JUDGMENT V.G. Sabhahit, J.—All the above appeals arise out of the judgment passed in W.P. No. 451 of 2000 and connected writ petitions, wherein the learned Single Judge of this Court by order dated 16-7-2003 ( Fr. Muller's Hospital, Rep. by its Director Vs. The Member Secretary and Others, AIR 2004 Kant 342 ) has held that Rule 8(3) of the Bio-Medical Waste (Management and Handling) Rules, 1998 (hereinafter called as 'Rules' for short) is ultra vires the provisions of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 (hereinafter called as 'Act' for short) and cannot be sustained and consequently setting aside the notification issued by the State Government dated 17-7-1999 and collection of fees by the Appellant-prescribed authority for Bio-Medical Waste (Management and Handling) Rules, 1998, which is Karnataka State Pollution Control Board. 2. The Petitioners filed writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for declaration of Rule 8(3) of the Rules as ultra vires the provisions of the Act as the Act does not enable imposition of fee by the Central or State Government to generate the fund for monitoring of agencies who are authorised as agents to levy the fee as provided under Rule 8(3) of the Rules, is ultra vires as the Rules can be framed for implementing the provisions of the Act and unless there is a substantive provision enabling imposition of fee, no fee can be imposed by the delegatory authority under the Rules as the power which the authority itself cannot possess, cannot be delegated. It was also contended that in the absence of any provisions enabling imposition of the fee after monitoring the function of the authorities by the Competent Authority, i.e., Karnataka State Pollution Control Board (hereinafter called 'Board') in this case, levy of such fee by notification issued by the Government dated 17-7-1999 at the rate of Rs. 25/- for application and Rs. 100/- per bed per annum, is declared to be ultra vires and consequential collection of the fee by the Board is without jurisdiction. The writ petitions were resisted by filing statement of objection on behalf of the first Respondent-Board. 25/- for application and Rs. 100/- per bed per annum, is declared to be ultra vires and consequential collection of the fee by the Board is without jurisdiction. The writ petitions were resisted by filing statement of objection on behalf of the first Respondent-Board. However, Respondents 2 and 3, Union of India and Government of Karnataka did not file any objection statement and it is averred in the statement of objections filed by the first Respondent-Board that the imposition of fee is attributable to Section 25 of the Act read with Sections 6, 8 and 25 of the Act. Section 25 of the Act enables framing of the Rules by the Central Government for carrying out the purpose of the Act and under Sub-section (2), Clause (f) of Section 25 of the Act the functions of the environmental laboratories, the procedure for the submission to such laboratories of samples of air, water, soil and other substances for analysis or test; the form of laboratory report; the fees payable for such report and other matters to enable such laboratories to carry out their functions under Sub-section (2) of Section 12; and it was contended that since the Board is required to generate finance for supervising the implementation of the Act, monitoring the provisions of the Act as the persons who are authorised to issue authorisation in Rule 8 of the Rules, prescription of the fee is justified. The learned Single Judge after considering the contention of the Counsel appearing for the parties and the reply arguments, held that there must be specific provision in the Act for imposition of fee and in the absence of any provision enabling imposition of fee, the said power cannot be delegated and under delegated legislation rules cannot be framed imposing fee as Rules are made only for implementation of the provisions of the Act and to provide procedure for the same. In the absence of any provision in the Act enabling imposition of the fee as per the notification issued by the State Government impugned in the writ petitions, imposing of fee as per Rule 8(3) of the Rules in the facts of the case, the provision of the Act is ultra vires. He has relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority Vs. He has relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority Vs. Sharadkumar Jayantikumar Pasawalla and others, AIR 1992 SC 2038 , wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows.