ORAL JUDGMENT: (S.A. BOBDE, J.) RULE. Rule returnable forthwith. Heard by consent. 2. The petitioners have challenged the order dated 09.06.2009 by which the Deputy Director of Education, Amravati Division, Amravati has directed the petitioner management, inter alia, to pay salary for the years 199798 and 200001 to the respondent no. teacher. The Deputy Director of Education has also held that the respondent no.3's approval has rightly been rejected. 3. The petitioners appointed the respondent no.3 as a teacher and the appointment was made subject to the approval of the Education Department in accordance with law. It appears that the salary was not paid to the respondent no.3 for the years 199798 and 200001. It appears that since the Department did not approve the services of the respondent no.3, the salary was not paid for the year 199798 and 200001. There is no dispute that the respondent no.3 has not been in service from 200102. 4. The respondent no.3, thereafter, filed a Writ Petition No.5794/2006 and this Court by an order dated 27.04.2009 directed the respondent therein to consider the question of approval after hearing the parties. This Court did not grant the prayer made in the writ petition for payment of salary. 5. Thereafter, the matter was decided by the Deputy Director of Education, who has, by the impugned order, held that the respondent no.3's approval was rightly rejected but, has directed the management to pay salary to the respondent no.3 for the years 199798 and 200001. 6. Mr. Kilor, the learned counsel for the petitioners, submitted that the order of the Deputy Director of Education, to the extent that it directs payment of salary, is without jurisdiction and in any case void for want of notice to the petitioners calling upon them to show cause why salary should not be directed to be paid. The salary for the year 199798 and 200001 could not have been directed to be paid by the order passed in pursuance of a claim, made for the first time in the year 2006 in the aforesaid writ petition and eventually granted by an order dated 09.06.2009. 7. Having considered the matter, we are of the view that the Deputy Director of Education did not have the power to recover the salary and direct it to be paid to the respondent no.3. 7. Having considered the matter, we are of the view that the Deputy Director of Education did not have the power to recover the salary and direct it to be paid to the respondent no.3. The law does not confer any such power on the Deputy Director of Education. Moreover, the claim for unpaid salary for the years 199798 and 200001 was barred by the delay and laches. It is settled law that a money claim, which is barred by limitation, cannot be directed to be paid over to the claimant on the principle that limitation bars the remedy and not the right. In this case, the respondent no.3 raised the demand for salary by way of writ petition for the first time in the year 2006. That claim was not adjudicated upon in the writ petition. Suffice it to say, it was barred even at that stage. Thereafter, the order has been passed by the Education Officer in the year 2009. It is, thus, clear that the claim for unpaid salary is barred by law and in any case could not have been granted by the Education Officer. In the case of Municipal Council, Ahmednagar & another Versus Shah Hyder Beig & others, reported in 2001 (I) SCALE 124, the Supreme Court observed in paragraph 13 as follows: “It is now well settled principle of law and we need not dilate on this score to the effect that while no period of limitation is fixed but in the normal course of events, the period, the party is required for filing a civil proceeding ought to be the guiding factor. While it is true that this extraordinary jurisdiction is available to mitigate the sufferings of the people in general but it is not out of place to mention that this extraordinary jurisdiction has been conferred on to the law courts under Article 226 of the Constitution on a very sound equitable principle. Hence, the equitable doctrine, namely, 'delay defects equity' has its fullest application in the matter of grant of relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. The discretionary relief can be had provided one has not by his act or conduct given a go-bye to his rights. Hence, the equitable doctrine, namely, 'delay defects equity' has its fullest application in the matter of grant of relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. The discretionary relief can be had provided one has not by his act or conduct given a go-bye to his rights. Equity favors a vigilant rather than an indolent litigant and this being the basic tenet of law, the question of grant of an order as has been passed in the matter as regards restoration of possession upon cancellation of the notification does not and cannot arise.” 8. We, thus, have no hesitation in holding that the respondent no.3's claim for unpaid salary was barred and in any case could not have been granted by the Deputy Director of Education. 9. Mr. Kothale, the learned counsel for the respondent no.3, submitted that the limitation for claiming salary began to run from the date, a decision was taken on the approval of the respondent no.3's service. 10. It is not possible to accept this argument since even by the impugned order, the respondent no.3's service has not been approved. Even otherwise, the liability to pay the salary is not made dependent upon the approval of the service of a teacher. In this view of the matter, Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer clause (1), which reads as follows. Issue any appropriate writ, order or directions in the nature of mandamus and thereby quash and set aside impugned order dated 09.06.2009 (AnnexureI), passed by the respondent no.2 Deputy Director of Education, Amravati Division, Amravati to the extent the respondent no.2 has directed the petitioners to deposit amount of arrears of salary within 30 days from the date of the order in favour of respondent no.3, in the interest of justice. 11. The writ petition is disposed of accordingly. No order as to costs.