled Tribe and thus adverse possession can not be applied. Possibly this case has been pressed into service to say that the claim made in 1984 for Nokmaship was not barred by limitation, unmindful of the fact that the issue was already settled way back in 1947 and 1950 and moreover there being no challenge to the same, the said two orders had attained finality which could not have been reopened with the kind of proceedings in question. 42. In the said judgment, it has been held as follows: Under the Garo Law, the Akhing land belongs to the mother of the house and her Nokma and not to the father of the house and the Garo-husband is only a guardian and manager of his wife's properties and as such he cannot dispose of them, nor can he make the property liable for any debt incurred by the father of the house without an explicit assent of the mother of the house and other female members of the family and some other important members of the family group. No Akhing land can be disposed of in any way without the consent of the mother of the house, Charas and Chatchis and prominent female members of the mother's Ma'chong, or family group. From Major A. Playfair's book called "The Garos' we find the following in the Inheritance Chapter The system which divides the Garo tribe into certain clans and "motherhoods" the members of which trace back their descent to a common ancestress, and which has laid down that descent in the clan shall be through the mother and not through the father, also provides that inheritance shall follow the same course, and shall be restricted to the female line. No man may possess property, unless he has acquired it by his own exertions. No man can inherit property under any circumstances whatever. 43. The other case i.e. Smti. Dore Sangma (supra), rather helps the case of the petitioner. No man may possess property, unless he has acquired it by his own exertions. No man can inherit property under any circumstances whatever. 43. The other case i.e. Smti. Dore Sangma (supra), rather helps the case of the petitioner. In the said case, while holding that Civil Court's jurisdiction to entertain a suit or proceeding relating to succession of Nokmaship or any other matter relating to Akhing is barred, dealing with the plea of finality to the matter having regard to an order passed way back in 1937, it was observed thus: 22. The contention of the learned Advocate General, Meghalaya is that the matter relating to Nokmaship of the Akhing in question having been decided in favour of the petitioners as early as on 04.01.37 by the then Deputy Commissioner in case No. 12 MC/36.37, any fresh decision in the matter is barred by the principle of res judicata. It has been urged that even if the spirit of the Cifil Procedure Code were not to apply to the proceedings under the Act, the principle of res judicata, would have application. To substantiate this contention, we have been referred to Humtse Village v. Yikhum Village (1983) 1 GLR 32 in which it was held that the spirit of section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code was applicable in Nagaland. Same view was taken in Vimdeo v. Zinkruoo (1983) 1 GLR 34. This view, however, could be taken because the spirit of the Code was applicable inasmuch as the matter was adjudicated upon by the Deputy Commissioner. In the present case, however, even the spirit of the Code is not applicable as noted above. Shri Lahiri has urged that that would not make any difference in view of what was stated in Styadhyan v. Deorajin AIR 1960 SC 941 , wherein it was observed that even if section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code does not apply, the principle of res judicata has been applied by courts for the purpose of achieving finality in litigation. This view was reiterated in Gulabchand Chhotelal v. State of Gujarat AIR 1965 SC 1153 and Darya v. State of U.P. AIR 1961 SC 1457 where it was held that the rule of res judicata is an essential part of the rule of law which is the basis of the administration of justice on which the Constitution lays so much emphasis. It was pointed out that it is in the interest of public at large that finality should attach to the binding decisions pronounced by courts and it is also in the public interest that individuals should not be vexed twice over the same litigation. In Lalchand v. Radha Kishan AIR 1977 SC 789 it was observed in para 19 that Section 11 of the Code is not exhaustive and the principle of which motivates that section can be extended to cases which do not fell strictly within the letter of the law. It was pointed out that the principle of res judicata is conceived in the larger public interest which requires that all litigation must, sooner than later, come to an end. The principle was said to be founded on equity, justice and good conscience, which require that a party which has once succeeded on an issue should not be permitted to be harassed by multiplicity of proceedings involving determination of the same issue. 23. Because of what has been stated above, we are of the firm view that principle of res judicata which is founded on equity, justice and good conscience has to apply to proceedings before the Revenue Member also. Deputy Commissioner Mr. W. Shaw, having held as early as 04.01.37 (that is, more than five decades before) that the petitioner Dora Sangma was Nokma being Khangse's own daughter, it is too late in the day to disturb that finding. May we state that the dispute in the present case is between the petitioners who are claiming through Khangse and the opposite parties claiming through Dingma who was the first wife of Goban Marak whereas Khangse is the second wife of Goban. It may be that the appellate order of the Chief Executive Member is founded on good reasons but then that is not enough by itself to undo the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner Mr. Shaw on the self-same matter on 04.01.37. Principle of res judicata would not allow us to reopen the controversy relating to nokmaship after the death of Goban Marak. 44. For all the aforesaid reasons, the writ petition merits acceptance. Accordingly, it is allowed by setting aside the Annexures- F, G and H orders dated 18.02.85, 09.02.99 and 30.08.04 passed by the Executive Member, In-charge Revenue, Garo Hills District Council and the Chief Executive Member, Garo Hills Autonomous Council, Tura respectively. 44. For all the aforesaid reasons, the writ petition merits acceptance. Accordingly, it is allowed by setting aside the Annexures- F, G and H orders dated 18.02.85, 09.02.99 and 30.08.04 passed by the Executive Member, In-charge Revenue, Garo Hills District Council and the Chief Executive Member, Garo Hills Autonomous Council, Tura respectively. It is hereby declared that the petitioner would be the Nokma of Sasatgiri Akhing and her nominated daughter will inherit the Nokmaship to the exclusion of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2. There cannot be any interference to the Nokmaship by the respondent Nos. 1 and 2. 45. The writ petition is allowed without, however, any order as to costs. Petition allowed.