- 6. After giving our anxious consideration to the contentions raised by Mr. Goswami, it appears to us that in a fiscal matter it will not be proper to hold that even in the absence of express provision, a delegated authority can impose tax or fee. In our view, such power of imposition of tax and/or fee by delegated authority must be very specific and there is no scope of implied authority for imposition of such tax or fee. It appears to us that the delegated authority must act strictly within the parameters of the authority delegated to it under the Act and it will not be proper to bring the theory of implied intent or the concept of incidental and ancillary power in the matter of exercise of fiscal power. The facts and circumstances in the case of District Council of the Jowai Autonomous Distt., Jowai and Others Vs. Dwet Singh Rymbai etc., AIR 1986 SC 1930 are entirely different. The exercise of powers by the Autonomous Jaintia Hills Districts are controlled by the constitutional provisions and in the special facts of the case, this Court has indicated that the realisation of just fee for a specific purpose by the autonomous district was justified and such power was implied. The said decision cannot be made applicable to the facts of this case or the same should not be held to have laid down any legal proposition that in matter of imposition of tax or fees, the question of necessary intendment may be looked into when there is no express provision for imposition of fee or tax. The other decision in Khargram Panchayat Samiti and Another Vs. State of West Bengal and Others, JT (1987) 2 SC 266 , also deals with the exercise of incidental and consequential power in the field of administrative law and the same does not deal with the power of imposing tax and fee. That in a fiscal matter, it will not be proper to hold that even in the absence of express provision, a delegated authority can impose tax or fee. That in a fiscal matter, it will not be proper to hold that even in the absence of express provision, a delegated authority can impose tax or fee. Such power of imposition of tax or fee by the delegated authority must be very specific and there is no scope of implied authority for imposition of such tax or fee and held that decision in the case of B.S.E. Brokers Forum, Bombay and Ors. etc. Vs. Securities and Exchange Board of India and Others etc., AIR 2001 SC 1010 is not helpful to the Respondents as there was specific provision under Section 11(2)(k) of the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 providing for imposition of regulatory fee and therefore, the Hon'ble Supreme Court upheld imposition of fee and accordingly passed the order impugned in these appeals. Being aggrieved by the order dated 16-7-2003 passed in W.P. No. 451 of 2000 and connected Writ Petitions. W.A. Nos. 7673 to 7678 and 8091 to 8097 of 2003 are filed by Respondent 1-Board and W.A. Nos. 828, 832 and 833 of 2004 are filed by the third Respondent-State of Karnataka. It may be noted here itself that the Union of India was the second Respondent in the writ petitions has not chosen to file any appeal being aggrieved by the order of the learned Single Judge dated 16-7-2003, wherein Rule 8(3) of the Rules framed by the Central Government has been held to be ultra vires of the Act. 3. We have heard the learned Counsel appearing for the Appellants in these appeals and the learned Counsel appearing for writ Petitioners in the respective impugned writ petitions and the learned Government Advocate appearing for the State Government. 4. It may be noted at the outset that the brder passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P. No. 451 of 2000 connected with Writ Petition No. 41005 of 1999 and in the connected writ petitions the above said decision is followed and they are disposed of on the same terms as in W.P. No. 451 of 2000 connected with W.P. No. 41005 of 1999. 5. Sri S.G. Kulkarni, learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant-Board submitted that the finding of the learned Single Judge that Rule 8(3) of the Rules is ultra vires the provisions of the Act, is erroneous and the fee that is prescribed is only Rs. 5. Sri S.G. Kulkarni, learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant-Board submitted that the finding of the learned Single Judge that Rule 8(3) of the Rules is ultra vires the provisions of the Act, is erroneous and the fee that is prescribed is only Rs. 100/- per bed per annum which is only negligible and the power to impose fee is traceable to Sections 25 and 12(2) of the Act, Rule 8 of the Rules and he has relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of B.S.E. Brokers' Forum, wherein imposition of regulatory fee under the Securities and Exchange Board of India (Stockbrokers and Sub-brokers) Regulations, 1992 (hereinafter called as 'SEBI' for short) was upheld. 6. Learned Government Advocate appearing for the Appellant-State in W.A. Nos. 828 and 832 of 2004 submitted that the learned Single Judge was not justified in holding that Rule 8(3) of the Rules is ultra vires the provisions of the Act. He also referred to the provisions of Section 12(2) and Section 25 of the Act and Rule 8 of the Rules and submitted that the source of authority to impose tax as delegatory and notification is issued on the basis of the Rule framed by the Central Government and the fee that is imposed is also not excessive. 7. The learned Government Advocate further submitted that the reasons assigned by the learned Single Judge for holding that Rule 8(3) of the Rules as ultra vires and consequently holding that the notification issued by the State Government and collection of fee, is also bad and is not based upon the material on record and wherefore, is liable to be set aside. 8. The learned Assistant Solicitor General has taken notice for Respondent 2 submitted that the learned Single Judge could not have declared the Rule 8(3) of the Rules as ultra vires as the power to impose fee by the first Respondent-Board as per the notification can be implied from the provisions of Sections 8 and 12 of the Act and the Rule is valid not ultra vires. Though the Union of India has not preferred any appeal, he has fully reiterated the arguments of the learned Government Advocate, Respondent 3 in the writ petition. 9. We have given careful consideration to the contention of the learned Counsel appearing for the parties and scrutinised the material on record. Though the Union of India has not preferred any appeal, he has fully reiterated the arguments of the learned Government Advocate, Respondent 3 in the writ petition. 9. We have given careful consideration to the contention of the learned Counsel appearing for the parties and scrutinised the material on record. In the light of the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decisions cited by the learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant and Respondents, it is necessary to cull out the provisions of Rule 8 of the Rules. The Rule has been framed by the Central Government in exercise of the power conferred upon by Sections 6 and 25 of the Act and Rule 8 reads as follows.-- 8. (3) Every application in Form I for grant of authorisation shall be accompanied by a fee as may be prescribed by the Government of the State or Union Territory. (4) The authorisation to operate a facility shall be issued in Form IV, subject to conditions laid therein and such other condition, as the prescribed authority, may consider it necessary. Section 6 of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 enables the Central Government by notification in the Official Gazette make rules in respect of all or any of the matters referred to in Section 3 of the Act and Section 6 reads as follows.- 6. Rules to regulate environmental pollution.--(1) The Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, make rules in respect of all or any of the matters referred to in Section 3. (2) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such rules may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely.-- (a) the standards of quality of air, water or soil for various areas and purposes; (b) the maximum allowable limits of concentration of various environmental pollutants (including noise) for different areas; (c) the procedures and safeguards for the handling of hazardous substances; (d) the prohibition and restrictions on the handling of hazardous substances in different areas; (e) the prohibition and restrictions on the location of industries and the carrying on of process and operations in different areas; (f) the procedures and safeguards for the prevention of accidents which may cause environmental pollution and for providing for remedial measures for such accidents. Section 8 reads as follows.-- 8. Section 8 reads as follows.-- 8. Persons handling hazardous substances to comply with procedural safeguards.--No person shall handle or cause to be handled any hazardous substance except in accordance with such procedure and after complying with such safeguards as may be prescribed. Section 12 of the Act reads as follows.-- 12. Environmental laboratories.--(1) The Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette.-- (a) establish one or more environmental laboratories; (b) recognise one or more laboratories or institutes as environmental laboratories to carry out the functions entrusted to an environmental laboratory under this Act. (2) The Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, make rules specifying.-- (a) the functions of the environmental laboratory; (b) the procedure for the submission to the said laboratory of samples of air, water, soil or other substance for analysis or tests, the form of the laboratory report thereon and the fees payable for such report; (c) such other matters as may be necessary or expedient to enable that laboratory to carry out its functions. 10. It is well-settled that Rules are framed for giving effect to the provisions of the Act and the Rules impugned herein has been framed to implement the provisions of the Act and in exercise of power under Sections 6, 8 and 25 of the Act. It is well-settled that Rules are delegated legislation and unless there is a provision in the Act enabling imposition of fee in the Act, question of imposition of fee by the delegated authority under the Rules by delegated legislation under the Rules, would not arise. The said principle has been succinctly laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down as follows.-- 6. After giving our anxious consideration to the contentions raised by Mr. Goswami, it appears to us that in a fiscal matter it will not be proper to hold that even in the absence of express provision, a delegated authority can impose tax or fee. In our view, such power of imposition of tax and/or fee by delegated authority must be very specific and there is no scope of implied authority for imposition of such tax or fee. In our view, such power of imposition of tax and/or fee by delegated authority must be very specific and there is no scope of implied authority for imposition of such tax or fee. It appears to us that the delegated authority must act strictly within the parameters of the authority delegated to it under the Act and it will not be proper to bring the theory of implied intent or the concept of incidental and ancillary power in the matter of exercise of fiscal power. The facts and circumstances in the case of District Council of Jowai, AIR 1986 SC 1930 are entirely different. The exercise of powers by the autonomous Jaintia Hills Districts are controlled by the constitutional provisions and in the special facts of the case, this Court has indicated that the realisation of just fee for a specific purpose by the autonomous District was justified and such power was implied. The said decision cannot be made applicable to the facts of this case or the same should not be held to have laid down any legal proposition that in matter of imposition of tax or fees, the question of necessary intendment may be looked into when there is no express provision for imposition of fee or tax. The other decision in Khargram Panchayat Samiti and Another Vs. State of West Bengal and Others, JT (1987) 2 SC 266 also deals with the exercise of incidental and consequential power in the field of administrative law and the same does not deal with the power of imposing tax and fee. 7. The High Court has referred to the decisions of this Court in The Hingir-rampur Coal Co. Ltd. and Others Vs. The State of Orissa and Others, AIR 1961 SC 459 and Mahant Sri Jagannath Ramanuj Das and Another Vs. The State of Orissa and Another, AIR 1954 SC 400 and Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Others Vs. Mohd. Yasin, AIR 1983 SC 617 . It has been consistently held by this Court that whenever there is compulsory exaction of any money, there should be specific provision for the same and there is ho room for intendment. Nothing is to be read and nothing is to be implied and one should look fairly to the language used. We are, therefore, unable to accept the contention of Mr. Goswami. Nothing is to be read and nothing is to be implied and one should look fairly to the language used. We are, therefore, unable to accept the contention of Mr. Goswami. Accordingly, there is no occasion to interfere with the impugned decision of the High Court. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed with no order as to costs. 11. The decision relied upon by the learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant-Board in the case of B.S.E. Brokers' Forum, has upheld the SEBI Regulations, 1992 on the ground that the Act provided for imposition or levy and collection of fee under Section 11(2)(k) and in view of the said provision Hon'ble Supreme Court upheld the imposition of fee and it has been observed in para 19 of the judgment as follows.-- 19. From the enumeration of the above provisions of the Act, Rules and Regulations, it is clear that the Board is empowered to collect two types of fees, namely, the fee under Section 11(2)(k) for carrying out the purposes of Section 11 and a fee for the purpose of registering the applicants under Section 12(2) of the Act. The quantum of fee to be paid is fixed under Schedule III of the Regulations as provided under the Act. Therefore, there is no room to attack the levy on the ground that the same is not authorised by law. 12. When the contention of the Counsel appearing for the parties is considered in the light of the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above referred cases, it is clear that neither Section 6, 8 nor Section 25 enables the imposition of fee for administering the work of the Board and to carry out the monitoring of said functions. Section 12(2) of the Act as referred to above only enables imposition of fee for the report that would be given by the laboratory established by the Environment Control Board and there is no merit in the contention of the learned Counsel appearing for the Board that the said provision should be implied to be applicable to imposition of fee as per Rule 8(3) of the Rules, cannot be accepted in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that delegatory authority cannot levy fee by any implication. In view of the above said reasoning, we are satisfied that the order passed by the learned Single Judge is justified and does not suffer from error or illegality as to call for interference in these appeals. 13. Accordingly, all the appeals are dismissed.